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ABSTRACT
The studies reported in this thesis sought to identify the cognitive processes mediating 
the hypothesised relationship between stressful events and recurrent headache. The prospects 
for linking cognitive processes to headache, through the mechanism of sensory modulation, 
were also explored.
A treatment study (reported in Chapter 6) compared rational-emotive therapy with 
progressive relaxation training and correlated changes in headache activity with alterations in 
rationality. The results did not support the hypothesis that rationality mediates improvements 
in headache. Rational-emotive therapy was no more effective in reducing headache activity 
(headache frequency, duration, intensity and medication consumption) than progressive 
relaxation training. Changes in headache activity occurring in each treatment were not 
correlated significantly with changes in scores on the Rationality Scale developed for the 
purposes of the study. It was suggested that the reduction in headache activity, observed in 
both treatments, may have been mediated by increases in self-efficacy which may have flowed 
from the acquisition of skills for the management of stressful events and headache.
In a second study (reported in Chapter 7) self-efficacy, concerning control over 
behavioural, cognitive and affective responses (self-control-efficacy), was observed to buffer 
the relationship between stressful events and headache frequency. Stressful events were found 
to precede headache attacks more often than periods of headache freedom. Higher levels of 
emotional upset in response to stressful events were found to precede periods of headache 
freedom, whilst lower levels preceded headache episodes. It was suggested that stronger 
emotional reactions to stress may inhibit the processes underlying headache onset.
Stressful events occurring during headache were followed by increases in the intensity 
of the attack. In these instances, avoidance coping was associated with higher headache 
intensity ratings following the event and direct coping with lower post-event ratings. The 
appraisal of stressful events as amenable to change and higher levels of coping behaviour were 
found to reduce the frequency of ensuing headache episodes. There was no differential effect 
of strategy use (avoidance coping, direct coping or affective regulation) on the occurrence of 
headache in the face of stressful events. The results were considered to support the thesis that 
cognitive processes may contribute to the onset of headache attacks.
The final study (reported in Chapter 8) explored the prospects for linking the cognitive 
constructs studied in Chapter 7 to headache, through the mechanism of sensory modulation.
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Headache subjects were found to have lower pain threshold and tolerance levels for electrical 
stimulation of the finger than control subjects. Headache subjects were also observed to have 
lower pain tolerance levels when ice was applied to the temporal region but, no significant 
difference between groups was found for temporal ice pain threshold. When threshold and 
tolerance levels for electrical finger pain were assessed in headache subjects, during and 
between attacks, no significant difference between conditions was observed.
The Pj-N i amplitude of the somatosensory average evoked potential (SSEP) was found 
to be greater, and to increase more rapidly with stimulus intensity, for headache sufferers than 
for control subjects. The amplitude was also found to be larger for headache subjects
than for controls, although there was no significant difference between groups on the rate at 
which this amplitude increased with stimulus intensity. When the P j -Nj and N j -Pj  SSEP 
components were assessed in headache subjects, during and between attacks, no significant 
differences between conditions were observed. No significant differences between pain 
sensitive and pain insensitive headache subjects were observed on Pj-Nj or N j-P2 
amplitudes. For the control subjects, the N j-P2 component increased more rapidly with 
stimulus intensity for pain sensitive than for pain insensitive subjects, but this result was not 
replicated for the headache sufferers.
The results of the study reported in Chapter 8 were interpreted as being consistent with 
the view that headache sufferers may be deficient in their capacity to modulate sensory input. 
It was suggested that this might represent one avenue through which cognitive processes could 
contribute to headache.
It was concluded that cognitive processes may play a significant role in the relationship 
between stressful events and headache and, may be related to headache through the mechanism 
of sensory modulation. Lines of inquiry from which further research might profit are 
discussed.
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION.
1.1. Background. Epidemiology and Demography.
Headache has been a common complaint of the human race for many centuries. The 
problem is mentioned in the writings of the ancient Babylonians, dating from about 3000 B.C. 
(Alvarez, 1945; McHenry, 1969), with the earliest clinical descriptions being recorded by the 
ancient Greek physician, Hippocrates (460-370 B.C.) (Critchley, 1967). Lance (1977) has 
drawn attention to the practice of trepanning (drilling holes in the skull), which, until recently, 
had been employed by the Melanesian Islanders as a method for relieving epilepsy, insanity 
and chronic headache. Evidence of trepanning has been found in skulls dating back to the 
Neolithic and Bronze ages, leading Lance (1977) to venture the suggestion that headache may 
have been troubling the human race for over ten thousand years.
In modem times, headache has become one of the most commonly presented complaints 
in outpatient medical care (De Lozier and Gagnon, 1975; Leviton, 1978). In the twelve months 
from 1973 to 1974, Americans made 12,314,000 visits to medical practitioners on account of 
headache (De Lozier and Gagnon, 1975). A survey conducted in Britain (Dunnell and 
Cartright, 1972) indicated that 38% of adults consulting general practitioners complained of 
headache. No other health problem was mentioned to doctors so frequently.
Surveys of the general population have confirmed the ubiquity of headache (e.g., 
Kaganov, Bakal and Dunn, 1981; Ogden, 1952; Waters and O’Connor, 1975). A study of the 
prevalence of headache in Calgary, Canada (Kaganov et al., 1981) revealed that 90% of 
females and 78% of males reported experiencing a headache in the last year. In a survey of 
4,634 Americans, Ogden (1952) found that 48% of the sample suffered with headache more 
than once per month; 30.8% suffered in excess of two headaches per month and more than 1% 
suffered headache every day. Nikiforow and Hokkanen (1978) surveyed a Finnish population 
and found that 37% (40% of females and 33% of males) suffered at least one mild headache 
per week. Furthermore, 15% of the sample (15% of females and 16% of males) experienced 
severe headaches at least once per week.
Females tend to be afflicted by headache more often than males with about 75% of 
headache sufferers being female (Friedman et al, 1954; Lance, Curran and Anthony, 1965;
2Oleson, 1978). Martin and Nathan (1987) observed the prevalence of headache amongst 
undergraduate psychology students to be 2.6 to 3.6 times greater for Americans than for 
Australians, suggesting that there may be some cultural influence on the prevalence of the 
complaint However, headache has been reported to occur independently of such factors as 
social class, education or intelligence (e.g., Friedman et al., 1954; Markush, Karp, Reyman 
and O'Fallon, 1975; Waters, 1975).
Passchier and Orlebeke (1985) studied the prevalence of headache among 602 
elementary school children and 1579 secondary school children living in Amsterdam. Of the 
elementary school children (aged 7 to 10 years), 16% (12% of males and 20% of females) 
reported suffering with headache several times per month and 8% (6% of males and 11% of 
females) several times per week. For the secondary school children (aged 12 to 17 years), 17% 
(12% of males and 22% of females) experienced headache several times per month and 10% 
(5% of males and 15% of females) several times per week. Thus, headache is a common 
problem for children as well as adults.
1.2. The Classification of Headache.
The first attempt at a formal classification of headache was made by the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Classification of Headache (1962). The Ad Hoc Committee sought to classify 
headache on the assumption that differential features of the attack represent the involvement of 
differential pain mechanisms. In 1962, when the Ad Hoc Committee designed their 
classificatory system, opinion on the pathophysiology of headache was influenced heavily by 
the work of Wolff and his colleagues. These researchers suggested that tension headache was 
occasioned by contraction of the muscles of the neck and cranium (Ostfeld, Reis and Wolff, 
1957) and that migraine arose from vasomotor instability of the cranial arteries (Tunis and 
Wolff, 1954). Thus, the Ad Hoc Committee's (1962) classification reflects the view that 
tension and migraine headache are qualitatively distinct disorders, each with a specific 
pathophysiology.
The Ad Hoc Committee (1962, p. 378) identified 15 varieties of headache:
" 1. Vascular headache of migraine type.
a. Classic migraine.
b. Common migraine.
c. Cluster headache.
d. Hemiplegic and ophthalmoplegic migraine.
e. Lower-half headache.
32. Muscle-contraction (tension) headache.
3. Combined headache: Vascular and muscle-contraction.
4. Headache of nasal vasomotor reaction.
5. Headache of delusional, conversion or hypochondriacal states (psychogenic 
headache).
6. Non-migrainous vascular headaches.
7. Traction headache.
8. Headache due to overt cranial inflammation.
9-13. Headache due to disease of ocular, aural, nasal and sinus, dental or other cranial or 
neck structures.
14. Cranial neuritides.
15. Cranial neuralgias.”
The vast majority of headache sufferers tend to be classified into one of the first three 
categories. For example, in a study of 1152 headache clinic patients, 94% were classified into 
the migraine, tension or combined categories (Lance et al, 1965). This thesis is concerned with 
these headache types.
Vascular headaches of the migraine type were defined as follows:
"Recurrent attacks of headache, widely varied in intensity, frequency and 
duration. The attacks are commonly unilateral in onset, are usually associated 
with anorexia and sometimes with nausea and vomiting, in some are preceded by 
or associated with, conspicuous sensory, motor and mood disturbances, and are 
often familial...cranial arterial disention and dilatation are important in the pain 
phase but cause no permanent changes in the involved vessel (Ad Hoc 
Committee, 1962, p. 378).
The subtypes of this first category were defined as follows:
a) Classic (or classical) migraine, where headache is preceded or accompanied by 
transient sensory disturbances such as visual or motor prodromes.
4b) Common migraine, where the vascular basis to the headache remains in the 
absence of sensory prodromes.
c) Cluster headache, where headache is predominantly unilateral, consistently 
affecting the same side of the head, of brief duration and usually occurring in bouts 
separated by lengthy remissions. It is usually associated with flushing, sweating, 
rhinorrhea and increased lacrimation.
d) Hemiplegic and ophthalmoplegic migraine, where the sensory and motor 
prodromes persist during and for a period following the headache.
e) Lower-half headache, where the painful area is the lower region of the face rather 
than the head.
Bakal (1975) has noted that the distinction between the classical and common migraine 
types is not typically observed in the literature, with researchers often content to subsume both 
subtypes into the single category of migraine. In a revision of the Ad Hoc Committee's (1962) 
classification, the Headache Classification Committee of the International Headache Society 
(1988) classified cluster and lower-half headache in categories separate from migraine. Thus, 
in this thesis, the term migraine does not encompass the cluster and lower-half headache types.
The Ad hoc Committee (1962, p. 379) offered the following definition of tension 
headache:
"...ache or sensation of tightness, pressure or constriction, widely varied in 
intensity, frequency and duration, sometimes long lasting and commonly 
suboccipital. It is associated with sustained contraction of skeletal muscles in the 
absence of permanent structural change, usually as part of the individual’s 
reaction during life stress."
The combined headache category, often referred to as tension-vascular (e.g., Lance and 
Curran, 1964) or mixed (e.g., Feurstein, Bush and Corbisiero, 1982) headache, was formulated 
to encompass those headaches for which the features of both the migraine and tension 
headache types co-exist in the one attack (Ad Hoc Committee, 1962). This classification has 
also been applied to persons who suffer migraine and tension headaches on separate occasions 
(e.g., Olesen, 1978).
As Martin (1985) has noted, the Ad Hoc Committee's classificatory system is weakened 
considerably by the body of evidence suggesting that migraine sufferers cannot be reliably 
distinguished from tension headache sufferers on the basis of cranial or neck muscle tension 
levels (e.g., Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, Saunders and Barron, 1982; Arena, Blanchard,
5Andrasik, Applebaum and Meyers, 1985; Philips and Hunter, 1982). Indeed, resting 
electromyographic (EMG) levels have been observed to be higher for migraineurs than for 
tension headache sufferers (e.g., Bakal and Kaganov, 1977; Pozniak-Patewicz, 1976) and it 
has been reported that increases in extracranial (Drummond and Lance, 1983) or cerebral 
(Oleson, Lauritzen, Tfelt-Hansen, Henriksen and Larsen, 1982) blood flow are not necessary 
for migraine headache. The pathophysiology of migraine and tension headache is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2.
The results of factor analytic studies involving the frequency with which migrainous 
features accompany or precede headache, have also questioned the Ad Hoc Committee's 
(1962) grounds for the distinction between the tension and migraine types (e.g., Drummond 
and Lance, 1984a; Peck and Attfield, 1981; Ziegler, Hassanein and Couch, 1982; Ziegler, 
Hassanein and Hassanein, 1972). These researchers reasoned that if migraine does exist as a 
qualitatively distinct headache condition, the factor structure emerging from an analysis of 
symptoms should reveal a cluster of migrainous features on a single factor representing the 
migraine syndrome. In each instance this expectation was not confirmed, thereby, undermining 
the view of migraine as a separate clinical entity.
Drummond and Lance (1984a) found that, although the features of cluster headache 
loaded on a clearly defined factor, subjects classified as suffering from classical migraine, 
common migraine, tension-vascular or tension headache could not be identified with particular 
clusters of symptoms. That is separate factors, corresponding to each of the four headache 
types, did not emerge from the analysis. Instead, these groups of subjects tended to differ from 
each other in terms of the number, rather than the nature of migrainous features reported, with 
classical migraineurs reporting most features, followed by common migraineurs, tension- 
vascular headache sufferers and tension headache sufferers who reported the fewest 
migrainous features. Drummond and Lance (1984a) concluded that, with the exception of 
cluster headache, clinically defined headache categories represent different points on a 
continuum rather than discrete entities.
Other researchers have found that the frequency with which all types of features occur, 
be these musculoskeletal (e.g., dull aches or sensations of tightness), vascular (e.g., throbbing 
or pulsating pain) focal neurological (e.g., visual disturbances or paraesthesiae) or 
gastrointestinal (e.g., nausea or vomiting), increases with the rated severity of headache, but 
that no particular set of features differentiates tension from migraine headache sufferers (e.g., 
Bakal and Kaganov, 1979; Thompson, Haber, Figueroa and Adams, 1980; Waters, 1974). 
Accordingly, a continuum model of headache has been proposed such that any given headache 
sufferer may be located on a continuum of severity, between the extremities of tension and 
migraine headache, at a point corresponding to his or her usual headache, but may suffer
6headaches at quite disparate points within that headache spectrum (e.g., Bakal and Kaganov, 
1977, 1979; Holroyd and Andrasik, 1982a; Thompson et al, 1982). According to this view, 
common psychobiological processes underlie both tension and migraine headache, with the 
frequency of associated features increasing with headache severity.
Against the continuum model of headache severity, Peck and Attfield (1981) found that 
the frequency of migrainous features was not associated with the rated severity of headache. 
All subjects in this study, however, were migraineurs and the range of severity ratings was 
very narrow. These characteristics of the sample may have obscured any correlation between 
severity ratings and the frequency of migrainous features that might have emerged over a 
broader range of severity ratings.
Hunter and Philips (1981) compared tension headache and migraine sufferers on pain 
descriptors chosen from the McGill Pain Questionnaire (Melzack, 1975). Although diary 
recordings of headache activity indicated no differences in severity between migraineurs and 
tension headache subjects, the former chose significantly more adjectives describing vascular 
features (e.g., sickening, nauseating, blinding, sharp) than did the tension headache cases, who 
preferred the word "tight" as descriptive of their pain. No such difference between groups in 
the quality of pain experience is predicted by the continuum model. However, many of the 
subjects studied by Hunter and Philips (1981) were psychiatric patients. Thus, the generality of 
the findings may be limited. Indeed, in a similar study, involving a non-psychiatric sample, 
Hunter (1983) was unable to replicate these results and interpreted the data as being in line 
with the continuum model.
Although the weight of the evidence favours the continuum model, researchers persist 
with the distinction between migraine and tension headache and this seems unlikely to change 
in the near future.
Martin (1985) has pointed out that a multiaxial system of classification could be applied 
to headache. Within such a system, headache could be classified along a number of dimensions 
including, for example, a classification in terms of antecedents such as stress, certain foods, 
visual or auditory stimulation. Such a classification may prove useful to those planning 
interventions for headache sufferers.
The Headache Classification Committee of the International Headache Society (1988) 
recently revised the Ad Hoc Committee's (1962) system and listed operational criteria for the 
classification of headache into particular categories. This may reduce the level of 
heterogeneity within subject groups classified as "tension" or "migraine" sufferers. However, 
the evidence suggests that, although this distinction may provide a convenient method for
7describing subjects' headaches, it does not imply the existence of two separate disorders 
distinguishable on the basis of clinical features (e.g., Bakal and Kaganov, 1979; Drummond 
and Lance, 1984a; Waters, 1974).
1.3. Genetic Factors.
Evidence relating to the genetic transmission of a predisposition to headache comes 
from studies of the family history of the disorder (e.g., Dalsgaard-Nielsen, 1965; Green, 1977; 
Lance and Anthony, 1966) and from investigations into the concordance rates for monozygotic 
and dizygotic twin pairs (Harvald and Hauge, 1956; Ziegler, Hassanein, Harris and Stewart, 
1975).
In an extensive inquiry into the family backgrounds of 100 female migraineurs, 
Dalsgaard-Nielsen (1965) found 90% to report a positive family history. In 57% of these cases 
the afflicted relative was the mother. Studies involving parents, grandparents and siblings (e.g., 
Green, 1977; Selby and Lance, 1960) report a family history of migraine in about 50% to 60% 
of migrainous cases. A family history of migraine is found in about 16% of headache-free 
controls (Green, 1977). Once again, amongst migraineurs, the mother has been found to be the 
most commonly afflicted family member, accounting for 53% of positive case histories in 
Green's (1977) study. Lance and Anthony (1966) included the parents and siblings of tension 
headache and migraine sufferers. These researchers found a positive family history of migraine 
in 46% of the migraineurs, as compared with only 18% of the tension headache subjects.
Although the above studies employed interview methods to establish positive and 
negative family histories, Waters (1971) used a survey method. He observed the prevalence of 
migraine amongst the immediate relatives of migraineurs to be no greater than for those of 
headache-free control subjects. Survey methods may be less probing than interview methods 
and perhaps less likely to uncover positive family histories.
The evidence is generally supportive of the notion that familial factors of some kind 
may be involved in the aetiology of migraine. Far less data have been collected on the family 
history of tension headache. Although Friedman et al (1954) observed 40% of tension 
headache sufferers to report a family history of some kind of headache, this figure is difficult 
to evaluate in the absence of an estimate of the proportion of headache-free persons reporting a 
similar family history. Currently, the data is such that no conclusion can be drawn regarding 
the role of familial influences in tension headache.
8Very few studies of concordance rates for headache in pairs of twins have been 
conducted, making it difficult to draw any firm conclusion regarding the question of genetic 
transmission. Harvald and Hauge (1956) identified 84 migraine sufferers from a sample of 
1900 pairs of twins. Twenty four migraineurs were members of monozygotic twin pairs. For 
this group the concordance rate for migraine was 33%. Fifty seven migraine subjects belonged 
to dizygotic twin pairs, for whom the concordance rate was 5%. Such a result is consistent 
with the hypothesis that genetic factors contribute to migraine. However, Ziegler et al (1975) 
studied headache sufferers across the tension-migraine spectrum and observed concordance 
rates of about 20% for both monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs. These concordance rates 
were not significantly greater for subjects reporting migrainous features.
The evidence for a genetic component in migraine draws most heavily upon analyses of 
the family history of the disorder (e.g., Dalsgaard-Nielsen, 1965; Green, 1977). However, 
conclusions drawn from this evidence are tempered by the possibility that environmental 
factors within the family, instead of, or as well as genetic influences, could be contributing to 
the onset and / or severity of the condition. In the case of tension headache, there exists no 
convincing body of evidence to support a role for genetic factors.
1.4. Factors Precipitating Headache.
Clinical interviews with headache sufferers have suggested that psychological stress is 
the most common precipitant of headache attacks (e.g., Friedman, 1979; Friedman et al., 1954; 
Howarth, 1965; Selby and Lance, 1960). It is an examination of the nature and strength of the 
relationship between psychological stress and headache which is a principal focus of this 
thesis. A discussion of the evidence pertaining to this relationship is presented in Chapter 3.
Investigations into other precipitating factors have been confined almost exclusively to 
studies involving migraine sufferers. This may be because tension headache is often present 
every day (Friedman et al., 1954; Lance and Curran, 1964), making it difficult to identify 
specific trigger factors. Among the factors which have been reported to precipitate migraine 
are oral contraceptives (e.g., Carrol, 1971; Kudrow, 1975), menstruation (e.g., Sacks, 1971; 
Selby and Lance, 1960), glare (e.g., Selby and Lance, 1960; Vijayan, Gould and Watson, 
1980) and foods such as alcohol, chocolate, fruit and dairy products (e.g., Selby and Lance, 
1960). However, several studies have found that, when the diets of migrainous subjects are 
manipulated, little effect of these foods on headache is evident (e.g., Medina and Diamond, 
1978; Olesen, 1984).
This thesis is concerned with an examination of the relationship between stress and 
headache. Before considering the nature of this relationship, however, it is important to
9consider the research that has been conducted into the pathophysiology of headache, as this 
will have implications for the mechanisms through which psychological processes might 
contribute to the condition. Accordingly, the next chapter is concerned with the 
pathophysiology of migraine and tension headache.
10
CHAPTER 2
THE PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF MIGRAINE 
AND TENSION HEADACHE.
2.1. Introduction.
The literature on the pathophysiology of headache has been dominated by the view of 
tension headache as the result of sustained contraction of the muscles in the neck and cranium 
(Ad Hoc Committee, 1962; Ostfeld, Reis and Wolff, 1957) and by the view of migraine 
headache as arising from vasomotor instability of the cranial arteries (Tunis and Wolff, 1954; 
Wolff, 1963).
In this chapter, these two theories are critically reviewed and shown to be inadequate 
explanations for the occurrence of headache. The view of headache as being the result of some 
deficiency in central pain inhibitory processes (e.g., Sicuteri, 1982) is also considered, but is 
judged to have difficulty in accounting for the specific location of head pain. It is suggested 
that a complete account of headache is most likely to follow from a consideration of both 
central and peripheral factors (e.g., Lance, 1982). The recognition of the involvement of 
central pain regulatory processes in headache (Sicuteri, 1982) is regarded as an important 
development for researchers concerned with the role of psychological factors in this condition.
Given that the literature on the pathophysiology of headache is organised around the 
distinction between tension and migraine headache, for the sake of consistency and clarity, this 
review will consider research within each headache type separately.
2.2. The Role of Muscle Contraction in Tension Headache.
Investigations into the view that tension headache is produced by over-contraction of the 
neck and / or cranial muscles (Ad Hoc Committee, 1962) have focused on comparisons of 
headache sufferers with headache-free control subjects on muscle tension levels at a variety of 
sites under conditions of rest (e.g., Anderson and Franks, 1981; Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, 
Saunders and Barron, 1982) and laboratory induced stress (e.g., Pritchard and Wood, 1983;
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Thompson and Adams, 1984). These variables have also been examined for headache sufferers 
in headache and headache-free states (e.g., Haynes, Cuevas and Garron, 1982; Martin and 
Mathews, 1978).
Comparisons of electromyographic (EMG) levels between tension headache subjects 
and headache-free controls have not revealed consistent differences between groups. Although 
EMG levels have been reported to be higher for tension headache sufferers in the frontalis 
muscle (e.g., Cohen et al., 1982; Philips, 1977; Van Boxtel and Van der Ven, 1978) many 
other researchers have been unable to replicate these results (e.g., Anderson and Franks, 1981; 
Andrasik et al., 1982; Bakal and Kaganov, 1977; Martin and Mathews, 1978; Pearce, 1977; 
Pritchard and Wood, 1983; Sutton and Belar, 1982; Traue, Gottwald, Henderson and Bakal, 
1985). Bakal and Kaganov (1977) and Traue et al (1985) reported neck EMG levels to be 
higher for tension headache sufferers than controls, but numerous studies have not confirmed 
this observation (e.g., Feuerstein et al., 1982; Martin and Mathews, 1978; Philips, 1977; 
Pozniak-Patewicz, 1976). No differences between tension headache sufferers and controls 
have been observed on the trapezius (Philips, 1977) or temporalis muscle (Philips, 1977; Van 
Boxtel and Van der Ven, 1978).
It has been suggested that the muscles of the shoulders, neck or cranium may be more 
reactive to stress for tension headache sufferers than for controls (Philips, 1977). However, 
studies comparing EMG responses to laboratory induced stress for tension headache and 
control subjects have provided equivocal results. Some researchers have reported increased 
EMG levels under stress for tension headache sufferers relative to controls on the frontalis 
muscle (e.g., Cohen et al., 1982; Philips and Hunter, 1982; Traue et al., 1985; Thompson and 
Adams, 1984), the neck muscles (e.g., Traue et al., 1985), the temporalis muscles (e.g., 
Thompson and Adams, 1984) and occipital muscles (e.g., Pritchard and Wood, 1983). 
However, other studies have found no differences between groups in their muscular reactions 
to stress on the frontalis (e.g., Anderson and Franks, 1981; Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, 
Saunders and Barron, 1982; Bakal and Kaganov, 1977; Feurstein et al., 1982; Gannon, 
Haynes, Safranek and Hamilton, i981; Martin and Mathews, 1978; Sutton and Belar, 1982; 
Vaughn, Pall and Haynes, 1977), neck (e.g., Bakal and Kaganov, 1977; Martin and Mathews, 
1978) or temporalis (e.g., Philips and Hunter, 1982) muscles. Thus, there exists a sizeable 
body of evidence undermining the notion that the muscles of the neck or scalp are more 
reactive to stress in tension headache sufferers than in headache-free controls.
Some researchers have reported tension headache sufferers to have higher resting 
frontalis EMG levels than migraineurs (e.g., Cohen et al., 1982), whilst others have observed 
lower resting EMG levels for tension headache sufferers than for migraineurs (e.g., Anderson 
and Franks, 1981; Bakal and Kaganov, 1977). Many Other studies have reported no
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differences between groups on resting EMG levels at the frontalis (e.g., Andrasik, Blanchard, 
Arena, Saunders and Barron, 1982; Arena et al., 1985; Philips and Hunter, 1982), temporalis 
(e.g., Philips and Hunter, 1982), occipital (e.g., Pritchard and Wood, 1983) or neck (e.g., 
Arena et al., 1985; Bakal and Kaganov, 1977) muscle sites. Similarly, although some studies 
have found tension headache sufferers to have higher frontalis and temporalis EMG levels than 
migraineurs under conditions of laboratory stress (e.g., Cohen et al., 1982; Thompson and 
Adams, 1984), other studies have found no differences during stress between these headache 
types on the frontalis (e.g., Anderson and Franks, 1981; Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, Saunders 
and Barron, 1982; Arena et al., 1985), temporalis (e.g., Philips and Hunter, 1982) or neck (e.g., 
Arena et al., 1985) muscles. These results argue against the notion that elevated neck or scalp 
muscle tension distinguishes tension from migraine headache (Ad Hoc Committee, 1962).
Studies of EMG levels in the same tension headache sufferers in headache and 
headache-free states have found no consistent evidence for increased tension in the frontalis 
muscle during headache (e.g., Arena et al., 1985; Haynes et al., 1983; Philips, 1977; Philips 
and Hunter, 1981; Thompson and Adams, 1984). In direct contradiction to the muscle- 
contraction theory of tension headache, Martin and Mathews (1978) found frontalis tension 
levels to be lower in the headache than in the headache-free state. Haynes et al (1983) reported 
neck EMG levels to be higher during the headache state, but other studies have reported no 
such differences at this site (e.g., Arena et al., 1985; Martin and Mathews, 1978; Philips, 
1977). With respect to other muscle sites, no differences in EMG levels between headache and 
headache-free states for tension headache sufferers have been observed on the temporalis (e.g., 
Philips, 1977; Philips and Hunter, 1982; Thompson and Adams, 1984) or trapezius (e.g., 
Philips, 1977) muscles. Furthermore, it has been reported that frontalis and temporalis muscle 
tension levels, for tension headache sufferers in the headache state, are no greater than for 
headache-free controls or for migraineurs in headache or headache-free states (Thompson and 
Adams, 1984). These findings indicate that neck or cranial muscle tension may not represent 
the primary source of pain in tension headache.
Several researchers have observed no significant relationship between EMG levels and 
locus (e.g., Bakal and Kaganov, 1979) or intensity (e.g., Haynes et al., 1983; Thompson and 
Adams, 1984) of reported headache pain. Moreover, Anderson and Franks (1981) observed a 
significant negative correlation between frontalis EMG levels and ratings of tension headache 
pain.
It has been suggested that it may be the duration for which the musculature is tense, 
rather than the actual magnitude of that tension, that may be critical to the mechanism of 
tension headache (Pearce, 1977; Philips, 1978). Pearce (1977) required tension, migraine and 
headache-free controls to contract the frontalis muscle at a constant level for one to three
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minutes and to rate the intensity of any ensuing pain. In each of these studies no significant 
differences between groups on the threshold for pain and ratings of pain intensity were 
observed. In a replication of this study, Philips (1978) noted that pain ratings remained very 
low in tension headache sufferers despite the fact that, during the experiment, frontalis tension 
levels increased well above the levels observed during headache attacks.
Finally, the muscle contraction theory of tension headache is called further into question 
by the now substantial body of evidence indicating that in the EMG biofeedback treatment of 
tension headache, where the aim is to provide relief by reducing muscle tension levels, there is 
often no association between headache improvement and changes in EMG levels at the 
frontalis (e.g., Abramowitz and Bell, 1985; Blanchard et al., 1982; Epstein and Abel, 1977; 
Holroyd, Andrasik and Westbrook, 1977; Martin and Mathews, 1978; Philips and Hunter, 
1981b), temporalis (e.g., Philips and Hunter, 1981b) or neck (e.g., Martin and Mathews, 1978) 
muscle sites.
It would appear that the bulk of the evidence on the psychophysiology of tension 
headache does not support the view that muscle contraction is essential to the aetiology of the 
disorder. Neither does this evidence indicate that tension headache can be differentiated from 
migraine by the degree of muscle contraction.
2.3. The Vascular Theory of Migraine.
Since the pioneering work of Wolff and his colleagues (e.g., Graham and Wolff, 1938; 
Wolff, 1963; Tunis and Wolff, 1953), it has been widely believed that a two-phase process of 
intracranial vasoconstriction, followed by extracranial vasodilatation, underlies migraine 
headache attacks (e.g., Ad Hoc Committee, 1962; Dalessio, 1980). Pain was considered to be 
associated with distension of the temporal artery on the painful side (Graham and Wolff, 1938; 
Tunis and Wolff, 1952). Thus, dilatation of the extracranial vasculature was claimed to 
constitute the source of pain in migraine. However, it was recognised that vasodilatation itself 
was not sufficient for a complete account of the pain of migraine. For example, distension of 
the superficial temporal artery was observed in migraineurs outside headache attacks (Wolff, 
1963) and the locus of pain during attacks was often unilateral despite dilatation of the 
temporal arteries on both sides of the head (Graham and Wolff, 1938). Wolff (1963) sampled 
the periarterial fluid at the site of migraine attacks and identified an inflammatory polypeptide 
which he named neurokinin. Wolff (1963) proposed that the pain of migraine arises from the 
distension of extracranial blood vessels rendered pain sensitive by inflammatory substances.
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In the present review the evidence pertaining to vasomotor instability in migraine will 
be considered, before moving on to a discussion of the role of local chemical action at the site 
of pain.
Investigations of the vascular theory of migraine have focused on comparisons of blood 
flow in migraineurs during and between headache attacks (e.g., Drummond and Lance, 1983; 
Tunis and Wolff, 1953) and on the vascular reactivity of migraineurs in comparison with 
control groups (e.g., Drummond and Lance, 1981; Feurstein et aL, 1982). These two lines of 
research are reviewed separately in the following sections.
2.3.1. Vascular Processes During and Between Migraine Attacks.
Tunis and Wolff (1953) studied ten migraineurs and observed a relationship between 
temporal pulse amplitude and the intensity of headache. Other researchers, however, have 
reported difficulties in obtaining reliable measures of scalp artery pulse amplitudes and did not 
identify any significant relationship between these measures and headache intensity (e.g., 
Brazil and Friedman, 1956; Heyck, 1969). Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the 
magnitude of the temporal artery pulses, observed during migraine attacks by Tunis and Wolff 
(1953), were no greater than those observed in the same subjects when they were headache- 
free (Blau, 1978).
By monitoring the flow of the radio-active substance Xenon-133 in the extracranial 
vasculature, Sakai and Meyer (1978) demonstrated that extracranial blood flow, throughout the 
entire scalp, was about 50% greater for subjects with a migraine headache than for headache- 
free controls. However, Thompson and Adams (1984) monitored the temporal artery pulse 
amplitude on both sides of the head, and found no differences between migraineurs with 
headache and non-headache controls. Similar results were reported by Arena et al (1985).
Drummond and Lance (1983) studied pulse amplitudes in migraine sufferers 
experiencing attacks of unilateral headache. Recordings, made from the main trunk of the 
temporal artery on the headache side and from the frontal branch of the temporal artery at the 
site of pain, were compared with those made from the corresponding regions on the headache- 
free side. The pulse amplitude in the frontal branch of the temporal artery was significantly 
greater on the headache than on the headache-free side. No significant difference was observed 
for the main trunk of the temporal artery. Using thermography to measure temperature 
asymmetry in the face and scalp, Drummond and Lance (1983) observed asymmetries of 
0.5°C or more (i.e., warmer temperatures on the headache than on the headache-free side) at 
temporal sites for 37 of 57 migraine subjects compared with 22 of 50 headache-free control 
subjects. In the region of the orbit, temperature asymmetry was evident in 25 migraineurs and
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10 of the controls. In each of these instances, the frequency of asymmetries was significantly 
greater for the migraineurs than for the controls. The thermographic readings were validated as 
measures of extracranial blood flow by showing them to be correlated positively and 
significantly with the size of the amplitude pulse measured at the frontal branch of the 
temporal artery (Drummond and Lance, 1983).
Drummond and Lance (1983) identified a subgroup of their migraineurs (N = 22) for 
whom the intensity of headache could be reduced by at least 50% through compression of the 
ipsilateral carotid and / or superficial temporal artery. These subjects were considered to have 
an extracranial vascular basis to their headache. For this subgroup there was once again no 
difference in temporal artery pulse amplitude between the headache and headache-free sides. 
However, in 14 of these subjects, for whom pain was specific to the frontotemporal region, a 
significantly greater pulse amplitude was observed over the frontal branch of the temporal 
artery ipsilateral to headache. Thermographic readings for the extracranial group indicated that 
the affected side was warmer than the headache-free side in 11 out of 18 subjects, this 
proportion being significantly greater than that observed in the remaining subjects.
The results obtained by Drummond and Lance (1983) indicate that there may be an 
increase in extracranial blood flow on the headache side in about two thirds of persons 
experiencing unilateral migraine (as assessed by thermographic changes), but that the temporal 
artery and its branches are involved in only about one third of individuals suffering this kind of 
headache attack. The results suggest that there are likely to be many migraine sufferers for 
whom extracranial vascular blood flow has little to do with their headaches.
Studies of cerebral blood flow using the Xenon-133 method have yielded consistent 
results suggesting that cerebral blood flow is reduced during the prodromal phase of classical 
migraine (e.g., Edmeads, 1977; Olesen, Larsen and Lauritzen, 1981; Olesen, Lauritzen, Tfelt- 
Hansen, Henriksen and Larsen, 1982; Sakai and Meyer, 1978). Although some studies report 
increased cerebral blood flow during the painful phase of the attack (e.g., Edmeads, 1977; 
Sakai and Meyer, 1978), Olesen et al (1981) observed an increase relative to baseline in only 
four of eight subjects studied and in a later investigation (Olesen et al., 1982), a reduction in 
cerebral blood flow was observed during the headache phase.
Studies of cerebral and extracranial blood flow during and between episodes of 
migraine, have failed to provide unequivocal support for the vascular theory first proposed by 
Wolff and his co-workers (Graham and Wolff, 1938; Tunis and Wolff, 1953; Wolff, 1963). It 
would appear that although increases in cerebral (e.g., Sakai and Meyer, 1978) and 
extracranial (e.g., Tunis and Wolff, 1953) blood flow do sometimes accompany the occurrence
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of migraine headache, these increments are not necessary to the pain phase of the attack (e.g., 
Drummond and Lance, 1983; Olesen et al., 1982).
2.3.2. Vascular Reactivity in Migraine Sufferers.
Tunis and Wolff (1953) considered that, even when migraine sufferers are free from 
headache, the pulsation of their superficial temporal arteries would be stronger than that 
observed for persons who are rarely troubled by headache. Wolff (1953) observed the scalp 
arteries of migraineurs to dilate readily during discussion of threatening issues. He considered 
that a hyper-reactivity of the extra-cranial vascular system, particularly in the face of stress, 
represents a predisposition to migraine (Wolff, 1963). However, investigations into the 
vascular functioning of migraine subjects (e.g., Andrasik et al., 1982; Arena et al., 1985; 
Drummond, 1985) have not supported Wolffs (1953, 1963) hypothesis that stress contributes 
to migraine through the mechanism of vasodilatation.
Studies of headache-free migraineurs, under standard baseline conditions, have shown 
consistently that their temporal pulse amplitudes are no different from those observed for 
control subjects or tension headache sufferers (e.g., Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, Saunders and 
Brron, 1982; Bakal and Kaganov, 1977; Drummond, 1985; Drummond and Lance, 1981; 
Feurstein et al., 1982; Thompson and Adams, 1984). Baseline measures of general vascular 
functioning such as blood pressure, digital finger temperature and digital pulse amplitude, have 
also been reported not to differ across these groups (e.g., Anderson and Franks, 1981; 
Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, Saunders and Barron, 1982; Arena et al., 1985; Feurstein et al., 
1982; Morley, 1985), although Drummond has reported greater baseline digital pulse 
amplitudes (Drummond, 1984) and heart rates (Drummond, 1984, 1985) for migraineurs than 
controls.
Under conditions of laboratory stress, such as stressful imagery, pain, mental arithmetic 
or loud noise, no consistent pattern of temporal artery amplitude response has characterised 
migraineurs as distinct from headache-free controls or tension headache subjects, with many 
researchers reporting no differences between groups (e.g., Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, 
Saunders and Barron, 1982; Cohen et al., 1982; Drummond, 1985; Feurstein et al., 1982; 
Thompson and Adams, 1984). Drummond (1982) observed a greater increase in temporal 
pulse amplitude on the habitually affected side for migraineurs than for headache-free controls 
in response to mental arithmetic, but he observed no such differences between groups in 
response to such noxious stimuli as cold pressor pain and radiant heat. Furthermore, in a 
subsequent study (Drummond, 1985), no differences in temporal pulse amplitudes were 
observed between migraine, tension and control groups in response to a reaction time task or
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mental arithmetic. Similarly, inconsistent findings have been reported by Morley (1985), who 
observed migraineurs to demonstrate greater temporal pulse amplitudes, on the habitually 
affected side of the head, than headache-ffee controls during a reaction time task, no difference 
in response during stressful imagery, and a reduction in temporal pulse amplitude relative to 
controls during exposure to noise. This latter finding was also observed by Bakal and Kaganov 
(1977).
With respect to the behaviour of the peripheral vasculature under laboratory stress, 
Morley (1985) reported the digital pulse amplitudes of migraineurs to be greater than those of 
headache-free control subjects under conditions of stressful imagery, but no differences 
between groups were found during a reaction time task or during exposure to noise. In other 
studies of the peripheral vasculature under stress, Feurstein et al (1982) were unable to 
distinguish between migraine, tension headache and headache-free controls on digital pulse 
amplitude, as were Gannon et al (1981) on ear lobe pulse amplitude. The same negative 
findings have been obtained for finger temperature (e.g., Anderson and Franks, 1981; 
Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, Saunders and Barron, 1982). Arena et al (1985) were unable to 
distinguish between tension, migraine and tension-vascular headache sufferers on this measure 
in response to mental arithmetic, stressful imagery or cold pressor pain.
Drummond and Lance (1981) examined the effect of structured exercise on temporal 
artery pulsation in migraineurs, tension headache sufferers and headache-free controls. No 
differences between groups were identified, although migraineurs did demonstrate greater 
amplitudes on the habitually affected side than on the side that was usually headache-free.
Drummond (1984) selected 30 unilateral migraine sufferers for study. In a previous 
investigation using thermography (Drummond and Lance, 1983), 11 of these subjects were 
found to demonstrate warmer temperatures over the affected region during headache and / or 
to rate their headache intensity as being reduced by at least 50% after compression of the 
superficial temporal artery ipsilateral to headache. In the remaining 19 subjects, this pattern of 
response during unilateral headache had not been evident. Drummond (1984) studied these 30 
subjects whilst they were headache-free and recorded temporal artery pulse amplitudes on the 
habitually affected side during periods of exercise and mental arithmetic. The 11 subjects who 
had been identified previously as having an extracranial vascular basis to their headaches, were 
found to demonstrate significantly larger temporal artery pulse amplitudes than the remaining 
migraineurs, in response to both the exercise and mental arithmetic tasks. These results suggest 
that scalp arteries dilate readily during stress and exercise in only a subgroup of migraineurs 
and that, therefore, this phenomenon cannot be regarded as crucial to the pathophysiology of 
migraine.
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It is clear that the majority of the studies conducted on the behaviour of the extracranial 
vasculature of migraineurs during and between headaches, as well as under conditions of 
laboratory stress or exercise, do not support the thesis that the pain of migraine is always 
accompanied by vasodilatation of the scalp arteries (Graham and Wolff, 1938; Tunis and 
Wolff, 1953). Neither do the findings support the claim that the extracranial vasculature of all 
migraineurs can be characterised by a tendency towards vasodilatation (Wolff, 1953, 1963). 
Rather, it would seem that vasodilatation may contribute to pain in only a minority of 
migraineurs (Drummond and Lance, 1983) for whom there may be a heightened tendency for 
scalp arteries, at the usual site of pain, to dilate during periods of exercise or stress 
(Drummond, 1984). For many migraine sufferers, however, these aspects would appear to 
have no place in explanations of their pain.
Attempts have been made to treat migraine through biofeedback procedures aimed at 
assisting subjects to learn a vasoconstrictive response which can then, supposedly, be used to 
help combat the pain that was presumed to arise from vasodilatation of the scalp arteries. 
Feedback is received from the fingers (e.g., Attfield and Peck, 1979; Daly, Donn, Galliher and 
Zimmerman, 1983) or from one of the temporal arteries (e.g., Feurstein and Adams, 1977; 
Friar and Beaty, 1976). The status of these procedures will be considered in a Chapter 4. It is 
sufficient to note at this point that, within each of these treatments, it has been common place 
to observe no significant correlation between learned control over the peripheral or 
extracranial vasclature and improvements in the migraine condition (e.g., Cohen, McArthur 
and Rickies, 1980; Gauthier, Lacroix, Cote, Doyon and Drolet, 1985). Hence, these findings 
are also at odds with the extracranial vascular theory of migraine.
2.4. Humoral and Metabolic Factors in Migraine.
The view that local chemical action at the site of pain may contribute to migraine was 
first raised by Wolffs research group (Chapman, Ramos, Goodell, Silverman and Wolff, 
1960), who identified an inflammatory polypeptide, which they called neurokinin, in the 
periarterial fluid at the site of headache. Since this time there have been many investigations 
into the blood chemistry of migraine.
Blood levels of serotonin have been found to be lowered during migraine attacks 
(Anthony, Hinterberger and Lance, 1967; Curran, Hinterberger and Lance, 1965; Hilton and 
Cummings, 1972). This substance has been found to constrict extracranial arteries both in the 
human (Lance, Anthony and Gonski, 1967) and in the monkey (Spira, Mylecharane and Lance, 
1976). Thus, it has been suggested that the sudden withdrawal of serotonin from the circulation 
could contribute to headache by giving rise to extracranial vasodilatation, and by producing
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inflammation of the vasculature as it is absorbed into the vessel wall (Anthony and Lance, 
1975). Indeed, Sicuteri (1967) has shown that the injection of serotonin into veins on the hand 
potentiates the pain-producing effect of bradykinin. Enzymes which release bradykinin into the 
blood stream have been observed to increase during migraine (Sicuteri, Fanciullacci and 
Anselmi, 1963).
Blood levels of histamine have been shown to be higher in migraineurs, during and 
between headaches, relative to controls (Heatley, Denburg, Bayer and Bienenstock, 1982). The 
injection of histamine into the external carotid artery has been reported to produce pain 
(Sicuteri, 1967). Thus, substances such as serotonin, bradykinin and histamine, in various 
combinations, could increase the sensitivity of the extracranial vasculature and thereby 
contribute to the pain of migraine. It has been suggested that these substances combine with 
vascular dilatation to produce pain at the site of migraine headache (e.g., Anthony and Lance, 
1975; Fanchamps, 1974). However, the fact that migraine often occurs in the absence of 
extracranial vasodilatation (Drummond and Lance, 1983) tends to weaken this position.
Fluctuating blood levels of serotonin have also been implicated in the occurrence of the 
nausea and vomiting which often accompany migraine attacks, as this substance could 
stimulate the vomiting centre in the medulla (Anthony and Lance, 1975).
The extent to which serotonin might contribute to headache through central nervous 
system mechanisms is considered in the next section.
2.5. The Central Theory of Headache.
Sicuteri (1976, 1978, 1982) conjectured that headache is a disorder of central 
nociception. That is, that headache sufferers are rendered pain sensitive by a depletion of pain 
inhibitory substances, such as serotonin, noradrenaline, endorphins and enkephalin in the 
endogenous pain control system (Basbaum and Fields, 1978, 1984), and that this constitutes 
the basis of tension and migraine headache. Sicuteri, Fanciullacci and Michelacci (1978) 
proposed that the depletion of central pain inhibitory substances occurs episodically in 
migraine, thereby, increasing the pain sensitivity of the intra and extracranial vasculature such 
that, normally unperceived vascular pulsations are experienced as painful. In the case of 
tension headache, alterations in muscle tension are assumed to interact with hyperaesthesia to 
produce pain.
In order to account for pain being experienced in the head rather than elsewhere in the 
body, a point which is generally underemphasised in the central theory, Sicuteri (1982)
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suggested that the disruption of pain modulation that occurs during headache, may be specific 
to the rostral section of the endogenous analgesic system which subserves the shoulders, neck 
and head. However, this is hardly an adequate explanation for the pain of migraine which is 
often unilateral and specific to a particular region of the scalp (Lance, 1982). As Lance (1982) 
has pointed out, the fact that headache is often localised suggests that a conceptualisation in 
terms of a failure of sensory' modulation needs to be supplemented by some hypothesis 
regarding peripheral processes, such as local chemical action (Chapman et al., 1960) or 
extracranial vasodilatation (Tunis and Wolff, 1953). It may be that it is because peripheral 
processes interact with varying levels of sensory modulation efficacy that the study of 
muscular and vascular processes per se has not revealed consistent relationships with 
headache.
Unfortunately, Sicuteri and his colleagues (Sicuteri, 1982; Sicuteri, Fanciullacci and 
Michelacci, 1978) are rather vague about the nature of the deficiency of central pain control 
mechanisms thought to characterise headache sufferers. It is not clear whether this deficiency 
is considered to be present at all times or only during episodes of headache. Furthermore, it has 
been suggested by this research group, on one occasion, that the deficiency is specific to the 
shoulders, neck and head (Sicuteri, 1982), and on other occasions, that it is a general condition 
affecting all regions of the body (Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978; Sicuteri, 
Fanciullacci and Michelacci, 1978). Obviously, the theory is in need of some clarification.
The central theory of headache reflects the influence of the gate control theory of pain 
(Melzack and Wall, 1965), and represents the first attempt to integrate the concept of a pain 
gate into an account of headache. The gate control theory is elaborated in Appendix A. It is 
sufficient to note at this point that the essential feature of the theory is the postulation of a pain 
gating mechanism within the central nervous system (CNS) which modulates afferent impulses 
before they reach the cortical structures subserving the experience of pain. Both the 
endogenous opioid system and brain stem monoamines have been implicated in the regulation 
of this mechanism (e.g., Basbaum and Fields, 1978, 1984; Lance and Bogduk, 1982), which is 
thought to be located within the substantia gelatinosa (Basbaum and Fields, 1978, 1984; 
Bogduk and Lance, 1981; Melzack and Wall, 1982). Investigations into the central theory of 
headache have focused on the role of serotonin, endogenous opiates and pain sensitivity.
2.5.1. Serotonin and Endogenous Opioids.
Sicuteri and his colleagues (Sicuteri, 1976; Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978) 
have argued that the lowered blood levels of serotonin observed to accompany migraine 
headaches (Anthony et al., 1967; Curran et al., 1965; Hilton and Cummings, 1972) might be
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concurrent with a depletion of this monoamine within the CNS, thus causing the pain gate to 
be opened. The assertion that brain levels of serotonin may be chronically low in cases of daily 
tension headache (Sicuteri, 1982), derives some support from the observation that blood levels 
of serotonin are lower in persons suffering daily tension headaches than in headache-free 
controls (Anthony and Lance, 1985; Rolf, Wiele and Bruner, 1981). However, the extent to 
which one can extrapolate from blood levels to brain levels of amines is uncertain (Fozard, 
1982).
In support of their theory, Sicuteri and his co-workers (e.g., Sicuteri, 1976; Sicuteri, 
Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978) often cite their observation that the administration of para- 
chlorophenylalanine (an inhibitor of the enzyme tryptophan hydroxylase, essential to the 
body's manufacture of serotonin) produces pain in the skin and muscles of some migraineurs 
(Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1973). However, since the drug produced pain in only 4 of 
16 migraine subjects and given that, even in these 4, pain was experienced elsewhere in body 
as well as in the head, this evidence can be discounted.
Studies of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) levels of endogenous opioids have been supportive 
of the involvement of pain inhibitory substances in headache. For example, migraineurs 
between headache attacks have been shown to have lower CSF levels of beta-endorphin 
(Genazzani et al., 1984; Nappi, Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Bono et al., 1985; Nappi, 
Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Manzoni et al., 1985). CSF beta-endorphin levels between 
attacks have also been found to be negatively correlated with clinicians' ratings of migraine 
headache severity (Nappi, Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Bono et al., 1985; Nappi, 
Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Manzoni et al., 1985). Furthermore, CSF levels of 
enkephalin have been observed to be lower during migraine attacks than between attacks 
(Anselmi, Baldi, Casacci and Salmon, 1980). To date, no studies of CSF morphine-like 
substances have been conducted with tension headache sufferers.
Investigations of blood plasma levels of endogenous opioids in headache sufferers have 
been less consistent. In the case of daily tension headache, some studies report lower plasma 
levels of beta-endorphin (e.g., Baldi et al., 1982; Facchinetti, Nappi, Savoldi and Genazzani, 
1981; Nappi, Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Bono et al., 1985; et al., 1985a) for these 
subjects than for headache-free controls. However, Fettes, Gawel, Kuzniak and Edmeads 
(1983) observed no difference between these groups. Furthermore, subjects with episodic 
common migraine studied between attacks, have been found to have plasma beta-endorphin 
levels no different from those of headache-free controls (e.g., Fettes et al., 1983; Nappi, 
Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Bono et al., 1985; Nappi, Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, 
Manzoni et al., 1985), although Fettes et al (1983) did observe diminished plasma beta- 
endorphin levels in classical migraine sufferers relative to controls. Finally, in subjects
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suffering migraine with interparoxysmal headache, plasma levels of beta-endorphin have been 
found to be lower than in headache-free controls (Nappi, Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, 
Bono et al., 1985; Nappi, Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Manzcni et al., 1985). Thus, it 
would appear that plasma levels of beta-endorphin are most likely to be lowered when 
headache is constant or when subjects are assessed during headache attacks.
2.5.2. Pain Sensitivity.
An alternative to the biochemical line of inquiry into the central theory is offered by 
studies of the pain sensitivity of headache sufferers.(e.g., Gannon et al., 1981; Martin and 
Mathews, 1978) Surprisingly, very few of these investigations have been conducted.
Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco (1978) reported on a study of pain sensitivity in 
headache sufferers and headache-free controls employing an electrical tourniquet device 
relying upon muscular work to induce pain. For headache sufferers, the pain threshold was 
found to be lower and the painful after-effects of the procedure were found to persist for 
longer, than for control subjects. Unfortunately, Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco (1978) 
provided little in the way of methodological detail making their results difficult to interpret. 
For example, it is not stated whether or not the headache sufferers were experiencing headache 
during the assessment of pain sensitivity.
Gannon et al (1981) employed an occlusion cuff inflated to 220 mm Hg to induce pain 
in the arm. Comparing a mixed group of headache sufferers with control subjects, there was a 
trend for the proportion of headache sufferers requesting termination of the cuff to be greater 
than the proportion of controls; the size of the difference fell just short of significance (p = 
0.06).
Fernstem et al (1982) employed the Forgione-Barber Pain Stimulator (Forgione and 
Barber, 1971), a method of applying pressure pain to the fingers, but found no differences 
between tension, tension-vascular, migraine headache and control subjects on pain threshold, 
tolerance or intensity ratings. All headache sufferers were headache-free. Unfortunately, the 
number of subjects within each group was very small, there being only eight subjects in the 
control group.
Drummond (1987) also employed the Forgione-Barber Pain Stimulator. He assessed the 
rate of increase in pressure pain over time and found no differences between migraine, tension 
headache and headache-free controls regardless of the presence or absence of headache. 
However, for a sub-group of the tension headache sufferers with episodic headaches, pain
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increased more rapidly than for the remaining subjects. For both the migraine and tension 
headache sufferers the pain threshold was greater during than between headaches, but did not 
differ from the threshold for control subjects.
Langemark and Olesen (1987) reported that the pericranial muscles of tension headache 
sufferers, during headache, are more sensitive to palpation than those of headache-free 
controls. Unfortunately, these researchers did not assess headache sufferers between attacks. 
The increased sensitivity they observed could have arisen simply from the pain of headache, 
rather than from any deficiency of sensory modulation.
Martin and Mathews (1978) employed thermal stimuli focused on the forehead and 
found no significant difference between the pain thresholds of tension headache sufferers and 
headache-free controls. Many of the headache subjects were experiencing a headache at the 
time of the assessment. Painful stimulation of one part of the body is known to elevate the pain 
threshold elsewhere in the body (e.g., Chen, Treede and Bromm, 1985; Le Bars, Roby and 
Wilier, 1983). Thus, the presence of headache in some subjects could have obscured any 
differences between groups that may have otherwise emerged.
Consuming cold drinks or ice cream can evoke mild headache in some individuals, this 
phenomenon being termed "ice cream" headache (Lance, 1982; Mumford, 1979). Raskin and 
Knittle (1976) found that 93% of 59 migraine subjects admitted to having experienced ice 
cream headache compared with 31% of 49 headache-free subjects. Furthermore, Drummond 
and Lance (1984b) found that the prevalence of ice cream headache increased with the number 
of migrainous features associated with the subject's usual headache and that, in 30 of 90 
headache subjects reporting ice cream headache, the site of pain corresponded to the site of 
their usual headache. Drummond and Lance (1984b) also found the reported location of sharp, 
jabbing "icepick-like" pains corresponded to the usual site of headache in 37 of 92 subjects 
studied. These findings suggest that, for some headache sufferers, a heightened sensitivity to 
pain may exist at the site of headache during periods of headache freedom. Indeed, employing 
the pressure algometer (Keele, 1954), Drummond (1987) observed scalp tenderness between 
headache attacks to be greater at the usual site of headache than at other locations for both 
tension and migraine headache sufferers. Scalp tenderness was also greater for headache 
subjects assessed between attacks than for headache-free controls. Thus, it is possible that 
seme localised hypersensitivity to pain contributes to the location of headache during any 
failure of the central pain control system.
The assumption that there exists some weakness in the pain inhibitory systems of 
headache sufferers, rendering them sensitive to pain, has yet to be thoroughly explored. It 
would appear that headache sufferers between attacks may be more sensitive than controls to
pressure pain in the head (Drummond, 1987). However, there is very little evidence to support 
the hypothesis that headache sufferers are hypersensitive to pain in a variety of regions in the 
body (Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978). More research, carefully matching subjects on 
factors such as age and sex, is required on this point
Sicuteri (1982, p. 72) has suggested that psychological factors may contribute to 
headache through their action on a weakened pain inhibitory system:
"if...(the endogenous antinociceptive system)...is efficient, stable and adaptable 
emotions leave it unimpaired or reinforce it. If the pain suppressor mechanism is 
phenotypically or genotypically fragile, repetitive emotional stress can provoke a 
weakening, a deterioration and ultimately a failure of the analgesizing apparatus 
resulting in hyperalgesia and spontaneous pain."
There is some evidence to support Sicuteri's (1982) view that stress could contribute to 
headache through an effect on pain inhibitory processes. The effect of stress on the opioid and 
aminergic systems is considered in the following sections.
2.5.3. Stress and the Opioid System.
Exposing animals to painful stimulation has been observed to activate endogenous 
opioid activity, stress-induced analgesia being attenuated by the administration of naloxone (an 
opiate antagonist) (e.g., Kelly, 1986). Providing animals with the capability to switch off 
electric shocks has been observed to attenuate opioid activation (e.g., Maier, 1986). Thus, it 
may be the stress arising from an absence of control that activates the opioids rather than mere 
exposure to pain (Maier, 1986).
Akil, Madden, Patrick and Barchas (1976) exposed rats to inescapable foot-shock for 
periods of up to an hour in length and then tested their sensitivity to heat (tail flick test). They 
found these "stressed" rats to be less reactive to the heat test relative to baseline and controls. 
These analgesic effects were accompanied by increased brain levels of morphine-like 
substances and could be diminished by naloxone. However, Akil et al (1976) also noted that 
when rats were repeatedly exposed to shock (every day for 12 days), there was an habituation 
of both responses, with the reaction latencies and brain opiate levels returning to their baseline 
levels.
Thus, while acute stress may precipitate an initial increase in morphine-like substances 
within the brain and concomitant analgesia, these effects tend to be absent under conditions of 
chronic stress. Hence, Rossier, Bloom and Guilleman (1980) have reported a series of studies
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demonstrating lowered levels of beta-endorphin and leu-enkephalin in the hypothalamus of the 
rat brain, following prolonged foot-shock.
Although it is very difficult to generalize the results of these studies to situations of 
human stress, they raise the possibility that exposure to repeated stress could contribute to 
headache by reducing the level of brain opiates.
2.5.4. Stress and the Aminergic System.
It has been demonstrated that when rats are exposed to repeated ether stress, 
noradrenaline and serotonin levels are reduced in most brain regions (Telegdy, Fekete and 
Varszegi, 1980). Telegdy and Vermes (1976) have shown that exposing rats to electric shock 
reduces the level of serotonin in the limbic system and decreases the rate of synthesis of the 
amine. Although the above results are to an extent dependent on the intensity and type of 
stressor employed (Telegdy and Vermes, 1976) other researchers have observed similar effects 
for immobilization stress (Palkovits, Brownsteint, Kiszer, Saavedra and Kopin, 1976) and 
activity-wheel stress (Hellhammer, Rea, Bell and Belkien, 1984).
The release of catecholamines into the blood stream which typically occurs in humans 
experiencing laboratory stress (Cox, Cox and Thirlaway, 1983; Forsman and Lindblad, 1983), 
has been shown to increase platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity (Owen, Acker, 
Bourne, Firth and Riley, 1977). Hence, increased monoamine oxidase activity secondary to 
stress, may provide an additional route by which brain levels of serotonin could be reduced 
(Mathew and Ho, 1981).
Finally, catecholamine release has been shown to lead to the accumulation of free fatty 
acids (Carlson, Levi and Oro, 1968), which in turn release serotonin from platelets and 
occasion its rapid removal from the blood stream (Anthony, 1978). If such a process of 
serotonin depletion were to occur in the brain stem, this would constitute yet another avenue 
through which stress could conceivably contribute to headache through an action on brain 
levels of serotonin.
2.6. General Comments.
The central theory of headache suggests that stress contributes to headache by acting 
upon a fragile pain inhibitory system. Although there seems to be some support for this 
position, the main problem confronting the theory is one of explaining why pain is specific to
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the cranium and, moreover, why headache is often confined to a particular region of the scalp. 
It would seem that in the last analysis, one has to postulate an interaction between central and 
peripheral factors in order to account for the clinical features of tension and migraine headache 
(e.g., Lance, 1982). The central theory of headache, however, has the potential to facilitate 
research on psychological aspects of headache, insofar as psychologists need not be required to 
articulate theories of the relationship between psychological factors and headache to peripheral 
physiological processes. For instance, as discussed previously, seeking relationships between 
stress, muscle contraction or the process of vasoconstriction-vasodilation has not proved to be 
a particularly successful line of inquiry into the relationship between stress and headache. 
Research might profit from the assumption that psychological factors may contribute to 
headache through central pain inhibitory processes.
This thesis is concerned with a description of the role of cognitive processes in the 
relationship between stress and headache, and with the prospects for linking these processes to 
the central mechanisms involved in sensory modulation. As a first step towards these goals, the 
next chapter deals with the literature on the role of psychological variables in headache. The 
concept of a cognitive process is discussed in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 3
PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES AND HEADACHE.
3.1. The Concept of Stress.
Despite the fact that the concept of stress has generated a wealth of research in 
psychology and medicine over recent decades, theoreticians and researchers have had little 
success in defining the term.
Stress has generally been conceptualised in one of three ways: as a state of the organism 
characterised by increases in sympathetic nervous system activity (e.g., Selye, 1956; Wolff, 
1953) which may occur in response to some threat or demand; in terms of the stimulus 
properties of events that may compromise the well-being of the individual (e.g., Holmes and 
Rahe, 1967) or as a transaction between the environment and the individual, mediated by the 
process of cognitive appraisal (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b; Lazarus, De Longis, Folkman 
and Gruen, 1985).
Each of the above definitions of stress may be criticised on the grounds that they are 
vague and question-begging. Selye defined stress as "the body's non-specific response to any 
demand placed on it, whether that demand is pleasant or not." (Selye and Cherry, 1978, p. 60). 
This confines the term stress to a description of a certain constellation of biological processes. 
As Hinkle (1973) has pointed out, such usage renders the term stress superfluous. One might 
just as well describe the biological processes without recourse to the confusing concept of 
stress.
To define stress in terms of the stimulus properties of events is clearly inadequate for it 
does not take into account the meaning or significance attached to the event by the individual 
on whom it impinges. For example, divorce is ranked second on the Social Readjustment 
Rating Scale (Holmes and Rahe, 1967). For the person who is very dependent on their spouse, 
this could indeed be very distressing. However, for the person who cares little for their spouse, 
or who is in love with someone else and wishes to marry them, the life event "divorce" takes
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on a completely different meaning. As those favouring an interactional approach to the 
understanding of stress have argued:
"Without some cognitive mediational concept, we could never account for 
individual differences in the levels of stress response displayed to common 
environmental conditions." (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, pp. 289-290).
The interactionists have defined stress in terms of the balance between the person’s 
appraisal of how much is at stake and their evaluation of their capacity to manage or escape 
from the perceived threat (Cox and Mackay, 1978; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b). This 
definition has the advantage of incorporating both the stimulus characteristics of the event and 
the response of the organism. However, although the definition provides us with some idea of 
the conditions under which stress might be said to arise, it makes no statement about the nature 
of stress itself.
The demand for a complete definition of stress seems unlikely to be met. Popper (1966) 
has argued that demands for a definition inevitably lead to an infinite regress: the teims used to 
define the concept in question must themselves be defined, and so on ad infinitum. Popper 
suggests that one reason why the physical sciences have outstripped the social sciences in 
terms of progress, may be because the latter have been pre-occupied with the precision of 
definitions, whilst the former have been relatively unconcerned with questions such as "what is 
light?" or "what is matter?" Popper insists that a pre-occupation with matters of definition, "is 
itself the main source of vagueness, ambiguity and confusion" (Popper, 1966, p. 19). He urges 
scientists to eschew questions such as "what is matter?" and to address themselves instead to 
questions such as "how does this particular piece of matter behave under certain specific 
conditions?"
Given that the focus of this thesis is on the role of cognitive processes in headache, the 
interactional conceptualisation of stress, involving a transaction between the environment and 
the individual, mediated by cognitive appraisal, will be employed as a working definition. The 
shortcomings of this definition are recognised, but it is employed on the grounds that it may set 
the stage for a broader understanding of the relationship between stress and headache than one 
couched exclusively in terms of either the biological reaction of the organism or the stimulus 
properties of the environment. The cognitive processes involved in theoretical models of stress 
are considered in Chapter 5.
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3.2. Life Events and Headache.
Clinical interviews with headache sufferers have been supportive of the view that 
stressful events are the most common precipitants of headache attacks (Friedman, 1979; 
Friedman, von Storch and Merritt, 1954; Howarth, 1965; Selby and Lance, 1960). However, 
comparisons of headache sufferers and headache-free control subjects on the Social 
Readjustment Rating Scale, administered with respect to the last twelve months (Blanchard, 
Radnitz, Evans and Schwartz, 1986) or with respect to the last six months (Andrasik, 
Blanchard, Arena, Teders et al., 1982) of the subject's life, have failed to reveal significant 
differences in the severity of life events reported. Using a structured interview method, 
Invemizzi, Gala and Sacchetti (1985) found headache sufferers to report more life events 
occurring over the last twelve months than controls.
The above approaches to the assessment of life events are likely to be insensitive to the 
relatively minor, but more frequent, problems of everyday life that might be associated with 
the onset of specific headache episodes. When subjects report that stressful events are the most 
common headache trigger factors (e.g., Henryk-Gutt and Rees, 1973), it is likely that they are 
referring to the recurrent difficulties of day to day living, rather than to much more significant 
events such as the death of a friend or the birth of a baby, which would remain salient over a 
six to twelve month period.
In an effort to tap less significant events, Levor, Cohen, Naliboff, McArthur and Heuser 
(1986) required migraine sufferers to keep diaries of the number of stressful events they 
experienced each day, as well as records of their headaches. More stressful events were 
observed to occur in four day periods leading up to migraine attacks than in corresponding four 
day periods preceding headache-free days.
Holm, Holroyd, Hursey and Penzien (1986) found that although tension headache 
sufferers did not differ from controls in the number of life events reported on an adapted 
version of the Social Readjustment Rating Scale, the headache sufferers reported a greater 
frequency of common, everyday stressful events, as assessed on the Hassles Scale (Kanner, 
Coyne, Schaefer and Lazarus, 1981). Holm et al (1986) found their headache sufferers to 
appraise themselves as having less control over stressful events; to report using higher levels 
of avoidance and self-blame coping strategies and to be less likely to make use of social 
support than headache-free controls. Such strategies have been reported to be relatively 
ineffective ways of coping (e.g., Folkman and Lazarus, 1986; Manne and Sandler, 1984; 
Wethington and Kessler, 1986).
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Employing the Unpleasant Events Schedule (Lewinsohen, Mermelstein, Alexander and 
MacPhillamy, 1985), which, like the Hassles Scale, is designed to assess frequent stressful 
events, Kearney, Wilson and Haralambous (1987) found no differences between headache 
sufferers, pain-free controls and tinnitus patients.
Thus, comparative psychometric studies have yielded inconsistent results on the 
relationship between stressful events and headache. However, even if one took the 
conservative view that the frequency of stressful events is equivalent for headache sufferers 
and controls, this would not rule out the hypothesis that stressful events may trigger headache 
attacks in headache sufferers. However, it would imply that some predispositional factor 
would need to be postulated to interact with stressful events to produce headache.
At the present time, the evidence for the existence of a link between stressful events and 
headache draws most heavily on unstructured retrospective judgements made by headache 
sufferers themselves (e.g., Friedman et al., 1954; Howarth,1965). A greater understanding of 
the functional relationship between such events and headache, awaits the completion of 
additional prospective studies of the kind reported by Levor et al (1986).
3.3. Personality and Headache.
To the extent that personality factors contribute to individuals' appraisals of and 
reactions to stressful situations, it has been suggested that aspects of personality might be 
important variables in the aetiology of headache (e.g., Friedman, 1979; Howarth, 1965; Wolff, 
1937).
Much of the evidence for the existence of a specific constellation of personality traits 
characteristic of tension or migraine headache sufferers is based upon clinical impressions of 
patients presenting at headache or neurology clinics (e.g., Howarth, 1965; Martin, Rome and 
Swenson, 1967; Ostfeld, 1962). Claims that migraine headache sufferers are perfectionistic, 
compulsive, rigid and repressive of hostile feelings (e.g., Alvarez, 1974; Friedman et al., 1954; 
Wolff, 1937), and that tension headache sufferers are anxious, dependent, hostile and 
psychosexually conflicted (e.g., Bihldorff, King and Pames, 1971; Martin, 1966; Martin et al., 
1967) are likely to be contaminated by the preconceptions of the investigator. Moreover, these 
inferences are based upon biased samples as less than 50% of headache sufferers actually seek 
medical advice (Waters and O'Connor, 1970).
Headache sufferers presenting to outpatient clinics have been found to score in the more 
pathological direction than headache-free controls on various scales of the Minnesota
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Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathaway and McKinley, 1951) (e.g., Kudrow and 
Sutkus, 1979; Stembach, Dalessio, Kunzel and Bowman, 1980) and on the Neuroticism Scale 
of the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1964) (e.g., Henryk-Gutt 
and Rees, 1973; Kumar, 1985). However, a number of studies employing non-clinic headache 
sufferers have not identified significant elevations on the MMPI (Henryk-Gutt and Rees, 1973) 
or on the clinical scales of the EPI (Henryk-Gutt and Rees, 1973; Philips, 1976). Employing a 
group of tension, migraine and tension-vascular headache sufferers, half of whom were clinic 
patients and half of whom were not, and comparing these with headache-free control subjects 
on the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980), Arena, 
Blanchard, Andrasik and Applebaum (1986) observed no differences between groups. These 
findings support the view that clinical samples of headache subjects may report more 
personality problems than non-clinic samples, and that the study of biased samples may have 
resulted in an exaggeration of the personality characteristics of headache sufferers (Blanchard 
and Andrasik, 1982; Philips, 1976).
Blanchard, Andrasik and Arena (1984) administered a wide range of personality tests to 
166 headache subjects and 63 headache-ffee controls. The headache sufferers were divided 
into cluster, migraine, tension and tension-vascular groups and compared with the controls. On 
several of the measures, no differences between groups were found. However, on the State and 
Trait Anxiety Inventories (Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene, 1970), Psychosomatic Symptom 
Checklist (Derogatis, Richels and Rock, 1976) and on the Hypomania, Depression, Hysteria, 
Paranoia and Psychasthenia Subscales of the MMPI significant differences between groups 
were observed. Tension headache sufferers scored higher than the tension-vascular group, 
followed by the migraineurs and, finally, the cluster and headache-free controls who obtained 
the lowest scores and did not differ significantly from each other on any measure. This general 
ordering was consistent for all these tests; the significance of the differences between groups 
varying from test to test. A similar trend was apparent on the Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mock and Erbaugh, 1961), except that the migraineurs were more 
depressed than the tension-vascular group.
Blanchard et al (1984) concluded that the level of psychological disturbance seems to be 
a function of the amount of time headache sufferers have to endure pain. A similar conclusion 
was offered by Stembach et al (1980) who also employed the MMPI. Tension headache 
sufferers may be rarely pain-free, whilst migraine and tension-vascular headache sufferers tend 
to have more episodic headaches and bouts of cluster headache generally occur only once or 
twice per year (Lance, 1982). Blanchard et al (1984) speculated that the personality 
characteristics of headache sufferers might be a consequence of the amount of pain they 
experience, rather than predispositional factors playing a causal role in the onset of the 
complaint.
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The most pertinent conclusion to come out of this work however, was the following:
"Despite the statistically reliable differences between group means, we are more 
impressed by the overlap of the scores on the various dimensions across the 
groups than by the group differences. Certainly these data do not support the 
notion of a "headache personality"; instead it is clear that individuals with 
headache are similar to most people without headaches" (Blanchard et al., 1984, 
p. 342).
Three recent studies have reported associations between Type A behaviour and 
headache severity amongst college samples (Hicks and Campbell, 1983; Martin, Nathan and 
Milech, 1987; Woods, Morgan, Day, Jefferson and Harris, 1984). The Type A behaviour 
pattern has been linked to coronary heart disease (Blumenthal, Williams, Kong, Schonberg and 
Thompson, 1978; Haynes, Feinleib and Kannel, 1980) and has been thought to be 
characterised by aggressiveness, time urgency and competitiveness (Friedman and Rosenman, 
1974). Type A individuals have been observed to demonstrate greater increases in blood 
pressure and plasma catecholamine levels under stress than Type B's (see Glass and Contrada, 
1982 and Price, 1983 for reviews). Since alterations in autonomic nervous system functioning 
have been implicated in the pathophysiology of headache (Anthony, 1981; Lance, 1982), it is 
not surprising that researchers have begun to explore the relationship between Type A 
behaviour and headache. Martin et al (1987) noted a stronger relationship between mood and 
headache for Type A than Type B individuals. However, interpretation of this finding is 
complicated by the fact that the Type A measure employed correlated 0.47 with scores on the 
Beck Depression Inventory. Thus, an alternative interpretation in terms of depression cannot 
be ruled out.
As with all correlational and non-experimental group comparison studies, statements 
regarding cause and effect cannot be inferred. Accordingly, it is not yet clear whether Type A 
behaviour is a cause or consequence of headache or merely a correlate of some other variable 
which is also related to headache.
In an attempt to determine whether certain personality characteristics are specific to 
headache sufferers, some research has compared the psychological functioning of these 
subjects with headache-free control subjects and included groups of subjects reporting other 
pain or medical conditions. Kearney et al (1987) found a mixed group of tension, migraine and 
tension-vascular headache sufferers to score in the more pathological direction than tinnitus 
patients and normal controls on the Neuroticism Scale of the EPI, on the Taylor Manifest 
Anxiety Scale (Bendig, 1956) and on the Stress Cognitions Inventory developed by the 
authors. No differences between groups were observed on the Beck Depression Inventory or 
on the Emotional Control Scale (Watson and Greer, 1983). The authors point out that although
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the differences observed on neuroticsm and anxiety were significant, there was a considerable 
overlap between groups on these two measures.
Maxwell (1966) compared migraine sufferers attending physicians with non-headache 
medical patients, and found the migraineurs to score higher on the Neuroticism Scale of the 
EPI. On the other hand Blaszczynski (1984) compared non-clinic classical migraine sufferers, 
non-clinic tension headache sufferers and normal controls with subjects suffering chronic pain 
problems other than headache. The three pain groups scored higher than the normals on the 
Neuroticism Scale, but the tension and migraine headache sufferers failed to differ from each 
other or from the other chronic pain group. Similar results were observed on the Buss-Durkhee 
Hostility-Guilt Inventory (Buss and Durkhee, 1957), whilst no differences between groups 
were observed on the Hysteroid-Obsessoid Questionnaire (Caine and Hope, 1967).
The inconsistency of the findings across studies precludes the conclusion that high 
scores on neuroticism differentiate headache sufferers from other medical patient groups.
Armentrout (1979) observed that although headache and chronic back pain sufferers had 
lower self-esteem scores than pain free medical patients, on the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale 
(Fitts, 1965), no significant difference between the pain groups was found. Ajwani and Ajwani 
(1983) found non-organic headache sufferers to be more depressed and anxious than headache 
sufferers for whom an organic cause had been identified. However, a recent comparison of 
pain-free controls with physician-referred migraineurs, tension headache sufferers and 
sufferers of irritable bowel syndrome (Blanchard et al, 1986), revealed the latter group to be 
most depressed (Beck Depression Inventory) and Anxious (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory), 
followed by the tension headache sufferers, migraineurs and normals. A similar ordering was 
observed on the Pychosomatic Symptom Checklist.
The fact that headache sufferers have not been shown to score consistently in the more 
disturbed range on measures of psychological functioning than other pain or patient groups, 
undermines the premise that there exists some constellation of personality traits that could be 
said to characterise the headache population.
In a rather different approach to the assessment of personality, Grothgar and Scholz 
(1987) evaluated the expression of anger in migraineurs, persons with chronic pain problems 
other than headache and pain-free controls. All groups had to solve difficult anagrams, in a 
competitive situation, whilst being harassed by the experimenter's confederate. The behaviour 
of the subject was video taped and rated on the basis of anger expression. The migraineurs 
were judged to be less expressive of anger than the remaining groups. Subjective reports of 
anger, failed to differentiate the groups. The authors concluded that headache sufferers tend to
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inhibit their expression of anger. However, in the report of the study, it is not stated whether or 
not the confederate and / or the independent raters were blind to the category to which each 
subject belonged or to the experimental hypothesis. Furthermore, the migraineurs had suffered 
with headaches for a mean of 21.4 years, whereas, the other pain sufferers had had pain 
problems for a mean of only 10.4 years. These factors make the obtained findings difficult to 
interpret
A number of authors have suggested that many headache sufferers are depressed, and 
have implicated this dysphoria in the aetiology of headache (e.g., Dalessio, 1968; Diamond, 
1983; Weatherhead, 1980). However, several studies have not revealed significant elevations 
in depression amongst chronic headache sufferers (e.g., Merskey et al, 1985; Philips and 
Jahanshahi, 1985), whilst Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, Teders et al (1982) observed headache 
sufferers to score no higher on the Beck Depression Inventory than headache-free controls. 
Furthermore, although there is evidence to suggest that anti-depressant medications, such as 
amitriptyline, are effective in the treatment of tension headache (Lance and Curran, 1964; 
Sherwin, 1979), this treatment has been demonstrated to relieve headache regardless of the 
presence or absence of depression (Carasso, Yehuda and Streifler, 1979; Lance and Curran, 
1964). Amitriptyline has also been reported to be effective in the treatment of migraine 
(Couch, Dewey, Ziegler and Hassanein, 1976; Gomersall and Stuart, 1978), the resultant 
improvement in headache being independent of the existence of any depression (Couch and 
Hassanein, 1979). Thus, it cannot be concluded that the treatment relieves headache because it 
addresses the depression thought to underlie the complaint.
The relationship between depression and headache has also been explored by requiring 
headache sufferers to record their headaches and mood states each day, and then calculating 
correlations between the two variables (Arena, Blanchard and Andrasik, 1984; Harrigan, Kues, 
Ricks and Smith, 1984; Martin et al, 1987). Harrigan et al (1984) employed 17 migraineurs 
and asked them to rate their headache intensity and mood (on ten scales), three times per day. 
For each individual, correlations between each mood scale and headache intensity were 
calculated. The authors reported that 26 of these correlations reached significance, but this is 
hardly impressive for it must be taken into account that in total, some 170 correlations were 
computed. Arena et al (1984) studied tension headache sufferers, but observed no significant 
correlations between headache intensity and daily ratings of anxiety, anger or depression. 
These findings suggest that there may be little association between daily fluctuations in mood 
and headache intensity. Mood ratings have been found to be more negative (i.e., indicative of 
higher levels of depression, anxiety, hostility, tiredness, confusion and unsureness) on 
headache than on headache-free days (Martin et al, 1987), but no causal relationship can be 
inferred. Even if a causal relationship between the variables were to exist, the direction of 
causality could not be specified from these data (Martin et al., 1987).
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In general, comparisons of the psychological functioning of headache sufferers with 
other pain and pain-free control subjects, have not indicated that the former group differ in any 
specific or reliable manner. Since the design of these studies is such that there can be no 
separation of cause and effect, their informative content is necessarily limited.
3.4. Summary.
There is very little evidence to suggest that the psychological functioning of headache 
sufferers is very different from that of headache-free persons (e.g., Andrasik, Blanchard, 
Arena, Teders et al., 1982; Blanchard and Andrasik, 1984). Nevertheless, it is widely believed 
that stressful events are the major triggers of headache attacks (e.g., Friedman et al., 1954; 
Lance and Selby, 1960). In addition to the case histories upon which this claim was originally 
based, there is now some evidence suggesting that headache sufferers do report a greater 
frequency of minor, day to day stressful events than headache-free controls (Holm et al., 1986) 
and that such stressful events tend to precede periods of headache more often than periods of 
headache freedom (Levor et al., 1986). However, given the ubiquity of these kinds of stressors, 
it would seem necessary to hypothesise that they interact with some predisposition for 
headache in precipitating particular attacks. Cognitive processes, mediating the impact of 
stressful events upon the well-being of the individual (Cox and Mackay, 1978; Lazarus and 
Folkman, 1984a, b), may be involved in this interaction.
What is lacking in the literature on psychological variables and headache is a conceptual 
model, detailing linkages between stressful events, psychological factors and headache. Much 
of the research conducted thus far has been relatively unconcerned with the formulation of 
such a model and has, hence, tended to progress in a rather haphazard manner, to seek 
differences between headache sufferers and control subjects on a wide range of psychological 
measures.
The main objective of this thesis is to conceptualise the relationship between stressful 
events and headache in terms of cognitive mediational processes, and to subject this model to 
empirical scrutiny. Toward this end, it was necessary to examine the literature on the 
psychological treatment of recurrent headache. This review is presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE TREATMENT OF HEADACHE.
The psychological treatments applied most commonly to headache in recent years 
include biofeedback training, relaxation training and cognitive therapy. The effects of these 
treatments on headache and their mechanisms of action are considered in this chapter. The task 
is prefaced by a consideration of the assessment of outcome from such treatments.
4.1. The Assessment of Outcome.
Evaluations of the effects of psychological treatments on headache, have most 
commonly employed a diary approach to assessment. This involves subjects in keeping a log 
of their headache activity during a pre-treatment baseline, over the course of treatment and 
throughout a post-treatment assessment phase. Such diaries require subjects to rate the 
intensity of their headaches several times per day (e.g., Andrasik and Holroyd, 1983; 
Blanchard, Andrasik, Neff, Arena et al, 1982; Budzynski, Stovya, Adler and Mullaney, 1970, 
1973; Epstein and Abel, 1977).
The diary recording methods have varied from hourly recordings, made on a 6 or 10 
point intensity scale (e.g., Andrasik and Holroyd, 1980; Budzynski et al., 1970, 1973; Holroyd 
and Andrasik, 1978, 1982a; Holroyd et al., 1984), to ratings of intensity made only four times 
per day: at breakfast, lunch, dinner and just before sleep (e.g., Attanasio, Andrasik and 
Blanchard, 1987; Blanchard et al., 1986; Epstein and Abel, 1977). Other researchers (e.g., 
Anderson, Lawrence and Olson, 1981; Kohlenberg and Cahn, 1981) have employed a more 
loosely structured approach, simply requiring that subjects note the time of onset and cessation 
of each headache and assign a global rating to its intensity.
The above methods of assessing treatment outcome stand in contrast with the practice of 
asking subjects to assign global ratings of headache improvement at the end of treatment, as 
has been common practice in pharmacological trials (e.g., Sherwin, 1979; Ward, Bloom and 
Fridel, 1979). This method is employed less often in behavioural treatment studies (e.g., 
Abramowitz and Bell, 1985; Sargent, Green and Walters, 1973). Andrasik and Holroyd (1980) 
found global ratings of headache activity to demonstrate a "minimal” relationship to measures 
derived from diary recordings. Furthermore, the results obtained by Blanchard, Andrasik, Neff,
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Jurish and O'Keefe (1981), suggested that global ratings of improvement may overestimate 
treatment effects relative to diary recordings.
The diary recording method has been found to be moderately correlated with global 
ratings of outcome from relaxation training made by a "significant other" living with the 
patient (Blanchard et al, 1981), allowing some validity to be attached to this procedure. 
Unfortunately, these researchers did not correlate the global ratings made by the patient with 
those made by the "significant other". Thus, no comparative evaluation of the validity of the 
global and diary approaches was carried out.
Further examination of the global and diary methods is required before it can be 
claimed, with any confidence, that the latter is superior. However, as Andrasik and Holroyd 
(1980) argue, until evidence is presented to the contrary, it is reasonable to suppose that diary 
recordings are probably more accurate than global ratings, insofar as the former are likely to be 
less susceptible to the distortions of memory.
From the diary recording methods discussed above, researchers have derived a number 
of measures of headache activity. The most popular measure has been the headache index, 
defined as the sum of the intensity ratings multiplied by the total number of headache hours 
(e.g., Anderson et al., 1981; Blanchard et al, 1983; Blanchard et al., 1986; Holroyd, Andrasik 
and Westbrook, 1977; Lake, Rainey and Papsdorf, 1979). When headaches are monitored 
hourly, it is possible to derive separate measures of intensity, duration, frequency and 
medication consumption. Some researchers have employed these four measures, as well as the 
headache index, in their assessment of outcome (e.g., Andrasik and Holroyd, 1980; Brown, 
1984; Holroyd et al, 1984). However, the use of a combined index has probably done more to 
obscure than to clarify specific treatment effects for, as Philips (1977) has pointed out, any 
given treatment may have differential effects on the intensity, frequency and duration of 
headache. When two or more of these variables are combined into a composite index, any 
differential effects are lost. There is, therefore, little to justify researchers’ reliance upon the 
headache index as a measure of headache activity. A greater appreciation of treatment effects 
seems more likely to be gained from the examination of separate dimensions of headache.
Consideration of the various methods of diary headache recording leads one to wonder 
whether accurate measures of headache duration can be obtained when subjects rate their 
headache intensity on only four occasions each day (e.g., Andrasik and Blanchard, 1987; 
Attanasio et al., 1987), for the period between each recording time could often be in excess of 
6 hours. This represents a considerable loss of precision in comparison with headache ratings 
made hourly (Budzynski et al., 1970, 1973; Holroyd et al., 1984) or once every two hours 
(e.g., Haynes, Griffin, Mooney and Parise, 1975).
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It would seem that, in the assessment of treatment outcome, hourly recordings of 
headache intensity are preferable to both global improvement ratings and to ratings of intensity 
made only four times per day. There is little to commend the use of a composite index as a 
measure of headache severity.
The various approaches to the treatment of headache, commonly employed by 
psychologists, are considered in the following sections.
4.2. Relaxation Training.
A variety of relaxation training methods have been applied to headache, including 
progressive relaxation (Jacobson, 1938) and its variants (e.g., Bernstein and Borkovec, 1979; 
Goldfried and Trier, 1974; Wolpe and Lazarus, 1966), autogenic training (Schultz and Luthe, 
1969) and, less commonly, meditation (Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth and Burney, 1985). Of these, the 
various forms of progressive relaxation training have been employed most widely.
For the present purposes, the term progressive relaxation training will be employed to 
refer to any relaxation training method, where the focus is predominantly upon the control of 
muscle tension. In their meta-analytic review involving nine studies of relaxation training for 
tension headache (usually progressive relaxation), Blanchard, Andrasik, Ahles, Teders and 
O'Keefe (1980) concluded that relaxation training was more effective than medical or 
psychological placebos and just as effective as frontal EMG biofeedback alone in reducing 
headache activity. Furthermore, relaxation training alone was found to be just as effective as a 
combined treatment involving both relaxation training and frontal EMG biofeedback. 
However, as recognized by Blanchard et al (1980), such an analysis obscures the 
methodological differences between studies and fails to take account of the perceived 
plausibility of the placebo-control conditions employed.
Cox, Freundlich and Meyer (1975) found progressive relaxation training to be more 
effective than medication placebos in reducing medication consumption amongst tension 
headache sufferers at post-treatment and four month follow-up assessments. Although the 
effects of progressive relaxation training and placebo, on the headache index, were not 
significantly different immediately after treatment, the relaxation treatment was found to be 
superior at follow-up. No differences in outcome were observed when relaxation training was 
compared with frontal EMG biofeedback treatment incorporating suggestions for relaxation. 
Other researchers have also reported equivalent outcomes for progressive relaxation training 
and relaxation plus frontal EMG biofeedback (e.g., Haynes et al, 1975; Martin and Mathews, 
1978) and Chesney and Shelton (1976) found progressive relaxation training to be more
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effective than EMG biofeedback alone in reducing headache duration. The relaxation and 
biofeedback treatments were equivalent to each other, but superior to the no treatment control 
group, in terms of the extent to which they reduced the frequency of tension headache.
Single subject studies (e.g., Eufemia and Wesolowski, 1983) and uncontrolled treatment 
trials (Philips and Hunter, 1981a; Tasto and Hinkle, 1973; Warner and Lance, 1975) have also 
provided results favourable to relaxation training. Teders et al (1984) observed a minimal 
contact home-based relaxation treatment to be as effective as therapist delivered instructions in 
reducing diary measures of headache frequency, duration and intensity.
Progressive relaxation training has also been employed in the treatment of migraine. 
Attfield and Peck (1979) observed a significant improvement in headache activity for 
migraineurs in this treatment, which was superior to the insignificant effects of finger 
temperature biofeedback. Blanchard, Theobald, Williamson, Silver and Brown (1978) found 
migraine sufferers assigned to progressive relaxation training to show greater improvements 
than those assigned to a waiting list control group.
Janssen and Neutgens (1986) compared progressive relaxation training with autogenic 
training for tension, tension-vascular and migraine headache. On the headache index, 
progressive relaxation was found to be more effective than autogenic training for tension 
headache at the post-treatment and three month follow-up assessments. There was no 
difference between treatments for the migraineurs. For the tension-vascular headache cases, 
autogenic training was superior to progressive relaxation training at post-treatment, but this 
difference was not evident at the follow-up evaluation. The superior effect of progressive 
relaxation training over autogenic training for tension headache suggests that, at least for this 
sub-group of headache sufferers, progressive relaxation may have therapeutic effects beyond 
those attributable to non-specific factors.
Given the studies suggesting that progressive relaxation training may be more effective 
than a medical or psychological placebo (Cox et al, 1975; Richter et al, 1986) and more 
effective than finger temperature or EMG biofeedback (Attfield and Peck, 1979; Chesney and 
Shelton, 1976) in the treatment of tension and migraine headache, progressive relaxation 
training would appear to generate more than a placebo effect in the treatment of recurrent 
headache. The evidence, however, is insufficient to warrant a similar conclusion for autogenic 
training or meditation.
Most often, autogenic training has been applied to migraine in conjunction with finger 
temperature biofeedback. Very few studies have evaluated the effectiveness of autogenic 
training itself. Anderson et al (1981) administered autogenic training to two tension headache
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sufferers and observed reductions on a combined headache index. However, Collet, Juenet and 
Cottreaux (1986) compared autogenic training with galvanic skin response biofeedback for 
tension headache and observed a lesser and insignificant effect for the former on diary 
measures of headache frequency. As mentioned previously, Jenssen and Neutgens (1986) 
found little evidence to support the effectiveness of autogenic training over progressive 
relaxation training for tension, tension-vascular or migraine headache sufferers.
Kabat-Zinn et al (1985) taught mindfulness meditation to subjects suffering back pain 
(N = 31), neck or shoulder pain (N = 15), migraine or tension headache (N = 24). All pain 
groups demonstrated improvements on a global rating outcome measure, no significant 
differences between groups being identified. The paucity of studies on the effectiveness of 
meditation with headache sufferers, however, precludes any statement regarding the efficacy 
of this treatment
The processes by which the various forms of relaxation training might lead to headache 
reduction are as yet unspecified. The original rationale for the application of progressive 
relaxation training was based on the Ad Hoc Committee's (1962) view that muscular tension in 
the neck and cranium constituted the source of pain in tension headache (Chesney and Shelton, 
1976; Tasto and Hinkle, 1973). Psychophysiological studies, however, have not supported this 
assumption (e.g., Anderson and Franks, 1981; Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, Saunders and 
Barron, 1982; Martin and Mathews, 1978; Pritchard and Wood, 1983). Indeed, Philips and 
Hunter (1981a) selected tension headache sufferers with low resting tension levels in the 
frontalis and temporalis muscles but, despite this, progressive relaxation training did result in 
significant reductions in headache frequency and duration.
The possibility that some biochemical mechanism involving serotonin turnover may 
mediate treatment effects is suggested by the observation that increases in the serotonin 
metabolite 5-HIAA (5-hydroxyindole-acetic acid) occur after periods of transcendental 
meditation (Bujatti and Riederer, 1976). It is also possible that relaxation training engenders 
some cognitive change in the subject, leading to an enhanced sense of control over the disorder 
(Turner and Chapman, 1982).
4.3. Biofeedback Treatment.
Biofeedback is a procedure designed to enable the individual to gain greater voluntary 
control over his or her physiological functioning. The placement of electrodes at the 
appropriate site and their connection to an amplifying system, allows the signal from the 
physiological process in question to be fed back to the individual as a variable light, tone or
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meter display. The intensity of the feedback signal is directly proportional to the physiological 
activity. Accordingly, through regulation of the signal, the subject may learn control over a 
particular physiological process (e.g., Schwartz, 1973).
Following the traditional view of headache as falling within at least two distinct 
categories (migraine and tension), early researchers (e.g., Budzynski et al. 1970, 1973; Sargent 
et al., 1973) reasoned that by teaching the subject voluntary control over the specific 
mechanisms thought to underlie headache, the condition could be eliminated or at least 
improved. Thus, biofeedback treatment of migraine has focused on the control of blood flow 
through the cranial arteries via finger temperature (e.g., Daly et al., 1983; Lacroix et al, 1983) 
or temporal arterial pulsation (e.g., Feurstein and Adams, 1977; Gauthier, Lacroix, Cote, 
Doyon and Drolet, 1985) feedback. For tension headache, the emphasis has been on the 
control over the neck or cranial musculature, through EMG biofeedback (e.g., Hudzynski, 
1983; Hart and Chichanski, 1981). The biofeedback treatment is often supplemented with 
instructions to practise some variant on Jacobson’s (1938) progressive relaxation procedure 
(e.g., Bernstein and Borkovec, 1979) for tension headache, or Schultz and Luthe’s (1969) 
autogenic training for migraine.
4.3.1. Finger Temperature Biofeedback (FTB).
In FTB (sometimes referred to as digital temperature feedback) the skin temperature is 
taken to reflect the amount of blood flowing through the area. The subject is taught to increase 
the peripheral blood supply by increasing the temperature of his or her finger (e.g., Blanchard 
et al, 1978).
FTB has been considered an effective treatment for the following reasons;
1. Increased peripheral blood flow is associated with relaxation (Schultz and Luthe, 
1969).
2. It has been assumed that learning to re-direct blood flow to peripheral areas would 
necessarily reduce blood volume in extracranial vessels, thereby reducing the 
pressure thought to be responsible for the pain of migraine headache (Sargent et al., 
1973).
Sargent et al (1973) treated 28 migraine sufferers with a combination of FTB and 
autogenic training (Schultz and Luthe, 1969). Independent global ratings of improvement 
ranged from 68% to 80%. Unfortunately, this study was methodologically weak. The
42
definition of improvement was not specified and no control or placebo-control groups were 
included. Furthermore, the research group did not attempt to assess changes in finger 
temperature and correlate these with improvements in headache severity.
Daly et al (1983) assigned migraine and tension headache sufferers to progressive 
relaxation training, FTB or EMG biofeedback. Each treatment was supplemented with 
autogenic relaxation training. Outcome was assessed by means of the headache index, 
headache intensity and hours of headache per month, as derived from diary recordings. All 
groups demonstrated significant improvements on all outcome measures assessed at three 
month follow-up (no immediate post-treatment assessment was conducted). There was no 
effect of headache type on outcome. Progressive relaxation training was observed to have a 
lesser effect on headache hours per month than either of the biofeedback treatments. The 
treatment effects for all groups were equivalent on the remaining outcome measures.
However, as with the study conducted by Sargent et al (1973), it is difficult to attribute 
the superior effects of the biofeedback treatments to the feedback components as these were 
combined with autogenic relaxation training which has, itself, been reported to be effective in 
the treatment of headache (Janssen and Neutgens, 1986; Schultz and Luthe, 1969). The most 
notable feature of the results reported by Daly et al (1983) is the finding that all treatment 
effects were unrelated to headache type. This does not augur well for the view that EMG 
biofeedback and FTB exert their therapeutic effects through specific actions on the 
pathophysiological processes thought to underlie the disorder. It would seem more likely that a 
relaxation response (Benson, 1975) may be the important therapeutic ingredient (Holmes and 
Burish, 1983). Indeed, Attfield and Peck (1979) found progressive relaxation training to be 
more effective in the treatment of migraine than FTB alone. Similar results were reported by 
Blanchard et al (1978), except that the superior effect of progressive relaxation training over 
FTB plus autogenic training was not apparent at the three month follow-up. During the last 
week of treatment, however, the relaxation group showed greater reductions in headache 
duration, intensity and medication consumption than the FTB group.
Barrios and Karoly (1983) observed migraineurs to rate their improvement following 
FTB alone as no greater than that accruing from progressive relaxation training, 
pharmacotherapy, insight psychotherapy or social skills training. These researchers considered 
that some common mechanism such as lowered arousal, self-monitoring or the learning of new 
coping strategies might have been responsible for the treatment gains. Similarly FTB has been 
found to be no more effective for migraine than temporal artery, frontal EMG or 
electroencephalographic (EEG) alpha biofeedback (Cohen, McArthur and Rickies, 1980). 
Gauthier et al (1985) found FTB and temporal artery biofeedback for migraine to be equivalent
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to each other, but superior to a waiting list control condition. Diary measures of medication 
consumption and headache frequency, intensity and duration served as outcome measures..
Studies of FTB alone compared with control and / or placebo- control conditions, have 
called into question the efficacy of this treatment. The effects of FTB on migraine have been 
found to be no greater than those occurring for a headache recording control group (Kewman 
and Roberts, 1980; Mullinex, Norton, Hack and Fishman, 1978). Furthermore, these same 
researchers found that, when subjects were assigned to finger warming or finger cooling 
treatment conditions, this made no difference to the outcome.
Jessup, Neufeld and Merskey (1979) described a study where migraineurs were assigned 
to autogenic training hand warming, FTB hand warming, FTB hand cooling, unassisted hand 
cooling or to a laboratory visit attention / placebo condition. At post-treatment, all five groups 
demonstrated significant but equivalent improvements relative to baseline. These gains were 
maintained by all groups at a six month follow-up. Increases in finger temperature occurred in 
all groups, regardless of the treatment received.
Reading (1984) found frontalis EMG, finger temperature, galvanic skin response or 
false EMG biofeedback conditions to be equally effective in the treatment of migraine. The 
subjects were exposed to cognitive stressors (arithmetic and word recognition tasks) before 
and after treatment. At post-treatment, the effects of stressors on frontalis EMG, skin 
conductance level, finger temperature, heart rate and respiration rate were no different from 
these effects at pre-treatment. This indicated that, on these measures, the subjects' 
physiological reactivity was not modified by any of the treatments. Lake et al (1979) observed 
no effect for FTB alone, or in combination with rational-emotive therapy, over a waiting list 
control condition in the treatment of migraine.
In summary, it would appear that FTB in isolation is no more effective in the treatment 
of migraine than a credible placebo, and certainly no more effective than some form of 
relaxation practice.
Damaging to the rationale underlying FTB is the observation that relief from migraine 
following this treatment, or autogenic training, does not correlate with learned control over 
peripheral blood flow (Gauthier et al, 1985; Mullinex et al 1978; Werbach and Sandweiss, 
1978).
Blanchard et al (1983) treated migraine and tension-vascular headache sufferers with 
FTB and observed a significant correlation (r = 0.3) between the number of sessions in which 
any increase in finger temperature occurred and improvements on the headache index. Despite
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its being significant, the correlation pertains to but one of six measures of finger temperature 
control. The five remaining measures failed to correlate significantly with the headache index. 
Moreover, the significant correlation observed by Blanchard et al (1983), was not replicated by 
Gauthier et al (1985), despite the fact that the latter research group employed a very similar 
measure of finger temperature control.
Lacroix et al (1983) administered an unspecified relaxation treatment, frontal EMG 
biofeedback or FTB to 23 migraine sufferers. In the biofeedback conditions, subjects were 
instructed to practise at home the response they achieved in the laboratory. These researchers 
claimed that FTB was the most effective treatment, and that there existed a relationship 
between finger temperature and the frequency of migraine attacks. However, examination of 
their results reveals that such bold conclusions are not supported by the data. First, the group x 
time interaction on global improvement ratings made at post treatment, eight week and six 
month follow-up fell short of significance (F (4,48) = 2.41; p > 0.05). A similar result was 
obtained for questionnaire responses concerning headache frequency (F (4,47) = 2.26; p > 
0.05). Secondly, although all three groups demonstrated significant increases in finger 
temperature over the course of treatment, this effect was no greater for the FTB group. Thirdly, 
when the data from all groups were pooled and correlations between global improvement 
ratings and various measures of finger temperature control calculated, none of these reached 
significance.
Thus, the results obtained by Lacroix et al (1983) are consistent with those reported by 
Cohen et al (1980). The latter research group observed migraineurs to be no more responsive 
to FTB than to temporal artery, EMG or alpha biofeedback. The EMG biofeedback group 
demonstrated a reduction in finger temperature over treatment (despite this, their headaches 
improved), whilst the FTB group did not differ from the temporal artery or alpha biofeedback 
groups on this measure. The capacity of the subjects in the FTB group to increase finger 
temperature was unrelated to headache improvement. Similarly, in each of the remaining 
treatment conditions, learned control over the targeted physiological process failed to predict 
the extent of therapeutic gains.
It has been found that teaching subjects to increase or decrease finger temperature 
makes no difference to cerebral blood flow (Largen, Mathew, Dobbins, Meyer and Claghom, 
1978) and that increasing finger temperature is associated with increased, rather than 
decreased, temporal artery blood flow (Price and Tursky, 1976). Such findings contradict the 
mechanism assumed to underlie the therapeutic effects of FTB.
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Given the unsympathetic outcome research and the lack of support for the assumptions 
upon which FTB is predicated, it must be concluded that there is very little justification for the 
continued application of the technique.
4,3.2. Temporal Artery Biofeedback (TAB).
As with finger temperature biofeedback, the rationale for TAB (sometimes referred to as 
cephalic biofeedback) rests on the notion that dilatation of the temporal arteries constitutes the 
source of pain in migraine headache (Ad Hoc Committee, 1962; Tunis and Wolf, 1953). 
Subjects receive feedback concerning the vasomotor functioning of the extra cranial arteries 
and attempt to learn a vasoconstrictive response (e.g., Bild and Adams, 1980; Friar and Beaty, 
1976). Vasoconstriction is thought to alleviate the pain by countering the vasodilative phase of 
migraine attacks. Accordingly, the technique has been applied almost exclusively to the 
treatment of migraine. Given that the source of feedback in TAB is closer to the presumed 
source of pain than that of finger temperature training, it is somewhat surprising to find that far 
fewer studies have been published on the efficacy of TAB.
In the first published investigation into the effects of TAB employing a group treatment 
outcome design (Friar and Beaty, 1976), subjects in the experimental condition received 
feedback from the temporal artery on the side of the head on which pain occurred most often, 
whilst those in the control condition received feedback for pulse amplitude in the hand (the 
authors did not specify from which hand feedback was received). A comparison of temporal 
artery pulse amplitudes across conditions revealed no significant difference between groups. 
Furthermore, both groups of subjects failed to demonstrate any significant reduction in 
headache activity relative to baseline. As the authors pointed out, the limited reduction in 
headache activity that did occur was probably explicable in terms of placebo effects.
Feurstein and Adams (1977) administered TAB followed by EMG biofeedback to one 
migraine and one tension headache sufferer, and the reverse order of treatments to a second 
migraine and tension headache sufferer. These researchers reasoned that the migraineurs 
would respond only to TAB and that the tension headache subjects would respond only to the 
EMG biofeedback phase of treatment. One tension and one migraine headache sufferer 
responded as expected, but the second migraineur improved more in frontalis EMG 
biofeedback treatment than in TAB treatment, and the second tension headache sufferer 
responded better to TAB than to frontalis EMG biofeedback. Accordingly, the results do not 
support the premise that these two treatments exert their therapeutic effects by addressing 
separate underlying pathophysiologies.
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Bild and Adams (1980) assigned migraine sufferers to two treatment conditions, one 
where they received TAB from the temporal artery on the habitually affected side of the head, 
or to another where they received EMG biofeedback from the frontalis muscle, or to a waiting 
list control condition. Although a number of measures were derived from subjects' diary 
recordings of headache activity, it was only on the measure of headache frequency that the 
TAB group demonstrated a greater improvement than the remaining groups. At the three 
month follow-up, headache frequency for the TAB group was no different from that observed 
at the post-treatment assessment. However, since there was no follow-up assessment for the 
remaining groups, it was impossible to evaluate the relative efficacy of TAB at this stage of 
the study.
The observations of Bild and Adams (1980) were not replicated by Cohen et al (1980), 
who found TAB, EMG biofeedback, alpha biofeedback or finger temperature training to exert 
equivalent effects on diary measures of headache frequency, intensity and disability ratings. 
Furthermore, although there was some evidence to suggest that subjects in the TAB condition 
were able to demonstrate greater vasoconstriction towards the end of treatment, the extent of 
these physiological responses was unrelated to headache improvement. A similar absence of 
any significant correlation between control over temporal artery blood volume and headache 
improvement following TAB was reported by Gauthier et al (1985). These researchers 
observed TAB to be no more effective for migraine than FTB. When the data from these two 
treatments were combined, greater reductions in headache intensity duration and medication 
consumption were observed relative to a waiting list control group.
It would appear that there is no consistent evidence to support either the efficacy of 
TAB or its rationale. When the technique has been evaluated against frontal EMG biofeedback 
(Cohen et al, 1980) or against feedback from the hand (Friar and Beaty, 1976), each of which 
have been employed by researchers as placebo-control conditions (Bild and Adams, 1980; 
Friar and Beaty, 1976), no clear cut demonstration of the superior efficacy of TAB has been 
forthcoming. It seems unlikely that TAB has anything more than a placebo effect on migraine 
headache. The rationale underlying the technique is questioned by the observation that 
alterations in vasomotor functioning, following treatment, are unrelated to improvements in 
headache (Cohen et al., 1980; Gauthier et al., 1985). Finally, the fact that migraine can occur 
in the absence of detectable changes in extracranial blood flow (e.g., Drummond, 1984) also 
questions the utility of this procedure.
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4.3.3. Electromyographic Biofeedback.
EMG biofeedback treatment is directed towards teaching subjects to reduce the level of 
tension in the cranial musculature (usually the frontalis muscle). It has thus been applied to the 
treatment of tension headache, following the view that this disorder stems from sustained 
contraction of the skeletal muscles in the region of the head and neck (Ad Hoc Committee, 
1962; Dalessio, 1980; Diamond and Dalessio, 1978). The technique has been applied to 
migraine only as a placebo control, not as an active treatment (e.g., Cohen et al., 1980; 
Reading, 1984). As was the case with finger temperature feedback, appraisal of the 
effectiveness of EMG biofeedback is complicated by some researchers' tendency to combine 
this treatment with instructions to engage in regular relaxation practice (usually progressive 
relaxation) (e.g., Bell, Abromowitz, Folkins, Spensley and Hutchinson, 1983; Budzynski et al., 
1970, 1973; Hudzynski, 1983).
In the first trial of EMG biofeedback from the frontalis muscle, five subjects received 
this treatment and were asked to practise at home the same relaxation they learned in the 
laboratory (Budzynski et al., 1970). Improvements in group ratings of headache intensity were 
reported to occur over the course of treatment. In a subsequent study, these researchers 
(Budzynski et al., 1973) assigned tension headache sufferers to EMG biofeedback plus home 
relaxation practise, false feedback or to a waiting list control group. The active treatment group 
demonstrated lower frontalis muscle tension levels in the last two weeks of the eight week 
treatment than subjects receiving false feedback. This finding persisted at the three month 
follow-up. Only subjects in the active treatment demonstrated significant reductions on the 
headache index. After treatment, headache index scores were lowest for the active treatment. 
At follow-up, the genuine feedback group was said to have a lower level of headache activity 
than the false feedback group, but no inferential statistic was given. A notable feature of the 
results is the finding that, over the course of the active treatment, a very high correlation (r = 
0.9) emerged between weekly frontal EMG levels and the size of the weekly headache index 
derived from diary recordings. In the false feedback condition, no significant correlation 
between these variables was observed. However, many subsequent studies have failed to 
confirm the association between reductions in headache activity and diminutions in cranial 
muscle tension levels over the course of EMG biofeedback (e.g., Abramowitz and Bell, 1985; 
Andrasik and Holroyd, 1980; Cram, 1980; Epstein and Able, 1977; Holroyd, et al., 1977; 
Martin and Mathews, 1978; Philips and Hunter, 1981a). Martin and Mathews (1978) also 
observed no significant correlation between reductions in neck muscle tension and headache 
activity over a course of EMG biofeedback. Andrasik and Holroyd (1980) found that 
improvements in tension headache occurred irrespective of whether subjects were trained to 
increase, decrease or hold constant their frontalis muscle tension levels during EMG 
biofeedback treatment. These results persisted at a three month follow-up assessment
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(Andrasik and Holroyd, 1980). Cram (1980) observed that tension headache subjects, taught to 
hold their frontalis muscle tension levels constant, were more improved on the headache index 
at a six month follow-up assessment than those trained to reduce frontalis tension levels. Thus, 
it would appear that reductions in cranial EMG levels may not represent the process by which 
EMG biofeedback occasions any improvement in tension headache.
On the question of the efficacy of EMG biofeedback, in the treatment of tension 
headache, it is important to note that, although some studies report EMG biofeedback alone to 
be more effective than medical placebos (Cox et al., 1975), attention placebos (Cram, 1980) or 
pseudo biofeedback (Budzynski et al., 1973; Kondo and Canter, 1977), Holroyd, Andrasik and 
Noble (1980) observed frontal EMG biofeedback to be no more effective than bogus 
medication. Furthermore, frontal EMG biofeedback has been reported to be no more effective 
than no-treatment control conditions (e.g., Chesney and Shelton, 1976; Holroyd et al., 1977; 
Janssen, 1983). These inconsistent findings cast doubt on the efficacy of EMG biofeedback 
training and raise the question of whether this treatment is any more effective than a much 
simpler technique such as progressive relaxation training.
Cox et al (1975) combined EMG biofeedback with regular home relaxation practice and 
compared this treatment with progressive relaxation training in the treatment of tension 
headache. On the basis of headache index scores, the combined treatment proved to be more 
effective at the post-treatment assessment. By the six month follow-up assessment, however, 
the two treatment groups were equivalent in terms of outcome, and superior to a medication 
placebo control group.
Comparisons of frontalis EMG biofeedback alone with progressive relaxation training 
have also resulted in equivalent outcomes (e.g., Haynes et al., 1975; Martin and Mathews, 
1978), whilst Chesney and Shelton (1976) found progressive relaxation training to be more 
effective than frontal EMG biofeedback alone in reducing the duration of tension headache. 
Equivalent outcomes were observed on other measures of headache activity.
There is one study claiming frontalis EMG biofeedback alone to produce greater 
reductions on the headache index than progressive relaxation training (Hutchings and 
Reinking, 1976). However, it was subsequently reported that at six and twelve month follow­
up assessments, no difference between the treatment groups was evident (Reinking and 
Hutchings, 1976). Furthermore, these researchers employed taped, rather than "live", 
relaxation training which may have attenuated the effects of this treatment (Borkovec and 
Sides, 1979).
49
Additional studies seeking to demonstrate the value of EMG biofeedback have 
investigated the hypothesis that tension headache sufferers, who achieve a minimal response to 
relaxation training, may derive benefit from a course of frontalis EMG biofeedback training, 
(e.g., Balanchard, Andrasik, Neff, Arena et al., 1982; Blanchard, Andrasik, Neff, Teders et al.,
1982) . In these studies, all subjects were started on a course of relaxation training, after which 
those achieving a reduction in headache activity of more than 60% were assigned to follow-up, 
whilst those failing to achieve such a reduction received EMG biofeedback. The relaxation 
training "non-responders" were found to have improved significantly after biofeedback 
training. This was interpreted as evidence for the additive therapeutic effect of biofeedback, at 
least for a subgroup of tension headache sufferers (Blanchard, Andrasik, Neff, Arena et al., 
1982; Blanchard, Andrasik, Neff, Teders et al., 1982). However, since the relaxation non­
responders received biofeedback immediately after their relaxation course, it is possible that 
the additive treatment effect reported was constituted, at least in part, by the continuing 
benefits of the relaxation training. Accordingly, it cannot be concluded that biofeedback 
contributes to outcome when relaxation training is only minimally effective, as these studies 
provided no control for any lagged effects of the latter treatment.
The body of evidence cited above, suggests that frontalis EMG biofeedback may be no 
more effective than relaxation training in the control of tension headache. As has been noted in 
a number of reviews of the literature (e.g., Blanchard and Andrasik, 1982; Holmes and Burish,
1983) , this conclusion would seem to hold regardless of whether or not the subject is classified 
as a migraine or tension headache sufferer. No significant differential outcome for migraine 
and tension headache sufferers has been observed for frontalis EMG biofeedback procedures 
(e.g., Cohen et al., 1980; Daly et al., 1983) or for progressive relaxation training (e.g., 
Blanchard et al., 1978; Blanchard, Andrasik, Neff, Arena et al., 1982; Daly et al., 1983). 
Furthermore, unless EMG biofeedback is supplemented with instructions to practise some sort 
of relaxation technique at home, be it progressive relaxation (e.g., Chesney and Shelton, 1976) 
or some idiosyncratic method acquired in the laboratory (e.g., Cox et al., 1975), it is probably 
no more therapeutic than a placebo.
The mechanisms through which progressive relaxation training and biofeedback 
alleviate headache remain unspecified. Although the regular attainment of a relaxation 
response (Benson, 1975) may be an important ingredient, as suggested by the observation that 
improvement is correlated with frequency of home relaxation practice (Blanchard et al., 1983), 
the evidence clearly does not warrant the conclusion that the various biofeedback procedures 
produce therapeutic gains by specifically altering the pathophysiological mechanisms 
presumed to underlie the tension and migraine headache conditions.
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4.4. Cognitive Therapy.
The development of cognitive therapies, where the focus of the intervention is on the 
thoughts assumed to mediate an individual's emotional response to a given situation, owes 
much to the work of Albert Ellis (1962, 1977a, b). Ellis' rational-emotive therapy seeks to 
identify irrational beliefs, persuade the individual to give up this style of thinking and replace 
it with more rational philosophies and self-statements. Ellis (1962) identified ten irrational 
beliefs which he regarded as being causally related to emotional distress. He considered beliefs 
such as "I must be thoroughly competent in everything I do” or "It is a dire necessity that I be 
liked or loved by every one" as irrational. According to Ellis, persons who hold these beliefs 
are vulnerable to emotional disturbance in the face of life events. The theoretical status of the 
concept of an irrational belief will be considered in detail in Chapter 6.
Similar interventions focusing on cognitions have been developed by Beck and his 
associates (Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1979) in relation to depression. Here the emphasis is on 
challenging clients' negative views of themselves and the future.
Meichenbaum (1975, 1977) developed self-instructional training which, like Ellis' 
rational-emotive therapy, focuses on self-statements. However, in Meichenbaum's (1975, 
1977) treatment, the emphasis is upon teaching the client specific cognitive coping skills rather 
than on challenging irrational assumptions. This treatment has been applied successfully to 
speech anxiety (Fremouw and Zitter, 1978), anger control (Novaco, 1976), test-anxiety 
(Meichenbaum, 1972) and weight control (Dunkel and Glaros, 1978).
The application of cognitive therapy to headache was first referred to as "cognitive 
coping skills training" (Holroyd et al., 1977). These researchers listed the following 
components:
1. An educational phase, where the pathophysiology underlying the condition is 
explained and the rationale for treatment is presented with an emphasis upon the 
cognitive mediation of stress reactions.
2. A self-monitoring phase, where the client is taught to record situations, thoughts, 
feelings and behaviours associated with headache attacks and stressful transactions.
3. A skills training phase which may include self-control relaxation (Goldfried and 
Trier, 1974), causal re-attribution (Beck et al., 1979), rational re-structuring 
(Goldfried, Decenteceo and Weinberg, 1974), calming imagery (Holroyd et al., 
1977) or problem-solving (Goldfried and Davison, 1976).
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Needless to say, the various studies employing cognitive interventions for headache 
have not all followed the regimen laid down in "cognitive coping skills training" (Holroyd et 
al., 1977; Holroyd and Andrasik, 1982b). The term "cognitive coping skills training" is 
somewhat ambiguous, for it may encompass a broad range of both cognitive and behavioural 
techniques. Accordingly, the term "cognitive therapy" is preferred. This term will be applied to 
any treatment study where the intervention was concerned with the restructuring of cognition. 
Where additional procedures were employed, these will be specified.
The first study to evaluate cognitive therapy for headache compared this treatment with 
frontalis EMG biofeedback (with instructions for between sessions practise of the acquired 
technique) and evaluated both against a headache monitoring control group (Holroyd et al., 
1977). Tension headache sufferers served as subjects. Subjects' ratings of treatment credibility 
were obtained at the end of the first treatment session, at post-treatment and follow-up. 
Subjects in the cognitive treatment demonstrated greater improvements on the headache index 
than those in the biofeedback group who were no more improved than the headache 
monitoring controls. These results persisted at the 15 week follow-up assessment. A two year 
follow-up of the two treatment groups revealed that only the cognitive therapy group 
evidenced a significant reduction in headache activity (frequency, duration and headache 
index) relative to the pre-treatment baseline (Holroyd and Andrasik, 1982b). The cognitive 
group was also more improved than the biofeedback group on headache duration, with trends 
in this direction being evident on headache frequency and the headache index.
In their initial study (Holroyd et al., 1977), all subjects were treated individually. In a 
second study (Holroyd and Andrasik, 1978), cognitive therapy was conducted in groups. 
Tension headache sufferers were assigned to a headache recording control condition or to one 
of three treatment conditions. Common to all treatments was the requirement that subjects 
monitor situations, cognitions and feelings associated with headache and stress. In addition, 
these subjects received cognitive therapy, cognitive therapy plus self-control relaxation 
training (Goldfried and Trier, 1974) or took part in a headache discussion group emphasising 
the "historical roots” of their symptoms, rather than the acquisition of specific coping skills. 
All treatments were conducted over five weekly sessions, each of 1 3/4 hours duration.
At the post-treatment and six week follow-up assessments, and on all measures of 
headache activity (headache index, frequency, duration and intensity), all three treatment 
groups were found to be significantly more improved than those simply recording their 
headaches, with no differences between treatments being evident. Holroyd and Andrasik 
(1978) observed that those subjects in the headache discussion group, who demonstrated 
improvements in headache, reported developing their own cognitive strategies for coping with 
stress and headaches. The authors concluded that self-control relaxation training does not
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contribute to the effectiveness of cognitive therapy and that the essential therapeutic ingredient 
in cognitive therapy may be the simple self-monitoring of cognitive and somatic reactions to 
stress and headache.
Efforts to assess the efficacy of cognitive therapy for tension headache by means of 
multiple baseline single subject designs have produced mixed results. One study found 
reductions in headache to be more dependent on the introduction of cognitive therapy than on 
the introduction of frontalis EMG biofeedback plus suggestions to practise relaxation at home 
(Kremsdorf, Kochanowicz and Costell, 1981). A second study found little evidence of any 
differential therapeutic effects of autogenic training, cognitive therapy or various combinations 
thereof (Anderson et al., 1981). All therapeutic procedures were equally effective in reducing 
headache index scores to near zero levels.
Cognitive therapy has also been applied to migraine. Knapp (1982) compared cognitive 
therapy, temporal artery biofeedback and sequential combinations of these two treatments with 
a headache recording control condition. Although equivalent significant reductions in 
headache frequency and duration occurred for all treatment groups over the course of therapy, 
these improvements failed to differ from the non-significant changes occurring in the waiting 
list control group. At the two month and twelve month follow-up assessments, all treatment 
groups demonstrated significant improvements relative to baseline on diary measures of 
headache frequency, duration, intensity and medication consumption. The controls were not 
followed up. The failure of the treatment groups to differ from the controls over the course of 
treatment is difficult to interpret in view of the very small number of subjects in each condition 
(n = 4).
Brown (1984) demonstrated that teaching migraineurs to employ imagery coping 
strategies under stress, as well as immediately before and during headache, was effective in 
reducing headache activity (total intensity ratings averaged over days) relative to an elaborate 
placebo condition emphasising the need to unlearn "...subconscious stressful 
thoughts...(through)...subliminal deconditioning ..." (Brown, 1984, p. 60). These improvements 
remained evident at the eight week follow-up. Brown (1984) speculated that the imagery 
treatment may have been effective because it aided relaxation, interrupted catastrophising 
ideation, which experimental pain studies have shown to be associated with a lowered 
tolerance for pain (e.g., Spanos, Brown, Jones and Homer, 1981; see Appendix A), and / or 
because the treatment increased subjects’ sense of self-efficacy with respect to headache 
management, thus leading to more effective coping.
Additional studies of cognitive therapy for headache have often mixed cognitive 
elements with behavioural techniques such as relaxation training or biofeedback, making it
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difficult to make any statement about the specific effects of the cognitive procedures 
themselves.
Bakal, Demjen and Kaganov (1981) combined cognitive therapy, relaxation training and 
frontal EMG biofeedback into a single package and applied this to the treatment of migraine, 
tension and tension-vascular headache sufferers. At the post-treatment and six month follow­
up assessments significant reductions were observed for all headache groups on diary 
recordings of headache hours, headache index and medication consumption. There was no 
significant relationship between headache type and outcome.
Steger and Harper (1980) compared cognitive therapy plus frontal EMG biofeedback 
with audiotaped relaxation training comprising, "...autogenic phrases, breathing exercises and 
various relaxation related instructions" (Steger and Harper, 1980, p. 138). Subjects in the 
relaxation group were given audio tapes and then had no further contact with the therapist for 
six weeks. In contrast, the subjects in the cognitive therapy plus biofeedback treatment had 
eight sessions with the therapist. Only subjects in the combined treatment demonstrated 
significant improvements on diary measures of headache frequency and intensity. After 
treatment, there was no difference between the groups on headache frequency. Subjects' in the 
combined treatment, however, reported lower levels of headache intensity than those in the 
relaxation group. The minimal response of the relaxation group may have been due to their 
lesser contact with the therapist, rather than to any difference in treatment effects.
Figueroa (1982) compared group cognitive therapy plus progressive relaxation training 
with "traditional psychotherapy" (group discussion of events associated with headache) and 
evaluated each of these treatments against a headache monitoring control group. Diary 
measures of headache activity revealed no differences between the psychotherapy and control 
groups. Reductions in headache frequency and duration were greater for the cognitive therapy 
plus relaxation group than for the remaining groups. A significant reduction in headache 
intensity occurred only for the combined treatment, but this was not significantly greater than 
that observed for the psychotherapy group. Both treatment groups demonstrated greater 
reductions in headache intensity than the headache recording control group.
Two studies have employed cognitive therapy in the home based treatment of headache. 
Kohlenberg and Cahn (1981) found that a written self-help programme, comprising a liquid 
crystal device for finger temperature feedback, plus instructions for relaxation training and 
cognitive therapy was significantly more effective in reducing the frequency, intensity and 
duration of migraine headache than a book on the diagnosis and management of the disorder. 
Explanation of these results in terms of differing expectations of outcome across the groups 
seems unlikely, as both groups gave equivalent confidence ratings for each treatment both
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before and after reading the material. Attanasio et al (1987) assigned tension headache 
sufferers to a combined office-based treatment, comprising cognitive therapy and progressive 
relaxation, training or to a home based version of this treatment consisting of written materials 
and involving 50% less therapist contact, or to a second self-help treatment involving 
progressive relaxation training only. All groups demonstrated equivalent and significant 
reductions (relative to baseline) on all measures of headache activity (headache index, peak 
intensity, frequency and medication consumption). The important result in this study is the 
finding that relaxation training plus cognitive therapy was no more effective than relaxation 
training alone.
Mitchell and White (1977) evaluated the various components of a cognitive-behavioural 
treatment programme for migraine by means of a dismantling design. Twelve subjects 
commenced diary recordings of headache. Three subjects received only this phase of the 
package, whilst the remaining nine also engaged in self-monitoring of stressful events. Twelve 
weeks later, six of these subjects progressed on to relaxation training. After another twelve 
weeks, three of the six subjects who received relaxation training received cognitive therapy. 
After a further twelve weeks (at week 48), there had been no change in headache frequency for 
the two self-monitoring groups. The two treatment groups were significantly more improved 
than the self-monitoring groups, with the relaxation training plus cognitive therapy group 
being more improved than the group receiving relaxation training but not cognitive therapy. 
These results were also evident 12 weeks later at the week 60 assessment. The findings suggest 
that cognitive therapy may be an effective adjunct to relaxation training in the treatment of 
migraine. The increased effectiveness of the cognitive intervention is unlikely to have been a 
function of the subjects greater exposure to the therapist, as only one additional group session 
with the therapist was involved, the remainder of the cognitive treatment being self- 
administered through audio tapes. However, it is possible that the larger number of techniques 
to which these subjects were exposed served to increase the strength of placebo effects. The 
findings are also limited by the fact that at the end of the study, there were only three subjects 
in each condition.
Newton and Barbaree (1987) found a cognitive intervention, focused principally upon 
pain control, plus some unspecified form of relaxation training, to be more effective in 
reducing headache frequency and intensity, amongst a group of tension and migraine headache 
sufferers, than a headache monitoring control condition. Treatment effects were independent of 
headache type.
It is unfortunate that so many studies of cognitive therapy for headache have combined 
this treatment with other interventions such as biofeedback or relaxation training, thereby 
precluding any statements about the effectiveness of cognitive therapy per se. Very few studies
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have examined the effects of cognitive therapy in isolation. Two studies have found cognitive 
therapy to be more effective for tension headache than a headache monitoring control 
condition (Holroyd and Andrasik, 1978; Holroyd et al 1977). Knapp (1982) observed no effect 
for cognitive therapy on migraine headache over a waiting list control condition, although the 
group sizes (n = 4) in this study may have obscured any treatment effects. Brown (1984) found 
cognitive imagery to be a more effective treatment for migraine than placebo. Holroyd et al 
(1977) observed cognitive therapy to be more effective than frontalis EMG biofeedback in the 
treatment of tension headache.
The only direct comparison of cognitive therapy with relaxation training is afforded by a 
study of paediatric migraine (Richter et al., 1986). These researchers observed both treatments 
to be more effective than placebo (a condition in which subjects were taught to label their 
emotions, to relate them to situations and were provided with "sham coping skills") in reducing 
headache index scores and headache frequency. However, there were no differences between 
treatments at the post-treatment or 16 week follow-up assessments. The subjects in this study 
were aged 9-18 years. It is difficult to appreciate how the group cognitive treatment could have 
been presented in such a way that it would have appealed to both 9 year olds and 18 year olds. 
The variability in the age of the subjects may have diluted the effects of cognitive therapy. 
Relaxation training, being a much simpler procedure, may have been less susceptible to this 
influence.
Given that Brown (1984) found a cognitive intervention alone to be superior to an 
elaborate placebo procedure in the management of migraine and, given also that Holroyd and 
his colleagues (Holroyd and Andrasik , 1982b; Holroyd et al 1977) found cognitive therapy 
alone to be superior to EMG biofeedback in the treatment of tension headache over a period of 
up to two years after treatment, it would seem reasonable to conclude that cognitive therapy 
may be more effective than placebo. More comparisons of cognitive therapy alone, with 
simpler procedures such as relaxation training, are required in order to establish whether or not 
the former is of any additional benefit. Headache type (migraine or tension) appears to have no 
bearing on outcome from cognitive interventions (Bakal et al., 1981; Newton and Barbaree, 
1987), although the level of confidence that one can have in these findings is tempered by the 
fact that, in these studies, the cognitive procedures were combined with other behavioural 
treatments.
Although many studies have been concerned with evaluating the effects of therapeutic 
regimens, involving cognitive procedures, on headache activity, very few studies have 
explored the question of what kinds of cognitive changes might underlie these treatment 
effects. Lake et al (1979) administered the Irrational Beliefs Test (Jones, 1968) to migraineurs 
before and after a treatment involving finger temperature biofeedback and three sessions of
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rational-emotive therapy. The treatment had no effect on Irrational Belief Test scores, possibly 
because of the very small amount of rational-emotive therapy delivered to subjects (three 40 
minute sessions). Unfortunately, Lake et al (1979) did not attempt to correlate changes in 
Irrational Belief Test scores with changes in headache activity. The rational-emotive plus 
finger temperature biofeedback treatment was no more effective in reducing headache activity 
than a waiting list control condition.
Over the course of their cognitive therapy plus relaxation training programme for 
tension and migraine headache sufferers, Newton and Barbaree (1987) attempted to assess 
subjects' thought processes by asking them to telephone an answering machine and to thus 
record their thoughts during headaches. Subjects receiving treatment, as well as those in the 
headache monitoring control group, engaged in these telephone recordings for three weeks 
before and after treatment. Each thought report was rated by independent raters on the 
following scales:
1. Headache appraisal (3-point scale: negative, neutral, positive).
2. Affective response (5-point scale)
3. Coping rated on the following subscales:
a) Problem-focused: Thoughts about how to manage the pain.
b) Cognitive avoidance: Wishing the pain would go away.
c) Unclassifiable thoughts.
4. Sensory focus: Thoughts about the sensory qualities of the pain.
At the end of the study, the treated subjects reported more positive appraisals of 
headache, more problem focused thinking and greater reductions in headache frequency and 
intensity than those subjects assigned to the headache monitoring control condition.
In the pre-treatment data, ratings of headache intensity were associated with more 
negative appraisal of headache, more cognitive avoidance and greater negative affect. Multiple 
regression analysis revealed that only the negative affect measure made a significant 
independent contribution to the prediction of headache intensity. Over the course of treatment, 
positive shifts in appraisal were significantly correlated with reductions in headache intensity. 
The authors concluded that thoughts about headache are related to its intensity and that a
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positive shift in headache appraisal might represent one mechanism by which cognitive 
therapy reduces headache intensity.
One of the problems with this study is that cognitive therapy was combined with 
relaxation training, making it difficult to determine whether the relationships observed were a 
function of one type of treatment or the other. Furthermore, it was made abundantly clear to 
subjects in the treatment group that the intervention was concerned primarily with their 
experience of headache pain. This would have been clear from the use of such treatment 
strategies as attention diversion, transformation of pain and reappraisal of headache. Thus, the 
observed relationship between shifts in headache appraisal and changes in headache intensity 
may have represented simply the simultaneous effect of the demand characteristics of the 
therapeutic situation on these two variables. It is also difficult to appreciate how appraisals of 
headache as "positive" or "negative", can be considered conceptually distinct from ratings of 
headache intensity. Indeed, as an example of a negative headache appraisal, Newton and 
Barbaree (1987) give the thought: "It's getting worse".
In an investigation of the role of cognitive changes underlying EMG biofeedback 
training for tension headache (Holroyd et al., 1984), it was found that changes in headache 
self-efficacy (defined as subjects' judgements of their ability to prevent headache onset) and 
headache locus of control (defined as the extent to which subjects believe that they can control 
their headaches) were both correlated significantly with improvement based on the headache 
index. Reductions in frontalis EMG levels were uncorrelated with changes in headache 
activity. However, since the self-efficacy and locus of control ratings were very specific to 
headache, it is possible that headache improvement was mediated by some other mechanism 
and that, as this improvement occurred, subjects' ratings of their own headache control skills 
increased, perhaps only as a side-effect of obtaining headache relief. That is, the changes on 
the rating scales may have reflected headache improvement rather than any underlying 
mechanism.
4.5. General Comments.
There have been very few investigations into the cognitive process variables that may 
underlie the effects of psychological interventions on recurrent headache. Those which have 
been conducted have tended to confound their measures of cognitive processes with outcome 
variables (Holroyd et al., 1984; Newton and Barbaree, 1987). Thus, the research conducted up 
to the present time, has yielded little in the way of information on the cognitive changes that 
may be critical to the success of psychological interventions in general, and to cognitive 
interventions in particular. This is unfortunate, for some description of the cognitive processes 
mediating outcome from cognitive therapy would facilitate the development of theoretical
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models linking stressful events with headache attacks. This thesis is concerned with the 
formulation and empirical examination of such a theoretical model. Some progress towards 
this goal might be achieved by conducting an examination of the cognitive processes 
underlying cognitive interventions for headache. Such a study is described in Chapter 6. 
However, before theorising about the kinds of cognitive processes that may mediate the 
cognitive treatment of headache, it is necessary to attempt some clarification of the concept of 
cognition and consider its relationship to emotion. This task is undertaken in the next chapter. 
The relationship between cognition and pain (other than headache) is considered, along with 
theories of pain and methods of pain measurement, in Appendix A.
59
CHAPTER 5
COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND EMOTION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEADACHE.
5.1. The Concepts of Cognition and Emotion.
The dominant view, expressed in the psychological literature, contends that cognition is 
a private process that cannot be exposed to public scrutiny (e.g., Mahoney, 1974; Turner, 
1967).
Towards the end of the last century, students of experimental psychology studied 
aspects of cognition, as components of the stream of consciousness, using the method of 
systematic introspection developed by Wundt. With the advent of behaviourism, heralded by 
the publication of J.B. Watson's (1913) paper entitled "Psychology as the Behaviourist Views 
It", there began a vigorous attack on the methods and subject matter of introspection (Boring, 
1950). Psychoanalytic theory, which regards emotions as the result of instinctual gratification 
or frustration, and cognitive processes as developing in Darwinian fashion to service the needs 
of the organism (Freud, 1920), was also criticised severely for its concern with unobservable 
structures and processes. Watson's positivism dictated that psychologists ignore the 
phenomena of consciousness and concepts such as the unconscious, and concern themselves 
only with observable behaviour. Watson considered thinking to be nothing more than subvocal 
speech and, in the words of Boring (1950, p. 644), he suggested that feeling "might turn out to 
be glandular activity or tumescence and detumescence of genital tissues." Such a position has 
been termed radical behaviourism (Mahoney, 1974).
Beginning with Tolman's (1927) efforts to offer behavioural definitions of cognition, 
and Mower’s (1960) attempts to demonstrate that emotions can be conditioned, cognition and 
emotion came to be recognised, once again, as legitimate fields of inquiry within experimental 
psychology.
As pointed out by Mahoney (1977b), within the domain of behavioural psychology, the 
main impetus for the shift towards the consideration of private events in explanations of 
human behaviour came from the field of psychotherapy, where Albert Ellis (1962) was the
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main protagonist. His emphasis upon cognitive activity, as crucial in the determination of 
emotion, set the stage for what Dember (1974) has termed a "cognitive revolution".
As a result of the work on cognition and emotion which has mushroomed in recent years 
(e.g., Beck, 1976; Bandura, 1977; Lazarus, 1966, 1982; Mahoney, 1974; Meichenbaum, 1977), 
many behaviourally-minded psychologists have been compelled to study these private events 
and to grapple with the problem of their definition.
5.1.1. Defining Cognition.
The usage of the term "cognition" in psychology has been so broad as to make definition 
very difficult. One of the major problems in this area is one of defining cognition 
independently of emotion. This is particularly important for those wishing to study 
relationships between these two classes of variables (e.g., Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen and De 
Longis, 1986; Goldfried and Sobocinski, 1975; Harrell, Chambless and Calhoun, 1981). For 
these purposes, the definition of cognition as "a Person's present thinkings, feelings and 
willings, his perceivings, rememberings and imaginings" (Ryle, 1949, p. 13) is inadequate, for 
some cognitive theorists, such as Ellis (1962) and Lazarus (1966), would almost certainly 
object that feelings are consequences of cognition and must, therefore, be considered as 
distinct from cognition.
Neisser (1967, p. 4) offered a definition which remains very broad, but is more 
independent of emotion:
"...cognition refers to all the processes by which the sensory input is transformed, 
reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered and used. Such terms as sensation, 
perception, imagery, retention, recall, problem-solving and thinking, among 
others, refer to hypothetical stages or aspects of cognition."
Theorists concerned with the cognitive processes involved in psychopathology and 
psychotherapy have focused on such aspects of cognition as belief systems, thoughts, 
assumptions or self-statements (e.g., Beck et al., 1979; Ellis, 1962; Mahoney, 1974; 
Meichenbaum, 1977). For example, Ellis (1962) regards irrational beliefs as being causally 
related to emotional distress. His system of psychotherapy is designed to persuade clients to 
give up such beliefs and replace them with more rational ones.
It is important to note that cognition has been defined as a process for becoming aware 
of reality, (Anderson, 1927; Rachlin, 1977), and as a process by which reality is inteipreted 
and evaluated against a background of expectations and values derived from previous
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experience (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1977). This distinction has been drawn by referring to 
"cold" and "hot" cognitions (Abelson, 1963); to "knowing" and "appraising" (Lazarus, 1982) 
or to "non-evaluative" and "evaluative" beliefs (Wessler, 1982). For example, the statement 
"his name is John" represents a non-evaluative belief, whilst the statement "I don't like John" is 
an example of an evaluative belief. Theoreticians who draw this distinction are concerned to 
speak of relations (usually causal relations) between cognition and emotion. Problems arise in 
this regard when one considers the distinction between evaluative beliefs and emotional 
reactions. For example, is the statement "I am afraid of the dark" a statement of an emotion 
(fear) or a statement of an evaluative belief?
At the present moment, only the broadest definitions of cognition can be offered, such 
that the term refers to the range of perceptual and mental processes of which the human being 
is capable (e.g., Neisser, 1967). Because of the wide range of processes subsumed into 
definitions of cognition, certain classes of cognitive processes such as evaluative beliefs 
(Wessler, 1982) or cognitive appraisal (Lazarus, 1982) are difficult to distinguish from self 
reports of emotional states.
5.1.2. Defining Emotion.
It is widely recognised that emotion is an ill-defined concept within psychology (Frijda, 
1986; Izard, Kagan and Zajonc, 1984; Mandler, 1979). As Mandler (1979, p. 279) notes, "there 
is no commonly, even superficially, acceptable definition of what a psychology of emotion is 
about." William James (1890) defined emotion in terms of the sensations produced by bodily 
changes:
"...bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and...our
feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion" (James, 1890, p. 449).
The implication of James’(1890) position is that each of the various emotions should be 
linked to specific differentiable physiological processes. This suggestion generated much 
research aiming to associate particular patterns of physiological activity with particular feeling 
states. This work was summarized by Cannon (1929) who concluded that "the same visceral 
changes occur in very different emotional states and in non-emotional states" (p. 351). Thus, it 
was recognised that emotion cannot be defined completely in terms of bodily responses. 
Accordingly, it was proposed that physiological arousal determines the strength of the 
emotion, but that the quality of the emotion is determined by the cognitive process of labelling 
the arousal (e.g., Schächter and Singer, 1962). Thus, arousal was regarded as a necessary but 
not as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of emotion. Emotion itself was conceived as an 
interaction of cognitive and physiological activity (Schächter and Singer, 1962). Reisenzein
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(1983) argued that the process of labelling arousal as a particular emotion involves two 
cognitions: one which evaluates a situation as having implications for one's well-being and a 
second which attributes the arousal experienced in the situation to the evaluative cognition. For 
example, in a given situation, one may experience a high degree of arousal and know that the 
situation is dangerous, but the emotion of fear will not be experienced unless one perceives a 
causal relation between the danger and the arousal (Reisenzein, 1983).
Within the frameworks of Schächter and Singer (1962) and Reisenzein (1983), 
cognition is regarded as an essential element of any emotional state to such an extent that it is 
impossible to speak of emotion without reference to cognition.
It is because emotion is such a complex phenomenon that it has proved so difficult to 
define. Given this complexity, it may be unwise to attach a definition which would necessarily 
limit the range of phenomena which many theoreticians take to be encompassed by the term, 
for this could hinder, rather than facilitate, efforts to better understand its nature (c.f., Popper, 
1966).
5.1.3. Distinguishing Between Cognition and Emotion.
The separation of cognition and emotion is crucial for those wishing to examine inter­
relationships between these variables. The approach taken most commonly by researchers 
concerned with exploring relationships between cognition and emotion is to delimit those 
aspects of cognition and emotion that are of interest and attempt to offer independent 
operational definitions of each (e.g., Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen et al., 1986; Goldfried and 
Sobocinski, 1975; Harrell et al., 1981; Lazarus, 1966). What is necessary for this kind of 
approach, however, is that theoreticians conceptualise their cognitive constructs such that these 
can, as far as possible, be assessed independently of emotional responses. •
Thus, for the purposes of identifying cognitive aspects of stress that may contribute to 
the onset and / or severity of headache attacks, the concept of cognition will be employed to 
refer to all of the mental processes described by Neisser (1967), of which the process of 
cognitive appraisal (Lazarus, 1982), will be regarded as a sub-category. However, at each 
stage of the research, the particular cognitive appraisal processes under investigation will be 
conceptualised and assessed so as to minimise any overlap with emotion.
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5.2. Relationships Between Cognition and Emotion.
The nature of the relationship between cognition and emotion has been a matter of 
considerable debate during recent years. The main protagonists in the argument have been 
Richard Lazarus (1982, 1984) and Robert Zajonc (1980, 1984).
Lazarus (1982, 1984) champions the view that cognition is both necessary and sufficient 
for the occurrence of an emotional response. In this respect, he is arguing the line taken by the 
cognitive therapists (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962), namely, that cognition antecedes emotional 
responses. The essential point made by Lazarus is that, if some input (an environmental event, 
sensation, thought or memory) is to trigger an emotional response, it must first be recognised 
by the receiver as having implications for his or her well-being.
In support of their position, Lazarus and his colleagues (e.g., Koriat, Melkman, Averill 
and Lazarus, 1972; Lazarus, 1966) have shown that emotional reactions to unpleasant films 
can be manipulated by altering the accompanying commentary. The conclusion offered is that 
the commentary altered subjects' cognitive activity, thereby, effecting some change in their 
emotional response.
In opposition to Lazarus, Zajonc (1980, 1984) views cognition as a sufficient but not as 
a necessary condition for emotion. He speaks in terms of the processing of sensory input by 
neurophysiological structures such as the non-dominant cerebral hemisphere, limbic system 
and hypothalamus. He argues that this processing can generate an emotional response in the 
absence of cognitive activity.
Zajonc (1980, 1984) supports his position by reference to the observation that 
subliminally presented stimuli, that cannot be recognised by the subject, produce predictable 
emotional reactions (Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc, 1980). In addition, Zajonc (1980) reports a 
series of studies demonstrating that subjects can make reliable like-dislike judgements about 
subliminally presented material. However, these studies do not rule out the possibility that 
cognitive processes might operate outside the field of conscious awareness.
The positions taken by Lazarus (1982, 1984) and Zajonc (1980, 1984) may both be 
oversimplifications of what is undoubtedly a complex relationship between cognition and 
emotion. For example, the evidence presented by both sides could be accommodated by the 
hypothesis that there exists a bidirectional relationship between cognition and emotion (e.g., 
Gilligan and Bower, 1984; Meichenbaum and Butler, 1980). That is, cognition may determine 
emotional responses and vice versa. Indeed, both Lazarus (1982) and Zajonc (1980) recognise 
a reciprocal relationship between the variables. Their argument concerns the determination of
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the initial emotional or cognitive response to a stimulus. If one recognises that these 
phenomena operate in a causal chain, then the proponents of cognitive therapy are justified in 
proposing that it may be possible to eliminate, or ameliorate, emotional distress by 
manipulating cognitive activity (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962; Meichenbaum, 1977). The 
position taken by these theorists is outlined in the next section.
5.3. Theories Relating Cognition and Emotional Distress.
Albert Ellis (1962) was one of the first to implicate specific cognitive processes in the 
aetiology of such human problems as anxiety and depression, and to apply such a theory to the 
practice of psychotherapy. His writings on rational-emotive theory and therapy have had a 
profound influence upon the field of behaviour therapy, and laid the ground work for the 
development of a variety of approaches to the treatment of psychological disorders, all of 
which share an emphasis upon the modification of cognitive appraisal as crucial to the 
effective treatment of these disorders. Such procedures as Beck's cognitive therapy for 
depression (Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1979), Meichenbaum's (1977) self-instructional training, 
as well as the various coping skills training (e.g., Goldfried, 1977; Kazdin, 1973) and problem 
solving (e.g., D'Zurilla and Goldfried, 1971; Mahoney, 1974) therapies owe their origins in 
large part to Ellis'(1962) contributions.
Of all the cognitive therapists outlining their approach in the psychological literature, 
Ellis (1977a, b) has been most concerned with examining the theoretical constructs underlying 
his method of psychotherapy. Beck, for example, is content to speak of "negative" views of the 
self and the future, and of "selective-abstraction" of the "negative" aspects of situations (Beck 
et al., 1979), with little regard for specifying the nature of these constructs. The only clue he 
gives is that they are associated with dysphoria. Similarly, Meichenbaum (1975) differentiated 
between "worrying" self-statements and "positive coping" self-statements. Both Beck and 
Meichenbaum invest little effort in elaborating the specific nature of their theoretical 
constructs. As a result, these constructs are easily confused with the emotional reactions they 
seek to explain.
In contrast, Ellis (1977a, b) has drawn a distinction between rational and irrational belief 
systems and has, on occasions, attempted to describe these independently of emotional 
responses. He regards irrational beliefs as those beliefs which demand that the environment, 
self or others, be different from the way they are in reality and conform, instead, to one's own 
desires and expectations (Ellis, 1977b). According to Ellis (1962, 1977a, b), individuals who 
hold irrational beliefs are more likely to become emotionally distressed in the face of stressful 
events than those who hold rational beliefs (beliefs that reflect an acceptance of the
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environment, self and others). Thus, for Ellis (1962), the task of psychotherapy is one of 
persuading clients to give up their irrational beliefs and to replace these with more rational 
philosophies. There remains the problem of specifying the extent to which a thought must be 
demanding before it can be termed irrational. This issue will be considered in the next chapter. 
However, it is probably because Ellis (1977a, b) has attempted to ascribe some empirical 
quality to his concept of an irrational belief that his theoretical framework has generated more 
research into its assumptions than those of Beck (1976) or Meichenbaum (1977).
The distinction between rational and irrational beliefs and the research pertaining to the 
relationship between such beliefs and emotional distress will be considered in the next chapter.
Bandura's (1977) concept of self-efficacy is allied to the position taken by Ellis (1962), 
Beck (1976) and Meichenbaum (1977), insofar as it is conceptualised as a cognitive 
mechanism, regulating behavioural and emotional responses (Bandura, 1977,1982, 1986).
Self-efficacy is defined as "the conviction that one can successfully execute the 
behaviour required to produce the outcome" (Bandura, 1977, p. 193). Bandura differentiates 
self-efficacy from outcome expectations, which he defines as "a person's estimate that a given 
behaviour will lead to certain outcomes" (Bandura, 1977, p. 193). It has been argued that the 
concept of self-efficacy becomes vacuous unless it is tied to specific outcomes and that it is, 
therefore, impossible to define self-efficacy independently of outcome expectations (e.g., 
Eastman and Marzillier, 1984; Marzillier and Eastman, 1984). This assertion will be examined 
in Chapter 7.
Bandura (1977) postulated a relationship between self-efficacy and emotion, mediated 
by the acquisition of coping responses. He argued that a low level of self-efficacy in managing 
the aversive aspects of a situation leads to avoidance behaviour which, in turn, stifles the 
development of coping skills. In Bandura's view, it is the perceived lack of competency in the 
face of aversive environmental conditions which generates the accompanying emotional 
distress. Bandura (1977) points out, however, that emotional arousal can also be a source of 
feedback which may contribute to the level of self-efficacy.
In support of his theory, Bandura (1977, 1982) has conducted a number of studies 
demonstrating that the fear experienced by snake and spider phobics, when approaching the 
feared object, is a function of their level of self-efficacy. Behavioural procedures, such as 
modelling, were found to result in an increased willingness to approach the feared object and 
in reductions in the level of self-reported anxiety. These responses were observed to be 
correlated with measures of subjects' perceived self-efficacy to manage anxiety and the feared
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object. Furthermore, self-efficacy to approach feared objects has been found to be a better 
predictor of avoidance behaviour than indices of autonomic arousal (Bandura, 1978; Bolles, 
1972).
Laboratory studies, indicating that subjects report less anxiety, demonstrate lower levels 
of autonomic arousal and show less impairment on task performance, when they believe they 
have control over an aversive stimulus (e.g., Averill, 1973; Miller, 1979, 1980), are also 
consistent with Bandura's (1977, 1982, 1986) position.
Lazarus and Folkman (1984a, b) have focused upon primary and secondary appraisal 
processes as determinants of coping responses and emotion. A primary appraisal refers to the 
degree of threat the situation is judged to present to the person. A secondary appraisal refers to 
the person's evaluation of his or her capacity to manage or obviate the threat According to 
Lazarus (1977), emotion is a direct result of these appraisal processes. Lazarus and his 
colleagues (Lazarus, 1977; Lazarus and Folkman 1984a, b) argue that when a person's 
perceived capacity to manage the demands of a threatening situation are taxed, that person will 
experience emotional distress. There follows a complex sequence of coping actions, 
reappraisal processes and emotional responses as the individual attempts to resolve the 
situation:
"As a result of constant feedback and continuing efforts to cope with the situation 
or to regulate the emotional response, the person is also constantly re-appraising 
his relationship with the environment, with consequent alterations in the intensity 
and quality of the emotional reaction" (Lazarus, 1977, p. 149).
The above review of some of the ways in which cognition has been related to emotional 
distress is not meant to be exhaustive. Other formulations such as Kelly's (1955) personal 
construct theory, and Seligman's reformulated theory of learned helplessness (Abramson, 
Garber and Seligman, 1980) are recognised as having much in common with the theoretical 
positions already -considered. Cognitive theories of emotional distress, whilst differing in their 
specification of the relevant cognitive constructs, all view human emotional reactions as being 
determined by symbolic representations of reality.
5.4. Implications for Headache.
Stress is widely recognised as the most common precipitant of headache attacks (e.g., 
Friedman, 1979; Friedman et al., 1954; Howarth, 1965; Selby and Lance, 1960). The 
application of such stress management techniques as relaxation training, biofeedback training
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and cognitive therapy reflects this assumption. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, the 
processes by which relaxation and biofeedback treatments produce relief are not clear, whilst 
the processes underlying the effects of cognitive therapy have barely been addressed.
Given that cognitive processes have occupied central positions in theories of emotional 
distress (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962; Lazarus, 1977) and that, therapy designed to manipulate 
cognition has been found to be more effective for headache than EMG biofeedback (Holroyd 
et al., 1977; Holroyd and Andrasik, 1982b) or placebo (Brown, 1984; Figueroa, 1982), it 
would seem reasonable to suggest, by way of an hypothesis, that cognitive appraisal processes 
may play a role in the aetiology and / or maintenance of recurrent headache. However, very 
little research has been conducted on the role of cognitive appraisal as a mediator of 
improvements in headache activity following psychological interventions. Those studies that 
have attempted to address this issue have confused measures of cognitive constructs with 
outcome variables (e.g., Holroyd et al., 1984; Newton and Barbaree, 1987), thereby limiting 
the value of the results obtained (see Chapter 4).
5.5. The Focus of the Present Research.
The studies reported in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis aim to identify the particular 
cognitive appraisal processes that may mediate the relationship between stressful events and 
recurrent headache. The thesis is also concerned with examining the prospects for linking a 
cognitive conceptualisation of the stress-headache relationship with the mechanism of sensory 
modulation, this task being undertaken in the final study, reported in Chapter 8.
In a step towards the description of the cognitive appraisal processes that may contribute 
to headache, the next chapter is concerned with the distinction between rational and irrational 
beliefs (Ellis, 1962, 1977a, b) and with an examination of the role of rationality, as a mediating 
variable, in the rational-emotive therapy of recurrent headache.
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CHAPTER 6 
STUDYI
THE EFFECTS OF RATIONAL-EMOTIVE THERAPY ON HEADACHE: 
THE ROLE OF RATIONALITY IN THE MEDIATION 
OF TREATMENT RESPONSE.
6.1. INTRODUCTION.
6.1.1. The Distinction Between Rational and Irrational Beliefs.
Ellis' (1962, 1977a, b) rational-emotive theory asserts that it is the way in which 
individuals interpret situations that determines their emotional response. Ellis contends that the 
process of interpretation is carried out within the context of a belief system. It is the nature of 
this belief system which shapes the interpretive process, and thus generates the emotional 
response. In order to account for the wide variation in the intensity of the human emotional 
response to situations, Ellis (1962, 1977a, b) has characterised belief systems as being rational 
or irrational. According to rational-emotive theory, stressful events lead a person to experience 
aversive emotions regardless of whether their belief system is rational or irrational; the 
intensity of that aversive emotion being a function of the extent to which the belief system is 
irrational. Thus, the distinction between rational and irrational belief systems is a crucial 
conceptual issue in rational-emotive theory.
Ellis (1977b, p. 15) defined irrationality as:
"any thought, emotion or behaviour that leads to self-defeating or self-destructive 
consequences that significantly interfere with the survival and happiness of the 
organism."
In a later article (Ellis, 1980, p. 2) he defined rationality in these terms:
"If people choose to stay alive and try to be happy, they think "rationally" or 
"self-helpfully" when they think, emote or behave in any way that abets these 
goals."
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These definitions, however, are far too broad. If irrationality is to be a characteristic of 
cognition within a theoretical system seeking to explicate relationships between cognition, 
emotion and behaviour, then to apply the term to all three sets of phenomena makes it difficult 
to speak of irrationality as a quality of cognition which affects emotion and behaviour. 
Furthermore, both definitions imply that rationality and irrationality can be known only by 
their effects on the "happiness of the organism"; but it is precisely such emotional responses 
that Ellis is seeking to explain. If rational and irrational cognitions can be known only by their 
emotional or behavioural effects, it becomes logically impossible to test the theory, as one is 
left with no way of independently assessing the variables alleged to be inter-related.
Later in his article "The Basic Clinical Theory of Rational Emotive Therapy", Ellis 
(1977b, p. 9) offers a more promising definition of irrational beliefs as:
"...demanding, commanding statements about what should and must happen so
that you can absolutely and necessarily get what you desire."
It follows from this definition that an irrational belief is a belief which demands 
particular outcomes or alterations to reality, while a rational belief is one which is accepting of 
oneself, others and the environment as they are (Ellis, 1962). Following his argument that 
irrational beliefs contain demandingness components, Ellis (1977a, b, 1980) suggests that 
statements involving the words "should" or "must" are often irrational. He refers to these as 
"musturbatory ideas" (Ellis, 1977b, 1980). However, complications arise for Ellis when he 
attempts to draw a distinction between the rational desire for reality to be different and the 
irrational demand that it should or must be different. This distinction blurs very quickly unless 
we are very particular about our usage of the English language. People often use words such as 
"must" or "should" when the meanings ascribed by Ellis to these terms are clearly not 
intended. For those not acquainted with rational-emotive theory, the following statements 
would almost certainly be regarded as meaning much the same thing:
1 .1 must get to the post office before it closes.
2 .1 desire to get to the post office before it closes.
If one takes Ellis' position to its extreme, the first statement is irrational; the second is 
rational. Although this point might seem rather trite in the above context, it becomes crucial 
when we consider the assessment of rational or irrational beliefs. For example, the first item on 
Jones' (1968) Irrational Beliefs Test states: "It is important to me that others approve of me." If 
the respondent agrees with the item, he or she obtains a score in the irrational direction. It is
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scored as if it read "others must approve of me". However, as the item appears on the test, it 
would seem to be the statement of a desire or preference and would, thus, be regarded by Ellis 
as rational.
The distinction between demandingness and desires or preferences would appear 
difficult to sustain. Confusion surrounding the distinction has pervaded assessment instruments 
such as the Irrational Beliefs Test, making many of the items ambiguous with respect to the 
concepts of rationality and irrationality. It is very difficult to conceive of an individual who 
would agree with statements expressing desires or preferences for certain outcomes, but 
disagree with statements expressing demands for those same outcomes.
A clearer appreciation of the central construct in rational-emotive theory may follow 
from a focus on rationality rather than irrationality. Rationality may be defined as an 
acceptance of oneself, others and the environment (Ellis, 1962). Irrationality may then be 
conceived as departures from this position. This circumvents the problem of distinguishing 
between desires and demands.
When acceptance is recognised as a defining characteristic of a rational belief, it 
becomes possible to speak of a rational or irrational belief system as standing in relations with 
emotion and behaviour, and to foimulate testable hypotheses concerning these relations.
For the purposes of the present study, acceptance is recognised as the essential feature 
of rationality and will therefore dictate the particular approach to assessment undertaken 
herein. Existing approaches to assessment will be considered in the next section.
6.1.2. The Assessment of Irrational Beliefs.
The measure of irrational beliefs employed most commonly by researchers is the 
Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT; Jones, 1968). The instrument consists of 100 items organised into 
ten different categories, each designed to assess one of ten irrational beliefs specified by Ellis 
(1962). The items are scored on a 5-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly 
agree". Summing the scores within categories gives a measure of the strength with which each 
irrational belief is held. Summing across categories gives a total irrationality score.
By means of factor analysis, Jones (1968) established that the 100 items could be 
separated into 10 different factors, each representing one of the irrational beliefs described by 
Ellis (1962).
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Jones (1968) demonstrated that all but two of the IBT subscales were correlated 
significantly with maladjustment scores on the 16 PF questionnaire (Cattell and Stice, 1957), 
and claimed this as evidence supporting Ellis (1962) assertion that irrational beliefs are related 
to emotional distress. However, as has been pointed out by a number of critics (e.g., Malouff 
and Schutte, 1986; Smith and Zurawski, 1983), the fact that scores on the IBT correlate with 
such aspects of emotional distress as depression (Nelson, 1977; Vestre, 1984) and anxiety 
(Deffenbacher, Zwemer, Whisman, Hill and Sloan, 1986; Smith and Zurawski, 1983) raises 
the question of whether the IBT assesses dimensions any different from those which might be 
more parsimoniously subsumed under the concept of emotional distress. Indeed, many of the 
items on the IBT seem to refer to emotional states. For example: "I often worry about how 
much people will approve of and accept me"; "I feel little anxiety over unexpected dangers or 
future events"; "I often get disturbed over situations I don't like";" I often become quite 
annoyed over little things". This confounding appears to have arisen because Jones (1968) did 
not ascribe any particular quality to the concept of an irrational belief, but instead followed one 
of Ellis'(1962) rather confused definitions, and finished up writing many items which refer to 
the effects of irrational beliefs rather than to the beliefs themselves.
The Idea Inventory (Kassinove, Crisci and Tiegerman, 1977) also purports to measure 
irrational beliefs but, like the IBT, many items refer to emotions such as worry, anxiety or 
depression.
Shorkey and Whiteman (1977) developed the Rational Behaviour Inventory (RBI), a 
confusing title given that, within Ellis'(1962) model, rationality is regarded as a characteristic 
of cognition rather than of behaviour. The instrument was developed along similar lines to 
those followed by Jones (1968). This scale consists of eleven subscales. Once again, the 
development of the scale was not based upon a clear conceptualisation of the nature of 
rationality and many of the items refer to emotional states. Accordingly, the RBI contains the 
same deficiencies as those outlined for the IBT.
In a recent effort to construct a unitary measure of irrationality, Malouff and Schutte 
(1986) developed a 20-item scale drawn from a large pool of items considered by the authors 
to reflect the content of the ten irrational beliefs identified by Ellis and Harper (1961) and 
attempted to exclude references to emotional states. Although the scale represents an 
improvement over previously developed scales and is reported to have a high internal 
consistency, what it is that is actually being measured is not clearly specified. The current 
usage of the term rationality within the cognitive-behavioural literature is far too vague for it to 
be treated as the focus of an assessment instrument without some qualification of the kind 
outlined in the previous section.
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In view of the above considerations, existing measures of rationality were deemed 
inadequate. Accordingly, and as a prelude to the first study, a scale designed to assess 
rationality, conceptualised in terms of acceptance and excluding emotional states, was 
developed.
6,1.3. Relationships Between Irrational Beliefs and Emotional Distress.
As mentioned previously a number of studies report significant correlations between 
measures of irrational beliefs and pencil and paper measures of emotional distress (e.g., 
Deffenbacher et al., 1986; Nelson, 1977; Vestre, 1984). The extent to which these studies can 
be regarded as supportive of the rational-emotive model is limited by the degree of 
confounding between the different measures of the constructs. Furthermore, these studies 
involve only two of the three features which make up the rational-emotive model, ignoring the 
relationship between irrational beliefs and stressful events. This latter issue was addressed by 
Smith, Boaz and Denney (1984) who examined relationships between the RBI and a measure 
of life events in the prediction of emotional (Psychological Screening Inventory; Lanyon, 
1970) and physical (Health Problems Inventory developed by the authors) distress. Multiple 
regression analysis revealed a significant interaction between life events and the RBI on the 
measure of physical distress, such that the correlation between life events and the Health 
Problems Inventory was greater for subjects scoring high on irrational beliefs than for those 
scoring low. This result is consistent with the rational emotive model. However, no such 
interaction was observed on the Psychological Screening Inventory. The pattern of findings is 
difficult to interpret in terms of rational-emotive theory, but as the authors point out, any 
interaction between the life events index and the RBI on the Psychological Screening 
Inventory may have been attenuated by the contamination of the two latter scales. The RBI is 
far less likely to have been contaminated with the Health Problems Inventory.
Goldfhed and Sobocinski (1975) required subjects to imagine scenes involving social 
rejection. In comparison with those scoring low on irrational beliefs, as assessed by the IBT, 
those scoring high demonstrated greater increases in hostility and anxiety, as assessed on the 
Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (Zuckerman and Lubin, 1965). Although the results of this 
study are consistent with rational-emotive theory, Craighead, Kimball and Rehak (1979) were 
unable to replicate the findings. However, Craighead et al (1979) did observe subjects scoring 
high on the IBT to make more negative self-referent statements following social rejection 
imagery than their low scoring counterparts; this finding being consistent with Ellis' (1962; 
1977a, b) position.
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Cash, Rimm and MacKinnon (1986) attempted to induce differential mood states in 
subjects scoring high or low on irrational beliefs by means of the Velten (1968) Mood 
Induction Procedure, in which subjects read sets of statements emphasising negative, positive 
or neutral self-evaluations. In response to the negative statements, high scorers on the IBT 
demonstrated greater increases in anxiety and depression on the Multiple Affect Adjective 
Check List than subjects scoring low on the IBT (Cash et al., 1986). No such interactions were 
observed for the positive mood induction condition. The results support the contention that 
irrational beliefs render individuals vulnerable to the experience of anxiety and depression 
(Ellis, 1962; 1977a, b). However, in order for it to be demonstrated that irrationality is the 
essential dimension constituting this vulnerability, it would have to be shown that measures of 
irrationality predict responsiveness to negative mood induction better than trait measures of 
emotional distress such as the various anxiety and depression scales.
Although the studies cited above present few findings which directly contradict rational- 
emotive theory, the supportive results reported are tempered by the existence of alternative 
explanations of the data and by the contamination between measures of irrational beliefs and 
emotional distress. It has been suggested that any causal relationship between irrational beliefs 
and emotional distress might be elucidated most effectively by treatment studies (Smith, 
1982). This body of research is considered in the following paragraphs.
Reviews of the effects of rational-emotive therapy indicate that the treatment is effective 
in reducing emotional distress in clients presenting with a range of problems (e.g., Rachman 
and Wilson, 1980; Sutton-Simon, Di Giuseppe and Miller, 1978). However, as pointed out by 
several authors (e.g., Mahoney, 1977a; Smith, 1982), favourable outcome studies bear no 
logical relation to the truth of rational-emotive theory. In addition, consideration of the 
outcome literature is complicated by the lack of uniformity in the treatment procedures 
employed (Rachman and Wilson, 1980). It is those studies concerned with an evaluation of the 
role of irrational beliefs in the process of rational-emotive and related cognitive interventions, 
which are most likely to cast light on the question of whether reductions in emotional distress 
are mediated by alterations in irrational beliefs. It is to those studies that we now mm.
Consistent with the rational-emotive model, several studies report that, in the rational- 
emotive therapy of anxiety (Lipsky, Kassinove and Miller, 1980; Trexler and Karst, 1972), 
depression (Lipsky et al., 1980), and under-assertiveness (Alden, Safran and Weideman, 
1978), improvements on outcome measures are accompanied by diminutions in irrational 
thinking. However, these studies provide rather weak evidence for the theory, for no attempt 
was made to correlate changes in irrational beliefs with changes on outcome measures. 
According to rational-emotive theory, alterations in irrational thinking constitute the specific 
mechanism mediating treatment effects. It follows, therefore, that reductions in emotional
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distress will be achieved to the extent that irrational beliefs are modified and that these two 
classes of variables will thus be correlated over the course of treatment. To the author's 
knowledge, only one study (Smith, 1983) has pursued this line of inquiry.
Smith (1983) re-analysed data originally collected by Lipsky et al (1980). Lipsky et al 
(1980) assigned 50 community mental health patients seeking psychotherapy to one of five 
conditions: rational-emotive therapy, rational-emotive therapy plus rational role reversal (a 
technique whereby the therapist and client switch roles for a short period), rational-emotive 
therapy plus rational-emotive imagery (a technique whereby clients imagine themselves 
disputing irrational beliefs) an alterative treatment (relaxation training plus supportive 
counselling) or to a waiting list control condition. Lipsky et al (1980) observed that on a 
number of measures of emotional distress (the Anxiety and Depression subscales of the 
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List, the Trait Anxiety Scale and the Neuroticism Scale of the 
Eysenck Personality Inventory), as well as on the Idea Inventory, equivalent reductions were 
observed for each of the rational-emotive conditions, which were greater than those observed 
for the alternative treatment and waiting list control conditions. Smith (1983) determined 
change scores for each variable and then adjusted these for baseline levels by means of 
multiple regression analysis. He then correlated the adjusted irrational beliefs scores with those 
for each of the outcome measures. The correlations were calculated for subjects receiving 
some form of rational-emotive therapy; separate correlations were calculated for those placed 
in one or the other of the control conditions. Of the eight correlations calculated, seven were 
statistically significant and in the expected direction. Significant correlations were observed 
irrespective of treatment condition. Such a pattern of results is consistent with the rational- 
emotive model.
Once again, however, and as Smith (1983) acknowledges, the possibility that the 
measure of irrational beliefs employed was confounded with the measures of emotional 
distress cannot be discounted as an alternative interpretation of the findings. Indeed, inspection 
of the baseline correlations between the outcome measures and the irrational beliefs measure 
tends to support this view. For example, in the pre-treatment scores, the Idea Inventory was 
found to correlate -0.68 with the Neuroticism Scale.
In conclusion, efforts to elucidate relationships between irrational beliefs and emotional 
distress have been plagued by the potential for confounding of the measurement instruments 
which seem to have flowed from ill-conceived notions concerning the nature of rationality. 
This state of affairs has precluded a thorough examination of the basic tenets of the rational- 
emotive model.
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6.1.4. Aims of Study I.
If stress is a major precipitant of headache attacks (e.g., Friedman et al., 1954; Levor et 
al., 1986) and if the impact of stressful events upon an individual's emotional and physical 
well-being is a function of the extent to which that individual thinks irrationally (Ellis, 1962; 
Ellis, 1977a, b) it follows that, interventions which strengthen the tendency to think rationally, 
will lead to reductions in headache activity. Study I aimed to design a measure of rationality 
reflecting the quality of acceptance (outlined at the beginning of this chapter) rather than 
aspects of emotional distress, and apply this to an investigation of the role of rationality in the 
rational-emotive therapy of recurrent headache. In this manner, the contribution of rationality 
to headache was evaluated.
6.2. ASSESSMENT OF THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS.
6.2.1. Development of The Rationality Scale.
Following the definition of rationality in terms of acceptance of oneself, others and the 
environment, and bearing in mind the need to separate measures of rationality from measures 
of emotional distress, a twelve item scale assessing rationality (the Rationality Scale) was 
developed.
The one hundred items on the Irrational Beliefs Test (Jones, 1968) served as the item 
pool. All items involving the self-disclosure of emotional states were eliminated. Twenty four 
items were eliminated on this basis (see appendix B). From the 76 remaining items, those 
scored by Jones (1968) in the direction of irrationality were eliminated (see Appendix B). 
Presumably, Jones (1968) regarded the remaining 41 items as in some way being measures of 
rationality, as these items are reverse scored on the original test. From these 41 items, the 
author selected 12 items considered to be representative of statements pertaining to acceptance 
of oneself, others and the environment. The Rationality Scale consisted of these 12 items (see 
Appendix B). As with the irrational Beliefs Test, each item is scored on a 5-point scale with 
responses ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". The sum of the scores obtained 
for each item gives an index of rationality, such that higher scores are indicative of higher 
levels of rationality.
All items on the Rationality Scale are scored in one direction, making it susceptible to 
response bias. Accordingly, it was decided to leave the twelve items embedded in the Irrational 
Beliefs Test, administer this test to subjects in its entirety, and then separate the twelve
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rationality items prior to conducting the statistical analysis. It was considered that such a 
procedure would be less likely to result in response bias than simply presenting subjects with 
the twelve Rationality Scale items.
Psychometric data pertaining to the Rationality Scale is presented later in this chapter 
and in Appendix B.
6.2.2. The Assessment of Headache Activity.
Following previous research, headache activity was assessed by means of a diary which 
subjects completed daily (e.g., Budzynski et al., 1970, 1973; Holroyd and Andrasik, 1978, 
1982a). Headaches were recorded in booklets, each consisting of seven printed sheets. The 
booklets were designed to be small and easy to carry so that subjects could keep a booklet with 
them at all times. Provision was made to record the intensity of headache hourly between 6.00 
am and 5.00 am on the following day (Budzynski et al., 1970, 1973). However, instead of the 
six category scales employed as measures of headache intensity by Budzynski et al (1970, 
1973), it was decided to present subjects with visual analogue scales on which they could 
indicate their headache intensity for each hour of the day. Visual analogue scales were 
preferred to category rating scales in view of the evidence suggesting that the former may be 
more sensitive to treatment effects in the study of chronic pain patients (Scott and Huskisson, 
1976). The visual analogue scales consisted of horizontal lines, one hundred millimetres in 
length. The left hand anchor point was labelled "No headache", and the right hand anchor 
point, "Headache as bad as it could be". Thus, subjects indicated the intensity of headache by 
placing a mark at the appropriate point on the scale. For hours that they were asleep or 
headache-free, subjects simply left the scale blank. This step was taken in order to minimise 
the effort involved in recording, by allowing subjects to be unconcerned with the diary during 
the hours that they were headache-free.
The headache recording sheets required subjects to indicate the type and quantity of 
medication consumed on a particular day. They were also required, where possible, to provide 
a brief description of the circumstances surrounding the onset of any headache that occurred.
An example of a headache recording sheet and its associated instructions appear in 
Appendix C.
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From the headache diaries, the following measures of headache activity were derived:
1. Headache Frequency: Defined as the number of days in the week on which the 
subject recorded a headache. It was recognised that rather than experiencing a single 
headache on a day, subjects might suffer two or more discrete headaches, separated by a 
number of headache-free hours. However, it was considered that such a pattern of 
headache could often be the result of repeated doses of medication. That is, the 
headache may disappear for the period over which any medication is active, only to 
return once the analgesic effects wear off. Cycles such as these would result in a 
spuriously inflated measure of headache frequency if one were to count the number of 
discrete headache episodes occurring each day. Accordingly, this practice was avoided 
in favour of a method whereby headache frequency is defined as the number of days in 
the week for which some headache activity is recorded, regardless of the number of 
discrete headache episodes appearing on those days.
2. Headache Duration: Defined as the mean number of headache hours recorded on 
headache days. Other researchers have defined headache duration as the total number of 
headache hours recorded over any given period (e.g., Andrasik and Holroyd, 1980; 
Budzynski et al., 1970, 1973). However, this method of measurement was not preferred 
as it is less independent of headache frequency than one defined in terms of the mean 
number of headache hours recorded on headache days.
3. Headache Intensity: The intensity of headache for each hour was determined simply 
by measuring the distance, in millimetres, from the left hand anchor point on the visual 
analogue scale to the mark made by the subject. In the determination of the mean 
headache intensity over any given period, zero ratings were not included. Thus, 
headache intensity was defined as the mean intensity rating for those hours on which 
subjects indicated that a headache was present.
4. Medication Consumption: Defined as the mean number of tablets consumed per day 
for the purposes of headache relief. Such a measure has been employed by researchers 
on many occasions (e.g., Andrasik and Holroyd, 1980; Bakal et al., 1981; Budzynski et 
al., 1970, 1973; Figueroa, 1982). Although medications for headache have been scaled 
according to the strength of their analgesic effects (Coyne, Sargent, Segerson and 
Oboum, 1976) and these weightings applied to the assessment of medication intake in 
some treatment studies (e.g., Attanasio et al., 1987; Blanchard et al., 1982a), such a 
level of precision was considered unnecessary in the present instance, in view of the fact 
that all subjects were asked not to change their medication during the period of the
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study. Thus changes in medication consumption were assessed in terms of quantity 
rather than quality of medication.
To conceptualise pain measures in unidimensional terms, as is implied by the use of 
category or visual analogue scales, is a simplification of a multidimensional phenomenon 
(Melzack and Wall, 1982; see Appendix A). It is recognised that the current assessment device 
is open to this criticism and that multidimensional instruments such as the McGill Pain 
Questionnaire (Melzack, 1975) and the Headache Assessment Scale (Hunter, 1983) are 
available. However, it was decided not to employ these instruments in the assessment of 
headache in view of the fact that four dependent measures were already under examination, 
and that the use of a comparative treatment outcome design necessarily restricted the number 
of subjects that could be included.
6.3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN.
The present study was concerned with evaluating the role of rationality in the aetiology 
and / or maintenance of recurrent headache. It was proposed to carry out this investigation by 
comparing the effects of rational-emotive therapy and relaxation training on headache activity, 
and by determining the strength of any correlation between improvements in headache activity 
and increases in rationality.
Rational-emotive therapy was preferred to the cognitive therapy that has been applied to 
headache on several previous occasions (e.g., Figueroa, 1982; Holroyd and Andrasik, 1978; 
Holroyd et al., 1977), in view of the fact that the former employs a much more circumscribed 
set of procedures with a specific focus on the modification of irrational beliefs. It was therefore 
considered most suitable for the purposes of the present inquiry. Cognitive therapy for 
headache, as described in the literature (e.g., Holroyd and Andrasik, 1982a; Holroyd et al., 
1977), involves the acquisition of a range of coping skills including problem solving, coping 
self-statements and calming imagery, as well as an emphasis upon irrational cognition. This 
multifaceted approach to treatment was not employed because teaching clients various coping 
skills may bear little relation to rationality and could exert independent effects on headache, 
thereby obscuring any relationship that may exist between rationality and headache activity.
A relaxation training treatment was employed as a comparison condition against which 
the effects of rational-emotive therapy could be evaluated. Relaxation training has been 
reported to be an effective treatment for headache (e.g., Cox et al., 1975; Tasto and Hinkle, 
1973; Warner and Lance, 1975), but does not seek to alter irrational beliefs. This treatment,
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therefore, provides a control for the effect of non-specific factors (i.e., non-specific with 
respect to rationality) involved in the psychological therapy of headache.
To investigate the hypotheses of the present study (see Section 6.4.), a 2 x 3 factorial 
design (with repeated measures on the time factor) was chosen.
The two experimental factors were as follows:
1. Treatment Group with two levels:
Rational-emotive therapy.
Relaxation training.
2. Time with three levels:
Pre-treatment assessment.
Post-treatment assessment.
Follow-up assessment.
Scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961) have been found to be 
predictive of headache improvement following progressive relaxation training (Jacob et al., 
1983), with subjects scoring high on this inventory having poorer outcomes. Similarly, 
headache sufferers who spend large proportions of their waking time with headache have been 
observed to have poorer outcomes from a multi-faceted treatment involving relaxation 
training, EMG biofeedback and cognitive therapy, than those subjects who have longer periods 
of headache freedom (Bakal et al., 1981). Thus, in an attempt to increase the precision of the 
experiment, it was decided to match subjects on each of these variables before assigning them 
to treatments on a random basis.
6.4. HYPOTHESES.
The hypotheses formulated prior to the collection of data were as follows:
1. Within each treatment there will be significant reductions in headache frequency, 
intensity, duration and medication consumption at the post-treatment and follow-up 
assessments, relative to pre-treatment baseline levels. The treatment outcome 
literature reviewed in Chapter 4 is not sufficiently sophisticated for one to predict 
that particular dimensions of headache activity will be most responsive to 
psychological interventions.
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2. Rational-emotive therapy will be more effective in reducing headache frequency, 
intensity, duration and medication consumption than relaxation training.
3. For subjects receiving rational-emotive therapy, there will be a significant increase 
in rationality over the course of treatment.
4. Any Increase in rationality over the course of treatment will be greater for subjects 
receiving rational-emotive therapy than for those receiving relaxation training.
5. Within each treatment group, reductions in headache frequency, intensity, duration 
and medication consumption will be correlated significantly with increases in 
rationality.
6. Within each treatment group, any reductions in anxiety and depression will be 
correlated significantly with increases in rationality. This hypothesis follows from 
the view of rationality as a variable mediating the effects of therapy on emotional 
distress (Ellis, 1962, 1977a, b).
7. Any Reductions in anxiety and depression will be greater for the rational-emotive 
treatment than for the relaxation treatment.
6.5. METHOD.
6.5.1. Subjects.
The sample of subjects participating in the study comprised 36 headache sufferers aged 
between 25 and 61 years, with a mean age of 40.5 years (S.D. = 10.2 years). Their years of 
full-time education ranged from 9 to 25 years with a mean of 14.4 years (S.D. = 3.3 years). 
There were 20 females and 16 males.
In view of the evidence suggesting that headaches often classified as "tension" or 
"migraine", tend to fall on a continuum of severity, rather than into distinct subtypes (e.g., 
Drummond and Lance, 1984a; Waters, 1974), this continuum model (Bakal et al., 1981; Bakal 
and Kaganov, 1977, 1979) was employed as the conceptual basis for subject selection. In the 
interests of ensuring some homogeneity of subjects, it was decided to select headache sufferers 
from the "milder" or "tension" end of the continuum. For this purpose, the exclusion criteria 
developed by Philips (1977) and also adopted by Janssen (1983) were employed. Prospective
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subjects were excluded from participation in the study on the basis of the presence of 
migrainous features in association with their usual headache. Headache sufferers were 
excluded if they met either of the following criteria:
1. They reported vomiting in association with their usual headache on more than 50% 
of occasions.
2. They reported one or more of the following features in association with their usual 
headache on more than 50% of occasions.
- Unilateral onset of headache.
- Nausea.
- Sensory prodromata.
Given the suggestion that oral contraceptives may exacerbate headache (e.g., Kudrow, 
1975), females using oral contraceptives were excluded from the study if they admitted to a 
worsening of headache at the time that they first began taking birth control tablets.
In addition to meeting the requirements of the above exclusion criteria, those subjects 
selected were also required to satisfy the following inclusion criteria:
1. They had been suffering from headaches for at least one year.
2. They estimated their headaches to occur on an average of at least 2 days per week.
3. They had made no change to their usual medication for headache in the past month.
4. They had not been involved in any relaxation training, meditation or other stress- 
management programme at any time during the previous 5 years.
5. They were not currently practising any relaxation or meditation technique.
6. They were aged between 18 and 65 years.
The criteria outlined above resulted in the selection of the 36 headache sufferers 
described at the beginning of this section.
All subjects selected were required to visit their local medical practitioner and obtain a 
certificate stating that, to their doctor's knowledge, there was no organic basis to their 
headaches, and no reason why they should not participate in a stress-management programme.
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Subjects were also required to pay a deposit of $10.00 which was refundable upon completion 
of the experiment.
Prospective subjects were recruited from the Canberra Community by means of 
newspaper articles and radio announcements, calling for headache sufferers to participate in a 
study designed to investigate the effectiveness of stress-management methods for headache. 
The specific details of each treatment were not released.
6.5.2. Measures.
In addition to the headache diary and Rationality Scale described previously, the Beck 
Depression and Trait-Anxiety Inventories were also administered pre-and post-treatment. 
These measures have been widely employed in the assessment of emotional distress and have 
been reported to possess satisfactory levels of reliability and validity (e.g., Anastasi, 1982; 
Beck, Steer, and Garbin, 1988; Bumberry, Oliver and McClure, 1978; Knight, Hendrika, 
Waal-Manning and Spears, 1983; Oliver and Burkham, 1979). These measures were included 
in the present study so as to allow for the examination of any relationship between anxiety, 
depression and rationality over the course of treatment
In order to examine whether or not the treatments differed in terms of non-specific 
variables such as expectations of success and perceived credibility, which have been 
implicated in the therapeutic process (Frank, 1961), subjects were asked to complete two 
visual analogue scales assessing these factors. On the first scale they were required to indicate 
the likelihood of their recommending the treatment to a friend also suffering from headache. 
On the second scale they indicated how important they thought it that the treatment be 
available to other headache sufferers (see Appendix D). These scales were administered after 
the first treatment session and at the post-treatment assessment. The method employed is 
similar to that described by Holroyd and Andrasik (1978).
6.5.3. Treatments.
The two treatments to be compared in the present study were rational-emotive therapy 
(Ellis, 1962, 1977a, b) and progressive relaxation training (Bernstein and Borkovec, 1979; 
Jacobson, 1938), each conducted in groups of five or six subjects. Each type cf treatment was 
delivered by the author, a graduate student in clinical psychology aged 26 years, with some 
previous experience in the application of rational-emotive therapy and progressive relaxation 
training in group settings.
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Each treatment comprised six weekly sessions, each of 75 minutes duration. Thus, each 
group of subjects received a total of 7 1/2 hours of therapist contact, which is comparable with 
the amount of contact offered to subjects in previous group treatment studies for headache 
(e.g., Figueroa, 1982; Holroyd and Andrasik, 1978).
Throughout both treatments, subjects recorded their headache activity and, where 
possible, they recorded the situation associated with headache onset (Bakal et al., 1981; 
Holroyd et al., 1977). Subjects receiving rational-emotive therapy were also asked to record 
any thoughts associated with those situations.
In the first session of each treatment, subjects were provided with a brief overview of 
the pathophysiology of tension and migraine headache. This was followed by a description of 
the relationship between stress and headache. In the progressive relaxation condition, a 
relationship between muscle tension and headache was emphasised. In the rational-emotive 
condition, the therapist focused upon the role of cognitive processes, particularly Ellis'(1962) 
ten irrational beliefs, in the generation of physiological responses likely to precipitate 
headache episodes.
The rational-emotive therapy followed the procedures outlined by Ellis and Grieger 
(1977) and Grieger and Boyd (1980). After being introduced to rational-emotive theory, 
subjects' thoughts regarding stressful events and headache were examined, with the therapist 
illustrating linkages between these thoughts and Ellis' (1962) irrational beliefs. Through such 
techniques as rational-emotive imagery, rational role reversal and role plays, as well as in the 
course of interacting with the therapist, subjects were taught how to detect irrational cognition 
and how to substitute it with more rational thoughts and self-statements (Ellis and Grieger, 
1977; Grieger and Boyd, 1980). Subjects were provided with homework exercises requiring 
them to analyse their thoughts during stressful encounters and to dispute any irrational 
thoughts.
Subjects receiving progressive relaxation training were provided with a 40-minute 
relaxation audio tape of the therapist delivering relaxation instructions along the lines specified 
by Jacobson (1938). Relaxation exercises were carried out during the sessions by the therapist, 
and subjects were asked to practise at home at least once per day. As treatment continued, 
subjects were weaned off the tape and taught how to abbreviate the procedure so as to allow 
relaxation to be achieved quickly and at the first indication of any increase in tension 
(Bernstein and Borkovec, 1979). Subjects were encouraged to apply their relaxation skills in 
every day situations of stress and at the onset of headache attacks (c.f. Goldfried and Trier,
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1974). The demand that subjects apply their relaxation skills in every day life was made so that 
the treatments were similar insofar as they both required the practise of newly acquired skills 
in daily life.
6.5.4. Procedure.
Prospective subjects telephoned the author at the Psychology Department, Australian 
National University and were interviewed by him in order to determine whether or not they 
met the criteria outlined in Section 6.5.1. Those subjects who failed to meet the selection 
criteria were thanked for their interest and were advised of locations within the community 
where they could expect to obtain stress-management training. Those subjects who did meet 
the selection criteria were told that two treatments were being offered, each known to be 
effective for headache, and that the purpose of the study was to determine whether one 
treatment was superior to the other. They were told that both treatments involved techniques of 
stress-management and that they would be conducted in small groups.
Subjects were kept unaware of the details of treatment until they presented for their first 
treatment session. They were not informed of the nature of the alternative treatment until after 
the collection of follow-up data, twelve weeks after the final treatment session.
During the initial telephone interview, subjects were informed that the study would be 
written-up as a thesis to be submitted to the University, but that full confidentiality would be 
maintained. They were told that they would be required to record their headaches for 4 weeks 
prior to treatment, throughout the course of treatment for two weeks after treatment and for a 
further two weeks three months after treatment.
The 36 subjects recruited by means of the above procedures were all sent letters 
informing them that they had been accepted into the study. These letters detailed the need for 
subjects to attend a pre-treatment assessment session to which they were asked to bring their 
medical certificates and deposit of $10.00. A form requiring subjects to give their written 
consent to participate in the study was also included with the letter. They were asked to bring 
the completed form to the pre-treatment assessment session. Subjects were subsequently 
telephoned to arrange appointments for this assessment
The pre-treatment assessments were conducted in groups of between five and ten 
subjects. The experimenter reiterated the purpose of the study, collected medical certificates 
and deposits and then administered the Irrational Beliefs Test, incorporating the Rationality 
Scale, and the Beck Depression Inventory.
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Subjects were informed that all treatment sessions would be held on four evenings of 
each week, and that they would be required to attend one of these treatment sessions each 
week for six weeks. Subjects were provided with a form detailing the days and times on which 
it was proposed to conduct the sessions and required to indicate those times at which they 
would be unable to attend because of scheduling difficulties.
The method of headache recording was explained and each subject was provided with 
six headache recording booklets, allowing for six weeks of continuous headache recordings. 
The importance of maintaining accurate records was impressed upon subjects. They were 
encouraged to keep a booklet with them at all times so that when a headache occurred, they 
could record its intensity on an hourly basis.
Subjects commenced their headache recordings immediately after the pre-treatment 
assessment. As soon as they had completed two weeks of recording, they were asked to return 
the completed booklets to the experimenter in stamped self-addressed envelopes which were 
provided. This material was used to match subjects on the number of hours for which headache 
was present. Thus, subjects were told that treatment could not begin until two weeks after all 
of them had returned the first two weeks of headache recording. All subjects returned the 
booklets promptly.
In order to match the headache sufferers on Beck Depression Scores and on the total 
number of headache hours suffered in the initial two week period, subjects were divided first 
into depressed and non-depressed groups on the basis of a median split on Beck Depression 
Scores. Those scoring at 6 or above were classified depressed; those scoring below 6 were 
classified non-depressed. Thus the median score fell towards the lower end of the Beck 
Depression Inventory. Scores of 8 or more on this inventory have been observed to be 
predictive of a poor response to relaxation training, while scores of 3 or less have been 
associated with better outcomes (Jacob et al., 1983). Since the obtained median score fell 
between these two figures, it was deemed an appropriate cut-off level.
Within each of these classifications subjects were then matched on the basis of the 
number of headache hours recorded on the two booklets returned by mail to the experimenter. 
As far as their schedules would allow, subjects within each matched pair were assigned to one 
of the two treatments on a random basis. As a result, 8 men and 10 women were assigned to 
each treatment.
The following two weeks of headache recording made by subjects served as the pre­
treatment baseline measure of headache activity (c.f. Blanchard, Andrasik, Neff, Arena et al., 
1982; Blanchard, Andrasik, Neff, Teders et al., 1982; Budzynski et al., 1970, 1973; Holroyd
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and Andrasik, 1978). Subjects continued to record headaches throughout the duration of 
treatment and for two weeks after treatment. Data from this latter period were employed in the 
determination of post-treatment measures of headache activity. Twelve weeks after the 
completion of treatment, subjects recorded their headaches for a further two weeks; this 
recording period allowing for follow-up measures of headache activity.
Subjects brought the headache recordings pertaining to the pre-treatment baseline with 
them to the first treatment session and returned them to the experimenter. Prior to the 
commencement of this session, the Irrational Beliefs Test, incorporating the Rationality Scale, 
and the Beck Depression Inventory were re-administered. The Trait Anxiety Inventory was 
also administered. These questionnaire responses were employed to assess pre-treatment levels 
of rationality, depression and anxiety. The same questionnaires were administered at the close 
of the final treatment session and thereby provided post-treatment measures of these same 
variables. Subjects were provided with enough headache recording booklets to last for the 
duration of treatment As they attended for treatment, they brought their completed headache 
recording booklets with them and passed these on to the experimenter. At the final treatment 
session, they were provided with two more booklets (required for the post-treatment 
assessment) and asked to return these completed booklets to the experimenter by mail. The 
follow-up measures of headache activity were obtained by sending booklets to subjects 
through the mail with an accompanying letter and stamped self-addressed envelope.
When the experimenter received the final set of headache diaries, the deposits of $10.00 
were returned to subjects by mail. During the pre-treatment, post-treatment and follow-up 
headache recording phases of the study, the experimenter maintained weekly telephone contact 
with subjects in an effort to maximise compliance.
6.6. RESULTS.
Of the 36 subjects who entered the study, three withdrew during the pre-treatment 
headache recording period. Two of these subjects (one male assigned to rational-emotive 
therapy, and one female assigned to relaxation training) claimed that their headaches were no 
longer a problem, while the third (assigned to rational-emotive therapy) said that he could not 
afford the time. Each of these subjects had completed the initial two-week headache recording 
period and returned their diaries to the experimenter. During the first three weeks of treatment 
one male and one female subject dropped out of each group. Thus by the post-treatment 
assessment phase, data on headache activity was available from 14 subjects in the rational- 
emotive treatment (9 females and 5 males) and from 15 subjects in the relaxation treatment (8 
females and 7 males). Follow-up data was available from 11 subjects in the rational-emotive
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treatment (6 females and 5 males) and from 12 subjects in the relaxation treatment (5 females 
and 7 males). Three females from each treatment failed to provide follow-up data. These 
observations indicate that the drop-out rate was very similar for both treatments.
The attrition of subjects from the study made it impossible to maintain the randomised 
block structure of the design. Accordingly, for the purpose of testing for the significance of 
differences between treatments, it was decided to analyse the experiment as a completely 
randomised design (Kirk, 1968).
Two subjects in the rational-emotive treatment group failed to complete the pre­
treatment measure of trait anxiety. Thus, analyses involving this variable involved fewer 
degrees of freedom.
The Beck Depression Inventory scores and the medication consumption scores, were 
observed to have skewed distributions. Since parametric statistics assume a normal distribution 
(Kirk, 1968), the obtained values were subjected to a natural logarithmic transformation prior 
to analysis.
6.6.1. Data Reduction.
The visual analogue headache intensity scale values were determined by measuring the 
distance from the left hand anchor point to the mark indicated by the subject. This was 
achieved by means of a bit-pad device which calculated the mean headache intensity of all 
headache hours recorded by the subject on any day when headache occurred. In this manner, 
the mean intensity of headaches was determined for each subject within the pre-treatment, 
post-treatment and follow-up periods. Headache frequency was determined by simply counting 
the number of days on which headache occurred within each of the recording periods and 
dividing the total by the number of weeks of recording in each period (2). The mean duration 
of headaches was determined by calculating, for each subject, the mean number of hours of 
headache recorded on days when headache occurred within each of the three specified periods.
6.6.2. Treatment Credibility Ratings.
Scores on the two treatment credibility rating scales were highly correlated. Ratings 
made at the end of the first treatment session correlated 0.94 (N = 33). Those made at the end 
of the final session correlated 0.91 (N = 29). Accordingly, in comparing the perceived 
credibility of the two treatments, it was decided to employ the mean of the two scale scores
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obtained for each subject. Two-tailed t-tests revealed no significant differences between the 
treatment groups (see Table 6-1).
Table 6-1
Mean Treatment Credibility Rating Scale Scores.
Session
Rational-Emotive
Therapy
Relaxation
Training t-value p-value
*
One 78.4 77.4 0.95 N.S.
(1.1) (1.0)
Six'1" 88.7 87.6 1.29 N.S.
(0.9) (0.8)
Indicates degrees of freedom = 31.
"•"Indicates degrees of freedom = 27.
Note: In the above table and in subsequent tables, N.S. indicates a result which fell
short of the p < 0.05 level. The standard deviations are given in brackets.
Thus, there were no significant differences between treatments in teims of subjects' 
credibility ratings.
6.6.3. Rationality Scale.
The reliability and validity of the Rationality Scale were evaluated by recourse to the 
data obtained when the scale was administered to subjects during the pre-treatment assessment 
and again at the commencement of the first treatment sessioa The scale was observed to have 
a test-retest reliability coefficient of 0.81 for the total score. Employing the data obtained in the 
initial administration, the scale was observed to have an internal consistency reliability 
coefficient (Cronbach, 1951) of 0.82. The construct validity of the scale was evaluated by 
correlating the total scores obtained at the initial administration with the total scores obtained 
for the remaining 88 items on the Irrational Beliefs Test. The product-moment correlation 
coefficient was r (36) = -0.48 (2-tailed p < 0.005).
As predicted by rational-emotive theory, scores on the Rationality Scale were found to 
be negatively correlated with scores on both the Beck Depression Inventory (r (36) = -0.46, 
2-tailed p < 0.005) and Trait Anxiety Inventory (r (34) = -0.52, 2-tailed p < 0.005).
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6.6.4. Planned Analyses.
The pre-treatment values of all variables studied were compared across the rational- 
emotive and progressive relaxation groups (for the 29 subjects who completed treatment) by 
means of t-tests. No significant differences between groups were observed (see Appendix E).
In an analysis of changes in variables occurring over time it is important to consider that 
pre-treatment, post-treatment and follow-up scores are almost invariably inter-correlated, 
suggesting that the pre-treatment variable values may be contributing to the magnitude of those 
values at subsequent assessments (Kinsman and Staudenmayer, 1978). Thus, minor variations 
in pre-treatment values could influence the significance of any differences between treatments 
observed at subsequent assessments (Kinsman and Staudenmayer, 1978). It has been suggested 
that this problem may be overcome by conducting an analysis of covariance on the post­
treatment and follow-up scores, with the pre-treatment scores as covariates (e.g., Benjamin, 
1967; Kinsman and Staudenmayer, 1978; Lord, 1963). Thus, it was decided to adopt this 
approach in the analysis of between treatment effects. Following this same logic, it was 
decided to determine the magnitude of correlations between pairs of variables assessed over 
the course of treatment, by correlating the post-treatment scores, and controlling any 
contribution of pre-treatment values by means of partial correlation analysis.
Within treatment effects on headache activity were examined by means of one-tailed 
paired t-tests on each of the dependent measures. One-tailed tests were carried out because the 
literature on the effects of progressive relaxation training and cognitive therapy suggest that 
these techniques are associated with improvements rather than with exacerbations of headache 
activity (e.g., Cox et al., 1975; Figueroa, 1982). Thus, since the direction of differences could 
be predicted, one-tailed tests were deemed appropriate (Welkowitz, Ewen and Cohen, 1976).
Since four dependent measures were employed in the assessment of headache activity 
analysing each separately would involve an inflation of the Type I error rate (Kirk, 1968). It 
was decided to control this error rate with the Bonferroni correction (Kirk, 1968). This 
involves splitting the nominal significance level of p = 0.05 between the number of 
comparisons made. Thus, for analyses involving headache activity, the Type I error rate was 
set at 0.05 /  4 = 0.0125. This probability level was termed the Bonferroni corrected Type I 
error rate, as distinct from the nominal Type I error rate (p = 0.05). For the examination of 
hypotheses involving a single dependent variable the nominal significance level was 
employed.
Given that reliance upon the Bonferroni corrected error rate results in a loss of power to 
detect significant differences, it was decided to examine each result for significance at both the
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Bonferroni corrected and nominal significance levels, but to be cautious about results which 
are significant only at the nominal level.
A multivariate approach to the analysis of between-groups effects was not employed in 
view of the observation that this technique is less powerful than the Bonferroni procedure 
(Bird, 1975).
Hypothesis 1.
The significance of any reductions in headache activity that occurred within each 
treatment group from pre-treatment to post-treatment, and from pre-treatment to follow-up, 
were evaluated by means of one-tailed paired t-tests. At the post-treatment assessment, 
subjects receiving rational-emotive therapy demonstrated reductions in headache frequency 
and intensity which were significant at the Bonferroni corrected level (p < 0.0125). The 
reductions in headache duration and medication consumption were significant only at the 
nominal level (p < 0.05). This pattern of results persisted at the follow-up assessment except 
that the result for medication consumption was no longer significant at the nominal level (see 
Tables 6-2 and 6-3).
Table 6-2
Pre-Treatment to Post-Treatment Changes in Headache Activity for the Rational-Emotive
Group (N = 14).
Headache
Activity
Pre-Treatment 
Mean
Post-Treatment
Mean
Paired 
t-value p-value
Frequency 5.21 3.36 3.88 0.001
(1.57) (2.18)
Intensity 20.20 12.51 3.87 0.001
(12.37) (10.63)
Duration 7.60 5.80 1.86 0.043
(4.06) (3.98)
Medication* 1.91 1.32 1.87 0.042
(1.41) (1.33)
Inspection of the distributions of the pre-treatment, post-treatment and follow-up*4^
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medication scores revealed these to be skewed. Thus, the transformation: In 
(Medication Score + 1) was carried out on these scores. All medication scores entered 
in subsequent tables were transformed in this manner.
Table 6-3
Pre-Treatment to Follow-up Changes in Headache Activity 
for the Rational-Emotive Group (N = 11).
Headache
Activity
Pre-Treatment
Mean
Follow-up
Mean
Paired
t-value p-value
Frequency 4.73 2.50 5.40 0.001
(1.40) (0.98)
Intensity 22.96 17.66 2.71 0.011
(12.63) (12.97)
Duration 7.23 5.57 2.28 0.046
(4.48) (2.97)
Medication 1.87 1.46 1.55 N.S.
(1.54) (1.05)
For the subjects receiving progressive relaxation training, the reductions in headache 
frequency were significant at the Bonferroni corrected level at both the post-treatment and 
follow-up assessments. For the remaining dimensions of headache activity, no reductions were 
significant at the nominal level (see Tables 6-4 and 6-5).
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Table 6-4
Pre-Treatment to Post-Treatment Changes in Headache 
Activity for the Relaxation Group (N = 15).
Headache
Activity
Pre-Treatment
Mean
Post-Treatment
Mean
Paired
t-value p-value
Frequency 4.50 2.47 4.48 0.001
(1.72) (2.22)
Intensity 17.76 17.45 0.11 N.S.
(12.64) (13.94)
Duration 7.57 7.38 0.27 N.S.
(3.18) (4.17)
Medication 1.64 1.16 1.69 0.056
(1.22) (1.21)
Table 6-5
Pre-Treatment to Follow-up Changes in Headache Activity 
for the Relaxation Group (N = 12).
Headache
Activity
Pre-Treatment
Mean
Follow-up
Mean
Paired
t-value p-value
Frequency 4.67 2.75 3.81 0.003
(1.50) (2.34)
Intensity 17.66 17.44 0.07 N.S.
(14.04) (14.16)
Duration 7.75 7.85 -0.09 N.S.
(3.50) (4.42)
Medication 1.71 1.37 1.34 N.S.
(1.33) (1.26)
Thus, adopting the conservative Bonferroni decision rule, the hypothesis that each 
treatment would lead to diminutions in headache activity was supported with respect to 
headache frequency for both treatments and with respect to headache intensity for rational-
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emotive therapy. The hypothesis was not supported with respect to reductions in headache 
duration or medication consumption.
Hypothesis 2.
The significance of any differences between treatments in their capacity to reduce 
headache activity was evaluated by means of analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) on the post- 
treatment and follow-up scores, employing the pre-treatment scores as covariates. The 
hypothesis that rational-emotive therapy would be superior to relaxation training in reducing 
headache activity was not supported for any headache measure when the Bonferroni correction 
was employed (p > 0.0125). Employing the nominal decision rule, a greater reduction in 
headache intensity was observed to occur for the rational-emotive than for the relaxation group 
(p < 0.05) at post-treatment, but this was not maintained at the 12-week follow-up (see Tables 
6-6 and 6-7 where the means are adjusted for the covariates). Accordingly, it was concluded 
that there was no clearly significant difference between the treatments in their capacity to 
reduce headache activity (see Appendix F for the ANCOVA summary tables).
Table 6-6
Adjusted Post-Treatment Mean Headache Activity Scores for Rational-Emotive 
Therapy and Relaxation Training Groups (N = 29).
Headache
Activity
Rational-Emotive 
Adj. Mean
Relaxation 
Adj. Mean
F-value 
(df=l, 26) p-value
Frequency 3.06 2.75 0.21 N.S.
Intensity 11.60 18.32 4.34 0.047
Duration 5.79 7.39 1.94 N.S.
Medication 1.32 1.16 0.08 N.S.
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Table 6-7
Adjusted Follow-Up Mean Headache Activity Scoresfor Rational-Emotive Therapy and 
Relaxation Training Groups (N = 23).
Headache
Activity
Rational-Emotive 
Adj. Mean
Relaxation 
Adj. Mean
F-value 
(df=l, 20) p-value
Frequency 2.48 2.77 0.21 N.S.
Intensity 15.53 19.40 0.99 N.S.
Duration 5.74 7.71 2.47 N.S.
Medication 1.46 1.37 0.00 N.S.
Hypothesis 3.
The significance of any increase in Rationality Scale scores over the course of rational- 
emotive therapy was evaluated through a comparison of the pre-treatment and post-treatment 
mean rationality scores, with a one-tailed paired t-test. A trend for the post-treatment 
rationality scores (mean = 32.71; S.D. = 8.37) to be greater than the pre-treatment scores 
(mean = 29.93; S.D. = 6.21) was observed, but this fell short of the 0.05 significance level (t 
(13) = 1.64; p = 0.06). Thus, the increase in Rationality Scores over the course of rational- 
emotive therapy only bordered on significance and cannot, therefore, be regarded as clear-cut.
Hypothesis 4.
It was hypothesised that rational-emotive therapy would lead to greater increases in 
Rationality Scale scores than progressive relaxation training. An analysis of covariance 
(employing the pre-treatment scores as covariates) revealed no significant difference (F (1, 26) 
= 0.02; p > 0.05) between the rational-emotive therapy (adjusted mean = 30.45) and 
progressive relaxation (adjusted mean = 30.24) conditions on this variable (the means are 
adjusted for the covariates; see Appendix G for the ANCOVA summary table). Thus, the 
results did not support the hypothesis.
95
Hypothesis 5.
Second order partial correlations (controlling for pre-treatment scores) between post- 
treatemnt rationality scores and post-treatment headache activity scores were calculated for 
each treatment.
There was no evidence to support the hypothesised correlation between reductions in 
headache activity and increases in rationality. All correlations fell short of both the Bonferroni 
corrected (p > 0.0125) and nominal (p > 0.05) significance levels (see Table 6-8).
Table 6-8
Partial Correlations: Post-Treatment Rationality Scores with Post-Treatment Headache
Activity Measures.
Headache
Activity
Rational-Emotive (N=14) 
r(df=10)
Relaxation (N=15) 
r (df=ll)
Frequency -0.37 -0.19
Intensity -0.17 -0.01
Duration -0.32 0.25
Medication 0.05 -0.15
Hypothesis 6.
It was hypothesised that reductions in Beck Depression and Trait Anxiety scores would 
be correlated significantly with increases in Rationality Scale scores within both treatments. 
Inspection of the distributions of the pre-treatment and post-treatment Beck Depression Scale 
Scores revealed these to be skewed. Thus, the transformation In (Beck Depression Score + 1) 
was carried out.
Second order partial correlations (controlling pre-treatment scores) between post- 
treatment rationality scores and post-treatment Beck Depression and Trait Anxiety scores were 
calculated. The Type I error rate was set at 0.05. Significant partial correlations for post­
treatment Rationality Scale scores with post-treatment Beck Depression scores (r (10) = -0.66; 
one-tailed p = 0.01) and post-treatment Trait Anxiety scores (r (8) = -0.54); one-tailed p =
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0.05) were observed for the rational-emotive treatment. However, for the relaxation treatment, 
these partial correlations were not significant, being r (10) = -0.165 and r (8) = -0.29 (one- 
tailed p > 0.05) respectively.
Thus, the results from the rational-emotive treatment were supportive of the 
hypothesised correlations between increases in rationality and reductions in anxiety and 
depression. The results from the relaxation treatment were not supportive of this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7.
The significance of any difference between the treatments in their capacity to reduce 
scores on the Beck Depression and Trait Anxiety Inventories was evaluated by analyses of 
covariance on the post-treatment scores for each variable, with the respective pre-treatment 
scores as covariates. The Type I error rate was set at 0.05. The hypothesis that rational-emotive 
therapy would be associated with greater reductions in anxiety and depression than relaxation 
training was not supported (see Table 6-9 where the means are adjusted for the covariates; see 
Appendix G for the ANCOVA summary table).
Table 6-9
Adjusted Post-treatment Mean Beck Depression and Trait Anxiety Scores for Rational- 
Emotive Therapy and Relaxation Training Groups (N = 29).
Dependent
Variable
Rational-Emotive 
Adj. Mean
Relaxation 
Adj. Mean F-value p-value
Beck
Depression 1.21 1.64 2.54 N.S.
Trait
Anxiety+ 35.68 37.60 0.60 N.S.
i|c
Indicates degrees of freedom = 1,26.
+Indicates degrees of freedom = 1, 24 (two subjects in the rational-emotive group failed 
to complete the pre-treatment Trait Anxiety Inventory).
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6.6.5. Supplementary Analyses.
Pre-Treatment Relationships Between Psychological Measures and Headache Activity.
Within the pre-treatment data (N = 36), relationships between rationality and headache 
activity were evaluated by correlating Rationality Scale scores with headache frequency (r (34) 
= -0.24), intensity (r (34) = 0.13), duration (r (34) = 0.11) and medication consumption (r (34) 
= -0.26). None of these correlations were significant (2-tailed p > 0.05).
Relationships Between Changes in Anxiety and Depression and Changes in Headache 
Activity.
In order to investigate relationships between changes in headache activity and changes 
in emotional distress over the course of treatment, second order partial correlations (controlling 
for pre-treatment scores) between post-treatment headache activity scores and post-treatment 
Trait Anxiety and Beck Depression scores were calculated. None of these partial correlations 
were significant at the Bonferroni corrected level (p > 0.0125). The partial correlations 
between changes in headache frequency and changes in depression and anxiety were positive 
and significant at the nominal level (p < 0.05) for the relaxation treatment, but no other partial 
correlations were significant by this criterion (see Tables 6-10 and 6-11). Thus, taking account 
of the inflated Type I error rate which occurs when more than a single statistical test is applied, 
the results can only be regarded as tentatively suggestive of a relationship between changes in 
anxiety and depression and changes in headache frequency for subjects receiving progressive 
relaxation training.
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Table 6-10
Partial Correlations: Post-Treatment Trait .Anxiety Scores with 
Post-Treatment Headache Activity Measures.
Rational-Emotive (N=14) Relaxation (N=15)
Headache
H e
p-value p-value*
Activity r (df=8) r (df=ll)
Frequency 0.34 N.S. 0.55 0.05
Intensity -0.03 N.S. 0.15 N.S.
Duration 0.03 N.S. -0.15 N.S.
Medication 0.14 N.S. 0.35 N.S.
H *  #
Indicates a 2-tailed p-value.
Table 6-11
Partial Correlations: Post-Treatment Beck Depression Scores with
Post-Treatment Headache Activity Measures.
Rational-Emotive (N=14) Relaxation (N=15)
Headache
H e
p-value
H e
p-value
Activity r (df=10) r (df=ll)
Frequency 0.18 N.S. 0.63 0.02
Intensity 0.12 N.S: 0.06 N.S.
Duration 0.21 N.S. -0.29 N.S.
Medication 0.14 N.S. 0.12 N.S.
%
Indicates a two-tailed p-value.
Relationships Between Pre-Treatment Depression Scores and Outcome on Headache Activitv
Measures.
High pre-treatment scores on the Beck Depression Inventory have been reported to be 
associated with poorer outcomes from relaxation training for tension headache (e.g., Jacob et
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al., 1983). Thus, it was decided to investigate the predictive role of pre-treatment depression 
scores by calculating first order partial correlations between this measure and post-treatment 
and follow-up headache activity measures (controlling for pre-treatment headache activity 
scores). Employing two-tailed tests, all correlations fell short of both the Bonferroni corrected 
(p > 0.0125) and nominal (p > 0.05) significance levels (see Tables 6-12 and 6-13).
Table 6-12
Partial Correlations: Pre-Treatment Beck Depression Scores 
with Post-Treatment Headache Activity Measures.
Headache
Activity
Rational-Emotive (N=14) 
r(d f= ll)
Relaxation (N=15) 
r(df=12)
Frequency 0.14 -0.32
Intensity 0.00 0.08
Duration 0.05 0.30
Medication -0.47 0.37
Table 6-13
Partial Correlations: Pre-Treatment Beck Depression Scores with 
Follow-Up Headache Activity Measures.
Headache Rational-Emotive (N=l 1) Relaxation (N=12)
Activity r (df=8) r (df=9)
Frequency -0.49 -0.06
Intensity 0.15 -0.07
Duration -0.10 -0.46
Medication -0.32 -0.04
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These results indicate that there was no significant correlation between pre-treatment 
Beck Depression scores and outcome on the various measures of headache activity for either 
treatment group.
Effect of Treatments on Anxiety and Depression.
The effects of each treatment on Beck Depression and Trait Anxiety scores was 
evaluated by testing the significance of the difference between pre- and post-treatment scores 
by means of two-tailed t-tests. The Type I error rate was set at 0.05. Significant reductions in 
anxiety and depression occurred in the rational-emotive group (see Table 6-14) but not in the 
relaxation group (see Table 6-15). There was a trend towards a lowering of Trait Anxiety 
within the relaxation group but this did not reach significance.
Table 6-14
Mean Beck Depression and Trait Anxiety Scores for 
Rational-Emotive Group (N = 14).
Variable Pre-Treatment 
Mean
Post-Treatment
Mean
Paired 
t-value
2-tailed
p-value
Beck 1.88 1.21 2.98 0.011
Depression (0.96) (1.09)
Trait 43.58 36.25 3.13 0.010
Anxiety* (10.40) (6.96)
^Indicates degrees of freedom =13.
+Indicates degrees of freedom =11.
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Table 6-15
Mean Beck Depression and Trait Anxiety Scores for Relaxation Group (N = 15).
Variable Pre-Treatment
Mean
Post-Treatment
Mean
Paired 
t-value
2-tailed
p-value
Beck 1.88 1.63 1.43 N.S.
Depression (0.77) (0.75)
Trait 41.33 37.15 1.92 0.08
Anxiety (9.85) (8.26)
*
Indicates degrees of freedom = 14.
6.7. DISCUSSION.
The results obtained in the present study were not supportive of a rational-emotive 
conceptualisation of the relationship between stress and recurrent headache. There was a 
suggestion that at the post-treatment assessment, rational-emotive therapy was superior to 
relaxation training in reducing headache intensity, but this difference was not maintained at the 
12-week follow-up assessment. Furthermore, the result for headache intensity at post-treatment 
was not significant when the Bonferroni correction was applied. On all other aspects of 
headache activity, no differences between treatments were observed at any stage of the 
experiment Contrary to expectations, reductions in headache activity occurring within the 
rational-emotive group were not associated with increases in rationality to any significant 
extent. Similar results were observed for the relaxation group.
The fact that pre-treatment measures of rationality and headache activity were not 
correlated significantly, whilst high negative correlations between the former variable and 
measures of anxiety and depression were observed suggests that, although rationality may be 
related to emotional distress, it may have little to do with headache. This does not augur well 
for a rational-emotive conceptualisation of any relationship between stressful events and 
headache.
The increase in rationality which occurred in the rational-emotive group fell just short of 
significance and was not significantly greater than the increase in the relaxation group. 
However, in spite of the limited effect of rational-emotive therapy on rationality, significant 
reductions in headache frequency and intensity were observed for this treatment at the post-
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treatment and follow-up assessments. Furthermore, within the relaxation treatment, where the 
focus was not upon rationality, a significant reduction in headache frequency occurred, this 
result being maintained at the follow-up assessment. This pattern of findings does not support 
the notion that there exists any firm linkage between rationality and headache activity. 
However, it is possible that such a relationship does exist, but that the Rationality Scale was 
insensitive to those aspects of rationality that may be involved. For example, rational-emotive 
therapy may have increased the level of rational thinking in situations associated specifically 
with headache onset or increases in headache intensity, without such an increase being 
registered on the Rationality Scale. However, the fact that, in the present study, there was no 
significant difference between the effects of relaxation training and rational-emotive therapy 
on headache activity tends to argue against the view that the degree of rationality plays a 
significant role in the aetiology and / or maintenance of headache. Rather, it would seem that if 
some cognitive process did play a role in the observed treatment effects, such a process is 
likely to have been altered to a similar extent by both treatments. That is, some cognitive 
change common to both treatments might underlie the observed reductions in headache 
activity.
It would seem difficult to argue that the absence of significant correlations between 
changes in rationality and changes in headache frequency and duration over the course of 
rational-emotive therapy was due to the small number of subjects involved in this treatment 
The respective correlations were -0.37 and -0.32. They were in the predicted direction but were 
not significant However, the number of subjects in this treatment was adequate for the 
identification of significant correlations between rationality and depression and between 
rationality and trait anxiety over the course of rational-emotive therapy, as predicted by the 
rational-emotive model (Ellis, 1962, 1977a, b). Although a significant relationship between 
rationality and emotional distress was evident during rational-emotive therapy, consistent with 
the view that rationality may mediate improvements in emotional distress during this treatment 
(Ellis, 1962; 1977a, b), no such significant relationship between rationality and headache 
activity was found. This undermines the hypothesis that rationality plays a significant role in 
the aetiology or maintenance of recurrent headache.
The significant correlations observed between rationality and anxiety and depression 
over the course of rational-emotive treatment are consistent with the rational-emotive theory of 
emotional disturbance. Against the theory, however, is the absence of any such significant 
relationships within the relaxation treatment group. The latter observation suggests that any 
alterations in the level of emotional distress need not be necessarily related to alterations in 
rationality. However, Smith (1983) observed changes in anxiety and depression, occurring in 
subjects placed in waiting list control or relaxation plus supportive counselling groups, to be 
correlated significantly with changes in irrational beliefs as assessed by the Idea Inventory
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(Kassinove et al., 1977). Smith (1983) suggested that these results could have been due to a 
confounding of items on the Idea Inventory with those on the measures of emotional distress. 
In the present study, efforts were made to avoid such confounding. This may account for the 
absence of significant correlations of Rationality Scale scores with scores on the Beck 
Depression or Trait Anxiety Inventories over the course of relaxation training.
Within the relaxation treatment, reductions in headache frequency were associated with 
reductions in anxiety and depression. These findings are difficult to interpret, given that no 
such relationships were observed within the rational-emotive group. However, the results 
could indicate that the capacity of relaxation training to reduce headache frequency may be 
limited by the extent to which this treatment generates alterations in emotional distress. Such a 
suggestion must be considered very speculative until further research is conducted.
Unlike Jacob et al (1983), no significant correlation between reductions in headache 
activity and pre-treatment Beck Depression scores was noted for the subjects receiving 
relaxation training. Unfortunately, Jacob et al (1983) provided little in the way of detail 
concerning their progressive relaxation training programme. In the present study, subjects 
receiving relaxation training were encouraged to apply their newly acquired skills in specific 
situations and to thereby employ the technique as a coping skill (Goldfried and Trier, 1974). 
This active approach to relaxation training may have challenged depressed subjects' view of 
themselves as helpless in the face of their headaches to a greater extent than the procedures of 
Jacob et al (1983), and this may have weakened the predictive power of pre-treatment Beck 
Depression scores.
Unlike the rational-emotive treatment described in the present study, which focused 
specifically on rationality, previous cognitive treatment studies have employed a range of 
techniques including imagery, coping self-statements, and cognitive re-appraisal, as well as 
emphasising the alteration of irrational beliefs (e.g., Holroyd and Andrasik, 1978; Holroyd et 
al., 1977). Thus, it is possible that the treatment effects reported for cognitive therapy could 
stem from the acquisition of specific cognitive coping skills' or from the restructuring of 
cognitive appraisal processes other than rationality.
Holroyd and Andrasik (1978) required subjects to record their thoughts in situations 
associated with emotional distress or headache. These subjects were then assigned either to a 
treatment designed to teach specific relaxation and cognitive coping skills or to a headache 
discussion group, which focused on the historical roots of their headaches and did not include 
the presentation of any coping skills for dealing with stress or headache. Relative to a control 
group, who simply recorded their headaches but not their cognitive responses, subjects in the 
two experimental conditions demonstrated significant reductions in headache frequency,
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intensity and duration. These effects were maintained at a 6-week follow-up assessment. There 
were no significant differences between the two experimental conditions on any measure of 
headache activity. Holroyd and Andrasik (1978) concluded that it may be the self-monitoring 
of cognitive responses which is the essential therapeutic ingredient in cognitive therapy for 
headache. They noted, however, that all but one of the subjects in the headache discussion 
group developed their own cognitive strategies (e.g., imagery or praying) for dealing with 
stress and headache. Holroyd and Andrasik (1978) suggested that providing subjects with a 
causal account of their headaches may have led them to believe that they possess the ability to 
manage their headaches themselves.
In the present study the treatments emphasised that subjects had the potential to master 
their headaches. A number of authors have argued that the provision of a rationale for the 
origin and treatment of clients' difficulties contributes to their sense of mastery over the 
problem, and is an essential feature of any effective psychotherapy (e.g., Bandura, 1977; 
Frank, 1961; Murray and Jacobson, 1978). For example, Frank (1961, pp. 328-330) has 
pointed out that:
"The therapeutic rationale, finally, enables the patient to make sense of his 
symptoms. Since he often views them as inexplicable, which increases their 
ominousness, being able to name and explain them in terms of an over-reaching 
conceptual scheme is in itself powerfully reassuring. The first step in gaining 
control of any phenomenon is to give it a name... all successful therapies 
implicitly or explicitly change the patient's image of himself as a person who is 
overwhelmed by his symptoms and problems to that of one who can master 
them... as a result, he becomes able to tackle the problems he had been avoiding 
and to experiment with new, better ways of handling them".
Bandura (1977) has referred to the degree of mastery that a person believes he or she 
has over a particular problem or situation as self-efficacy. Increases in self-efficacy have been 
found to be associated with reductions in phobic symptoms (Bandura, 1977, 1982) increased 
tolerance for experimental pain (Dolce, Doleys et al., 1986; Vallis and Bucher, 1986), reduced 
ratings of arthritic pain severity (Shoor and Holman, 1984) and with better outcomes from 
chronic pain management programmes (Dolce, Crocker and Doleys, 1986; Dolce, Crocker, 
Moletteire and Doleys, 1986; Kores, Murphy, Rosenthal, Ellias and Rosenthal, 1985). 
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that perceived self-efficacy to withstand pain 
may be related to the functioning of the endogenous pain inhibitory system (Bandura, O'Leary, 
Taylor, Gauthier and Gossard, 1987) which has been implicated in the aetiology of headache 
attacks (e.g., Lance, 1982; Sicuteri, 1982).
Thus, with respect to the present study, outcomes from both rational-emotive therapy 
and relaxation training could have been mediated by increases in self-efficacy to reduce 
emotional distress and headache in stressful situations, rather than by increases in rationality.
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Bandura (1977, 1982) has postulated that the level of self-efficacy is an important 
determinant of the extent to which individuals will persist in their efforts to cope with stressful 
situations. Appraisal processes related to self-efficacy, such as the extent to which the 
individual believes that he or she can control a given situation, have been observed to be 
related to coping behaviour (e.g., Folkman and Lazarus, 1980; Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel- 
Schetter, De Longis and Gmen, 1986; Parkes, 1984). Both appraisal and coping have been 
found to be related to emotional responses (e.g., Aldwin and Revenson, 1987; Folkman and 
Lazarus, 1986, 1988). Thus, an examination of these concepts may shed light on the nature of 
the relationship between stress and headache.
In the next chapter, the concepts of self-efficacy, appraisal and coping are elaborated. A 
conceptual model, proposing that these constructs operate as intervening variables, mediating 
the relationship between stressful events and headache, is developed and subjected to 
empirical examination.
6.8. SUMMARY.
Study I was concerned with evaluating the role of rationality, defined as the acceptance 
of oneself, others and the environment, in the aetiology and /  or maintenance of headache. 
Following the rational-emotive model of human distress (Ellis, 1962, 1977a, b), wherein the 
magnitude of the emotional response to stressors is considered to be a function of the extent to 
which the individual's belief system is irrational, increases in rationality were postulated to 
mediate outcome from rational-emotive and progressive relaxation treatments for headache. 
The results obtained did not support this hypothesis. Rational-emotive therapy was no more 
effective in producing lasting improvements in headache frequency, duration, intensity or 
medication intake than progressive relaxation training. Furthermore, within each treatment, 
changes in headache activity were not correlated significantly with alterations in rationality. It 
was concluded that rationality may not make a significant contribution to headache attacks.
In the rational-emotive treatment, significant reductions in headache frequency and 
intensity were observed to occur and to be maintained at the 12-week follow-up assessment. In 
the progressive relaxation treatment significant reductions in headache frequency only, were 
observed at the post-treatment and 12-week follow-up assessments. It was suggested that these 
reductions in headache activity may have been mediated by increases in self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1977, 1982, 1986) which may have followed from the acquisition of skills for the 
management of stressful events and headache.
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CHAPTER 7
STUDY n
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SELF-EFFICACY, STRESS, APPRAISAL, 
COPING AND HEADACHE: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY.
7.1. INTRODUCTION.
7.1.1. The Concept of Self-Efficacv.
The term self-efficacy, as defined by Bandura (1977, 1986), has been discussed in 
previous chapters of this thesis. The purpose of the present section is to attempt some 
clarification of the concept by raising the question of the tenability of the distinction between 
efficacy expectations and outcome expectations (Eastman and Marzillier, 1984; Marzillier and 
Eastman, 1984).
Bandura (1977, p. 193) defines an outcome expectation as "...a person's estimate that a 
given behaviour will lead to certain outcomes", and an efficacy expectation as "...the 
conviction that one can successfully execute the behaviour required to produce the outcomes." 
He is very concerned to maintain this distinction, so as to argue that his concept of self- 
efficacy is distinct from Rotter's (1966) concept of locus of control. This latter concept was 
introduced into psychology in an effort to distinguish persons who perceive reinforcement as 
contingent upon their own actions (internal locus of control) from those who believe that such 
outcomes occur independently of their own actions, being determined by factors outside their 
own scope of influence (external locus of control) (Rotter, 1966).
Bandura (1977, p. 204) states that locus of control refers to beliefs about "action- 
outcome contingencies", and that what is being defined is an outcome expectation. He argues 
that the concept cannot be regarded as synonymous with self-efficacy because "...people who 
regard outcomes as personally determined, but who lack the requisite skills would experience 
low self-efficacy" (Bandura, 1977, p. 204). That is, they would perceive themselves as lacking 
the capability to influence their situation. However, it would seem equally true that persons
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who believe that they possess the skills to execute a particular behaviour, but who also believe 
that the execution of that behaviour pattern would have no effect on their environment, would 
similarly perceive themselves as incapable of influencing their situation, and could thus be 
regarded as being low in self-efficacy. In both scenarios the person would experience low self- 
efficacy, albeit for different reasons.
It would appear that far from being independent of self-efficacy, expectations about 
outcome are crucial determinants of the level of self-efficacy. However, this hardly implies 
that self-efficacy is a redundant concept. Rather, self-efficacy, as defined by Bandura (1977), 
is a function of both the extent to which outcomes are perceived to be personally determined 
and the extent to which it is believed that one is in possession of the skills to effect the 
outcome. Problems arise for Bandura (1977) when he attempts to speak of outcome 
expectations as independent of perceived capabilities.
As Teasdale (1978, pp. 211-212) has pointed out:
"By including the words "successfully" and "required to produce the outcomes" 
in his definition of efficacy expectations, Bandura combines belief about ability 
to make a response with expectations concerning the outcome of the response..."
Nevertheless, Bandura (1978) has persisted with his argument that efficacy and outcome 
expectations are conceptually distinct, but his position is not defensible. He has argued that:
"...the expectation that one can jump 6 feet is an efficacy judgement; the social 
recognition, applause, trophies and self-satisfactions anticipated for a 
performance constitute outcome judgements" (Bandura, 1978, p. 240).
However, this distinction between outcome expectations and efficacy expectations is 
entirely arbitrary and question-begging. As Eastman and Marzillier (1984, p. 220) point out, 
"When is an outcome part of a behaviour pattern and when is it an outcome in the Bandura 
sense?"
Jumping 6 feet could be regarded as an outcome expectation following from the efficacy 
expectation that one can approach the jump at the correct speed. Approaching the jump at the 
correct speed, could be conceived as an outcome expectation following from the efficacy 
expectation that one can execute the appropriate muscle movements. However, this constitutes 
an infinite regress, wherein, any behaviour can be labelled an outcome expectation, with its 
antecedents labelled efficacy expectations. As Wolpe (1978) has pointed out, on this logic, 
efficacy expectations reduce quickly to judgements regarding our capability to perform the 
motor components of an act, thereby trivialising the concept. Although Bandura (1978, p. 241)
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insists that "...one must not confuse efficacy judgements with trivial skeletal movements", it is 
difficult to appreciate how this can be achieved when he insists that efficacy and outcome 
expectations are conceptually distinct.
It would appear impossible to conceive of an appraisal of one's capacity to perform a 
given task which does not take account of outcome expectations. The confidence that one has 
in one's capacity to reach a certain level of task performance surely requires that one be 
cognisant of that level of performance for which one is striving (i.e., the outcome). The 
efficacy expectation requires the anticipation of task completion and, therefore, involves an 
outcome expectation. Efficacy expectations cannot be formulated without reference to 
outcome and it is, therefore, absurd to speak of an efficacy judgement as independent of any 
consideration of outcome.
Thus, for the purposes of Study II, which is concerned with an exploration of the 
relationship between self-efficacy and recurrent headache, Bandura's definition of self-efficacy 
as "the conviction that one can successfully execute the behaviour required to produce the 
outcome" (Bandura, 1977, p. 193) will be accepted. However, outcome expectations will be 
regarded as essential features of self-efficacy (Eastman and Marzillier, 1984; Kirsch, 1985; 
Marzillier and Eastman, 1984).
7.1.2. Self-Efficacv and Headache.
In order to study relationships between self-efficacy and headache it is necessary to 
specify those kinds of efficacy expectations that are likely to have implications for the 
disorder. The evidence reviewed in Chapter 4 suggests that self-control procedures, such as 
relaxation training, biofeedback and cognitive therapy, do occasion improvements in recurrent 
headache. If, as was suggested in the last chapter, these procedures produce their effects by 
altering efficacy expectations, the focus of this increase in self-efficacy may be upon headache 
sufferers’ perceived capability to exercise self-control responses in the face of stressful events 
and headache. The self-control therapies have emphasised control over cognitive, behavioural 
and affective responses by means of cognitive therapy (e.g., Figueroa, 1982; Holroyd and 
Andrasik, 1978), relaxation training (e.g., Chesney and Shelton, 1976) or biofeedback (e.g., 
Budzynski et al., 1973; Daly et al., 1983). Such control may mitigate against the occurrence of 
headache in the face of stressful events. The term self-control-efficacy shall be employed to 
refer to the individual's perceived capacity to exercise self-control over cognitive, behavioural 
and affective responses.
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The relationship between life events and emotional and physical distress has been the 
subject of much research over the last twenty years. However, as a number of authors have 
pointed out, the strength of the relationship between stressful events and measures of 
psychological or somatic functioning has tended to be weak, with stressful events typically 
accounting for less than 10% of the variance in measures of emotional and physical distress 
(e.g., Andrews and Tennant, 1978; Elliott and Eisdorfer, 1982; Nezu and Ronan, 1985; Rabkin 
and Struening, 1976). It has been shown that many people do not develop psychological or 
physical symptoms despite exposure to stressful events (Kobasa, 1979). Furthermore, from a 
theoretical perspective, the identification of a relationship between life events and 
psychological and physical health does not, in itself, shed light on the psychological processes 
that may mediate such a link. These concerns have led a number of researchers to hypothesise 
that the impact of stressful events on the individual's well-being may be buffered or moderated 
by psychological and /  or social resources (e.g., Kobasa, Maddi and Kahn, 1982; Pearlin and 
Schooler, 1978; Wethington and Kessler, 1986).
Johnson and Sarason (1978) found that the correlation of the severity of undesirable life 
events with depression and anxiety was greater for subjects with an external locus of control 
than for those with an internal locus of control. Employing a multiple regression analysis, 
Krause (1985) observed an interaction between locus of control and the frequency of 
undesirable life events in the prediction of depression. Once again, subjects with an external 
locus of control demonstrated strong relationships between the frequency of undesirable events 
and the severity of depression. Thus, it was concluded in each of these studies that, locus of 
control buffers or moderates the strength of the relationship between stressful events and well­
being (Johnson and Sarason, 1978; Krause, 1985).
Aspects of personality such as hardiness (Kobasa, 1979; Kobasa et al., 1982) and 
mastery (Pearlin and Schooler, 1978) have also been implicated in the buffering process.
Hardiness has been conceptualised as a multidimensional construct comprising 
commitment to one's goals, the belief that outcomes are within one's scope of influence, and 
the tendency to appraise change as a challenge rather than as a threat (Kobasa et al., 1982).
The concept of mastery has been defined in terms very similar to those used to 
characterise an internal locus of control:
"Mastery ... concerns the extent to which one regards one's life-changes as being
under one's own control in contrast to being fatalistically ruled" (Pearlin and
Schooler, 1978, p. 114).
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Given that stressful events are widely regarded as the most common precipitants of 
headache attacks (e.g., Friedman et al., 1954; Selby and Lance, 1960; Henryk-Gutt and Rees, 
1973), and given also that self-control therapies have been found to reduce headache activity 
(e.g., Budzynski et al., 1973; Cox et al., 1975; Figueroa, 1982), self-control-efficacy may 
moderate the strength of any relationship between the frequency of stressful events and the 
frequency of headache. This chapter is concerned with an investigation of this hypothesis. The 
instrument developed to assess self-control-efficacy is described in a later section.
It has been suggested that the relationship between psychological resources (such as 
mastery or locus of control) and well-being may be mediated by the processes of appraisal and 
coping (Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen and De Longis, 1986; Parkes, 1984). The following section 
is concerned with these mediational processes.
7.1.3. Appraisal and Coping.
According to Lazarus and his colleagues (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, De 
Longis and Gruen, 1986; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b), it is the way in which an individual 
appraises a situation that determines coping actions, with both appraisal and coping 
contributing to subsequent well-being. The distinction between the concepts is not always 
clear, for in a number of instances the process of re-appraisal is termed a coping response 
(Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b). Furthermore, the relations between the theoretical constructs 
may be bidirectional with, for example, appraisal influencing coping and subsequent coping 
influencing appraisal (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b).
Lazarus and Folkman (1984a, b) have distinguished between primary and secondary 
appraisals. A primary appraisal is an evaluation of the degree of threat that a situation poses to 
the individual’s well-being. A secondary appraisal refers to the individual's evaluation of his or 
her capacity to manage or obviate the threat.
Folkman and Lazarus (1980, p. 223) defined coping as:
"...the cognitive and behavioural efforts made to master, tolerate or reduce
external and internal demands and conflict among them.”
They distinguished between problem-focused coping (efforts to modify the source of 
stress) and emotion-focused coping (efforts to regulate one’s emotional response to the 
stressor). Folkman and Lazarus (1980) developed the Ways of Coping Scale to assess these 
two broad categories of coping and found that, when individuals appraised situations as 
amenable to change, they were most likely to engage in problem-focused coping. When they
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appraised situations as ones which could not be influenced, they tended to employ emotion- 
focused coping. These findings are consistent with the view that appraisal influences coping 
actions (Folkman and Lazarus, 1980; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b).
Other researchers have been concerned with describing relationships between particular 
styles of coping and psychological and physical well-being. In these studies, subjects are 
typically asked to describe a stressful event and then to complete a questionnaire detailing the 
manner in which they coped with the event (e.g., Aldwin and Revenson, 1987; Billings and 
Moos, 1984; Holm et al„ 1986).
Researchers in the field of coping do not adhere to any accepted classification of coping 
strategies. Instead, they select from a wide range of strategies, and design assessment scales 
for each on a rational basis. Some of the most commonly assessed coping strategies are listed 
by Moos and Billings (1982). These include cognitive avoidance (trying to forget about the 
problem or engaging in wishful fantasies), problem solving action (this is sometimes referred 
to as direct coping and involves efforts to deal directly with the situation), affective regulation 
(efforts to control one's emotional response to the situation), and emotional discharge (venting 
feelings of frustration or anger on oneself or others). Behavioural avoidance of the situation 
has also been assessed (e.g., Holahan and Moos, 1986; Holm et al., 1986), with these 
researchers combining this measure with cognitive avoidance in the construction of a single 
avoidance scale.
Avoidance and emotional discharge coping strategies have been associated with 
depressed mood and more psychological symptoms (e.g., Aldwin and Revenson, 1987; 
Billings and Moos, 1984; Cronkite and Moos, 1984), whilst tendencies to employ low levels of 
avoidance coping, high levels of direct coping and high levels of affective regulation have 
been associated with lower levels of depression and fewer psychological symptoms (Billings 
and Moos, 1981, 1984; Holahan and Moos, 1985, 1986).
Felton and Revenson (1984) studied patients suffering from hypertension, diabetes, 
arthritis or cancer. Those patients who employed an active coping strategy in the face of their 
illness (information seeking), demonstrated better psychological adjustments (as assessed on 
sickness impact scales developed by the authors) than those relying on an avoidance strategy 
(wish-fulfilling fantasy). Similarly, Manne and Sandler (1984) found that persons with genital 
herpes demonstrated lower self-esteem, poorer sexual adjustment and higher levels of 
depression when they coped with their disease by means of wishful thinking (cognitive 
avoidance) and characterological self-blame (emotional discharge).
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In a study of coping amongst tension headache sufferers, Holm et al (1986) observed 
these subjects to employ more avoidance and self-blame coping than headache-free control 
subjects. Furthermore, Philips and Jahanshahi (1986) found that avoidance behaviour 
accounted for 60.5% of the variance in the pain behaviour of chronic headache sufferers. 
Philips (1987a) suggested that this avoidance behaviour may be maintained by the belief that 
withdrawal from activity reduces the severity of pain. That is, a low level of self-efficacy for 
engaging in activities without triggering or aggravating pain, may foster avoidance behaviour 
(Philips, 1987a).
Although it has only been in recent years that psychologists have attempted to study 
relationships between coping and psychological adjustment in a systematic fashion, the 
evidence appears to indicate that coping strategies involving avoidance or emotional discharge 
may be associated with poorer adjustments, whilst those involving direct action or affective 
regulation may be associated with better adjustments. The question of whether there exists any 
causal relationship between coping and adjustment requires the conduct of prospective studies 
with repeated observations of coping and emotional distress.
Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen et al (1986) hypothesised that mastery is related to 
psychological and somatic symptoms through the processes of appraisal and coping. Subjects' 
primary and secondary appraisals, as well as their coping responses, were assessed by 
requiring them to describe their responses to five stressful situations. The number of variables 
assessed (seven primary appraisals, four secondary appraisals and eight coping strategies) 
makes it difficult to interpret their results. However, multiple regression analyses revealed that 
secondary appraisals did not account for any significant proportion of the variance in 
psychological or somatic symptoms. The primary appraisal and coping variables did account 
for a significant proportion of the variance in psychological symptoms, but did not explain the 
variance in somatic symptoms to any significant extent. Although high mastery scores were 
associated with fewer psychological and somatic symptoms, mastery was not correlated 
consistently with measures of appraisal or coping. Thus, as Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen et al 
(1986) point out, these results leave unclear the processes by which mastery might influence 
psychological and somatic functioning.
Parkes (1984) was able to identify inter-relationships between locus of control, appraisal 
and coping. Locus of control was weakly correlated with direct coping. Subjects with an 
internal locus of control tended to appraise situations as less important than those with an 
external locus control. In situations appraised as amenable to change, subjects with an internal 
locus of control reported high levels of direct coping and low levels of suppression (a type of 
coping involving efforts to ignore the situation and inhibit action), whilst those with an 
external locus of control reported the converse pattern of coping. The results of this study
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suggest that the moderating effect of locus of control on well-being (e.g., Johnson and Sarason, 
1978; Krause, 1985) may be mediated by appraisal and coping processes.
This chapter is concerned with the development and examination of a model of the 
relationship between stressful events and headache. It is proposed that this relationship is 
moderated by self-control-efficacy and that this moderating function is mediated by the 
processes of appraisal and coping. Such a model is detailed in the following section.
7.1.4. Theoretical Model of Relationships Between Stressful Events and Headache.
Although there is little evidence to support a role for major life events in the aetiology 
of headache (e.g., Andrasik, Blanchard, Arena, Teders et al., 1982; Blanchard et al., 1986; 
Holm et al., 1986), there is some evidence suggesting that, less severe, more frequent stressful 
events, may contribute to headache attacks (e.g., Holm et al., 1986; Levor et al., 1986). Since 
headache afflicts a large proportion of the community and is often an episodic complaint, 
occurring several times per week in many sufferers, it follows that, if the onset of discrete 
attacks is precipitated by stressful events, these events must be of a fairly common nature 
similar to those listed on the Daily Hassles Scale (Kanner et al., 1981). Indeed, it was on this 
scale that Holm et al (1986) observed tension headache sufferers to report more stressful 
events than headache-free control subjects.
It is postulated that frequent stressful events precede headache onset, but that the 
strength of the relationship between these variables is moderated by the level of self-control- 
efficacy (defined as the individual's perceived capacity to self-regulate cognitive, behavioural 
and affective responses). It is proposed that persons with a high level of self-control-efficacy 
will appraise stressful events as less threatening and as more amenable to change than persons 
with low levels of self-control-efficacy. Persons with high levels of self-control-efficacy are 
recognised as those who are self-efficacious with respect to control over their cognitive, 
behavioural and emotional responses to stressors and are, therefore, considered to have a high 
degree of confidence in their capacity to meet the demands of stressful encounters.
Lazarus and his colleagues (Lazarus, 1977; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b) have 
proposed that the more individuals believe they have at stake in an encounter, and the less they 
appraise the impact of an encounter as amenable to change, the more emotional distress they 
will experience in the face of that encounter. If these appraisal processes do operate to increase 
the strength of the emotional response to stressors and if the strength of this response plays a 
role in the onset of headache attacks (e.g., Friedman et al., 1954; Henryk-Gutt and Rees,
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1973), it follows that appraising stressful events as highly important (primary appraisal) and as 
not amenable to change (secondary appraisal), will be associated with headache onset. 
Similarly, it follows that the stronger the emotional response to the stressful event, the greater 
the likelihood of the person suffering a headache.
A high level of self-control-efficacy is expected to foster higher levels of affective 
regulation coping in stressful encounters. This follows from the conceptualisation of self- 
control-efficacy as involving control over cognitive and emotional responses, each of which 
may contribute to affective regulation coping (Moos and Billings, 1982).
As discussed previously, affective regulation skills are taught in the successful 
application of self-control therapies to headache (e.g., Chesney and Shelton, 1976; Cox et al., 
1975; Figueroa, 1982). Furthermore, affective regulation coping in response to stressors has 
been associated with lower levels of depression (Billings and Moos, 1984). Thus, it is 
proposed that high levels of affective regulation will mitigate against the occurrence of 
headache attacks in the face of stressful events.
Appraising events as amenable to change has been associated with active coping 
methods directed towards the modification of the stressor (direct coping) (Folkman and 
Lazarus, 1980; Parkes, 1984). Conversely, stressful events that are not appraised as amenable 
to change have been observed to be associated with an increased use of avoidance coping 
strategies (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter et al., 1986). Direct coping has been associated 
with fewer psychological symptoms (Aldwin and Revenson, 1987) and lower levels of 
depression (Billings and Moos, 1984), whilst avoidance coping has been associated with 
higher frequencies of psychological and physical symptoms (Cronkite and Moos, 1984; 
Aldwin and Revenson, 1987; Billings and Moos, 1981; Holahan and Moos, 1985, 1986). 
Furthermore, the frequency of avoidance coping has been found to be greater amongst tension 
headache subjects than headache-free controls (Holm et al., 1986). Accordingly, it is proposed 
that direct coping, in the face of stressful events, will mitigate against the occurrence of 
headache whilst avoidance coping will increase the probability of headache occurring.
To summarize the theoretical model, it is proposed that the action of stressful events 
upon headache frequency is moderated by the level of self-control-efficacy, this moderating 
action being mediated by appraisal, coping and emotional response variables. Lower levels of 
self-control-efficacy will lead persons to appraise stressful events as less amenable to change 
and as more threatening. These appraisals will increase the strength of the aversive emotional 
response to the stressor, thereby increasing the probability of headache occurring. Lower levels 
of self-control-efficacy will be associated with lower levels of affective regulation coping 
which will, in turn, increase the probability of headache onset in the face of stressful events.
115
Appraising stressful events as amenable to change will foster direct coping which will mitigate 
against the onset of headache. Appraising stressful events as not amenable to change will 
increase the frequency of avoidance coping which will in turn increase the probability of 
headache developing in the face of stressful events.
7.2. LONGITUDINAL DESIGN.
The present study was concerned with an empirical examination of the model proposed 
in the previous section. In order to study the temporal relationships between stressful events, 
appraisal, coping, emotional upset and headache onset, a daily self-observation methodology 
was chosen, similar to that developed by Levor et al (1986).
Levor et al (1986) required migraine sufferers to record their headaches, stressful events 
and emotional states over a four week period. For the purposes of examining relationships 
between these variables, this group of researchers identified migraine and migraine-free 
cycles. A migraine cycle was defined as three migraine-free days followed by a day on which 
migraine occurred. A migraine-ffee cycle was defined as four consecutive migraine-free days. 
Non-migrainous headache days were counted as migraine-free days.
Levor et al (1986) chose cycles of four days on the basis of the observed vasomotor 
instability of migraine sufferers said to be evident as much as 72 hours prior to the actual 
attack (Tunis and Wolff, 1953). However, this is a rather weak rationale for the determination 
of cycle length. Firstly, Tunis and Wolffs (1953) observations were based on a sample of only 
ten migraine sufferers who were selected on the basis of previous observations indicating the 
occurrence of vascular changes during headache. Secondly, the evidence on the 
pathophysiology of migraine, reviewed in Chapter 2, indicates that, although vascular changes 
do occur during some migraine episodes, these alterations are not necessary to the occurrence 
of many attacks (e.g., Drummond and Lance, 1983; Thompson and Adams, 1984).
For many of their subjects, Levor et al (1986) were unable to identify a single migraine 
and migraine-free cycle, necessary for their repeated measures analysis of variance. Although 
they started with 33 migraineurs, only 14 subjects recorded patterns of headache activity 
wherein at least one of each migraine and migraine-free cycle could be identified. No cycles 
could be identified for subjects reporting frequent migraine attacks. Levor et al (1986) 
observed that a greater number of stressful events were recorded in the migraine than in the 
migraine-free cycles, and that there was a trend (p = 0.06) towards greater emotional arousal 
during the migraine cycles.
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The methodology of Levor et al (1986) promises to shed more light on the relationship 
between stressful events and headache than studies which have simply relied on headache 
sufferers' retrospective reports (e.g., Henryk-Gutt and Rees, 1973; Holm et al., 1986). 
Accordingly, it was decided to adapt this methodology, which allows for the study of the 
temporal relationship between stressful events and headache, to the present research problem.
The main difficulty with the methodology described by Levor et al (1986) is their choice 
of four day cycles. This resulted in a considerable loss of data. Furthermore, as discussed 
previously, their rationale for the selection cycle lengths is suspect.
The present study was concerned with the spectrum of headache ranging from tension 
headache sufferers through to migraineurs, as specified in the continuum model (Bakal and 
Kaganov, 1979; Drummond and Lance, 1984). It would be impossible to identify headache 
and headache-free cycles of four days in length if subjects were experiencing more than one or 
two headaches per week. Thus, the present study aimed to employ shorter cycles, so as to 
permit the study of a wider range of headache activity patterns, and to minimise the loss of 
data that invariably occurs when cycles are selected from records of headache activity.
There is very little data or theory to guide the selection of cycle length. However, there 
have been a number of recent studies suggesting that there may be same-day and one-day 
lagged relationships between the occurrence of stressful events and the report of physical 
symptoms (e.g., De Longis, Folkman and Lazarus, 1988; Stone, Jandore and Neale, 1986; 
Verbrugge, 1985). Each of these studies employed a daily self-observation methodology and 
assessed physical symptoms by means of The Daily Health Record (Verbrugge, 1985) which 
assesses such symptoms as flu, sore throat, backache and headache. Thus, on the basis of this 
evidence, it was decided to employ cycles of two days in length. Accordingly, a headache 
cycle was defined as a headache-free day followed by a day with headache; a headache-free 
cycle was defined as two consecutive headache-free days.
It was decided to alter further the methodology of Levor et al (1986) by requiring 
subjects to indicate the time at which stressful events occurred so that, within any given day 
for which a headache was present, it would be possible to establish whether the event occurred 
before, during or after the headache. This represents an advance over previous self-observation 
methodologies which have not noted the time of onset of symptoms, or the time at which 
stressful events occurred, thus making it impossible to determine the temporal relationship 
between stressful events and symptoms when these two classes of phenomena occur on the 
same day (e.g., De Longis et al., 1988; Levor et al., 1986; Stone et al., 1986; Verbrugge, 
1985).
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The proposed refinement of previous methodologies implies that stressful events 
occurring on the headache day of the headache cycle, will be counted within that cycle (and 
included in between-cycles analyses) only if they precede headache onset. Since the headache 
will occupy a period of time on the headache day of the headache cycle, there is necessarily a 
reduction in the time available, within that cycle, for a stressful event to occur and be coded as 
preceding the headache. Thus, when all events are coded, the headache cycles will be biased 
towards the inclusion of fewer stressful events than the headache-free cycles. However, the 
direction of this bias runs counter to the hypothesis that a greater number of stressful events 
will occur in the headache cycles (prior to headache onset) than in the headache-free cycles. 
Accordingly it was considered unnecessary to attempt to exert any control over this biasing 
factor.
Although the studies cited above allowed subjects to record a number of stressful events 
on each day, in the present study it was decided to confine subjects to one stressful event per 
day (the most distressing). This step was taken in view of the need to obtain data on subjects' 
appraisals, coping strategies, and emotional response to the event. It was considered that 
requiring subjects to complete the questionnaire items on these variables more than once per 
day might over burden them and reduce compliance.
7.3. HYPOTHESES.
The hypotheses derived from the theoretical model outlined in section 7.1.4, and 
formulated prior to the collection of data were as follows:
1. There will be a significant positive correlation between the frequency of stressful 
events and the frequency of headache.
2. The relationship between the frequency of stressful events and the frequency of 
headache will be moderated by the level of self-control-efficacy such that, the 
correlation between the frequency of stressful events and the frequency of 
headache will be greater for subjects low in self-control-efficacy than for those 
high in self-control-efficacy.
3. Subjects with higher self-control-efficacy will engage in higher levels of affective 
regulation in response to stressful events than those lower in self-control-efficacy.
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4. Subjects with higher self-control-efficacy will appraise stressful events as less 
threatening and more amenable to change than subjects lower in self-control- 
efficacy.
5. When events are appraised as more amenable to change, subjects will engage in 
more direct coping and less avoidance coping than when events are appraised as 
less amenable to change.
6. Events appraised as less threatening or as more amenable to change will be 
associated with lower levels of emotional upset.
7. Lower levels of direct coping, lower levels of affective regulation and higher levels 
of avoidance coping will be associated with higher levels of emotional upset in 
response to stressful events.
8. A greater number of stressful events will be reported in headache cycles (prior to 
headache onset) than in headache-free cycles.
9. Stressful events occurring within headache cycles (prior to headache onset) will be 
appraised as more threatening and as less amenable to change than those occurring 
within headache-free cycles.
10. In response to stressful events occurring within headache cycles (prior to headache 
onset) subjects will report lower levels of affective regulation, lower levels of 
direct coping and higher levels of avoidance coping than they will in response to 
stressful events occurring within headache-free cycles.
11. In response to stressful events occurring within headache cycles (prior to headache 
onset) subjects will report higher levels of emotional upset than they will in 
response to stressful events occurring within headache-free cycles.
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7.4, ASSESSMENT OF THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS.
7.4.1. Stressful Events.
As mentioned previously in this chapter, the present research is concerned with the 
assessment of relatively minor stressful events which are commonly termed hassles (Kanner et 
al., 1981; Lazarus, 1984b).
It was noted in Chapter 3 that cognitive conceptualisations of stress (e.g., Folkman, 
Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter et al., 1986, Lazarus, 1966, Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b) 
conceive of stress as a relation between the individual and the environment, mediated by 
cognitive appraisal processes. This raises the problem of defining a stressful event 
independently of cognitive appraisal. Clearly, once cognitive appraisal processes are 
recognised as fundamental components of stress, it is not possible to speak of these processes 
as being fully independent of the events upon which they are focused. The confounding of 
stressful events with appraisal cannot be eliminated completely. For example, the most 
common approach to the assessment of stressful events is to present subjects with lists of 
events pre-judged by researchers to be associated with some degree of emotional distress. 
Subjects are asked to select from these lists those events which have occurred over the last 
year (Holmes and Rahe, 1967), past week (Kanner et al., 1981) or preceding few hours (Stone 
and Neale, 1982). Such tasks require that subjects remember stressful events. The strength of 
the memory trace would be a function of the personal significance attached to any event at the 
time it occurred and, thus, responses to such questionnaires are necessarily confounded with 
appraisal processes. The degree of confounding is increased further by requiring subjects to 
rate the severity of any stressful event they endorse on the questionnaire and deriving an index 
of the severity of stressful events from these values (e.g., Kanner et al., 1981; Stone and Neale, 
1982).
The method of asking subjects to report the occurrence of stressful events from the 
ground of their own experience (e.g., Clark and Watson 1988, Folkman and Lazarus, 1980) 
involves cognitive appraisal insofar as subjects can only select events on the basis of the extent 
to which they perceived those events as stressful. This method, however, does have the 
advantage of allowing subjects greater flexibility in their reporting of stressful events. For the 
purposes of recording daily stressful events it is far less cumbersome than Stone and Neale's 
(1982) method which requires subjects to select from a list of 80 stressful events.
Levor et al (1986) employed a combination of the above procedures by requiring 
subjects to select from a list of "common stressors" such as an "encounter with family or
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friend" and "time pressure", supplemented with a list of items which the subject selected from 
the Hassles Scale as being "personally upsetting". However, it can hardly be assumed that such 
a combination of items would be representative of all the various types of stressful events that 
an individual might experience in the four week period over which the study of Levor et al 
(1986) was conducted.
If theoretical formulations of stress are to attach central roles to concepts such as 
cognitive appraisal, some confounding of stressful events with appraisal must be tolerated. In 
the present research it was decided to minimise this confounding by allowing subjects, at the 
end of each day, to decide whether or not any irritating or upsetting event had occurred during 
the course of that day, but to avoid the practice of requiring subjects to rate the severity of 
those events. Thus, a diary approach to assessment was employed with subjects indicating 
whether or not an irritating or upsetting event had occurred. If more than one event occurred 
subjects reported the one that was most upsetting.
7.4.2. Self-Control-Efficacv.
As discussed in Section 7.1.2, for the purposes of the present study, self-control-efficacy 
was conceptualised as the individuals' perceived capacity to regulate his or her behavioural, 
cognitive and affective responses. In order to assess this construct, a nine item scale (three 
items pertaining to each of the response categories listed above) was developed. Six of the 
items were drawn from Rosenbaum's (1980) Self-Control Scale, with three additional items 
being written by the author. Each item required subjects to indicate the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed with the item on a 4-point scale. The Self-Control-Efficacy Scale is 
presented in Appendix H.
Rosenbaum's (1980) Self-Control Schedule was not employed as the measure of self­
control-efficacy because it contains many items which refer to coping strategies. Since the 
present study was concerned with examining relationships between self-control-efficacy and 
coping strategies, the use of the Self-Control Schedule would have resulted in a confounding 
of these two variables. Indeed, the term "self-control-efficacy" was preferred to the term "self- 
control", for the latter is commonly defined in tenms of the individual’s propensity to employ 
coping strategies (e.g., Rosenbaum, 1980; Thoresen and Mahoney, 1974), rather than in terms 
of the individual’s judged capacity to control his /  her responses.
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7.4.3. Appraisal.
Primary and secondary appraisals of stressful events, as defined by Lazarus and his co- 
workers (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b), and as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, were assessed by requiring subjects to indicate the extent to which the stressful event 
mattered to them at the time (primary appraisal) and the extent to which they believed that they 
could change this event (secondary appraisal). Similar measures of these concepts were 
employed by Parkes (1984). Each of these judgements was made on a 4-point scale. The two 
rating scales were included in the Self-Monitoring Diary presented in Appendix I.
7.4.4. Coping.
The dimensions of event coping employed in the present study included direct coping, 
affective regulation and avoidance coping. In constructing scales to assess these dimensions of 
coping, the following definitions, derived from the stress and coping literature reviewed 
earlier, served as guides:
Direct Coping: Any action or thought focused upon confronting or resolving the 
problem. The items comprising this scale were as follows:
Doubled my efforts and tried harder to make things work out.
Talked to someone who could do something about the problem.
Tried to think of a number of ways to sort out the problem.
Tried to find out more about the situation.
Changed something to try and make things work out.
Went over in my mind what I would say or do.
Affective Regulation: Cognitive or behavioural attempts to self-regulate the intensity of 
the emotional response to the situation. This scale consisted of the following items:
Tried to relax myself.
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Reassured myself that things would work out all right.
Tried to view the situation as a challenge.
Reminded myself how much worse things could be.
Concentrated on something good that could come out of the whole thing.
Avoidance Coping: Cognitive or behavioural attempts to avoid the problem including 
engaging in wishful fantasy or evasive manoeuvres. The items comprising this scale were as 
follows:
Postponed dealing with the problem.
Avoided discussion of the issue.
Wished that I could change what had happened.
Avoided things that reminded me of the problem.
Wished the situation would go away or somehow be over with.
Fantasized about how things might turn out.
Wished I was a stronger person - more optimistic and forceful.
Even though the problem had not been sorted out, I tried to forget about the whole thing.
The 19 items listed above comprised the Event Coping Scale and were drawn from the 
Ways of Coping Scale (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b) or constructed by the author on the 
basis of the stress and coping literature. All items were answered "yes” or "no" (see Appendix 
I).
7.4.5. Emotional Response.
The present study required that subjects indicate the magnitude of their aversive 
emotional response to any situation that they recorded in the Self-Monitoring Diary. Given that
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subjects were required to respond to a number of questionnaire items on the diaries it was 
desirable that the assessment of their emotional response be as brief and simple as possible.
Visual analogue scales have been observed to offer reliable measures of such emotions 
as depression (Folstein and Luria, 1973) and well-being (Gark and Spear, 1964). Scores on 
visual analogue scales assessing depression have been found to correlate with scores on the 
Zung (1965) Depression Scale (Folstein and Luria, 1973), and to be sensitive to reductions in 
depression following treatment with anti-depressant medications (Zealley and Aitken, 1969). 
Thus, some measure of validity can be attached to these instruments. Accordingly, it was 
decided to employ a visual analogue scale in the assessment of each subject's emotional 
response to stressful events. The scale was 95 mm in length. The left hand anchor point was 
labelled "not at all upset"; the right hand anchor point was labelled "as upset as I have ever 
been". Subjects were required to place a small vertical line across the scale at the point 
representing how upset they felt during the stressful event (see Appendix I).
7.4.6. Headache Activity.
Headache activity was assessed by means of hourly diary recordings. The method was 
similar to that described in Chapter 6, except that, instead of rating headache intensity on a 
visual analogue scale, subjects were required to indicate their level of pain on a 6-point 
category scale ranging from 0 (no headache) to 5 (extremely intense headache). This procedure 
is very similar to that originally described by Budzynski et al (1970, 1973). The headache 
recording component of the Self-Monitoring Diary is presented in Appendix I.
A category scale was preferred to the visual analogue scale, employed in Chapter 6, 
because the bit-pad equipment, essential to the rapid and efficient measurement of thousands 
of visual analogue scales, was not available. Furthermore, it was considered that the increased 
sensitivity of visual analogue scales to reductions in pain intensity (Scott and Huskisson, 1976) 
was not necessary for the purposes of the present study.
7.5. METHOD.
7.5.1. Subjects.
The sample of subjects participating in the study comprised 120 headache sufferers aged 
between 17 and 67 years, with a mean age of 38.7 years (S.D. = 12.8 years). Their years of
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full-time education ranged from 5 to 24 years, with a mean of 13.5 years (S.D. = 3.5 years). 
There were 88 females and 32 males. Seventeen subjects were recruited from the Neurology 
Outpatients Ginic at the Prince Of Wales Hospital, Sydney. Another 103 subjects were 
recruited from the Sydney Community, by means of a newspaper article and advertisement.
The study was not confined to any single headache type, but sought to determine 
whether or not the hypothesised relationships between variables, existed across the spectrum 
of headache activity, from tension to migraine headache.
All prospective subjects were contacted by telephone. They were accepted into the study 
if they satisfied the following criteria:
1. They had been suffering from headaches for at least one year.
2. They estimated their headaches to occur on an average of at least one day in each 
week.
3. Their headaches were not constant. This requirement was important because the 
study was concerned with the factors that precipitate headache attacks.
4. The onset of their headaches was not associated with any accident or disease.
5. For females taking the contraceptive pill, the onset or worsening of headache was 
not associated with their commencement of this method of birth control.
6. They were not receiving any form of psychotherapy, stress-management, or 
relaxation training.
7. They had made no change to their usual medication for headache in the previous 
month.
The criteria outlined above resulted in the selection of the 120 headache sufferers 
described at the beginning of this section.
7.5.2. Procedure.
Following the initial telephone contact, all subjects were interviewed individually, and 
in person, by the experimenter. They were told that they would be participating in an
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investigation of the relationship between stress and headache. The procedures were outlined 
briefly, and subjects signed a statement giving their informed consent to participate. All 
subjects were informed that although the results of the study might be published, their identity 
would be fully confidential.
Subjects were interviewed and asked to indicate the site of their headaches and to 
estimate the proportion of headaches (none, less than half, more than half) accompanied by 
any visual disturbance Goss of vision or scintillating scotoma), nausea, vomiting or sensitivity 
to light They then completed the Self-Control-Efficacy Scale and a shortened version of the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Strahan and Gerbasi, 1972).
The Social Desirability Scale was administered in view of Krause's (1985) observations 
concerning the behaviour of interaction terms in multiple regression analyses. Krause (1985) 
studied the moderating effects of locus of control on the relationship between life events and 
depression. This involved testing the significance of the coefficient pertaining to the locus of 
control x life events interaction term obtained through a multiple regression analysis (Cohen 
and Cohen, 1975; Finney, Mitchell, Cronkite and Moos, 1984). He found that the magnitude 
(and hence significance) of this interaction term was reduced when a measure of social 
desirability was not included in the equation. Krause (1985) concluded that this reduction 
resulted from the effects of a need for approval upon the remaining variables under study and 
suggested that these effects should be controlled by including social desirability as a variable 
within the regression equation. Accordingly, it was decided to employ the Social Desirability 
Scale in the present study. The shortened 20-item version of the Marlowe-Crowne Scale 
(Strahan and Gerbasi, 1972) was preferred to the original 33-item scale (Crowne and Marlowe 
1960) because it is shorter, correlates highly with the original scale (r > 0.9) and has a high 
level of internal consistency (Strahan and Gerbasi, 1972). The scale requires subjects to 
respond "true" or "false" to each item. It was termed the "Personal Reaction Inventory" so that 
subjects might be unaware that it was assessing social desirability.
After completing the questionnaires, subjects were instructed in the use of the Self- 
Monitoring Diary. The diary consisted of 7 double sided sheets (one for each day of the week) 
each diary being prefaced by an instructions sheet (see Appendix I). Each of the 7 recording 
sheets was divided into "Headache Recording" and "Event Recording" sections. As outlined 
earlier, subjects rated the intensity of their headaches for every hour of the day from 6.00 am to 
5.00 am the following day on a 6-point category scale. They were required to commence 
recording as soon as a headache began and to continue recording until they made a zero rating, 
indicating that the headache had gone. They re-commenced recording if and when headache 
resumed. Subjects were also instructed to detail the type and quantity of medication consumed
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on any particular day. Measures of headache frequency, intensity and duration were derived in 
the manner described in Chapter 6.
At the end of each day, subjects were required to complete the Event Recording Section 
of the form. They were first required to respond "yes" or "no" to the question:
"Was there anything today that you found at all irritating or upsetting? This can 
be an event that actually occurred today, or one that you recalled from the past or 
some future event that you thought about."
If they responded "no" to this first question they were not required to complete the 
remaining items. If they responded "yes" they were required to give a brief description of the 
event and to indicate the time at which it occurred to the nearest hour. They then completed the 
appraisal scales and Event Coping Scale described previously. The Event Coping Scale was 
presented as a list of some of the ways in which people react to events, rather than as a coping 
scale, in order to avoid the favourable connotations associated with the term "coping". Subjects 
then indicated how upset they felt during the event on the visual analogue scale described 
previously. Finally, subjects were asked to respond "yes" or "no" to the question: "Did you 
have a headache today?" If they answered "yes" they were required to indicate whether the 
event occurred before, during or after the headache. This last question was included in order to 
account for occasions when events occurred within one hour of headache onset. On such 
occasions the hourly calibration on the Headache Recording Section of the form would have 
made it impossible to determine the temporal relationship between the two variables solely on 
the basis of these recordings.
All of the items described above were included on the Self-Monitoring Diary, which is 
presented in Appendix I.
In order to illustrate the way in which the Event Recording Section of the diary was to 
be used, each subject was asked to describe a recent stressful event. Employing this event as an 
example, the experimenter guided the subject through completion of the form. Each subject 
was provided with a set of written instructions which they could take home and use for their 
own reference. These same instructions were also read aloud to subjects by the experimenter, 
and were as follows:
Irritating or upsetting events include common day to day hassles, minor 
annoyances, or frustrations, as well as any major pressures, problems or 
difficulties that may occur.
At the end of each day, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT A 
HEADACHE HAS OCCURRED, please complete the Event Recording Section 
of the form. If an irritating or upsetting event did occur on that day, circle YES in 
reply to the first question, and be sure to complete both sides of the form.
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Irritating or upsetting events may occur on days when you don't have headaches 
as well as on days when you dü have headaches. So, in reply to the first question, 
you wifi circle YES or NO REGARDLESS OF THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE 
OF HEADACHE.
If an event that irritated or upset you occurred on any day, circle YES and fill out 
both sides of the foim WHETHER OR NOT YOU HAD A HEADACHE ON 
THAT SAME DAY.
All subjects were required to monitor their headaches, stressful events and reactions to 
those events for 28 days (Levor et al., 1986). Accordingly, each subject was provided with four 
Self-Monitoring Diaries, containing a total of 28 separate recording sheets. The diaries were 
designed to be small enough to be carried in a pocket or handbag. Subjects were asked to keep 
one diary with them at all times, and to record headaches as they occurred, rather than 
recording them retrospectively. All subjects were instructed to telephone the experimenter if 
they had any queries concerning the procedures. They were also asked not to make any 
alterations to their usual medication for headache during the course of the study.
After each subject had completed one weeks' recording, they were telephoned by the 
experimenter in order to ensure that they were complying with the procedures. Each subject 
was re-contacted towards the end of the recording period, to make arrangements for them to 
attend the laboratory on a second occasion, so as to return their Self-Monitoring Diaries, be 
briefed fully by the experimenter on the aims of the study, and be allowed the opportunity of 
discussing their completed records.
7.6. RESULTS,
Of the 120 subjects who entered the study, six withdrew during the self-monitoring 
period. One had to be admitted to hospital for a lengthy period and was unable to continue the 
recordings. The remaining five subjects who withdrew indicated that they could not find the 
time to maintain accurate records. Thus, diary recordings of headache, stressful events and 
reactions to those events were available from 114 subjects.
7.6.1. Identification of Cycles.
Each subjects’ continuous records of headache activity were inspected for the 
identification of headache and headache-free cycles. As stated previously, a headache cycle 
was defined as a headache-free day followed by a day with headache, whilst a headache-free 
cycle was defined as two consecutive headache-free days. These cycles were defined 
independently of one another. That is, the second day of the headache-ffee cycle was not
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counted simultaneously as the first day of a second headache-free cycle or as the first day of a 
headache cycle. Such a practice was avoided because it could have produced artifactual results 
arising from counting the one stressful event twice: First within one cycle and then within 
another. Thus, the two days comprising any given cycle were specific to that cycle alone.
The manner in which cycles were identified was an important consideration, for the 
number of each cycle type identified for any given subject would vary depending on the 
method employed. Thus, it was important to use one method consistently and one which, as far 
as possible, balanced the number of headache and headache-free cycles identified. With these 
considerations in mind, the following method of identifying cycles was employed:
Given that continuous series of headache-days would be excluded from cycles by virtue 
of the cycle definitions given earlier, whilst consecutive headache-free days would be included 
as headache-free cycles, it was decided to select cycles such that the number of headache 
cycles (and thus headache days) included would be maximised. A second advantage of such a 
procedure was that by identifying headache cycles first, headache-free cycles would be 
identified such that the second day of the headache-free cycle did not immediately precede a 
headache day. Such a headache-free day would have already been included as the first day of a 
headache cycle. Thus, this method of identifying headache cycles first ensured that any two 
headache-free days, included in a headache-free cycle, would be separated from any 
subsequent headache day by at least another headache-free day (the first day of the headache 
cycle). Accordingly, headache-free cycles were separated from any subsequent headache day 
by at least one headache-free day. Such a separation of cycle types was considered desirable 
from the point of view of minimising any lagged effect of stressful events occurring in 
headache-free cycles on headache activity in subsequent headache cycles.
After identifying headache cycles, all consecutive pairs of headache-free days were 
included in headache-free cycles. Where an odd number of headache-free days clustered 
together, these were paired into cycles such that one non-cycle headache-free day would 
precede the start of a headache cycle, thereby, once again, maximising the period between any 
headache-free cycle and subsequent headache cycle.
The method outlined above resulted in the identification of 432 headache cycles and 347 
headache-free cycles amongst the 114 subjects who completed the self-monitoring diaries. It 
was possible to identify at least one of each cycle type for 82 of these 114 subjects.
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7.6.2. Internal Analysis of Scales.
The internal consistency of the Self-Control-Efficacy Scale was evaluated by means of 
coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951). An alpha value of 0.76 was obtained (see Appendix H for 
the full reiability analysis).
The Event Coping Scale required dichotomous responses, and thus the internal 
consistency of its subscales was evaluated by calculating coefficient KR-20 (Kuder and 
Richardson, 1937).
No reliability analysis was conducted on the Social Desirability Scale in view of the fact 
that results attesting to a high level of internal consistency for this scale have already been 
provided by previous researchers (Strahan and Gerbasi, 1972).
The 114 subjects who completed the self-monitoring phase of the study filled out the 
Event Coping Scale between one and 28 times. A total of 935 completed coping scales were 
available for analysis. The KR-20 coefficients were 0.72 for the Direct and Avoidance Coping 
Scales and 0.61 for the Affective Regulation Scale (see Appendix I).
In order to determine whether or not the three subscales of the Event Coping Scale 
represented separate dimensions of coping, the 19 items comprising the Scale were subjected 
to a principal components analysis (PA 1) with varimax rotation (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, 
Steinbrenner and Bent, 1975). All 935 completed records were employed in this analysis. In 
line with expectations, three factors were extracted and accounted for 38.7% of the variance. 
Accepting rotated factor item loadings of 0.3 or greater as significant (Comrey, 1973; Gorsuch, 
1983), all of the Direct Coping items loaded significantly on the first factor, all of the 
Avoidance Coping items loaded significantly on the second factor, and all of the Affective 
Regulation items loaded significantly on the third factor. Each items' factor loadings were 
significant for only a single factor, except for item 1 (Doubled my efforts and tried harder to 
make things work out) which loaded as expected on the Direct Coping factor but also on the 
Affective Regulation factor, and item 8 (Fantasized about how things might turn out), which 
loaded as expected on the Avoidance Coping factor, but also on the Direct Coping factor (see 
Appendix I).
The results of the principal components analysis corresponded very closely to the 
hypothesised structure of the Event Coping Scale, suggesting that the scale may be regarded as 
assessing three different ways of coping, although inspection of the correlation matrix in 
Appendix I suggests that the scales cannot be regarded as independent.
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7.6.3. Planned Analyses.
In each of the following analyses the Type I error rate was set at 0.05 unless stated 
otherwise.
Hypotheses 1 and 2.
The first two hypotheses concerned the relationship between stressful events and 
headache frequency, and the proposed moderating effect of self-control-efficacy. These 
hypotheses were evaluated by means of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis (Cohen and 
Cohen, 1975). Within such an analysis, the moderator effect is assessed by entering all 
variables into the equation, and then entering the interaction term. In this instance, the 
interaction term was stressful events x self-control-efficacy. The values of this term were 
obtained by simply multiplying the scores for stressful events and self-control-efficacy for 
each subject (Cohen and Cohen, 1975). The expectation was that as the level of self-control- 
efficacy increases the correlation between stressful events and headache frequency would 
become weaker. Such a relationship would be indicated if the standardised regression 
coefficient for the interaction term were found to be significantly less than zero (Finney et al., 
1984).
Given that the absence of any control for social desirability has been found to attenuate 
moderator effects, as assessed through multiple regression analysis (Krause, 1985), the social 
desirability scores were entered into the equation prior to the entry of the interaction term. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 7-1.
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Table 7-1
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Relating Stressful Events, Self-Control-Efficacy and Social 
Desirability to Headache Frequency (N = 114).
Standardised Regression Coefficients
Predictor
Variables r Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Events 0.21* 0.21* 0.22* 0.22* 1.31*
Self-Control
-Efficacy
0.06 0.08 0.06 0.41*
Social
Desirability
0.11 0.11 0.11
Events x 
Self-Control 
-Efficacy 
(interaction)
0.19* -1.13*
Change R2 0.043 0.007 0.010 0.033
F-ratio for change R2 5.037* 0.774 1.269 3.934*
Total R2 0.043* 0.050* 0.061* 0.093*
%
Indicates p < 0.05 (2-tailed significance test).
The significant positive correlation between stressful events and headache frequency 
provides support for Hypothesis 1. The significant negative standardised regression coefficient 
of the interaction term (events x self-control-efficacy) is consistent with the hypothesis that 
self-control-efficacy operates as a moderator of the relationship between stressful events and 
headache frequency, this relationship becoming weaker as the level of self-control-efficacy 
increases (Hypothesis 2).
A second way to illustrate the moderating effect of self-control-efficacy is to compare 
the correlation between stressful events and headache frequency for subjects high in self- 
control-efficacy with that for subjects scoring low on this variable. "High" and "low" groups 
were established with cut-off points placed one standard deviation above and below the mean 
Self-Control-Efficacy Scale score for the 114 subjects who recorded stressful events and 
headaches (Mean = 25.90; S.D. = 5.25). For the 23 subjects high in self-control-efficacy, the
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correlation between the frequency of stressful events and the frequency of headache was not 
significant (r = 0.13; 2-tailed p > 0.05). For the 21 subjects low in self-control-efficacy, the 
correlation between these variables was significant (r = 0.70; 2-tailed p < 0.001). Fisher's z-test 
for the difference between two independent correlations (Cohen and Cohen, 1975) yielded a z- 
value of 2.27 (1-tailed p = 0.012), indicating that the correlation was significantly greater for 
the low self-control-efficacy subjects
The results indicate that the frequency of stressful events is positively and significantly 
correlated with the frequency of headache, and that this relationship is buffered or moderated 
by the level of self-control-efficacy.
Hypotheses 3 and 4,
In Hypotheses 3 and 4 it was predicted that higher levels of self-control-efficacy would 
be associated with higher levels of affective regulation, lower event mattered ratings and 
higher event change ratings. The results did not support the hypothesis that self-control- 
efficacy would be associated positively with affective regulation (Hypothesis 3), nor the 
hypothesis that self-control-efficacy would be correlated positively with event change or event 
mattered ratings (Hypothesis 4) (see Table 7-2). High levels of self-control-efficacy were 
associated significantly with low levels of avoidance coping, but were not correlated 
significantly with any other aspect of coping or with the strength of the emotional response to 
the stressor (see Table 7-2).
Table 7-2
Correlations: Diary Recordings of Appraisal, Coping and Upset Ratings with 
Self-Control-Efficacy (N = 114).
Variable r p-value
Event Mattered Rating 0.04 N.S.+
Event Change Rating 0.03 N.S.+
Direct Coping -0.05 N.S.*
Avoidance Coping -0.35 N.S.*
Affective Regulation 0.08 N.S.+
Upset Rating -0.16 N.S.*
)|(
Indicates a 2-tailed test (unplanned analysis). 
+Indicates a 1-tailed test (planned analysis).
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Hypothesis 5.
In Hypothesis 5 it was predicted that, when events are appraised as amenable to change, 
subjects will engage in more direct coping and less avoidance coping. Change ratings 
correlated significantly and in the expected direction with direct coping (r = 0.43; 1-tailed p < 
0.001), thereby supporting the hypothesis. However, contrary to the hypothesis, avoidance 
coping also correlated significantly and positively with change ratings (r = 0.17; 1-tailed p = 
0.038).
In view of the fact that change ratings were positively correlated with both direct and 
avoidance coping, it was decided to examine whether or not avoidance coping accounted for a 
significant proportion of the variance in change ratings, independent of the variance accounted 
for by direct coping. This was accomplished by means of a stepwise multiple regression 
analysis, relating direct and avoidance coping to change ratings. The results indicated that the 
relationship between direct coping and change ratings remains significant despite the entry of 
avoidance coping into the equation, and that avoidance coping accounts for no significant 
proportion of the variance in change ratings, beyond that already accounted for by direct 
coping (see Table 7-3).
Table 7-3
Stepwise Regression Analysis Relating Direct and Avoidance 
Coping to Change Ratings (N = 114).
Standardised Regression 
Coefficients
Predictor
Variables r Step 1 Step 2
Direct Coping 0.43** 0.43** 0.42**
Avoidance Coping 0.17* 0.02
Change R2 0.184** 0.000
F-ratio for change R2 25.188** 0.067
Total R2 0.184** 0.184*
%
Indicates p < 0.05 (2-tailed significance test). 
Indicates p < 0.001 (2-tailed significance test).
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Thus, the results supported the hypothesis that change ratings would be positively 
correlated with direct coping but not the hypothesis that change ratings would be negatively 
correlated with avoidance coping.
Hypotheses 6 and 7.
In Hypothesis 6 it was predicted that events appraised as less threatening and as more 
amenable to change would be associated with lower levels of emotional upset. In Hypothesis 7 
it was predicted that lower levels of direct coping, lower levels of affective regulation and 
higher levels of avoidance coping would be associated with higher levels of emotional upset.
The results supported Hypothesis 6 with respect to the relationship between event 
mattered ratings and emotional upset, but no significant relationship between change ratings 
and emotional upset was observed (see Table 7-4).
Hypothesis 7 was supported with respect to avoidance coping which correlated 
positively and significantly with upset ratings (see Table 7-4). Against the hypothesis, 
however, affective regulation was not correlated with upset ratings and direct coping correlated 
positively (not negatively as expected) with upset ratings (see Table 7-4).
Table 7-4
Correlations: Diary Recordings of Appraisal and Coping 
Variables with Upset Ratings (N = 114).
Variable r p-value
Event Mattered Rating 0.37 0.001
Event Change Rating 0.01 N.S.
Direct Coping 0.22 0.01
Avoidance Coping 0.27 0.002
Affective Regulation 0.06 N.S.
In view of the unexpected positive correlation between direct coping and upset ratings, 
it was decided to examine whether or not this variable accounted for a significant proportion of 
the variance in upset ratings beyond the variance accounted for by avoidance coping. This was 
accomplished by means of a step-wise multiple regression analysis relating direct and 
avoidance coping to upset ratings. The results indicated that the relationship between
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avoidance coping and upset ratings remains significant despite the entry of direct coping into 
the equation, and that direct coping accounts for no significant proportion of the variance in 
upset ratings beyond that already accounted for by avoidance coping (see Table 7-5). Thus, the 
results supported Hypothesis 7 with respect to avoidance coping, but not with respect to direct 
coping.
Table 7-5
Regression Analysis Relating Direct and Avoidance Coping to Upset Ratings (N = 114).
Standardised Regression 
Coefficients
Predictor
Variables r Step 1 Step 2
Avoidance Coping 0.27 0.27* 0.22*
Direct Coping 0.22* 0.14
Change R2 0.071 0.018
F-ratio for change R2 8.567* 2.223
Total R2 0.071* 0.089*
* Indicates p < 0.05 (2-tailed significance test).
Hypothesis 8.
In Hypothesis 8 it was predicted that a greater number of stressful events would occur in 
headache cycles, prior to headache onset, than in headache-free cycles. Eighty two subjects 
reported at least one of each cycle type. These data were employed in a within subjects 
analysis conducted by means of a one-tailed paired t-test. A significant difference between 
cycles was observed (t (81) = 2.29; p = 0.013) with a greater number of stressful events 
occurring in headache (Mean = 0.243; S.D. = 0.192) than in headache-free cycles (Mean = 
0.188; S.D. = 0.226). Thus, the results were supportive of the hypothesis.
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Hypotheses 9.10 and 11.
These hypotheses pertain to the behaviour of the appraisal, coping, and upset data across 
headache and headache-ffee cycles. The within-subjects analysis of these data required that 
subjects report at least one stressful event within each cycle type (the appraisal coping and 
upset measures were employed by subjects only when they reported a stressful event). Forty- 
two subjects met this criterion and were included in the paired t-test analysis.
Counter to Hypothesis 9, events occurring in headache-free cycles were assigned higher 
mattered ratings than those occurring in headache cycles. However, the hypothesis that events 
occurring in headache-free cycles would be appraised as being more amendable to change than 
those occurring in headache cycles, was supported (see Table 7-6).
Hypothesis 10 was supported with respect to affective regulation and direct coping, each 
of which was higher in headache-ffee than in headache cycles. However, the result for 
avoidance coping ran counter to the hypothesis that there would be higher levels of this type of 
coping in the headache than in the headache-ffee cycles (see Table 7-6).
Table 7-6
Between-Cycles Analysis of Means for Self-Monitoring 
Appraisal, Coping and Upset Scores (N = 42).
Variable
Headache
Cycle
Headache-Free
Cycle
Paired
t-value
1-tailed 
p-value
Mattered 2.714 3.015 -2.20 0.017
Rating (0.808) (0.733)
Change 0.661 0.967 -1.92 0.030
Rating (0.725) (0.879)
Direct 2.682 3.116 -1.69 0.049
Coping (1.615) (1.651)
Avoidance 3.229 3.585 -1.75 0.044
Coping (1.540) (1.823)
Affective 2.225 2.672 -2.42 0.010
Regulation (1.317) (1.380)
Upset 39.531 46.843 -2.40 0.011
Rating (18.942) (19.904)
In the above table the standard deviations are entered in brackets and degrees of
freedom = 41.
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Contrary to Hypothesis 11, upset ratings were significantly lower in headache than in 
headache-free cycles (see Table 7-6).
7.6.4. Supplementary Analyses.
Analysis 1.
Ninety subjects reported at least one stressful event occurring within a period of 
headache, thereby making it possible to determine whether stressful events preceded increases 
in headache intensity. This hypothesis was explored by taking each individual headache that 
included a stressful event and calculating the mean headache intensity prior to the event, and 
the mean intensity following the event. For those subjects reporting a stressful event during 
headache on more than one day, thus providing more than a single mean score for each 
intensity measure, the average of these means served as the unit of analysis. Thus, for each of 
the 90 subjects, there was a pre-event mean intensity and a post-event mean intensity. The 
significance of the difference between these means was evaluated with a 2-tailed paired t-test. 
Ratings of headache intensity were found to be significantly greater (t (89) = 2.39; p < 0.02) 
after stressful events (Mean = 2.15; S.D. = 0.75) than before stressful events (Mean = 1.93; 
S.D. = 0.84).
Analysis 2.
In view of the result of Analysis 1, it was decided to explore the relationship between 
changes in headache intensity following the stressful event and appraisal, coping and 
emotional responses, as recorded on the Self-Monitoring Diary. Eighty nine of the 90 subjects 
examined in Analysis 1 recorded data on the above variables. A stepwise multiple regression 
analysis was conducted on the mean headache intensity ratings made after the event. The 
appraisal, coping and emotional responses to the event served as predictor variables. Since a 
correlational analysis showed that post-event headache intensity ratings were correlated 
significantly with pre-event intensity ratings, and with the number of headache hours following 
the event (post-event duration) (see Table 7-7), these variables were entered into the equation 
on the first step of the analysis. Once again, for those subjects reporting a stressful event 
during headache on more than a single day, the mean for each of the variables served as the 
unit of analysis.
138
The results indicated that increases in avoidance coping in response to stressful events 
occurring within headache attacks, were associated significantly with increases in headache 
intensity following the event Increases in direct coping in response to these stressful events 
were associated significantly with reductions in headache intensity (see Table 7-7).
Table 7-7
Stepwise Regression Analysis Relating Appraisal, Coping and Emotional Upset Variables 
to Post-Event Headache Intensity (N = 89).
Standardised Regression Coefficients
Predictor
Variables r Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Post-Event
Duration
0.54* 0.46** 0.46** 0.44**
Pre-Event 
Intensity
0.39** 0.24** 0.25** 0.19**
Avoidance
Coping
0.22* 0.21* 0.26**
Direct
Coping
-0.30** -0.24**
Change R2 0.343 0.045 0.051
F-ratio change R2 22.439** 6.296** 7.633**
Total R2 0.343** 0.388** 0.439**
)|c
Indicates p < 0.05 (2-tailed significance test).
% %
Indicates p < 0.001 (2-tailed significance test).
After the third step of the analysis, presented above, none of the remaining self­
monitoring variables accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in the post-event 
headache intensity scores.
Analysis 3
Since primary appraisal has been thought to be a significant determinant of coping 
behaviour (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b) it was decided to correlate the event mattered
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ratings with the coping measures. For the 114 subjects who completed the study, the 
correlations of event mattered ratings with direct, avoidance and affective regulation coping 
were 0.17, 0.09 and 0.00 respectively. None of these correlations were significant on a 2-tailed 
test.
Analysis 4.
It was decided to divide the sample of headache subjects into migraine, tension-vascular 
and tension headache types to explore the possibility that these groups might score differently 
on the variables under investigation.
Employing the continuum model of headache severity (Bakal and Kaganov, 1979; 
Holroyd and Andrasik, 1982a) as a basis for classification, subjects were divided into 
headache types, according to the frequency with which they reported the following migrainous 
features in association with their headaches:
1. Visual disturbance (loss of vision or scintillating scotoma).
2. Nausea.
3. Vomiting.
4. Sensitivity to light.
These features are widely recognised as defining characteristics of migraine (e.g., Ad 
Hoc Committee, 1962; Bakal and Kaganov, 1979; Lance, 1977, 1982).
Subjects were classified as migraineurs if they reported two or more features occurring 
in association with more than 50% of their headaches; as tension-vascular headache sufferers 
if they reported at least two features occurring with less than 50% of their headaches, and / or a 
single feature occurring with more than 50% of their headaches; or as tension headache 
sufferers if they reported no more than a single feature occurring with less than 50% of their 
headaches.
The above classification resulted in 33 migraineurs, 65 tension-vascular headache 
sufferers, and 22 tension headache sufferers. Differences between these groups on each 
variable studied were examined for significance by means of one-way analyses of variance. No 
significant results were obtained (see Appendix J).
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7.7. DISCUSSION.
Study II was concerned with an examination of the theoretical model outlined in Section 
7.1.4. This model was concerned with an explanation of the occurrence of headache in terms 
of stressful events and the processes of cognitive appraisal and coping which are thought to 
determine the impact of these events on the individual’s psychological and somatic functioning 
(Aldwin and Revensen, 1987; Folkman and Lazarus, 1986; Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen et al., 
1986; Manne and Sandler, 1984, Pearlin, Menaghan, Lieberman and Mullen, 1981).
Consistent with the view that stressful events are the most common precipitants of 
headache attacks (e.g., Friedman et al., 1954; Howarth, 1965; Selby and Lance, 1960), the 
frequency of stressful events was found to be greater in periods preceding headache (i.e., in 
headache cycles prior to headache onset), than in periods of headache freedom (i.e., in 
headache-free cycles). A similar finding was reported by Levor et al, (1986). The study 
conducted by Levor et al (1986) was concerned only with migraine headache attacks. Thus, the 
results of the present study extend the observed relationship between stressful events and 
headache onset to the spectrum of headache encompassing both the tension and migraine 
types.
Other studies seeking relationships between stressful events and headache onset, have 
merely relied upon headache sufferers' own retrospective reports (e.g., Friedman et al., 1954; 
Henryk-Gutt and Rees, 1973; Howarth, 1965), or have attempted to show that headache 
sufferers report a greater frequency of stressful events than headache-free control subjects 
(e.g., Kearney et al., 1987; Holm et al., 1986). However, these studies cast no light on the 
question of whether or not there exists any causal relationship between stressful events and 
headache onset. This issue is addressed best by longitudinal studies of the kind reported in this 
chapter and by Levor et al (1986). The results of these latter types of study indicate that 
stressful events do tend to precede periods of headache, more often than they do periods of 
headache freedom, thereby suggesting that stressful events may be causally related to 
headache onset. The present study provides stronger evidence for the existence of such a 
relationship than that reported by Levor et al (1986), who counted stressful events occurring 
during headache cycles regardless of whether they occurred before, during or after headache 
attacks. In the present study, only those events in headache cycles occurring prior to headache 
onset were counted and compared with those occurring in headache-free cycles. This 
refinement of methodology allows greater confidence to be attached to the conclusion that 
stressful events precede headache onset more often than periods of headache freedom.
The present study also went beyond that of Levor et al (1986) by requiring subjects to 
note the times at which stressful events occurred, thus making it possible to examine the
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relationship between the occurrence of stressful events during headache attacks and the 
intensity of subsequent headache activity. The results indicated that headaches became 
significantly more intense after stressful events than they were prior to the occurrence of those 
events. Once again, the longitudinal nature of the study makes for the suggestion that stressful 
events occurring during headache attacks may be causally related to subsequent increases in 
headache intensity.
The results of the present study suggest that common stressful events may be causally 
related to headache onset and to increases in headache intensity amongst recurrent headache 
sufferers. The possibility that subjects may have suspected that the experimenter was seeking a 
relationship between the occurrence of stressful events and pandered to this expectation, by 
making a greater effort to identify stressful events just prior to headache onset and just prior to 
increases in headache intensity, cannot be discounted. However, the higher upset ratings 
associated with stressful events occurring in headache-free than in headache cycles is 
inconsistent with the view that the data were affected by expectancy effects.
In addition to the findings discussed above, a significant and positive correlation was 
observed between the frequency of stressful events and the frequency of headache (see Table 
7-1). Consistent with the model proposed in Section 7.1.4, the extent to which individuals 
believed that they possessed the capacity to regulate their cognitive, emotional and behavioural 
responses (self-control-efficacy) moderated the strength of the relationship between stressful 
events and headache frequency. That is, subjects with low levels of self-control-efficacy 
demonstrated a positive and significant relationship between the frequency of stressful events 
and headache frequency, whilst those with high levels of self-control-efficacy demonstrated a 
weak non-significant relationship.
These results suggest that self-control-efficacy may be an important psychological 
resource functioning to protect headache sufferers from the deleterious effects of stressful 
events on headache frequency, in a manner similar to that by which locus of control has been 
found to buffer the relationship between life events and psychological symptoms (e.g., 
Johnson and Sarason, 1978; Krause, 1985).
The buffering effect observed for self-control-efficacy suggests that psychological 
interventions for headache, such as cognitive therapy, relaxation training, and biofeedback 
training, might exert their therapeutic effects, at least in part, by increasing subjects’ self- 
control-efficacy regarding their cognitive, emotional and behavioural responses to stressful 
events.
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The analysis of subjects' appraisal, coping and emotional responses to stressful events, 
occurring in headache and headache-free cycles (see Table 7-6) indicated that, in headache- 
free cycles, subjects appraised events as being more amenable to change, employed higher 
levels of affective regulation coping and higher levels of direct coping in response to those 
events than they did in response to events occurring prior to headache in the headache cycles. 
These observations are consistent with the model proposed in Section 7.1.4 and with the 
literature suggesting that direct and affective regulation coping are associated with better 
adaptational outcomes (e.g., Billings and Moos, 1984; Felton and Revenson, 1984).
However, the analysis presented in Table 7-6 also produced some unexpected results.
Firstly the level of avoidance coping was greater in headache-free than in headache 
cycles. This observation runs counter to previous studies indicating that avoidance coping 
tends to be associated with poorer adaptational outcomes (e.g., Holahan and Moos, 1986; 
Holm et al., 1986; Manne and Sandler, 1984) and suggests that the higher level of avoidance 
coping observed for tension headache subjects relative to headache-free controls by Holm et al 
(1986), may not be related to the occurrence of headache attacks. The present findings suggest 
that the relationship between avoidance coping and headache onset may be quite different 
from the relationship between avoidance coping and emotional distress noted in the stress and 
coping literature. In the present study higher levels of avoidance coping were associated 
significantly with higher levels of emotional upset in response to stressful events, but mitigated 
against the onset of headache in the face of those events (see Table 7-6). Given that higher 
levels of direct, affective regulation and avoidance coping were found to precede periods of 
headache freedom, the number or diversity of coping strategies employed in response to a 
stressful event, rather than the actual nature of those strategies, may be an important 
determinant of whether or not a headache develops.
Secondly, the event mattered ratings and emotional upset ratings were greater in 
headache-free than in headache cycles. This pattem of findings suggests that the events most 
relevant to headache onset may be those which the headache sufferer perceives as being of 
relatively minor significance to his or her well-being. This interpretation of the results suggests 
the hypothesis that headache sufferers may be less sensitive to their emotional and 
physiological reactions, to many stressful events, than headache-free control subjects and that 
this may contribute to the occurrence of their attacks. Indeed, it has been emphasised that 
teaching headache sufferers to become more sensitive to their own cognitive, emotional and 
physiological reactions to stressors may be critical to the successful psychological treatment of 
this condition (Bakal et al., 1981).
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It was found that avoidance coping in response to stressful events occurring during 
headache episodes was associated with an increase in headache intensity following the event, 
whilst direct coping was associated with a decrease in subsequent headache activity. These 
findings are consistent with the view that avoidance behaviour may play a significant role in 
sustaining chronic pain (Letham, Slade, Troup and Bentley, 1983; Philips, 1987a; Slade, 
Troup, Letham and Bentley, 1983). Although the longitudinal nature of the data makes it 
tempting to suggest that a causal relationship may exist between these two methods of coping 
and headache intensity following the stressful event, the fact that coping strategies are 
processes which develop over time and which cannot, therefore, be regarded as having 
occurred only in the hour at which the stressful event was recorded, would lead one to be 
sceptical of such a conclusion. An alternative interpretation of the findings, in terms of intense 
headache incapacitating the person to the extent that he or she is able to engage only in passive 
avoidance strategies, rather than in more active direct coping strategies, cannot be ruled out. 
An exploration of the direction of any causal relation between coping and headache intensity 
would be approached best by treatment studies seeking to alter coping and to track the 
relationship between such alterations and headache intensity over time.
Self-control-efficacy did demonstrate a moderating effect on the relationship between 
stressful events and headache frequency. Given that events appraised as more amenable to 
change, and coped with by means of higher levels of affective regulation, direct coping, and 
avoidance coping, were found to be less likely to give rise to subsequent headache activity, it 
was surprising that these variables were not observed to constitute the psychological processes 
by which self-control-efficacy exerted its buffering effect on headache frequency. The 
correlations of change ratings, affective regulation and direct coping with self-control-efficacy 
were not significant (see Table 7-2). Although event mattered ratings were correlated 
positively with ratings of emotional upset, this measure of primary appraisal was unrelated to 
self-control-effic acy.
Avoidance coping was found to correlate negatively with self-control-efficacy. This is 
consistent with the view that avoidance coping strategies preclude mastery experiences, and 
therefore stifle the growth of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1982, 1986). However, the fact that 
lower, rather than higher, levels of avoidance coping were associated with headache onset (see 
Table 7-6) suggests that this type of coping is unlikely to mediate the buffering effect of self- 
control-efficacy on headache frequency. Although avoidance coping was associated with 
higher ratings of emotional upset in response to stressors, lower rather than higher upset 
ratings preceded headache onset.
Thus, despite the demonstration of a significant buffering effect for self-control- 
efficacy, and despite the study of appraisal, coping and emotional responses, it was not
144
possible to elucidate the psychological mechanisms which underlie the buffering process. A 
similar state of affairs was reported by Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen et al (1986), who found that, 
although mastery correlated negatively with measures of psychological and health status, no 
significant relationships between mastery and appraisal or coping processes could be 
identified. More research is required into the buffering effect of self-control-efficacy on the 
relationship between stressful events and headache frequency in order to uncover significant 
mediational processes.
Lazarus and his colleagues (Lazarus, 1977; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984a, b) have 
argued that appraisal processes determine both coping responses and adaptational outcomes. In 
the present study, event mattered ratings (primary appraisals) did not correlate significantly 
with any event coping variable (see Analysis 3), but did correlate significantly and positively 
with upset ratings (see Table 7-4). Event change ratings (secondary appraisals) did not 
correlate significantly with upset ratings, but did correlate positively and significantly with 
direct coping scores (see Table 7-3). This latter finding is a replication of the result obtained by 
Parkes (1984) who used a similar measure of direct coping. The finding is also consistent with 
the observation that when events are appraised as amenable to change, subjects tend to engage 
in more problem-focused coping (Folkman and Lazarus, 1980). In the present study the 
appraisal of events as amenable to change mitigated against the occurrence of headache.
In view of the above findings, one could speculate that appraising stressful events 
occurring during headache attacks as amenable to change, might be important in facilitating 
the use of direct coping strategies, which were found to be associated with lower ratings of 
headache intensity subsequent to stressful events occurring during headache attacks (see Table 
7-7). Thus, through the action of secondary appraisal processes on direct coping, the increase 
in headache intensity, that was observed to occur following stressful events, may be 
minimised.
Consistent with the stress and coping literature indicating that avoidance coping 
strategies tend to be associated with poorer adaptational outcomes (e.g., Aid win and Revenson, 
1987; Cronkite and Moos, 1984; Holahan and Moos, 1986; Manne and Sandler, 1984), 
avoidance coping was found to be associated with greater emotional upset in response to 
stressful events (see Table 7-4). Surprisingly a similar relationship was observed for direct 
coping. However, a multiple regression analysis revealed that direct coping did not account for 
a significant proportion of the variance in upset ratings, beyond that explained by avoidance 
coping (see Table 7-5). The significant correlation for direct coping with emotional upset may 
have been a spurious result, attributable to the finding that the Avoidance and Direct Coping 
Scales were not fully independent (see the factor analysis presented Appendix I).
145
The model proposed in Section 7.1.4. was not fully supported by the data collected in 
the present study. The major areas in which it was not supported concern the proposed 
linkages between self-control-efficacy, appraisal, coping, and the strength of the emotional 
response to stressful events occurring prior to headache onset. However, the data did support a 
role for stressful events in the onset and exacerbation of headache attacks and also supported a 
role for self-control-efficacy as a buffer of the relationship between the frequency of stressful 
events and the frequency of headache. A greater frequency of coping responses, in relation to 
stressful events, was associated with a decreased probability of subsequent headache onset, as 
was the tendency to appraise stressful events as amenable to change.
The results are consistent with the thesis that cognitive processes may play an important 
role in determining the severity of recurrent headache.
The results of the study reported in this chapter suggest that psychological interventions 
for recurrent headache may exert their therapeutic effects by increasing the level of perceived 
self-control-efficacy. Future studies could examine this hypothesis, along with the role of 
appraisal, coping, and emotional upset in the process of treatment, by means of studies 
tracking the behaviour of these variables over the course of psychological treatment This 
would be particularly important from the point of view of specifying a maximally effective 
focus for psychological interventions.
A second line of inquiry would be to try and clarify the rather multi-faceted measure of 
self-control-efficacy employed in the present study. The Self-Control-Efficacy Scale assessed 
perceived efficacy with respect to cognitive, behavioural and emotional control. The 
development of a factored measure, assessing each of the three components separately, might 
yield more specific information on the nature of the buffering process observed in the present 
study.
A third avenue of investigation is suggested by the intriguing finding that stressful 
events are less likely to result in a subsequent headache when they are appraised as highly 
important and generate a substantial emotional response. The question of whether or not some 
suppression of cognitive or emotional responses is a characteristic of headache sufferers 
(Grothgar and Scholz, 1987), disposing them to react to stressful events with headache, is 
worthy of further investigation. Some light might be cast on this issue by obtaining similar 
data on headache-free control subjects, and comparing their reactions to stressful events with 
those of headache subjects.
It is clear that the results of the present study suggest a number of directions for further 
research. However, having demonstrated that there may be an important role for cognitive
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processes, such as self-control-efficacy and the appraisal of events as amenable to change, in 
the linkage between stressful events and headache onset, the question of the 
psychophysiological processes through which these variables could conceivably contribute to 
headache would seem of paramount importance to the construction of theoretical models 
linking cognitive processes to headache.
As discussed in Chapter 2, a number of attempts have been made to relate psychological 
variables to headache through muscular and vascular processes, but these have not produced 
consistent results (e.g., Anderson and Franks 1981; Cohen et al., 1982; Morley, 1985). The 
central theory of headache (Sicuteri, 1982) suggests that stress may contribute to headache 
through an action on central pain control mechanisms involving serotonin and endogenous 
opioids. Bandura et al (1987) taught subjects cognitive strategies for the management of cold 
pressor pain and observed that this increased their perceived efficacy to withstand and reduce 
pain, and also increased their pain tolerance times. These subjects then received an injection of 
saline or naloxone (an opiate antagonist). Those subjects receiving naloxone became less able 
to tolerate pain than their counterparts receiving saline. Moreover, the extent to which pain 
tolerance times were reduced by naloxone was associated with the level of perceived efficacy 
to reduce pain following training in cognitive strategies. These results suggest that efficacy 
expectations may be related to pain through central pain regulatory mechanisms. Thus, it is 
conceivable that the concept of self-control-efficacy, studied in this chapter, could be related to 
headache through the process of sensory modulation as outlined in the central theory of 
headache.
With the aim of exploring the prospects for linking cognitive constructs with the central 
theory, the next chapter is concerned with an empirical evaluation of the premise that headache 
sufferers possess weakened sensory modulation systems.
7.8. SUMMARY.
The frequency of stressful events was found to be correlated with headache frequency 
and to be greater in periods preceding headache attacks than in periods of headache freedom. 
Stressful events occurring during headache attacks were observed to be followed by increases 
in headache intensity.
The relationship between stressful events and headache frequency was observed to be 
buffered by the level of self-efficacy regarding control over behavioural, cognitive and 
affective responses (self-control-efficacy). It was proposed that this buffering effect of self­
control-efficacy would be mediated by appraisals of the importance of stressful events and of
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the extent to which those events are amenable to change; by affective regulation, direct and 
avoidance coping responses to stressful events and by the emotional response to stressors. The 
appraisal processes were found to be unrelated to self-control-efficacy. Greater frequencies of 
each type of coping studied mitigated against the onset of headache in response to stressful 
events, as did the appraisal of events as amenable to change. Avoidance coping was correlated 
negatively with self-control-efficacy but since lower, rather than higher, frequencies of this 
type of coping preceded periods of headache, avoidance coping was considered unlikely to 
mediate the buffering action of self-control-efficacy. Affective regulation and direct coping 
were unrelated to self-control-efficacy. Ratings of emotional upset were found to be lower in 
periods leading up to headache than in periods of headache freedom as were appraisals of the 
importance of stressful events. These two variables correlated significantly with each other, 
but neither correlated significantly with self-control-efficacy.
It was concluded that the cognitive processes of self-control-efficacy and appraisal of 
stressful events as amenable to change, as well as the frequency of coping behaviours, may 
serve to protect headache sufferers from the deleterious effects of stressful events on headache. 
The mechanisms by which self-control-efficacy exerted its buffering effect remained unclear. 
It was decided to extend the inquiry into the role of cognitive processes in recurrent headache 
by examining the prospects for linking these with the central theory.
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CHAPTER 8
STUDY ITT
TOWARDS A MECHANISM LINKING COGNITIVE PROCESSES WITH 
HEADACHE: AN INVESTIGATION OF PAIN SENSITIVITY AND 
SENSORY MODULATION IN HEADACHE SUFFERERS.
8.1. INTRODUCTION.
8.1.1. Review of the Central Theory of Headache.
The central theory of headache was outlined in Chapter 2. To reiterate, the theory 
proposes that headache is, at least in part, the result of some disorder in CNS pain regulatory 
mechanisms (Sicuteri, 1976, 1981, 1982). This theory is not without its problems. Firstly, there 
is the problem of accounting for the localisation of headache. That is, why does the headache 
sufferer often experience pain in a specific region of the head, rather than elsewhere in the 
body? To account for this observation the theory must be supplemented by postulating a 
heightened sensitivity to pain at the site of headache, arising from a local disturbance of pain 
processing in the trigeminal nerve (e.g., Drummond, 1987) or from local chemical action and / 
or vasodilative processes (e.g., Lance, 1982). Secondly, it is not clear whether the 
hypothesised deficiency in sensory modulation is a consistent feature of the headache sufferer’s 
pain control system, or whether it is a feature which becomes apparent only when headache is 
present, or when the pain control system has been over-taxed, as is postulated to occur when 
the headache sufferer is under stress (Sicuteri, 1982). In spite of these problems, however, 
there is evidence to suggest that alterations in the function of endogenous pain inhibitory 
substances may be involved in the pathophysiology of headache (e.g., Anthony and Lance, 
1985; Genazzani et al., 1984; Nappi, Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Bono et al., 1985; 
Nappi, Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Manzoni et al., 1985), and that stress may act to 
disrupt central pain inhibitory processes (e.g., Rossier et al., 1980; Palkovits et al., 1976). 
These points were discussed in Chapter 2.
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In the last chapter, self-efficacy expectations regarding control over cognitive, 
emotional and behavioural responses, were shown to buffer the relationship between stressful 
events and headache frequency. The central theory of headache asserts that the central pain 
control system performs a similar buffering function such that, in the face of stress, the 
individual is less likely to experience headache if this system is "... efficient, stable and 
adaptable ...", but more likely to experience headache if it is "... phenotypically or 
genotypically fragile ..." (Sicuteri, 1982, p. 72). As discussed in Chapter 8, there is some 
evidence to suggest that self-efficacy to manage pain may be related to the functioning of 
endogenous pain inhibitory substances (Bandura et al., 1987). Accordingly, it is conceivable 
that the aspects of self-efficacy studied in Chapter 8, could have exerted their effects on 
headache frequency through some action on central pain regulatory processes.
This chapter is concerned with the prospects for articulating concepts such as self- 
efficacy to the mechanisms of central pain regulation specified in the central theory of 
headache. If psychological constructs are to be related to headache in this manner, it is 
necessary to explore and clarify the extent to which CNS pain control processes play a part in 
the pathophysiology of headache. If, as Sicuteri (1982) contends, it is the interaction of stress 
with a weakened pain control system that contributes substantially to the onset of headache 
attacks, it follows that headache sufferers should have some deficiency in their capacity for 
central pain inhibition, setting them apart from headache-free persons. The aim of this chapter 
is to conduct an evaluation of this proposition.
As noted in Chapter 2, less research has been conducted into the role of pain inhibitory 
processes in headache than into the involvement of peripheral mechanisms, such as 
vasodilatation and muscle contraction. Some researchers have examined the sensitivity of 
headache sufferers and headache-free persons to experimental pain, but the findings are 
equivocal (see Chapter 2). The majority of these studies have not matched subjects on 
variables such as age and sex, which are known to affect sensitivity to this kind of pain 
(Woodrow, Friedman, Siegelaub and Collen, 1972), and many have not controlled for the 
presence or absence of headache (e.g., Langemark and Oleson, 1987). The study reported in 
this chapter seeks to redress these methodological shortcomings, and to explore the hypothesis 
that there may exist a neurophysiological basis to any heightened pain sensitivity in headache 
sufferers, as suggested by the central theory.
8.1.2. The Study of Central Pain Control Functions.
The capacity of CNS mechanisms to modulate the impact of sensory input on the 
cortical structures subserving the experience of pain, has been studied by measuring pain
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sensitivity (e.g., Lieberman, Corkin, Spring, Growdon and Wurtman, 1983; Sicuteri, Anselmi 
and Del Bianco, 1978); sampling pain inhibitory substances such as the endogenous opioids 
from the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) (e.g., Genazzani et al., 1984; Nappi, Facchinetti, 
Martignoni, Petraglia, Bono et al., 1985; Nappi, Facchinetti, Martignoni, Manzoni et al., 
1985); manipulating the level of pain inhibitory substances in the CNS by the administration of 
substances such as naloxone (e.g., Adams, 1976; Buchsbaum, Davis and Bunney, 1977) or 
parachlorophenylalanine (Sicuteri et al., 1973); or by studying the amplitude of the average 
evoked potential (the electrical response of the brain to sensory input) (e.g., Buchsbaum and 
Davis, 1979; von Knorring, 1974).
The assessment of pain sensitivity is discussed in Appendix A. A wide variety of pain 
producing stimuli have been employed, including the cold pressor test, radiant heat, pressure 
algometer and electrical stimulation, with the most common pain measures derived from these 
procedures being pain threshold and pain tolerance (Wolff, 1978, 1984). These measures have 
been found to correlate with CSF endorphin levels (von Knorring, Almay, Johansson and 
Terenius, 1978), and to be responsive to opiate antagonists (Buchsbaum et al., 1977; 
Buchsbaum, Davis, Coppola and Naber, 1981a). Thus, measures of pain sensitivity would 
appear to be related to physiological aspects of pain regulation, as well as responsive to 
psychological influences (see Appendix A).
As discussed in Chapter 2, the manipulation of brain levels of serotonin and endogenous 
opiods has been found to affect the response of animals to stimulation (e.g., Proudfit and 
Anderson, 1975; Yaksh and Rudy, 1978). However, assessing the levels of these substances in 
humans is made difficult by the fact that invasive procedures are required, particularly in 
respect of CSF sampling (e.g., von Knorring et al., 1978). A less invasive method of assessing 
physiological correlates of pain sensitivity is afforded by the average evoked potential (AEP) 
generated by the brain in response to stimulation.
8.1.3. AEP Amplitudes and Pain Modulation.
When the senses of a human or animal are stimulated, the input generates an electrical 
response from the cortex which may be detected in electroencephalographic (EEG) 
recordings. This response is termed the evoked response or evoked potential (Bartley, 1934; 
Dawson, 1954). These responses are very small and are easily lost in the background EEG 
rhythms generated by the brain (Buchsbaum, 1976; Callaway, 1966). Since the evoked 
potential (measured in microvolts) is a series of peaks and troughs with a reproducible form, it 
is possible to obtain an image of this wave by exposing the organism to repeated stimulation 
and averaging the response obtained. In this manner the average evoked potential becomes
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apparent as the background random "noise" in the EEG averages towards zero (Buchsbaum, 
1976; Callaway, 1966). The AEP develops as a series of peaks and troughs after a latent period 
(measured in milliseconds from the time at which stimulation was delivered). These 
components have been the subject of much research in psychiatry and neurology, proving most 
useful in the diagnosis of multiple sclerosis (Halliday, McDonald and Mushin, 1973).
Those components of the AEP studied most commonly in pain research occur over the 
first 300 milliseconds after stimulus onset, there being three components that have been 
prominent in the literature on pain modulation. For the purposes of this chapter these peaks in 
the AEP shall be referred to as the Pj, Nj and P2 peaks. Positive peaks are indicated by the 
letter "P"; negative ones by the letter "N". There has been some confusion over whether 
positive peaks should be illustrated as deflecting downwards or upwards (Callaway, 1966). 
The choice of direction is of course purely arbitrary. The Pj, Nj and P2 peaks are illustrated in 
Figure 8-1, with positive peaks deflecting downwards. The P j, Nj and P9 peaks have been 
identified by reference to the time bands in which they are considered to occur. For example, 
Buchsbaum and his colleagues (Buchsbaum and Davis, 1979; Buchsbaum, Davis, Coppola and 
Naber, 1981a, b; Lavine, Buchsbaum and Poncy, 1976) have referred to the Pj, Nj and P2 
peaks as P jqo ^120 ^  p20O on ^as s^ ^ at: these components fall within the time bands 
76-112 msec, 116-152 msec and 168-248 msec respectively. However, Connolly and Gruzelier 
(1982) found that on many occasions the three major peaks, generated in response to visual 
stimulation, did not fall within the respective time bands. Accordingly, rather than refer to the 
AEP peaks in terms of their latency, it was decided to follow Connolly and Gruzelier (1982) 
and employ the Pj, N j and P2 terminology.
N j FIGURE 8-1
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AEP's may be obtained by means of visual (Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982), auditory 
(Prescott, Connolly and Gruzelier, 1984) or somatosensory (Chen, Chapman and Harkins, 
1979) stimulation. However, little is known about the cortical structures responsible for the Pj, 
Nj and P2 components (Chundler and Dong, 1983). Thus, the relationship between AEP's and 
pain modulation is based almost entirely upon the association of these components with 
measures of pain sensitivity (e.g., Lavine et al., 1976; Ashton, Golding, Marsh and Thompson, 
1984), or with measures of the level of pain inhibitory substances in the CSF (e.g., von 
Knorring, Almay, Johansson and Terenius, 1979).
The rationale for the application of AEP's to the study of pain modulation dates back to 
the work of Petrie (1967). She was concerned with assessing a dimension of personality which 
she termed "perceptual reactance" or "augmenting-reducing". People at the opposite 
extremities of this dimension were termed "augmenters" and "reducers" (Petrie, 1967). Petrie 
(1967) postulated that the nervous system of augmenters is such that they tend to amplify the 
intensity of stimulation, whilst that of reducers functions to attenuate stimulation. According to 
Petrie (1967), augmenters are much more likely to experience noxious stimuli as painful than 
reducers.
Petrie conceived of the augmenting-reducing dichotomy as having a neurophysiological
basis:
"... perhaps the most helpful model of these processes is to think of them as 
contrasted examples of central modulation of sensory perception. Such central 
modulation may be dependent on the presence and nature of reverberating circuits 
in the nervous system... biochemical factors undoubtedly will be found to play an 
important part..." (Petrie, 1967, p. 104).
Thus, the concept of augmenting-reducing, as defined by Petrie (1967), is similar to the 
gate control concept of pain modulation introduced by Melzack and Wall (1965).
Petrie (1967) assessed augmenting-reducing by means of the kinaesthetic figural after­
effect (KFA). This after-effect is assessed by blindfolding subjects and instructing them to rest 
their hands with the palms upwards for 45 minutes. They are then given a wooden block (the 
standard) which they handle for a short period. The standard is then taken away, and subjects 
are presented with a wedge which becomes progressively wider from the bottom to the top. On 
the wedge is a movable marker which subjects move to the point which they consider to 
correspond to the width of the standard block. This procedure is repeated over a number of 
trials. Those subjects who over-estimate the size of the standard block are called augmenters; 
those who under-estimate its size are called reducers. Employing this methodology, 
augmenters have been found to be less pain tolerant and to be less disturbed by sensory 
deprivation than reducers (Petrie, 1967; Petrie, Collins and Solomon, 1960; Sweeney, 1966).
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Buchsbaum and Silverman (1968) were the first to employ the AEP as an alternative 
measure of augmenting-reducing. These researches reasoned that if augmenters amplify the 
impact of stimulation on the nervous system, and reducers attenuate this impact, the AEP 
amplitudes of augmenters should increase with the level of stimulation at a greater rate than 
those of reducers. Employing a modification of Petrie's (1967) KFA task, Buchsbaum and 
Silverman (1968) calculated perceptual reactance scores. They then recorded the AEP's 
generated in response to four different light intensities. Each intensity was presented 120 
times. The visual average evoked potentials (YEP's) were recorded from an electrode placed at 
C4 (see Figure 8-2). The amplitude intensity slopes for the Pj, Nj and ?2 components were 
calculated by means of least squares regression for each subject. It was found that the 
amplitude / intensity slope for the negative peak occurring at about 140 msec (N|), correlated 
significantly, and in the expected direction, with scores on the KFA.
Since Buchsbaum and Silverman's (1968) findings, researchers have been concerned 
with the relationship between AEP components and measures of pain sensitivity, with the most 
popular recording site being the vertex (Cz; see Figure 8-2) (e.g., Ashton et al, 1984; 
Chapman, Chen, Colpitts and Martin, 1981; Haier, 1983). Several studies have reported 
significant relationships between AEP components (in visual and somatosensory modalities) 
and tolerance for experimental pain, (e.g., Buchsbaum, 1976; von Knorring, 1978; von 
Knorring Espvall and Perris, 1974). No such studies have been conducted on the auditory 
AEP.
FIGURE 8-2
The 10-20 System of Electrode Placement (Jasper, 1958).
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Buchsbaum and his colleagues have found the amplitude / intensity slope for various 
components of the somatosensory average evoked potential (SSEP) to be correlated with 
ratings of pain intensity generated by electric shock (e.g., Buchsbaum and Davis, 1979; 
Buchsbaum et al., 1977). These researchers have reported that opiate antagonists, such as 
naloxone, increase amplitude / intensity slopes in the SSEP recorded from vertex and C4  (the 
area of the scalp over the somatosensory cortex; see Figure 8.2) for the Nj component 
(Buchsbaum et al., 1977, 1981; Buchsbaum et al., 1977). However, although Buchsbaum et al 
(1981b) observed this effect to be present over all 29 subjects studied, Buchsbaum et al (1977) 
found it to occur only for those subjects with high pain tolerance levels, as assessed on a 
previous electrical pain test.
In a study of the analgesic effects of aspirin, this drug was found to reduce the size of 
the SSEP amplitude / intensity slope for the Nj component (Buchsbaum and Davis, 1979). The 
Pj and amplitude / intensity slopes have also been related to pain sensitivity (Lavine et al., 
1976), with the former variable having been found to increase with naloxone (Davis, 
Buchsbaum and Bunney, 1978). In each of these studies, somatosensory stimulation was 
employed and recordings were made from the vertex.
In many studies differences between the Pj and Nj peaks (Pj-Nj ) (e.g., Birchali and 
Claridge, 1979; Buchsbaum and Pfefferbaum, 1971; Stelmack, Achom and Michaud, 1977) 
and between the and P2  peaks (N1-P2 ) (e.g., Buchsbaum, 1976; Kaskey, Salzman, 
Klorman and Pass, 1980) have been said to reflect augmenting-reducing. Indeed, von Knorring 
and his colleagues have reported on relationships between pain sensitivity and the amplitude / 
intensity slope of a VEP component defined as the largest peak to peak amplitude occurring 
over the first 150 msec of the VEP wave recorded from the occiput (von Knorring 1978; von 
Knorring et al., 1974).
In their conceptualisation of AEP amplitude /  intensity slopes as measures of sensory 
inhibition, Buchsbaum and Pfefferbaum (1971) contended that augmenting-reducing on this 
variable represents the operation of a non-specific inhibitory process. However, the absence of 
significant cross-modal correlations for P j-Nj and N^-P2  peak to peak amplitude / intensity 
slopes, recorded from vertex in response to visual and auditory stimulation (Kaskey et al., 
1980; Raine, Mitchell and Venables, 1981), suggests that augmenting-reducing in the AEP 
may be modality specific and, therefore, not indicative of a generalised mechanism of sensory 
inhibition. As Raine et al., (1981) point out, it is possible that cross-modal relationships might 
emerge if recordings are made over the specific cortical areas corresponding to the stimulus 
modalities employed.
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Although each of the Pj, Nj and P2  AEP amplitudes have been related to the process of 
pain modulation, there is confusion over which components are of most relevance. 
Furthermore, drawing any conclusion from this field is made difficult by the range of 
methodologies employed by researchers, and by the methodological problems which 
characterise many of the AEP studies reviewed above. These methodological problems include 
the selection of a recording site, the number and intensity of stimuli, the identification and 
measurement of AEP component amplitudes, the contribution of eye movement artifacts and 
the role of attentional and arousal factors. Each of these issues is considered in the following 
sections.
8.I.3.I. The Selection of a Recording Site.
The phenomenon of augmenting-reducing has been found to vary markedly with the 
placement of the recording electrode (Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; Prescott et al., 1984). 
However, in the literature on augmenting-reducing a plethora of recording sites have been 
employed, with little rationale for their selection being offered. In cases where the researcher is 
concerned with somatosensory stimulation, there is evidence to suggest that the vertex may be 
the site at which AEP components are observed most readily. (Goff, Matsumiya, Allison, and 
Goff, 1977). In topographic studies of SSEP components, these researchers observed that at 
vertex the amplitudes of the P j, and P2  components are at least 90% of the maximum size 
observed at other cranial locations. Otherwise, however, there exists little to guide researchers 
in their choice of a recording site.
8.I.3.2. The Number and Intensity of Stimuli.
There exist no guidelines for the choice of the number or intensity of stimuli to be 
employed in AEP studies of augmenting-reducing. Most studies have employed four different 
stimulus intensities (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1977; Davis et al., 1978; Stark and Norton, 1974), 
but others have used six (e.g., Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; Connolly, Gawel and Rose, 
1982) or three (e.g., von Knorring, 1978; von Knorring et al., 1974).
In VEP studies, the stimulus intensity has been described in terms of photostimulator 
settings (e.g., Buchsbaum and Pfefferbaum, 1971; von Knorring, 1977; von Knorring et al., 
1974), in terms of its intensity at the source of stimulation (e.g., Haier, Robinson, Braden and 
Williams, 1984), or in terms of its intensity at the subject (e.g., Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; 
Connolly et al., 1982). In SSEP studies, the intensity of the electrical stimulus is usually given 
in milli-amps, with the duration of the pulse also being specified (e.g., Ashton et al., 1984;
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Buchsbaum et al., 1977, 1981b). Occasionally, the shocks are delivered according to the 
intensity required to generate responses from "barely noticeable" to "painful" in each subject 
(e.g., Lavine et al., 1976). These variations make it difficult to compare results obtained from 
different laboratories.
8.I.3.3. The Identification and Measurement of AEP Peak Amplitudes.
Although the Pp and P2  peaks have been said to fall within specific latency ranges 
(e.g., Buchsbaum, 1976; Buchsbaum and Silverman, 1968), it has been noted that the form of 
the AEP is sometimes poorly defined, making it difficult to identify these triphasic 
components (Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982). It has also been observed that the frequency with 
which VEP peaks occur within the time bands specified by Buchsbaum and his associates 
(e.g., Buchsbaum and Pfefferbaum, 1971; Buchsbaum and Silverman 1968) is low and tends to 
vary with recording electrode placement (Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982). Furthermore, in 
augmenting-feducing studies, where stimuli of varying intensities are employed, the rigid 
specification of time bands is bound to produce difficulties in peak identification, as the 
latencies of VEP peaks have been found to be inversely related to stimulus intensity (e.g., 
Creutzfeldt and Kuhnt, 1967). Indeed, the classification of subjects as augmenters or reducers 
varies markedly depending on the AEP components studied, and on the method of peak 
identification employed (Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; Prescott et al., 1984).
A more flexible approach to peak identification, which is less dependent on the 
specification of time bands, has been proposed by Connolly and Gruzelier (1982). These 
researchers noted that the Nj peak of the VEP was the most readily identified in recordings 
from vertex, occipital and temporal electrode placements. Thus, these researchers' approach to 
peak identification was to first identify the Nj component, defined as the most negative point 
in the latency range of 80-180 msec. The positive peaks were then defined relative to the Nj 
peak, with Pj being the most positive peak within the first 60 msec before Nj and P2  being the 
most positive peak occurring between Nj and 280 msec (Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982).
Three different methods of measuring peak amplitudes are common in the literature. 
Peak to peak amplitudes are measured as the vertical distance from the Pj to the Nj peaks (Pj- 
N j) or from the Nj to the P2  peaks ( N j ^ )  (e.g., Buchsbaum and Pfefferbaum, 1971; Chen et 
al., 1985; Haier et al., 1984). Once the peaks have been identified, no measurement problems 
are involved in the assessment of peak to peak amplitudes. However, some evidence has been 
presented suggesting that the individual peaks involved in peak to peak measures may be 
differentially affected by increasing stimulus intensities (e.g., Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; 
Prescott et al., 1984). The advantage of the peak to peak amplitude measure is that it does not
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require the specification of a baseline (Donchin et al., 1977). In order to measure individual 
peaks, it is necessary to specify a baseline. Two methods have been employed for determining 
baselines. Some researchers have employed the mean of the entire AEP epoch as the baseline 
from which individual peak values are subtracted (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1981b; Lavine et al., 
1976). The problem with this procedure is that since the amplitude of all peaks contributes to 
the baseline, measures of each individual peak relative to this baseline cannot be regarded as 
independent (Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982). Other studies report the use of a pre-stimulus 
baseline in the measurement of individual peak amplitudes (e.g., Buchsbaum and Davis, 1979; 
Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; Davis et al., 1978). The pre-stimulus baseline is obtained by 
sampling the EEG, from the recording site, for a very short time just prior to stimulus onset. In 
this manner, independent measures of individual peak amplitudes may be obtained.
The amplitudes of AEP components identified and assessed in various manners, have 
been reported to be reliable across testing sessions (e.g., Buchsbaum, 1976; Soskis and 
Shagass, 1974; Stark and Norton, 1974). In particular, the amplitude / intensity slope has been 
reported to be most reliable (Stark and Norton 1974). However, this measure has been 
criticised on the grounds that the correlation between amplitude and intensity, for individual 
subjects, is often close to zero and that, therefore, to describe this relationship as a 
monotonically increasing or decreasing function is misleading (Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; 
Iacono, Gabbay and Lykken, 1982).
8.I.3.4. The Role of Eve Blinks and Eve Movements.
A serious methodological deficiency which characterises much of the work on 
augmenting-reducing in the AEP is the failure to control for recording artifacts produced by 
eye blinks and eye movements (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1977, 1981b; Buchsbaum and 
Pfefferbaum, 1971; Buchsbaum and Silverman, 1968; Davis et al., 1978; von Knorring, 1978; 
von Knorring et al., 1974). This source of AEP contamination is particularly important in 
studies of the VEP, where eye blinks will alter the level of stimulation at the retina. Some 
researchers have attempted to overcome the problem by testing subjects with their eyes closed 
(e.g., von Knorring, 1978; von Knorring et al., 1974), but such a method has been criticised 
because requiring subjects to close their eyes, often generates slow-wave activity in the EEG, 
which can affect the AEP in an idiosyncratic manner (e.g., Cooper, Osselton and Shaw, 1974). 
It has also been pointed out that contaminating eye movements can still occur even when the 
eyes are closed, and that factors, such as the thickness of the eyelids and skin pigmentation, 
would affect the intensity of light at the retina (OToole and Iacono, 1987).
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Iacono et al (1982) studied vertex P j-Nj amplitude / intensity slopes calculated from 
VEP records contaminated with eye blinks, and compared these with the slopes calculated 
from records with eye blinks removed. Contaminated records were found to reveal smaller 
slopes than uncontaminated records, indicating that eye blinks could contribute to the 
phenomenon of reducing. It is, therefore, essential to control for eye blink artifacts in VEP 
augmenting-reducing studies.
Many AEP augmenting-reducing studies have employed somatosensory stimulation 
(e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1977, 1981; Davis et al., 1978; Lavine et al., 1976) and have not 
employed any control for eye movements or eye blinks. However, Donchin et al (1977) have 
pointed out that any eye movement alters the orientation of the evoked potential field, and 
exerts an effect on scalp electrodes proportional to the distance of those electrodes from the 
eyes. Donchin et al (1977) note that vertex electrodes would certainly be affected by these 
artifacts. Accordingly, many researchers now monitor eye movements and eye blinks with the 
electro-oculogram (EOG), irrespective of stimulus modality, and exclude contaminated evoked 
potential recordings from the AEP (e.g., Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; Prescott et al., 1984; 
Raine et al., 1981).
8.I.3.5. The Role of Attentional and Arousal Factors.
It has been suggested that factors such as the level of attention paid to the stimulus, and 
the subject's level of arousal may influence AEP components (e.g., Callaway, 1966; Hillyard 
and Picton, 1979). Indeed, it has been observed that when the VEP is studied by testing 
subjects repeatedly within a single testing session the amplitude / intensity slope for the Pj-N^ 
component is inversely related to increases in skin conductance (Birchall and Claridge, 1979). 
These authors concluded that augmenting-reducing in the VEP may be an inverse function of 
arousal levels. Nevertheless, researchers concerned with the phenomenon of augmenting- 
reducing, or with relating AEP components to pain mechanisms, have not attempted to 
consider the role of attentional or arousal factors in the interpretation of their results.
While the AEP has shown promise as a measure of sensory modulation, the wide range 
of methodologies employed and the absence of any clear convention in the identification and 
measurement of peak amplitudes, have resulted in this field becoming a rather confused area 
of psychophysiology. Nevertheless, since a deficiency in sensory modulation has been 
postulated to play a central role in the pathophysiology of headache (Sicuteri, 1981, 1982), it 
was considered worthwhile to explore the prospects for applying an AEP methodology to the 
study of this disorder.
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8.1.4. AEP Amplitudes and Headache.
Very few studies of AEP parameters in headache sufferers have been conducted. Those 
reported in the literature have dealt almost exclusively with the response of migraineurs to 
visual stimulation.
VEP components studied in unilateral migraine sufferers during attacks have been 
reported to be smaller on the headache than on the headache-free side (Regan and Heron, 
1969, 1970). These researchers attributed their findings to the presence of cerebral ischemia 
under the electrode.
Lehtonen (1974) compared VEP responses in migrainous and headache-free control 
subjects. None of the migraineurs had a headache at the time of testing. Subjects were exposed 
to 200 stimuli, presented either as single flashes or as flickering flashes at a variety of different 
rates. All stimuli were of a single intensity. Subjects were tested with eyes open and with eyes 
closed. The VEP was recorded from the left and right occipital regions and from points on 
either side of the vertex. Allowing for the number of different recording sites and experimental 
conditions employed, very few significant differences between groups were observed. In the 
case of single flashes with eyes open, only the amplitude of the positive component occurring 
at 170-260 msec (P2 ), recorded from the right occipital electrode, was greater for migraineurs 
than for controls. For single flashes with eyes closed, the only significant difference to emerge 
was for the positive component occurring at 50-70 msec (Pj), recorded from the left occipital 
electrode. Again, migraineurs demonstrated larger amplitudes than controls. In the case of 
flickering stimulation, when subjects had their eyes closed, no significant differences between 
groups were apparent; when they had their eyes open, larger response amplitudes were 
observed for migraineurs at both occipital electrodes, but this occurred at only one of eight 
stimulus repetition rates (22 flicks per second). Unfortunately, Lehtonen (1974) did not state 
which VEP components demonstrated this response. The results are complicated further by the 
fact that Lehtonen measured peak to peak amplitudes, but reported separate amplitude 
measures for each peak. Peak to peak measurements incorporate information about both peaks. 
It is difficult to appreciate how information about individual peaks can be obtained from this 
method of measurement.
In a subsequent study, VEP amplitudes recorded from right and left occipital sites were 
pooled and compared across migraine and control subjects (Lehtonen, Hyyppa, Kaihola, 
Kangasniemi and Lang, 1979). Subjects were tested, with eyes open and with light flickering 
at 22 flicks per second. On this occasion, the negative component at 120-175 msec (Nj), and 
the positive component, at 170-260 msec (P2 ) were smaller for migraine than for control 
subjects. These differences were consistent over four separate assessment sessions.
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MacLean, Appenzeller, Cordaro and Rhodes (1975) studied the VEP recorded from the 
parietal and occipital regions. They did not say on which side of the head the parietal 
electrodes were placed. VEP's generated from 100 flashes of light were obtained for eight 
migraineurs and five headache-free control subjects. All subjects were tested with eyes closed; 
seven of the migraineurs were assessed during and between headaches. The authors reported 
that independent raters were unable to distinguish migraineurs, with or without headache, from 
the control subjects on the basis of VEP patterns.
Employing a reversing checkerboard pattern of light as the evoking stimulus, and 
recording the VEP from electrodes placed at the right, left and midline points in the occipital 
region, Kennard, Gawel, Rudolph and Rose (1978) tested subjects with eyes open and 
observed no differences on any VEP amplitude between migraineurs (assessed in the 
headache-free interval) and control subjects. For migraineurs reporting left sided headaches, 
the peak to peak amplitudes for a negative component occurring at 68-83 msec, and for a 
positive component occurring at 88-111 msec, were found to be greater on the left side of the 
head than on the right. The authors were unable to explain this finding.
Brinciotti, Guidetti, Matricardi and Cortesi (1986) studied the VEP in headache-free 
children and in children with common or classical migraine. Visual checkerboard stimulation 
was employed and recordings were made from Fz (see Figure 8-2). The study was restricted to 
the P2  amplitude which was found to be greater for the headache sufferers than for the 
controls. There was no significant difference between the classical and common migraineurs 
on this amplitude. The authors state that the P2  amplitude was measured peak to peak, but they 
do not specify the reference peak (presumably it was N j).
It is difficult to draw any conclusion from the studies reviewed above other than to say 
that the evidence for the involvement of VEP abnormalities in migraine is equivocal. Despite 
the fact that all of these studies employed visual stimulation, none controlled for EOG artifacts 
and the results obtained are, therefore, susceptible to the spurious influences described 
previously. As is the case with studies attempting to relate AEP components to pain 
perception, the variability in the methods applied to the study of the VEP in headache and 
headache-free control subjects is likely to be contributing to the absence of consistent findings.
The most thorough examination of the VEP in migraineurs and headache-free controls 
to date is that reported by Connolly, Gawel and Rose (1982). These researchers sought to 
explore the possibility that some deficiency in sensory modulation may characterise 
migraineurs by studying VEP components. They exposed 16 migraineurs and 22 headache-free 
control subjects to 6 different light intensities, each intensity being presented 60 times in 
blocks of 10. The blocks were presented in a randomised order. Migraineurs were assessed in
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the headache-free state. Subjects were instructed to keep their eyes open, the EOG was 
monitored and recordings contaminated by eye movement artifacts were rejected. The VEP 
was recorded from the vertex and from bilateral temporal sites.
Connolly et al (1982) employed the method of Connolly and Gruzelier (1982), outlined 
in the previous section, in identifying the Pj, N j and P2  peaks. They measured the P j-Nj and 
Nr P2 peak to peak amplitudes, as well as the amplitude of each peak relative to a pre­
stimulus baseline. They pooled their results across stimulus intensities and found that, for 
vertex recordings, the P j .N j peak to peak amplitude and the amplitude of the individual Nj 
peak were greater for migraineurs than for controls. No other significant differences were 
observed for vertex recordings. Pooling the data for the temporal electrodes across both sides 
of the head and across all six intensities, the N j-P2  peak to peak amplitude was found to be 
greater for migraineurs than for controls. The P | amplitude was smaller for the migraineurs 
whilst the Nj amplitude was larger. Temporal P j-Nj peak to peak amplitudes were greater for 
subjects with right sided headaches than for those with bilateral headaches. Those migraineurs 
with right sided headaches demonstrated larger P j-N j amplitudes, at left temporal sites, than 
those with bilateral headaches.
It is unfortunate that Connolly et al (1982) did not present a between groups analysis for 
linear or quadratic trend across intensities (Kirk 1968), as this would have allowed for some 
evaluation of any differential rates of amplitude increase over stimulus intensity and, thus, 
afforded some integration of their findings with the literature on augmenting-reducing in the 
AEP.
Connolly et al (1982) were not able to articulate their results to a theory of headache 
couched in terms of a deficit in sensory modulation (e.g., Sicuteri, 1982; Sicuteri Anselmi and 
Del Bianco, 1978) because they focused specifically on migraineurs, many of whom are 
known to be particularly sensitive to light when they have a headache (e.g., Dalessio, 1980; 
Lance, 1982); and because they employed only photic stimulation. Thus, an interpretation in 
terms of some specific hypersensitivity in the visual system of migraineurs, rather than in 
terms of a general failure of sensory modulation, may account for their findings. In attempting 
to separate these two alternative interpretations, it would be important to examine the AEP 
response of headache sufferers and control subjects to stimuli in other modalities. Moreover, 
from the point of view of applying the AEP methodology to an examination of the central 
theory of headache (Sicuteri, 1982; Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978), it would be 
important to determine the extent to which any AEP abnormalities, identified in headache 
sufferers, could be related to measures of pain sensitivity. The identification of significant 
relationships between these variables would suggest that AEP abnormalities, such as those
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reported by Connolly et al (1982), may reflect some neurophysiological deficiency in the CNS 
pain regulatory system.
8.1.5. Aims of Study III.
Study III sought to explore the prospects for extending the findings of Connolly et al 
(1982) so that they might have greater implications for the central theory of headache. 
Towards this end, it was proposed to study the SSEP in headache and headache-free control 
subjects; to assess pain sensitivity in each of these groups, so as to explore the premise that 
headache sufferers lack the capacity to modulate pain (Sicuteri et al., 1978); and to determine 
the strength of any relationship between AEP amplitudes and pain sensitivity.
As argued at the beginning of this chapter, some demonstration of the involvement of 
CNS mechanisms in the pathophysiology of headache would raise the possibility that the 
cognitive factors described in Chapter 8 may be related to headache through these processes 
and would, thus, have implications for the development of theoretical models linking cognitive 
factors with headache activity.
8.2. HYPOTHESES.
The experiment described in subsequent sections of this chapter was designed to test the 
following hypotheses:
1. Headache subjects tested between headaches will have lower pain thresholds and 
demonstrate reduced pain tolerances relative to headache-free control subjects. 
This hypothesis was derived from the central theory of headache (Sicuteri, Anselmi 
and Del Bianco, 1978), outlined in Chapter 2. If it is true that headache sufferers 
are deficient in their capacity to modulate their experience of pain (Sicuteri, 
Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978), they should be found to be more pain sensitive 
than headache-free persons.
2. Headache sufferers will demonstrate lower pain thresholds and reduced pain 
tolerances during headache attacks, as compared with headache-free periods. This 
hypothesis follows from the view that any failure of pain modulation may not 
become evident until headache occurs (Sicuteri, 1982).
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3. The P j -Nj amplitude of the SSEP, recorded from vertex, will be larger for 
headache sufferers, tested between attacks, than for headache-free controls. 
Furthermore, the rate at which the P j-Nj amplitude increases with stimulus 
intensity will be greater for headache subjects tested between attacks than for 
headache-free subjects. This hypothesis follows from the view that headache 
sufferers may be unable to modulate the impact of sensory input on their nervous 
systems because of some neurophysiological deficiency in the sensory modulating 
mechanism (Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978). If this theory were true, the 
amplitude of the SSEP would be expected to be larger for headache sufferers, and 
to increase with stimulus intensity at a rate greater for headache sufferers than for 
headache-free controls. Such patterns of responding have been observed for pain 
sensitive persons (e.g., Buchsbaum and Davis, 1979; Buchsbaum et al., 1977; 
Harkins and Chapman, 1978; von Knorring, 1978) and for persons given the opiate 
antagonist naloxone (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1977, 1981b). The choice of the Pj- 
N j component of the SSEP was based on the findings of Connolly et al (1982) with 
respect to the VEP.
4. The P j -Nj amplitude of the SSEP, recorded from vertex, will be greater and will 
increase at a greater rate with stimulus intensity for headache sufferers tested 
during headache attacks than for those same subjects tested between attacks. This 
hypothesis follows from the view that any disruption to the sensory modulating 
system may be specific to episodes of headache (Sicuteri, 1982).
5. The P j -Nj amplitude of the SSEP will be related to pain sensitivity such that, for 
both headache and control subjects, this component will be larger, and will increase 
at a greater rate with stimulus intensity, for pain sensitive than for pain insensitive 
subjects. This hypothesis follows from the assumption that augmenting in the Pj- 
Nj amplitude of the AEP is indicative of a deficiency in central pain inhibitory 
functions (e.g., von Knorring, 1978; von Knorring et al., 1974, 1979).
8.3. METHOD.
8.3.1. Subjects.
The sample of subjects participating in the study comprised 36 headache sufferers and 
36 headache-free control subjects, matched for age and sex with each of the headache
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sufferers. Pairs of subjects were considered to be matched on age provided that each member 
of the pair was aged within five years of the other.
Headache sufferers were recruited from the Neurology Outpatients Clinic at the Prince 
Of Wales Hospital, Sydney (n = 21), from the staff of the Prince Of Wales and Prince Henry 
Hospitals and from the general community (n = 15). The latter group of subjects were recruited 
by means of advertisements placed on hospital and community notice boards.
As was the case in the Study II (see Chapter 8), the present study was not confined to 
any single headache type. The intention was to discover if the hypothesised differences 
between headache sufferers and control subjects would hold across the spectrum of headache 
from tension to migraine.
All prospective headache subjects were contacted by telephone and were accepted into 
the study if they met the criteria outlined in Chapter 7. In addition, they were required not to 
have taken any regular prophylactic medication for headache in the month preceding the study. 
It was considered that prophylactic medication could affect pain sensitivity and SSEP 
measures in unspecified ways. The sample of 36 headache sufferers satisfied the selection 
criteria, and consisted of 22 females and 14 males, aged between 21 and 63 years, with a mean 
age of 41.6 years (S.D. = 10.7 years), all of whom reported suffering with headache on at least 
one day in each week.
In view of the wide prevalence of Headache (see Chapter 1), it is difficult to find people 
who have not suffered a headache at some time or another. Accordingly, headache-free 
persons were defined operationally, as those who reported suffering no more than one mild 
headache per month and who denied the occurrence of any migrainous features (as set out in 
Section 7.6.4 of Chapter 7) in association with any such headaches.
Headache-free control subjects were recruited from the general community and from the 
staff of the Prince of Wales and Prince Henry Hospitals by means of notice board 
advertisements. All control subjects were required not to be taking any regular medication. 
Thirty six control subjects were selected such that they could be matched with at least one 
member of the headache group. The control group consisted of 22 females and 14 males aged 
between 18 and 65 years with a mean age of 41.0 years (S.D. = 13.6 years).
All subjects signed a statement giving their informed consent to take part in the study. 
They were assured that although the results of the study may be published, their identity would 
remain confidential.
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8.3.2. Pain Sensitivity Measures: Apparatus and Procedure.
In view of the fact that there exists, within the central theory of headache, some 
confusion over whether the postulated deficit in pain modulation is specific to the head 
(Sicuteri, 1982), or is a generalised condition affecting all regions of the body (Sicuteri, 
Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978), it was decided to assess pain sensitivity in both the head and 
the index finger of the non-dominant hand.
8.3.2.I. Inducing Pain in the Finger.
Various procedures exist for inducing pain in the fingers, including the cold pressor test, 
the Forgione-Barber Pain Stimulator and electrical stimulation. These methods are reviewed in 
Appendix A. In the present study electrical stimulation was preferred because the stimuli can 
be delivered over a number of trials, thus making for a high level of reliability (e.g., Tursky 
and O'Connell, 1972; Wolff, 1978). Furthermore, pain induced in the human by electrical 
stimulation has been shown to be responsive to analgesics (e.g., Wolff, Kantor and Cohen, 
1976; Wolff, Kantor, Jarvik and Laska, 1966), allowing some validity to be attached to the 
method.
Wolff and his colleagues (Wolff, 1978, 1984; Wolff et al., 1966, 1976) reported a 
method by which the subject receives electrical shocks by placing each of two fingers into one 
of two beakers, each filled with saline solution in which electrodes are submerged. This 
procedure has been reported to be highly reliable (Wolff, 1978). However, it was decided not 
to adopt this method in the present study, in view of the risk posed to subjects by the 
possibility of them inadvertently knocking the beakers over and spreading saline solution 
across the laboratory floor. Instead, copper wires fleeced with absorbent cotton material served 
as electrodes. The area around the first and second phalanx of the index finger on the subject's 
non-dominant hand was rubbed with lime stone to remove any dirt or loose tissue and laced 
with conductive jelly. The indifferent electrode was wrapped around the first phalanx of the 
prepared finger; the active electrode was wrapped around the second phalanx. The 
experimenter ensured that the electrode placements were comfortable for all subjects. The 
electrodes were connected to a constant current stimulator (Medelec ST10 sensor), and then 
soaked with a 10% saline solution. The resultant impedance of the electrode-skin circuit was 
below 5000 Ohms. It has been noted that ratings of pain intensity are related consistently with 
the amperage of the stimulus when the impedance is maintained below 5000 Ohms (Tursky 
and Watson, 1964).
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Shocks were delivered to subjects at the rate of one every two seconds. These stimuli 
were delivered as square wave pulses, measured in milli-amps (mA), with each pulse having a 
duration of one millisecond (msec).
The pain measures studied were the pain threshold and the pain tolerance, which have 
been widely employed in studies of experimental pain and which have also been found to be 
responsive to the effects of analgesics (e.g., Wolff et al., 1966, 1976; see also Appendix A). 
These measures were obtained by the method of limits (Wolff, 1978; Wolff and Horland, 
1967). The experimenter increased the intensity of stimulation in one mA steps and noted the 
point at which the subject indicated that some sensation was present (ascending sensation 
threshold), the level at which the subject indicated that the sensation was painful (ascending 
pain threshold) and the point at which the subject stated that the pain was unbearable (pain 
tolerance). At this point the experimenter immediately reduced the shock intensity to a level 
half-way between the obtained tolerance and threshold levels. The intensity of shock was 
reduced in one mA steps and the experimenter noted the point at which the subject indicated 
that the sensation was no longer painful (descending pain threshold). Shock intensity 
continued to be reduced in this manner until the subject indicated the absence of any sensation 
(descending sensation threshold). At this point, the experimenter embarked on a second 
ascending trial. Five ascending and descending trials were conducted for each subject. The 
pain threshold and tolerance levels were defined as the mean of the shock intensities 
corresponding to each of these parameters over all ascending and descending trials (Wolff, 
1978). The maximum intensity of shock delivered to any subject was set at 65 mA.
The instructions given to subjects were similar to those employed by Wolff and Horland 
(1967), and were as follows:
This test involves electrical stimulation of the fingers. There is no danger 
associated with the electricity because everything is carefully controlled and 
perfectly safe. I am going to take a number of measurements and repeat them five 
times. I would like you to give me five verbal responses which I shall now 
explain. When I first turn on the current, you will not feel anything. I shall slowly 
increase the current, and I want you to say "now" as soon as you begin to feel the 
slightest sensation, such as a faint touch or tickling sensation. As the current 
continues to increase, say "pain" as soon as the first sensation changes to pain. 
Concentrate carefully on the sensation in your finger and as soon as this changes 
into any kind of pain, ache or hurting sensation, say "pain" straight away. As the 
current continues to increase, I want you to say "stop" when the pain becomes 
unbearable. As soon as you say "stop", I will turn down the current. As the 
current decreases, I want you to say "pain gone" as soon as the sensation in your 
finger is no longer painful. Finally, say "all gone" as soon as all sensations of any 
kind have disappeared. I shall then begin to increase the current again and we will 
repeat the procedure. Remember to concentrate carefully on the sensation in your 
finger so that you can identify the changes as soon as they occur. You are free to 
terminate your involvement in this procedure at any stage if you so wish. Do you 
have any questions?
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During the electrical pain procedure, each subject lay on a bed with his or her head 
supported by a pillow. Their non-dominant hand, with the electrodes attached to the index 
finger, was placed on a small plastic grid. At the commencement of each of the five pain 
measurement trials, the electrodes were soaked with saline solution with a syringe. Any excess 
saline solution was absorbed into a towel placed between the grid and the bed.
In a pilot study designed to determine the test-retest reliability of the electrical pain 
induction procedure 24 headache-free subjects (17 females and 7 males), aged between 21 and 
57 years (mean age = 31.8 years; S.D. = 10.8 years), were tested on two occasions, each 
separated by a period of seven to fourteen days. The subjects were recruited from amongst the 
staff of the Prince Henry Hospital. Reliability was assessed by means of Pearson's correlation 
coefficient. For pain threshold, the reliability was 0.91 (2-tailed p < 0.01). For pain tolerance, 
the reliability was 0.95 (2-tailed p < 0.01). Thus, the electrical pain procedure employed in the 
present study demonstrated a high level of reliability for each of the pain measures. The 
reliability coefficients obtained were of a similar magnitude to those reported by previous 
researchers employing electrical stimulation (e.g., Tursky, 1974; Wolff, 1978).
8.3.2.2. Inducing Pain in the Head.
Few methods have been developed for inducing pain in the head. The most commonly 
employed stimulus is radiant heat. Pain is induced in the forehead by focusing a high intensity 
light beam onto a blackened surface of the skin (Hardy, Wolff and Goodell, 1952; Mor and 
Carmon, 1977). However, this procedure was not employed, as it carries the risk of blistering 
the flesh (Wolff, 1978). A second method of pain induction is offered by the pressure 
algometer (Keele, 1954). In this method, a flat tipped plunger attached to a pressure gauge is 
applied to the surface of the skin, until pain develops. This method was not selected because it 
has been reported to have a rather low level of reliability in comparison with other pain 
induction procedures (Wolff, 1977). Langemark and Oleson (1987) induced pain in headache 
and control subjects by palpating the various muscles of the cranium. However, the rate and 
pressure of palpation was uncontrolled, and the authors provided no data concerning the 
reliability of their method.
In view of the fact that existing methods for inducing pain in the head were deemed 
unsuitable, it was decided to develop another procedure. Immersing the vertex in cold water at 
a temperature below 18°C, has been reported to produce pain in the head (Wolf and Hardy, 
1941). In a modification of this procedure, the experimenter and a colleague found that head 
pain could be induced to unbearable levels by holding a piece of ice against the temporal
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region. Furthermore, it seemed that the level of pain and its rate of increase were independent 
of the degree of pressure with which the piece of ice was held against the skim
Pieces of ice were produced by filling plastic satchels with distilled water and placing 
these on a perspex shelf located within the freezer compartment of a refrigerator. Distilled 
water was preferred to ordinary tap water as the latter is known to contain impurities that 
might have affected the rate at which the water was cooled. The temperature of the freezer was 
maintained at -17°C. Freezing distilled water in plastic satchels allowed the size and shape of 
the ice pieces to be standardised. The pieces of ice were rounded with one flat side (the side 
sitting on the shelf). The flat side had a diameter of 4.5 cm and each piece of ice consisted of 
15 millilitres of distilled water.
From the point of view of applying stimuli of a consistent temperature to the temporal 
region, it was important to determine the length of time for which pieces of ice had to be kept 
in the freezer before their temperature became stable. Accordingly, a pilot study was 
conducted, whereby a thermometer was inserted into one of the water-filled satchels and 
placed inside the freezer. After periods of 6 and 24 hours, the temperature of the ice was noted 
to be -14°C. After 30 hours, the temperature of the ice was observed to be -14.5°C. A further 
inspection, 55 hours after incubation again revealed this temperature to be unchanged. Thus, 
the temperature of the ice was considered to have stabilised after 30 hours in the freezer. Only 
pieces of ice which had been placed in the freezer for at least 30 hours served as stimuli in the 
main experiment.
Subjects were seated in front of a chart recorder, through which the paper moved at 0.25 
cm / sec. A steel rod was fitted across the chart recorder, and a moveable perspex frame, 
holding a pen perpendicular to the paper, was fitted onto the rod. The chart recorder was 
activated as soon as the flattened side of the piece of ice was placed against the subject's 
temple. The ice was held in place by the experimenter, and a towel was placed around the 
subject's neck so as to absorb droplets of water. The subject indicated the presence of pain 
(pain threshold) by making a movement of the pen towards the top of the paper. When the pain 
became unbearable (pain tolerance) the subject pushed the pen to the very top of the paper, and 
the experimenter removed the ice. Pain threshold and tolerance were measured in terms of the 
time taken (in seconds) to reach each of these points. The experimenter first assessed pain 
sensitivity in the right temple and then in the left temple. The procedure for each temple was 
discontinued either when subjects reached pain tolerance, or after 180 seconds had elapsed 
since the placement of the ice. Prior to the measurement of temporal pain sensitivity, subjects 
were issued with the following instructions:
In a moment I will hold a small piece of ice against your temple. Because of the
cold, the resulting sensation may be unpleasant, but by no means harmful.
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Initially, your temple will feel cold, but after a time a dull aching pain will 
develop. Concentrate carefully on the sensations in your temple, and notice when 
these change from cold to pain. As soon as this happens, begin moving the pen up 
the paper. As the pain develops, move the pen further up the paper. If the pain 
becomes unbearable, push the pen to the very top of the paper and I will remove 
the ice. Remember, do not start moving the pen up the paper until the sensation in 
your temple changes from cold to pain. Also remember that as soon as you push 
the pen to the very top of the paper, I shall remove the ice. You are free to 
terminate your involvement in this procedure at any stage if you so wish. Do you 
have any questions?
A pilot study was conducted to determine the test-retest reliability of the temporal ice 
pain measures and also to evaluate the effect on pain measures of varying the degree of 
pressure with which the ice was held against the temple. Twenty one headache-free subjects 
(12 females and 9 males) recruited from amongst the staff of Prince Henry Hospital, served as 
subjects. They were aged between 20 and 57 years (mean age = 35.6 years; S.D. = 13.0 years). 
These subjects were tested on two occasions, each separated by a period of seven to fourteen 
days. The level of pressure applied to the skin through the piece of ice was varied in a counter­
balanced fashion, with 10 subjects receiving a low level of pressure on the first occasion and a 
higher level on the second occasion, and 11 subjects receiving these respective levels of 
pressure in the reverse order. As it was not possible to standardise the degree of pressure, this 
was simply varied by the experimenter in an ad hoc fashion, with the ice being held "gently" 
against the skin on one occasion, and "firmly" on another. The pain measures obtained in each 
of the "gentle" and "firm" conditions were compared separately for the right and left temples 
by means of the paired t-statistic (see Table 8-1). The test-retest reliability of the temporal ice 
pain measures was assessed by means of the Pearson correlation coefficient (see Table 8-2).
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Table 8-1
Mean Threshold and Tolerance Scores for the "Gentle" and "Firm" Applications of the
Temporal Ice Pain Test (N = 21).
Pain Measures (Time in Seconds)
Left Temple Right Temple
Pressure Threshold Tolerance Threshold Tolerance
Firm 29.5 129.6 24.2 119.2
(40.8) (65.8) (27.4) (65.4)
Gentle 20.0 126.6 22.2 119.8
(18.8) (68.4) (20.8) (66.5)
Paired t-value 1.48 0.92 1.03 -0.09
2-tailed p-value N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
Note: The standard deviations are entered in brackets.
N.S. Indicates a result which fell short of the p < 0.05 significance 
level.
The results indicated that the degree of pressure with which the pieces of ice were 
applied to the temple, had no significant effect on the obtained threshold and tolerance 
measures.
Table 8-2
Reliability Coefficients for each Temporal Ice Pain Measure (N = 21).
Pain Measure r
Pain Threshold:
Left Temple 0.63
Right Temple 0.91
Pain Tolerance:
Left Temple 0.98
Right Temple 0.94
All correlations in the above table were significant beyond the 2-tailed p < 0.01 level.
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The results indicated that the temporal ice pain test demonstrated good reliability for 
both pain threshold and pain tolerance measures, despite the fact that a deliberate effort was 
made to vary the level of pressure applied over the two occasions.
8.3.3. SSEP Apparatus and Procedure.
8.3.3.I. Stimuli.
As noted previously in this chapter, there is little in the literature on augmenting- 
reducing in the AEP to guide the researcher in the choice of the number and intensity of 
stimuli to be employed.
In augmenting-reducing paradigms, where the intention is to calculate amplitude / 
intensity slopes, more than two stimulus intensities must be employed for obvious reasons. 
However, beyond this requirement, no rationale has been offered concerning the optimum 
number of stimulus intensities. Practical considerations restrict the number of stimulus 
intensities that can be employed. For example, if blocks of stimuli are to be presented in a 
randomized fashion and if the number of intensities exceeds the number of recording channels 
available, some of the averaged traces cannot be stored within the recording machine, and thus 
have to be stored on computer so that more channels are free to record evoked potentials at 
other stimulus intensities. As the number of different stimulus intensities increases the 
procedure of switching stored traces between the recording machine and the computer 
becomes progressively more cumbersome and time consuming. In the present study three 
channels were available for recording evoked potentials. It was considered that switching the 
trace for one intensity between the recording apparatus and the computer was not so 
demanding as to interfere with the conduct of the experiment. Thus, it was decided to employ 
four different stimulus intensities, this being the number used most commonly in SSEP studies 
of augmenting-reducing (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1977, 1981b; Davis et al., 1978; Lavine et al., 
1976; Prescott et al., 1984).
It was considered necessary to define stimulus intensities in terms of stimulus 
parameters (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1977; Davis et al., 1978) rather than in terms of subjective 
intensity ratings (e.g., Bromm, 1984; Lavine et al., 1976), as the central theory of headache 
predicts that the latter measures would differ between the headache and control groups. If the 
parameters of the stimuli delivered to subjects differed consistently between the two groups, 
this could artificially produce differences in the SSEP. Furthermore, it was necessary to select 
stimuli such that the minimum intensity would be perceived by all subjects, and such that the
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maximum intensity would be no more than slightly above the pain threshold for most subjects, 
thus avoiding the jumpy motor reactions which can contaminate SSEP recordings (Bromm, 
1984).
A pilot study was conducted with the aim of identifying a stimulus intensity range that 
would meet the above criteria. Eighteen headache-free persons (11 females; 7 males), recruited 
from amongst the staff of the Prince Henry Hospital, served as subjects in a study designed to 
determine sensory threshold, pain threshold and pain tolerance levels for electrical stimulation. 
The age of the subjects ranged from 21 to 60 years (mean age = 28.1 years; S.D. = 9.6 years). 
The method employed was the same as that described in Section 8.3.2.1, except that the 
electrical pulse duration was 0.1 msec and the maximum shock intensity was 100 mA (the 
limit of the Medelec ST 10 Sensor constant current stimulator).
The results obtained indicated that on each of the 5 ascending and descending trials, no 
subject was insensitive to stimulation at or above an intensity of 5 mA. Averaging over each of 
the five ascending and descending trials, pain threshold levels ranged from 17.6 mA to 43.8 
mA (Mean = 28.3 mA; S.D. = 7.5 mA). Averaging over the five pain tolerance measures gave 
a range of 35.0 mA to 100.0 mA (Mean = 69.8 mA; S.D. = 20.6 mA).
In view of the findings listed above, it was decided to set the minimum stimulus 
intensity at 6 mA and to increase the intensity in steps of 6 mA's, up to a maximum of 24 mA. 
Thus, the four stimulus intensities employed were 6 mA, 12 mA, 18 mA and 24 mA. This 
ensured that the stimulus intensities were equally spaced and that, in the main experiment, 
there would be a very high probability that the minimum shock would be perceived by all 
subjects and that the maximum shock would be well below the pain tolerance level for most 
subjects.
It has been recommended that in AEP studies, the delivery of stimulus intensities should 
be randomized so as to maintain the subject's arousal at a constant level (Bromm, 1984). 
Accordingly, investigators have either completely randomized the stimuli (e.g., Buchsbaum et 
al., 1981b; Davis et al., 1978), or have presented stimuli in blocks of one intensity at a time, 
and randomized the order of blocks, there being several blocks of each intensity (e.g., Birchall 
and Claridge, 1979; Connolly et al., 1982).
The number of evoked potentials employed in the generation of an AEP wave varies 
from one research group to another. Ashton et al (1984) used 30 evoked potentials, while 
Birchall and Claridge (1979) used 128 separate waves. Callaway (1966) suggested that, in the 
interests of obtaining an AEP with clearly defined components, 36 individual evoked 
potentials should be averaged. Most studies have derived the AEP from approximately 60
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separate wave forms (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1981b; Connolly et al. 1982; Haier, 1983; 
Prescott et al., 1984). This latter procedure was followed in the present study with a sufficient 
number of each stimulus intensity being presented to generate 64 corresponding evoked 
potentials, these being averaged by computer. Since trials contaminated by large muscle 
movements, eye blinks and eye and eye movements were rejected, the actual number of 
stimulus presentations varied slightly from subject to subject.
In the present study, each of the four stimulus intensities was divided into four blocks, 
there being a minimum of 16 stimuli within each block (additional stimuli were added as 
required when trials were rejected) and a total of 16 blocks. The order of presentation of the 
blocks was randomized, the only restriction being that no two blocks of the same intensity 
were permitted to be presented consecutively (Birchall and Claridge, 1979). The inter-stimulus 
interval was set at one second (Birchall and Claridge, 1979; Buchsbaum et al., 1981b; Haier, 
1983) and the interval between blocks ranged from 5 to 15 seconds (Connolly et al., 1982; 
Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; Prescott et al., 1984).
Stimuli were delivered to the index finger of the non-dominant hand in the manner 
described in Section 8.3.2.1. The stimulus electrodes were soaked with saline solution prior to 
stimulation and they were soaked again at intervals of four stimulus blocks. In a post­
experiment interview all subjects indicated that they felt the 6 mA stimulus.
8.3.3.2. SSEP Recording.
In view of the fact that Connolly et al (1982) observed differences between migraineurs 
and headache-free control subjects on the P j-Nj component of the VEP recorded from vertex, 
and since the SSEP has been reported to be generally larger at this site than at other scalp 
locations (Goff et al., 1977), it was decided to record the SSEP from vertex (Cz; see Figure 8- 
2).
It has been noted that chlorided silver electrodes are more sensitive to changes in 
electrical potential and have a lower level of impedance than platinum alloy or stainless steel 
electrodes (Cooper, Ossleton and Shaw, 1980). Thus, it was decided to record the SSEP with 
chlorided silver cup electrodes. As the subject lay down on a bed, with head supported by a 
pillow, the experimenter located the vertex, rubbed the area with lime stone to remove loose 
skin and cleaned this region with antiseptic. Conductive jelly was placed inside the cup 
electrode and this electrode was fitted onto the scalp by means of collodion glue. The reference 
electrode was fitted to the ear lobe on the side contralateral to the finger being stimulated. 
After cleaning the ear lobe with antiseptic, the reference electrode was fitted to this region in
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the manner described for the vertex electrode. The ear lobe has been regarded as an indifferent 
site by many researchers (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1981b; Buchsbaum and Silverman, 1968; 
Connolly et al., 1982; Haier, 1983; Prescott et al., 1984).
As discussed previously in this chapter, eye blinks and eye movements are a potential 
source of artifact in AEP research (Cooper et al., 1980; Donchin et al., 1977). Accordingly, it 
was decided to monitor eye blinks and eye movements by means of the electro-oculogram 
(EOG). Chlorided silver cup electrodes were placed supraorbitally and over the outer canthus 
of the left eye to monitor both vertical and horizontal eye movements (Connolly and 
Kleinman, 1978). These electrodes were fitted in the manner described for the vertex 
electrode. Thus, one channel of the recording machine was used to monitor the EOG while the 
remaining three channels were available for recording evoked potentials from vertex.
Trials on which muscle movements generated potentials greater than 100 micro-volts 
(uV) at vertex were rejected online by the recording machine, as were trials on which eye 
blinks or eye movements generated potentials greater than 100 micro-volts in the EOG. 
(Connolly et al., 1982; Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; Prescott et al., 1984). So as to minimise 
the occurrence of these artifacts, every effort was made to ensure that subjects were 
comfortable; they were asked not blink during periods when their finger was being stimulated 
and they were required to focus their vision on a small black spot on a white screen placed at a 
distance of 800 cm from their eyes, adjusted to a comfortable height. These precautions are 
recommended by Cooper et al (1980).
Prior to the commencement of SSEP recording, the experimenter checked the 
impedance of all electrodes. Those electrodes with an impedance greater than 5000 Ohms were 
removed and re-applied until the impedance of all electrodes was below 5000 Ohms (Cooper 
et al., 1980).
The four electrodes employed during recording were attached to a four channel Medelec 
connector box and, from there, electrical potentials were relayed to a Medelec four channel 
recorder where they were amplified, averaged and stored.
In order to reduce the noise present in AEP averages to the point where specific 
components can be readily identified, it is necessary to filter each individual evoked potential 
prior to on-line averaging (Kaskey et al., 1980). In the interests of obtaining an AEP wave with 
clearly defined components, it has been pointed out that the sampling rate should be greater 
than the frequency range allowed to pass through the filter (Cooper et al., 1980). In the present 
study, the EEG recorded from vertex was sampled at an interval of one msec (500 Hz). Thus, 
the EEG was filtered within the range 1-125 Hz. This range is referred to as the band width
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(Cooper et al., 1980). The band width chosen in the present study was similar to that employed 
by previous researchers (e.g., Chapman et al., 1981; Gortelmeyer and Zimmerman, 1984).
The recording machine was time-locked to the Medelec ST10 constant current 
stimulator so that the recording of each evoked potential commenced immediately after the 
stimulus presentation and continued for 300 msec. Thus, all SSEP's were 300 msec in length, 
this length being necessary for the identification of all SSEP components through to ? 2-
The recording machine was connected to an Apple 2C Duo Disk Drive Computer, on 
which all SSEP's were stored for analysis. During the recording procedure itself, the SSEP's 
obtained after each 6 mA stimulus block were stored on the computer, so as to leave three 
channels available for the remaining stimulus intensities. The 12, 18 or 24 mA stimulus block 
SSEP's recorded immediately prior to the presentation of the second, third and fourth 6 mA 
blocks were transferred to the computer before recalling the 6 mA SSEP's to the recording 
machine.
All subjects were earthed by means of a lead electrode fleeced with cotton and soaked in 
saline solution which was strapped to the forearm, contralateral to the finger being stimulated. 
This electrode was then attached to the Medelec connector box.
The SSEP recordings were conducted in the Evoked Potential Laboratory in the 
Department of Neurology at Prince Henry Hospital, Sydney. The illumination within the room 
was maintained at a constant level. Blinds were pulled down over the windows and a 60 watt 
electric light was placed behind the subject
All subjects were told that they could terminate the procedure at any stage if they so 
wished.
8.3.4. General Procedure.
Prior to the experiment, subjects were told that the study was concerned with attempting 
to discover whether there exists any physiological cause for headaches. They were briefed on 
the procedures involved and required to sign a form giving their informed consent to 
participate. Headache and control subjects were interviewed about their headache activity, in 
the manner described in Section 7.5.2.
All subjects were assessed individually. Headache subjects (in the headache-free state) 
and control subjects first took part in the temporal ice pain test described in Section 8.3.2.2.
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These subjects were then taken to the Evoked Potential Laboratory and took part in the 
electrical finger pain test. The experimenter then explained the SSEP procedure and 
administered the State Anxiety Scale (Spielberger et al., 1970). This questionnaire was 
administered in order to check on the possibility that differential levels of arousal existed 
between the headache and control subjects, as this factor has been found to influence AEP 
amplitudes (Birchall and Claridge, 1979). The SSEP procedure was carried out in the manner 
described in Sections 8.3.3.1 and 8.3.3.2. Subjects were then disconnected from the SSEP 
apparatus and thanked for their co-operation. Headache sufferers were asked to contact the 
experimenter at the start of a headache and to make arrangements to attend the laboratory 
during that attack. They were asked not to take any medication for the headache until the 
experimental procedures had been completed.
Sixteen headache subjects presented in a headache state. The procedures outlined above 
were repeated for these subjects, except that the temporal ice pain test was not administered. It 
was considered that subjects with headache may find it difficult to discriminate the pain 
induced by the ice test from the headache which they were already experiencing.
8.3.5. Assessment of SSEP Component Amplitudes.
The SSEP recording apparatus employed in the present study did not have the facility 
for recording a pre-stimulus EEG. Thus, it was not possible to measure individual peak 
amplitudes. The recording machine arbitrarily set the baseline to zero micro-volts one micro­
second prior to the recording of each evoked potential. Since there was no way of determining 
the pre-stimulus baseline EEG for each evoked potential, it would have been meaningless to 
attempt to measure individual peak amplitudes relative to the arbitrary zero level. Accordingly, 
peak amplitudes were measured (in micro-volts) peak to peak for the P j-Nj and N 1-P2  
components.
The SSEP components, P j, Nj and P2 , were identified by means of the procedure 
described by Connolly and Gruzelier (1982) and employed by Connolly et al (1982) in their 
study of the VEP in migraineurs and control subjects. This method was discussed in Section 
8.1.3.3., and was preferred to the time band method (Buchsbaum and Pfefferbaum, 1971; 
Buchsbaum et al., 1981b), as AEP components are frequently observed to fall outside the time 
bands stipulated (e.g., Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; Prescott et al., 1984). Following 
Connolly and Gruzelier (1982), the Nj component was identified first and defined as the most 
negative point in the latency range 80-180 msec; Pj was defined as the most positive point 
occurring between 60 msec and N j and P2  as the most positive point occurring between N | 
and 280 msec.
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When each completed SSEP (64 trials) was recalled from the computer, it was presented 
on an oscilloscope. The peak to peak amplitudes (in micro-volts) were displayed on the 
oscilloscope after placement of one of two moveable cursors at each peak. Thus, peak to peak 
amplitudes were determined by placing one cursor at Nj and the other at either Pj or P2 , and 
observing the vertical distance between these cursors as displayed on the oscilloscope. 
Separate measurements were taken for each of the four SSEP's obtained for each subject.
The test-retest reliability of the P j-Nj and N j -P2  SSEP amplitudes was determined by 
means of a pilot study. Twelve headache-free subjects (7 females and 5 males), recruited from 
amongst the staff of Prince Henry Hospital, served as subjects. They were aged between 22 
and 57 years (mean age = 40.7 years; S.D. = 13.3 years). These subjects were tested on two 
occasions, each separated by a period of seven to fourteen days. Reliability was assessed by 
calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient between the values obtained on the two 
occasions for each SSEP measure. The results indicated that the component amplitude 
measures, derived from the SSEP procedure, are reliable when an individual is tested on two 
separate occasions (see Table 8-3).
Table 8-3
Test-Retest Reliability Coefficients for Pj-N j and N j -P2  SSEP Amplitudes 
at each Stimulus Intensity (N = 12).
Stimulus 
Intensity (mA)
SSEP Components
pr N i N r p2
6 0.64 0.69
12 0.61 0.83
18 0.78 0.97
24 0.80 0.88
The reliability coefficients were of a magnitude similar to that reported by previous 
researchers (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1981b; Stark and Norton, 1974) and were all significant 
beyond the 2-tailed p < 0.05 level.
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8.4. RESULTS.
8.4.1. Planned Analyses.
The Type I error rate for the following statistical analyses was set at 0.05, unless stated 
otherwise.
Hypothesis 1.
In this hypothesis it was predicted that headache subjects, tested between attacks, would 
have lower pain threshold and tolerance levels than headache-free control subjects.
The dependent variables were electrical finger pain threshold and tolerance, and 
temporal ice pain threshold and tolerance. Temporal ice pain threshold was taken as the mean 
of the threshold measures observed for each side of the head. Similarly, temporal ice pain 
tolerance was taken as the mean of the tolerance measures observed for each temple.
Since headache and control subjects were matched for age and sex it was intended to 
examine the hypothesis by conducting a paired t-test on each of the four pain measures. 
However, inspection of the data obtained for the temporal ice pain tolerance measure indicated 
that 28 control subjects and 13 headache sufferers reached the 180 second tolerance limit 
imposed on the test. Given data with such a skewed distribution, it was decided to examine 
differences between groups on their tolerance for ice pain by means of the distribution-free 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed ranks test (Welkowitz et al., 1976). After subtracting the 
tolerance level for each headache subject from that of their respective matched control subject, 
and assigning ranks to the difference scores, the positive ranks totalled 323 whilst the negative 
ranks totalled only 27. The obtained z-value was 3.75, indicating that control subjects had 
significantly greater tolerance levels on the temporal ice pain test than their headache 
counterparts (one-tailed p = 0.0002).
The significance of differences between groups on the remaining pain measures was 
evaluated with one-tailed paired t-tests. The results indicated that headache subjects were more 
pain sensitive than controls on all pain measures, except the threshold measure obtained from 
the temporal ice pain test, for which there was no significant difference between groups (see 
Table 8-4).
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Table 8-4
Paired T-Test Analysis of Pain Measures (Number of Matched Pairs = 36).
Pain
Measure
Control
Mean
Headache
Mean
t-value
(df=35)
1-tailed 
p-value
Ice Threshold 28.5 23.9 0.54 N.S.
(29.8) (37.6)
Electrical 17.2 12.8 3.21 0.002
Threshold (7.4) (5.6)
Electrical 35.4 25.8 3.52 0.001
Tolerance (15.4) (11.3)
Note: In the above table and subsequent tables, N.S.
indicates a result which fell short of the 
p < 0.05 level and the standard deviations are 
entered in brackets.
Hypothesis 2.
It was hypothesised that headache sufferers would be more sensitive to electrical finger 
pain during than between attacks. Sixteen headache subjects were assessed in headache and 
headache-free states. One-tailed paired t-tests indicated no significant differences between 
conditions on electrical pain threshold or tolerance. Thus, the results did not support 
Hypothesis 2 (see Table 8-5).
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TABLE 8-5
Paired T-Test Analysis of Electrical Pain Measures Obtained During and Between Headache
Attacks (N = 16).
Pain
Measure
Headache
Absent
Mean
Headache
Present
Mean
Paired 
t-value 
(df=15)
1-tailed 
p-value
Electrical 13.8 14.0 0.34 N.S.
Threshold (6.5) (6.5)
Electrical 27.0 25.7 0.95 N.S.
Tolerance (10.0) (11.2)
Hypothesis 3.
It was hypothesised that the P j-Nj amplitude of the SSEP would be larger for headache 
sufferers than control subjects and that the size of this amplitude would increase with stimulus 
intensity at a rate greater for headache subjects than controls.
The analysis of SSEP amplitudes involved a repeated measures factor (Stimulus 
Intensity with four levels). It has been pointed out that the use of pooled error univariate F- 
tests to test the significance of the within subjects main effect and the interaction of between 
and within subjects factors assumes that the correlations between pairs of levels, on the 
repeated measures factor, are equal and that the variances are equal across the levels of this 
factor (Jaccard and Ackerman, 1985; Vasey and Thayer, 1987). Repeated measures designs 
rarely meet these assumptions (Rogan, Keselman and Mendoza, 1979) with the typical 
consequence of using the pooled error term being an inflation of Type I errors (Jaccard and 
Ackerman, 1985; Vasey and Thayer, 1987). Accordingly, it has been proposed that within 
subjects effects and interactions should be assessed by specifying particular contrasts for each 
and testing these for significance with separate (rather than pooled) error terms (Boik, 1981; 
Rogan et al., 1979). Thus, given that the present study was concerned with differences between 
groups on the rate at which SSEP amplitudes increase with stimulus intensity, it was decided 
to examine the Intensity effect and Group x Intensity interactions on linear trend, with separate 
error terms. The main effect of Intensity was not of major theoretical interest, so these results 
are confined to Appendix K. Group x Intensity interactions and main effects of Intensity on 
quadratic and cubic trend (each determined with separate error terms) are also presented in 
Appendix K.
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The experimental design for the analysis of the P^-N^ amplitude conformed to a 2 x 4 
split-plot design (Kirk, 1968). The two factors were as follows:
Factor A:
Group with 2 levels:
Factor B:
Stimulus Intensity with 4 levels:
Headache
Control
6 mA 
12 mA 
18 mA 
24 mA
Headache and control subjects were matched in pairs, thus imposing a block structure 
on the design and minimising any effect of subject heterogeneity. Each subject received all 
levels of the stimulus Intensity Factor.
The design was analysed by means of a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
repeated measures on the Stimulus Intensity Factor. The ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect for Group (F (1, 35) = 7.82; p = 0.008), with P j-Nj amplitudes being larger for 
headache (Mean = 5.53; S.D. = 2.93) than for control subjects (Mean = 4.10; S.D. = 1.50). The 
ANOVA also revealed a significant Group x Intensity interaction on linear trend (F (1, 35) = 
8.59; p = 0.006). Inspection of Figure 8-3 indicates that P^-N^ amplitudes increased more 
rapidly with stimulus intensity for headache than for control subjects. Thus, the results 
supported Hypothesis 3. The ANOVA summary table is presented in Appendix K-l.
A between groups comparison of State-Anxiety scores with a paired t-test revealed that 
the headache (Mean = 38.92; S.D. = 9.80) and control (Mean = 36.33; S.D. = 9.84) groups did 
not differ significantly on this variable (t (35) = 1.30; 2-tailed p > 0.05) and argues against an 
interpretation of the significant Pj-Nj difference between groups in terms of factors such as 
differential arousal levels (Birchall and Claridge, 1979).
Hypothesis 4,
It was hypothesised that the P^-Nj amplitude of the SSEP would be larger, and would 
increase at a greater rate with stimulus intensity for headache subjects, assessed during 
headache attacks, than for those same subjects assessed when headache-free. Sixteen headache 
subjects were assessed in headache and headache-free states.
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The experimental design for the analysis of the P^-Nj amplitude conformed to a 2 x 4 
split plot design (Kirk, 1968). The two factors were as follows:
Factor A:
Status with 2 levels:
Factor B:
Stimulus Intensity with 4 levels:
Headache 
Headache-free
6 mA 
12 mA 
18 mA 
24 mA
Each subject was tested in a headache and headache-free condition. Within each of these 
conditions all four stimulus intensity levels were presented.
The design was analysed by means of a two-way ANOVA, with repeated measures on 
the Stimulus Intensity factor. The analysis revealed no significant main effect for Status (F (1, 
15) = 0.18; p > 0.05) and no significant Status x Intensity interaction on linear trend (F (1, 15) 
= 0.04; p > 0.05). The ANOVA summary table is presented in Appendix K-2.
It was concluded that there were no significant differences between the headache (Mean 
= 6.22; S.D. = 2.38) and headache-free (Mean = 6.42; S.D. = 3.14) conditions on Pj-N^ 
amplitudes, or on the rate at which these amplitudes increased with stimulus intensity (see 
Figure 8-4). Hence, the results obtained did not support Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 5.
It was hypothesised that the larger the Pj-N j amplitude, and the greater the rate at 
which this component increased with stimulus intensity, the more pain sensitive subjects 
would be. This relationship could have been examined by calculating the P j-Nj amplitude / 
intensity slope for each subject and correlating these values with pain sensitivity measures. 
Previous researchers have reported significant correlations between amplitude / intensity 
slopes and measures of pain sensitivity (e.g., Buchsbaum and Davis, 1979; Buchsbaum et al., 
1977; von Knorring, 1978). However, it was decided to avoid calculating amplitude /  intensity 
slopes in view of the fact that, for individual subjects, these measures often give a very 
misleading impression of the behaviour of the AEP amplitude over the range of stimulus 
intensities (Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; Iacono et al., 1982). Instead, it was decided to 
divide the headache and control subjects into pain sensitive and pain insensitive groups and to
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FIGURE 8-4
Pj-N i Mean Amplitudes for Headache Subjects Tested During and
Between Attacks.
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test for differences between these latter two groups on the mean P j-Nj amplitude and for 
differences on linear trend for this component over increasing stimulus intensities. Separate 
analyses were conducted for the headache and control subjects.
Within the headache and control groups, subjects were classified as having a "high" or 
"low" pain threshold or pain tolerance level on each of the two pain tests. For the electrical 
finger pain measures and for the temporal ice pain threshold measure, this was achieved by 
means of a median split of the obtained values. In view of the fact that, on the temporal ice 
pain tolerance measure, a large number of subjects in both the headache and control groups 
reached the tolerance time limit of the test, thus imposing a ceiling effect on the values, it was 
decided to classify all subjects reaching this limit as having a "high" tolerance, and all those 
who failed to reach the limit as having a "low" tolerance. Within the headache and control 
groups, subjects scoring "high" on at least three of the four measures were classified as pain 
insensitive, whilst those scoring "low" on at least three of the four measures were classified as 
pain sensitive. Unclassified subjects were not included in the analysis. For the headache 
subjects, this procedure resulted in there being 13 pain sensitive subjects and 10 pain 
insensitive subjects, 13 subjects being unclassified. For the control subjects, there were 13 pain 
sensitive subjects and 15 pain insensitive subjects, 11 subjects being unclassified.
The experimental design for the analysis of the P^-Nj amplitude conformed to a 2 x 4 
split-plot design (Kirk, 1968). The two factors were as follows:
Factor A:
Pain Sensitive 
Pain Insensitive
6 mA 
12 mA 
18 mA 
24 mA
The design was analysed by means of a two-way ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the Stimulus Intensity factor. For the headache subjects (n = 23) the ANOVA revealed no 
significant main effect for pain sensitivity (F (1, 21) = 0.04; p > 0.05), there being no 
significant difference between pain sensitive (Mean = 5.58; S.D. = 2.19) and pain insensitive 
headache subjects (Mean = 5.83; S.D. = 3.40) on the size of P j-Nj amplitudes. The ANOVA 
also revealed no significant Pain Sensitivity x Intensity interaction on linear trend (F (1, 21) = 
0.15; p > 0.05) (see Figure 8-5). The ANOVA summary table is presented in Appendix K-3.
Pain Sensitivity with 2 levels:
Factor B:
Stimulus Intensity with 4 levels:
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FIGURE 8-5
Pj-Nj Mean Amplitudes for Pain Sensitive and Pain Insensitive 
Headache Subjects.
Pain Sensitive
Pain Insensitive
Stimulus Intensity (mA)
187
Similar results were obtained for control subjects (n = 28). There was no significant 
main effect for Pain Sensitivity (F (1, 26) = 0.01; p > 0.05), there being no significant 
difference between pain sensitive (Mean = 3.81; S.D. = 1.22) and pain insensitive control 
subjects (Mean = 3.86; S.D. = 1.29) on the size of P j-N | amplitudes. The ANOVA also 
revealed no significant Pain Sensitivity x Intensity interaction on linear trend (F (1, 26) = 0.16; 
p > 0.05) (see Figure 8-6). The ANOVA summary table is presented in Appendix K-3.
The results did not support the hypothesis that P j-N | amplitudes would be larger and 
increase more rapidly with stimulus intensity for pain sensitive than for pain insensitive 
subjects (Hypothesis 5).
8.4.2. Supplementary Analyses.
The Type I error rate for the following statistical analyses was set at 0.05, unless stated 
otherwise.
Analysis 1
In order to investigate whether or not the sensitivity of headache subjects to ice pain 
varied with the site of headache, it was decided to identify subjects reporting unilateral 
headaches affecting the temporal region, and compare pain sensitivity on the side affected 
habitually by headache with that unaffected by headache. Thirteen subjects reported headaches 
affecting only one side of the head, including the temporal region. A paired t-test revealed that 
temporal ice pain thresholds obtained from the side affected habitually by headache (Mean = 
12.1; S.D. = 14.9) were not significantly different from those obtained from the unaffected side 
(Mean = 10.7; S.D. = 7.9) (t (12) = 0.47; 2-tailed p > 0.05).
The data for the temporal ice pain tolerance measure were found to be very skewed. 
Since parametric tests, such as the paired t-test, assume a normal distribution, it was decided to 
employ the distribution-free Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test to test for differences 
between the two sides of the head on pain tolerance. After subtracting the ice pain tolerance 
score for the temporal region on the unaffected side of the head from that obtained for the side 
affected habitually by headache and assigning ranks to the difference scores (Welkowitz et al., 
1976), the positive ranks totalled 20 and the negative ranks totalled 18. The z-value obtained 
was 0.28 which was not significant (2-tailed p > 0.05).
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FIGURE 8-6
Pj-N i Mean Amplitudes for Pain Sensitive and Pain Insensitive
Control Subjects.
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The above results indicate that there was no significant differential influence of the 
reported site of headache on pain sensitivity in unilateral headache subjects, as assessed by the 
temporal ice pain test.
Analysis 2.
Any effect of headache type on the pain measures was investigated by identifying 
migraine and tension headache subjects in the manner described in Chapter 7. As a result of 
this procedure, 13 headache subjects fell into the migraine category and 15 fell into the tension 
headache category. Only eight subjects fell into the tension-vascular category. The latter falls 
between the tension and migraine extremities of the headache severity continuum (Bakal and 
Kaganov, 1979; Holroyd and Andrasik, 1982a), and would, thus, not be expected to contribute 
substantially to the identification of differences in psychophysiological responses along this 
continuum. Accordingly, it was decided not to include the small number of subjects falling 
into the tension-vascular category in the analysis of the effects of headache type on the 
variables under investigation.
In view of the ceiling effect evident in the data obtained on the temporal ice pain 
tolerance measure, it was decided to examine differences between the migraine, tension 
headache, and control groups on this variable, by means of the distribution-free Kruskal Wallis 
analysis of variance, corrected for tied ranks (Siegel, 1956). In this procedure, each subject is 
ranked according to their score on the dependent variable. These ranks are then treated as the 
units of analysis. The analysis resulted in a chi-square value of 14.38 with two degrees of 
freedom (p < 0.001).
Comparisons between mean ranks for each pair of groups were carried out with Mann- 
Whitney U-Tests corrected for ties, as suggested by Kirk (1968). The family-wise error rate 
was controlled by means of Dunn's procedure, whereby the Type I error rate is divided by the 
number of comparisons made (Kirk, 1968). Thus, the Type I error rate was set at 0.017 (ie., 
0.05 / 3). The Mann-Whitney U-Tests revealed the mean pain tolerance rank for controls 
(39.36) to be significantly greater than that for both the tension (25.13) (z = 2.96; 2-tailed p = 
0.003) and migraine (22.00) (z = 3.39; 2-tailed p = 0.0007) groups. No significant difference 
between the tension and migraine groups was observed (z = 0.45; p = 0.65).
The significance of differences between the tension, migraine and control groups on the 
remaining pain measures was evaluated by means of one-way analyses of variance. When a 
significant F-value was obtained, a posteriori comparisons between all pairs of means were 
conducted with Scheffe’s procedure (Kirk, 1968). Significant group effects were observed on
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electrical pain threshold (F (2, 61) = 4.11; p = 0.021) and on electrical pain tolerance (F (2, 61) 
= 6.51; p = 0.003) but not on temporal ice pain threshold (F (2, 61) = 1.43; p > 0.05) (see 
Appendix L for the ANOVA summary tables). Scheffe's procedure revealed the control 
subjects to have significantly higher electrical pain thresholds and tolerances than either of the 
headache groups who did not differ significantly from one another (see Table 8-6).
Table 8-6
Means on Ice Pain Threshold and Electrical Pain Threshold and Tolerance For Tension,
Migraine and Control Groups.
Group N
Ice
Threshold
Electrical
Threshold
Electrical
Tolerance
Tension 15 30.5 12.7 22.6
(45.3) (5.6) (8.4)
Migraine 13 12.4 12.0 24.7
(13.7) (6.1) (10.2)
Control 36 28.5 17.2* 35.4*
(29.8) (7.4) (15.4)
)|C
Indicates that, for electrical pain threshold and tolerance, the control group means were 
significantly greater than those for the two headache groups, as revealed by Scheffe's 
procedure.
On electrical pain threshold, the differences between the means for the tension and 
migraine, tension and control, and between the migraine and control groups were required to 
exceed 6.43, 5.22 and 2.38 respectively, in order to reach the 0.05 level of significance as 
assessed by Scheffe's procedure. On electrical pain tolerance these differences were required to 
exceed 12.50, 10.14 and 10.67. The critical F-value was given by 2 Fq 05(2, 61) = 6.30). In the 
absence of a significant F-value for the ice threshold measure, no pairwise comparisons were 
made.
Analysis 3.
In order to determine whether or not there was any significant effect of headache type 
on P j -Nj mean amplitudes, or on the rate at which these amplitudes increased with stimulus 
intensity, the tension, migraine and control groups were compared on this variable.
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The experimental design for the analysis conformed to a 3 x 4 split plot design (Kirk, 
1968). The two factors were as follows:
Factor A:
Group with 3 levels: Tension Headache
Migraine Headache 
Control
Factor B:
Stimulus Intensity with the four levels given previously.
There were 13 migraineurs, 15 tension headache subjects and 36 control subjects. The 
design was analysed by means of a two-way ANOVA, with repeated measures on the Stimulus 
Intensity factor. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Group (F (2, 61) = 5.71; p 
= 0.005) and a significant Group x Intensity interaction on linear (F (2, 61) = 3.51; p < 0.05) 
and quadratic trend (F (2, 61) = 5.30; p < 0.01) (see Appendix K-4 for the ANOVA summary 
table).
The significant Group effect was explored by testing for differences between means 
with Scheffe’s procedure. The tension headache subjects were observed to have significantly 
larger Pj-N j amplitudes (Mean = 6.43; S.D. = 2.92) than the controls (Mean = 4.10; S.D. = 
1.50) (F (2, 61) = 7.54; critical Fq 0 5 (1 , 61) = 6.30), but the migraineurs (Mean = 4.98; S.D. = 
3.05) did not differ significantly from either of these groups. The differences between the 
means for the tension and migraine, tension and control, and between the migraine and control 
groups were required to exceed 2.14, 1.73 and 1.83 respectively, in order to reach the 0.05 
level of significance as assessed by Scheffe's procedure. The critical F-value was given by 2 
F0>05(2,61) = 6.30.
The significant Group x Intensity interactions on linear and quadratic trend were 
explored by comparing pairs of groups within each trend component and controlling the Type I 
error rate by adjusting the significance level for the number of comparisons made (Kirk, 1968). 
Since it was intended to make all three comparisons between groups for each trend component, 
the Type I error rate was set at 0.017 (i.e., 0.05 / 3).
The a posteriori F-tests revealed significant differences between tension headache and 
control subjects on linear trend (F (1, 49) = 6.38; p = 0.015) and between the migraine and 
control subjects on quadratic trend (F (1, 47) = 10.86; p = 0.002). The difference between the 
migraine and tension headache subjects on quadratic trend fell just short of the 0.017 
significance level (F (1, 26) = 6.22; p = 0.019). No other significant differences between
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groups on linear or quadratic trend were noted. The results are illustrated in Figure 8-7 and the 
ANOVA summary tables are presented in Appendix K-4.
Inspection of Figure 8-7 indicates that the significant difference between the tension and 
control groups on linear trend, was due to the fact that the P^-Nj amplitude increased more 
rapidly with stimulus intensity for the tension headache subjects than for the controls. The 
significant difference between control and migraine subjects, on quadratic trend, appears to 
have been due to the fact that, between the two highest stimulus intensities, the P^-Nj 
amplitude for the control group continued to rise, whilst for the migraineurs, this amplitude 
tended to reduce slightly.
Analysis 4.
The tension, migraine and control groups were compared on the N j-P2 amplitude by the 
method described in Analysis 3. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for Group (F 
(2, 61) = 3.17; p < 0.05) but no significant Group x Intensity interaction on linear (F (2, 61) = 
0.77; p > 0.05) or quadratic trend (F (2, 61) = 2.36; p > 0.05) (see Appendix K-5 for the 
ANOVA summary table). It was concluded that there were no significant differences between 
the tension headache, migraine or control groups on linear or quadratic trend for the N j-P2 
amplitude. The results are illustrated in Figure 8-8.
The significant Group effect was explored by testing for differences between mean Nj- 
P2 amplitudes with Scheffe's procedure. The tension headache subjects were observed to have 
significantly larger N j -P2 amplitudes (Mean = 7.69; S.D. = 4.74) than the controls (Mean = 
5.08; S.D. = 2.52) (F (2, 61) = 6.33; critical F-value = 2 Fq 05(2, 61) = 6.30). The migraineurs 
(Mean = 5.80; S.D. = 3.63) did not differ significantly from either of the remaining groups. 
The differences between the means for the tension and migraine, tension and control, and 
between the migraine and control groups were required to exceed 3.21, 2.60 and 2.74 
respectively, in order to reach the 0.05 level of significance as assessed by Scheffe's procedure.
Analysis 5.
Regardless of headache type, the headache and control subjects were compared on Nj- 
P2 amplitude by means of the procedure outlined under Hypothesis 3. The 2 x 4  split plot 
design, with subjects matched in pairs for age and sex, was analysed by means of a two-way 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the Stimulus Intensity factor. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for Group (F (1, 35) = 4.24; p < 0.05), with N jT ^  amplitudes being
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FIGURE 8-7
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larger for headache (Mean = 6.65; S.D. = 4.00) than for control subjects (Mean = 5.08; S.D. = 
2.52). There was no significant Group x Intensity interaction on linear (F (1, 35) = 2.54; p > 
0.05) or quadratic trend (F (1, 35) = 2.47; p > 0.05) (see Appendix K-6 for the ANOVA 
summary table). The results are represented graphically in Figure 8-9.
Analysis 6.
In order to examine whether or not the behaviour of the N j -P2  amplitude, in response to 
increasing stimulus intensity, was affected by the presence or absence of headache (Status), 
this SSEP amplitude was compared across headache and headache-free conditions for the 16 
headache subjects assessed during and between attacks. The analysis followed the procedures 
outlined for the analysis of Hypothesis 4. The ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for 
Status (F (1, 15) = 0.57; p > 0.05) nor any significant Status x Intensity interaction on linear (F 
(1, 15) = 1.46; p > 0.05) or quadratic trend (F (1, 15) = 0.48; p > 0.05) (see Appendix K-7 for 
the ANOVA summary table). It was concluded that there were no significant differences 
between the headache (Mean = 7.04; S.D. = 2.98) and headache-free (Mean = 7.63; S.D. = 
4.34) conditions on P^-N| amplitudes or on the rate at which these amplitudes increased with 
stimulus intensity (see Figure 8-10).
Analysis 7.
In order to investigate any relationship between the Nj-P2  SSEP amplitude and pain 
sensitivity, headache and control subjects were divided into pain sensitive and pain insensitive 
groups, as described previously, and the N^-P2  amplitude was analysed separately for each of 
the headache and control groups, as outlined in the analysis of Hypothesis 5.
For the headache subjects (n = 23), the ANOVA revealed no significant main effect for 
Pain Sensitivity (F (1, 21) = 0.30; p > 0.05), there being no significant difference between pain 
sensitive (Mean = 7.17; S.D. = 3.72) and pain insensitive headache subjects (Mean = 6.17; 
S.D. = 5.10) on the size of N jT ^  amplitudes. The ANOVA also revealed no significant Pain 
Sensitivity x Intensity interaction on linear (F (1, 21) = 0.04; p > 0.05) or quadratic trend (F (1, 
21) = 0.01; p > 0.05) (see Figure 8-11). The ANOVA summary table is presented in Appendix 
K-8.
For the control subjects (n = 28) the main effect for Pain Sensitivity fell just short of 
significance (F (1, 26) = 3.62; p = 0.068), there being a trend for pain sensitive subjects (Mean 
= 6.12; S.D. = 3.28) to have larger N j -P2  amplitudes than pain insensitive subjects (Mean =
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FIGURE 8-9
N1 -P2  Mean Amplitudes for Headache Sufferers and Control
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4.23; S.D. = 1.86). The ANOVA revealed a significant Pain Sensitivity x Intensity interaction 
on linear trend (F (1, 26) = 4.37; p < 0.05), indicating that N jTS amplitudes increased more 
rapidly with stimulus intensity for pain sensitive than for pain insensitive control subjects (see 
Figure 8-12). There was no significant Pain Sensitivity x Intensity interaction on quadratic 
trend (F (1, 26) = 0.17; p < 0.05). The ANOVA summary table is presented in Appendix K-8.
8.5. DISCUSSION.
The present study was concerned with an investigation of the central theory of headache 
(Sicuteri, 1982; Sicuteri Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978). The theory asserts that headache 
sufferers may be characterised by a deficiency in the central pain inhibitory system, disposing 
it to breakdown during periods of stress (Sicuteri, 1982), and that this contributes substantially 
to the onset of headache attacks. The proponents of this hypothesis have been rather vague 
about how this deficiency becomes manifest as a headache. On the one hand, it has been 
suggested that there exists a generalised failure of the endogenous analgesic system causing 
headache sufferers to be more sensitive to pain than headache-free persons in all regions of the 
body (Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978). This implies that some peripheral process such 
as local chemical action (Chapman et al., 1960), vasodilatation (Tunis and Wolff, 1953) or 
muscle contraction (Ostfeld et al., 1957) must interact with the disruption of central pain 
control mechanisms to account for the presence of pain in cranial regions. On the other hand, 
however, Sicuteri (1982) has suggested that the weakness in the pain inhibitory system is such 
that it affects only the head, neck and shoulders. Furthermore, it is not clear from the theory 
whether this weakness is manifest at all times or only on occasions when headache is present. 
Finally, there remains the question of whether any heightened pain sensitivity observed in 
headache sufferers can be shown to have a neurophysiological basis. The central theory, 
contends that the deficiency in the pain control system of headache sufferers is constituted by a 
depletion of pain inhibitory substances such as serotonin, endorphins and enkephalins in the 
CNS (Sicuteri, 1976, 1981, 1982; Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978). The study reported 
in this chapter was concerned with the clarification of these issues.
Headache subjects assessed between attacks were found to be more sensitive than 
control subjects to electrical pain in the finger, as represented by lowered pain threshold and 
tolerance levels. With respect to differences between these groups on their sensitivity to pain 
in the head, the results were less conclusive. Headache subjects demonstrated a lower 
tolerance for temporal ice pain than control subjects, but there was no difference between these 
groups on the pain threshold measure. These results suggest that, during periods of headache 
freedom, headache sufferers may be more sensitive to pain than headache-free persons, and
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that this heightened sensitivity may be a generalised condition affecting other regions of the 
body besides the head.
Subjects reporting unilateral headaches were no more sensitive to ice pain in the 
temporal region, habitually affected by headache, than in the corresponding region 
contralateral to the site of headache. This finding suggests that when headache-free, headache 
sufferers may be no more pain sensitive over the site of headache, than in other regions of the 
head. However, Drummond (1987) did fmd scalp tenderness to be greater over the usual site of 
headaches than in other regions. In the present study only 13 subjects reported unilateral 
headaches affecting the temporal region, whereas, Drummond (1987) studied 65 subjects 
reporting unilateral headaches. The difference in sample sizes could account for the discrepant 
results.
As noted in Chapter 2, several studies have observed no significant differences in pain 
sensitivity between headache and control subjects (Feurstein et al., 1982; Gannon et al., 1981; 
Martin and Mathews, 1978). However, in these studies, subjects were not matched for age and 
sex, which are known to affect pain report in experimental studies (Woodrow et al., 1972). In 
the study reported by Martin and Mathews (1978), pain sensitivity was assessed whilst many 
of the headache subjects were experiencing headache. Any difference between groups may 
have been masked by the presence of pain concurrent with the experimental stimulus (Chen et 
al., 1985; Le Bars et al., 1983). In the present study, an effort was made to rectify these 
methodological shortcomings and this may have contributed to the observation of a heightened 
pain sensitivity amongst headache subjects.
Drummond (1987) assessed the rate of increase in pressure pain induced in the fingers 
of headache sufferers (tested in the headache-free interval) and control subjects, but observed 
no difference between groups. The headache subjects tested between attacks consisted of 68 
migraineurs and 10 subjects reporting episodic tension headaches. This latter group of subjects 
was observed to report more rapid increases in pressure pain than either controls or 
migraineurs. Unfortunately, the frequency of headache within the headache groups was not 
specified. In the study reported in this chapter, all headache subjects reported their headaches 
as occurring at least once per week. It may be that the headache subjects included in the 
present study had more frequent headaches than the migraineurs studied by Drummond (1987), 
and that this might be responsible for the discrepant results with respect to finger pain. In 
future investigations it would be useful to classify subjects on the basis of headache frequency 
before testing for differences between groups on pain sensitivity.
When the sample of headache sufferers assessed in the present study was divided into 
tension and migraine types no significant difference between groups on sensitivity to finger
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pain (assessed between headache attacks) was observed, although both groups were found to 
be significantly more pain sensitive than the controls on all measures except temporal ice pain 
threshold. These observations suggest that the difference in finger pain sensitivity between 
Drummond's (1987) migraineurs and episodic tension headache subjects, may have been due 
to factors other than a difference in the number of migrainous features characterising these two 
groups.
In the present study no significant differences on finger pain sensitivity were observed 
for the 16 headache subjects tested during and between headache attacks. These results do not 
support the hypothesis that headache is accompanied by a generalised increase in pain 
sensitivity (Sicuteri, 1982). Indeed, it has been reported that headache sufferers are more 
sensitive to finger pain in the headache-free interval than during attacks (Drummond, 1987). 
This latter finding may be explicable in terms of pain in one part of the body attenuating the 
experience of pain in other regions (e.g., Chen et al., 1985; Le Bars et al., 1983).
The results obtained on the pain measures employed in the present study are consistent 
with the hypothesis that there exists, amongst headache sufferers, a generalised weakness in 
the endogenous pain control system, affecting various regions of the body (Sicuteri, Anselmi 
and Del Bianco, 1978), which is not specific to the occurrence of headache. The findings are 
consistent with the observation that headache sufferers, assessed in the headache-free have 
lower CSF levels of the pain inhibitory substance beta-endorphin than controls (e.g., 
Genazzani et al., 1984; Nappi, Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Bono et al., 1985; Nappi, 
Facchinetti, Martignoni, Petraglia, Manzoni et al., 1985). However, since results less 
supportive of this hypothesis were reported by Drummond (1987), with respect to finger 
pressure pain, more research is required before the central theory can be regarded as having 
substantial empirical support. It would be important to attempt to identify groups of headache 
sufferers for whom heightened pain sensitivity may play a role in the pathophysiology of their 
attacks. The results of the present study suggest that headache sufferers, reporting at least one 
headache per week, may fall into this category irrespective of whether or not they report 
migrainous features in association with their headaches. The results reported in this chapter 
also suggest that if there is a deficiency in the pain inhibitory system of headache sufferers, 
this deficiency is not specific to the shoulders and above, as hypothesised by Sicuteri (1982), 
and that any such deficiency is likely to be a constant feature of the pain control system rather 
than a phenomenon which occurs only in association with headache episodes. However, it is 
possible that some additional disruption of pain regulatory mechanisms does occur during 
headache attacks but that, in the present study, this phenomenon was masked by subjects’ 
concurrent experience of headache. For example, CSF enkephalin levels have been found to be 
lower during than between episodes of migraine headache (Anselmi et al., 1980).
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Alternative interpretations of the results obtained on the pain measures, in terms of 
psychological differences between headache and control subjects, cannot be ruled out. 
Attitudes towards experimental pain have been found to exert a profound influence upon pain 
measures (e.g., Davison and Vallis, 1969; Spanos, et al., 1981; Vallis and Bucher, 1986; see 
Appendix A). Given their history of having been inconvenienced or distressed by pain 
repeatedly, the headache subjects may have appraised the experimental pain stimulus as more 
threatening than their headache-free counterparts. This fear of pain may have depressed 
headache subjects' pain threshold and tolerance levels (Letham, et al., 1983; Slade, et al., 
1983). Future studies could address this hypothesis by assessing headache and control subjects' 
cognitive and affective responses during experimental pain induction procedures. Such a 
methodology has been described by Spanos and his colleagues (Spanos, Radtke-Bodorik, 
Ferguson and Jones, 1979; Spanos et al., 1981).
Sicuteri and his co-workers (Sicuteri, 1976, 1982; Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 
1978) contend that headache sufferers are more pain sensitive than headache-free individuals, 
and that this heightened sensitivity has its origin in depleted levels of pain inhibitory 
substances in the CNS. The finding that plasma levels of serotonin are lower during than 
between migraine attacks (e.g., Anthony et al., 1967; Curran et al., 1965), and lower in persons 
with daily tension headache than in control subjects (e.g., Anthony and Lance, 1985; Rolf et 
al., 1981) is consistent with this hypothesis. However, it is difficult to generalise from 
differences in plasma levels of serotonin to differences in brain levels of this amine, 
particularly since serotonin is not stored in large quantities in brain structures (Fozard, 1982).
In the present study it was decided to investigate the hypothesised heightened sensitivity 
of the headache sufferer's nervous system to sensory input (Sicuteri, 1976, 1982; Sicuteri, 
Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978), by studying the behaviour of SSEP amplitudes over 
increasing stimulus intensities. This line of inquiry was considered important from the 
standpoint of evaluating the assumption that differences in neurophysiological functioning 
underlie headache sufferer's heightened sensitivity to pain (Sicuteri, 1982; Sicuteri, Anselmi 
and Del Bianco, 1978).
The literature on augmenting-reducing in AEP amplitudes suggests that marked 
increases in these amplitudes, in response to increasing stimulus intensities, between 60 and 
300 msec after stimulation, may be indicative of a failure of sensory modulation giving rise to 
a heightened sensitivity to pain (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1977, 1981b; Harkins and Chapman, 
1978; von Knorring, 1978; von Knorring et al., 1974). Furthermore, augmenting in AEP 
amplitudes has been found to be associated with low levels of endorphins and low levels of the 
serotonin metabolite 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) in the CSF (von Knorring and 
Perris, 1981) and with the administration of substances known to deplete CNS levels of
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serotonin and endogenous opioids (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1981b; Davis et al., 1978; von 
Knorring and Johansson, 1980). Unfortunately, this body of research has not been successful 
in identifying those particular AEP amplitudes related to pain mechanisms. This may be 
explicable in terms of the methodological inconsistencies reviewed earlier in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, Connolly et al (1982) studied the VEP recorded from vertex in migraine and 
control subjects and observed an enlarged Pj-N^ amplitude for the patient group. The present 
study sought to extend this finding to somatosensory stimulation and to bring any enlargement 
of the Pj-N j amplitude for headache sufferers into line with the literature on augmenting- 
reducing, by investigating whether or not this amplitude increased more rapidly with stimulus 
intensity for headache than for control subjects. Finally, the study was concerned with 
exploring the question of whether or not any abnormality observed in the P j-Nj amplitude, 
amongst headache sufferers, could be related to measures of pain sensitivity. This last issue 
was considered important from the viewpoint of articulating any differences between groups 
on SSEP amplitudes to the central theory of headache, cast in terms of a heightened sensitivity 
to pain.
As hypothesised, the P j -Nj SSEP amplitude, recorded from vertex, was found to be 
larger and to increase more rapidly with stimulus intensity for headache subjects than for 
controls. The amplitude was also greater for headache than control subjects, however,
for this component there was no difference between groups on the rate at which the amplitude 
increased with stimulus intensity.
In order to determine whether or not these differences in SSEP amplitudes could be 
related to pain mechanisms, each of the headache and control subject samples were divided 
into pain sensitive and pain insensitive groups. On the P j-Nj component, no differences 
between pain sensitive and pain insensitive groups was observed for either the headache or 
control subjects on mean amplitude or on the rate at which this amplitude increased with 
stimulus intensity. Among control subjects the N 1-P2  amplitude was observed to increase 
more rapidly with stimulus intensity for pain sensitive than for pain insensitive subjects. There 
was also a trend for the mean N j -P2  amplitude to be larger for the pain sensitive subjects. 
However, these observations were not replicated with the headache subjects, for whom no 
significant differences between pain sensitive and pain insensitive groups was observed on the 
N j -P2  amplitude.
Thus, although the P ^N j SSEP amplitude increased more rapidly with stimulus 
intensity for headache sufferers and although both this component and the N j -P2  amplitude 
were larger for headache sufferers than for controls, these aspects of the SSEP were not found 
to be related consistently to the pain sensitivity measures which also distinguished the 
headache and control groups. It would appear that, although the nervous systems of headache
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sufferers may be more responsive to sensory input, as suggested by the presence of enlarged 
SSEP component amplitudes, this heightened reactivity may not underlie the heightened pain 
sensitivity also observed for these subjects. This suggests that the differences observed on the 
SSEP and pain measures may represent separate processes, each of which could be involved in 
the pathophysiology of headache.
Amongst depressed psychiatric patients, augmenting in the VEP has been associated 
with reports of greater frequencies of life events in the year prior to admission, increased 
ratings of distress in the face of those life events, and with ratings of the degree of difficulty 
encountered in adapting to such events (von Knorring, Jacobsson, Perris and Perris, 1980). 
These researchers defined the VEP amplitude as the largest peak to peak difference occurring 
over the first 280 msec following stimulus onset. The findings raise the possibility that the 
augmenting response in the SSEP Pi-N j, amplitude observed for headache subjects in the 
present study, may represent a tendency for these persons to experience the exigencies of 
everyday life as stressful and to be, therefore, more likely to experience headache in the face of 
such stress. Indeed, in the last chapter, greater frequencies of stressful events were shown to be 
associated significantly with more frequent headache attacks. The P j-Nj amplitude may 
represent some process which buffers the relationship between stressful events and headache, 
in a manner similar to that demonstrated for self-control-efficacy in the last chapter. The 
exploration of such an hypothesis might cast some light on the nature of the relationship 
between SSEP amplitudes and headache.
The absence of relationships between SSEP amplitudes and pain sensitivity in the 
present study is difficult to explain. Studies which do report significant relationships between 
these variables have typically employed the amplitude / intensity slope as the measure of 
augmenting-reducing and have found this to be correlated with pain sensitivity (e.g., 
Buchsbaum and Davis, 1979; Buchsbaum et al., 1977; Lavine et al., 1976). The calculation of 
amplitude / intensity slopes was avoided in the present study because, for many individuals, 
the regression equation accounts for so little of the variance in the relationship between 
amplitude and intensity that the slope cannot be regarded as an adequate index of this 
relationship (Connolly and Gruzelier, 1982; Iacono et al., 1982). However, it seems unlikely 
that this difference in approach to the measurement of augmenting-reducing could account for 
the absence of significant relationships in the present study. Indeed, it is argued that the 
methodology employed herein is more likely to be sensitive to such relationships than the 
practice of calculating amplitude / intensity slopes.
As noted earlier in this chapter, the literature reporting relationships between AEP 
components and pain mechanisms is difficult to interpret because of the plethora of recording 
methodologies and peak identification methods employed. Until the approach to AEP
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recording becomes more uniform it will remain difficult to account for the occurrence of 
unexpected results, as observed in the present study. More research into the effects of different 
AEP recording methods on the relationship between amplitude and pain sensitivity are 
required.
Connolly et al (1982) observed a greater Pj-N} mean amplitude for migraineurs than for 
control subjects on the VEP whilst no difference between these groups was observed in the 
present study. This discrepancy may be explicable in terms of the different stimulus modalities 
employed. That is, the results obtained by Connolly et al (1982) could represent a heightened 
sensitivity specific to photic stimuli in migraineurs. Many migraine sufferers are known to be 
sensitive to light during headache attacks (Dalessio, 1980; Lance, 1982), and Connolly et al 
(1982) may have been examining a process related to this phenomenon. Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that augmenting-reducing in the AEP may be dependent upon the modality of 
stimulation (Kaskey et al., 1980; Raine et al., 1981). With respect to the present findings, the 
above considerations may account for the absence of enlarged SSEP amplitudes for the 
migraine subjects.
To the author’s knowledge, all studies conducted on the AEP in headache have been 
confined to the response of migraineurs to photic stimulation. Given that the present study 
uncovered significant differences between tension headache and control subjects on both the 
P |-N | and N j -P2  SSEP amplitudes, it is clear that future research needs to be concerned with 
the spectrum of headache from tension to migraine and ought not be confined to migraineurs. 
In the present study, the Pj-Nq amplitude was observed to be larger for tension headache 
subjects than for controls, whilst the migraine subjects did not differ significantly from the 
controls on this component. The P j-N | amplitude also increased more rapidly with stimulus 
intensity for the tension headache than for the control subjects, there being no significant 
difference between migraineurs and controls on this aspect. Finally, the amplitude was
found to be larger for the tension headache subjects than for the controls whilst the migraineurs 
did not differ significantly from the controls on this component. Thus, a heightened 
responsivity of the CNS to somatosensory input may be more readily apparent in tension 
headache sufferers than in migraineurs.
For headache subjects assessed during and between headaches, no significant 
differences between conditions were evident on the mean P j-N |, mean N j-P2  or on the 
behaviour of these amplitudes over the range of stimulus intensities. Thus, it would appear that 
the larger P j-Nj and amplitudes, and the strong augmenting response on the P j-Nj
component observed for headache subjects, are consistent features of these persons, and are 
not accentuated during periods of headache. This suggests that the reactivity of the nervous 
system of headache sufferers to somatosensory input may not be altered during headache.
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Reductions in CSF levels of pain inhibitory substances have been reported to occur 
during attacks of migraine headache (Anselmi et al.t 1980) and such processes have been 
thought to occur centrally (Sicuteri, 1982). Accordingly, the absence of significant differences 
in SSEP amplitudes between headache and headache-free intervals was surprising. However, 
the situation is complicated by the fact that tonic pain, induced experimentally, has been found 
to depress the size of the and N j amplitudes to an extent similar to that observed for 
morphine (Chen et al., 1985). Thus, it is possible that during headache, two opposing forces 
operated on SSEP amplitudes, namely, an increased sensitivity attributable to the biochemical 
changes considered to occur by Sicuteri (1982) and an inhibitory effect of headache pain itself. 
The latter process may have masked the effect of the former on SSEP amplitudes.
The results of the present study suggest that headache sufferers may be more pain 
sensitive than headache-free persons and that this increased sensitivity may not be specific to 
the head. These observations are consistent with the central theory of headache as proposed by 
Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco (1978). The enlarged P j -Nj and components, and the 
stronger augmenting response on the P^-N^ amplitude, observed for headache subjects relative 
to controls, are also supportive of the theory that some deficiency in the capacity to modulate 
somatosensory input may characterise headache sufferers. However, the absence of significant 
relationships between SSEP parameters and pain sensitivity makes it difficult to claim that 
these SSEP abnormalities are indicative of deficiencies in pain processing. Nevertheless, the 
results for both the pain measures and the SSEP do suggest that headache sufferers may be 
more responsive to somatosensory input than headache-free persons. This heightened 
responsivity could contribute to the occurrence of headache attacks in the manner outlined by 
the central theory. That is, headache sufferers may possess weakened sensory modulation 
systems which are easily disrupted by stress and which may contribute to the onset and / or 
severity of headache attacks under these conditions (Sicuteri, 1982).
Bandura et al (1987) observed that the extent to which cold pressor pain tolerance times 
could be reduced following the administration of naloxone (an opiate antagonist) was 
associated significantly with the level of self-efficacy to reduce pain following training in 
cognitive pain management strategies. These results suggest that efficacy expectations may be 
related to central pain regulatory mechanisms.
In a second study (Bandura, Coiffi, Taylor and Brouillard, 1988), subjects’ perceived 
mathematical self-efficacy was manipulated by assigning them to a condition where they could 
control the rate at which they had to solve mental arithmetic problems (high self-efficacy 
condition) or to a condition where the same tasks were presented at a rapid rate exceeding their 
cognitive capacity (low self-efficacy condition). Cold pressor pain tolerance was assessed 
before the mental arithmetic tasks. Ratings of mathematical self-efficacy made before and after
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completion of the arithmetic problems confirmed that the manipulations altered self-efficacy in 
the expected directions. Following the arithmetic tasks, subjects in each condition were 
injected with saline or the opiate antagonist naloxone and then re-tested for pain tolerance on 
the cold pressor test. No significant difference between the saline and naloxone 
administrations was observed on percentage change in pain tolerance for the high self-efficacy 
(low-stress) subjects, whereas for those in the low self-efficacy (high-stress) condition the 
percentage increase in pain tolerance was significantly greater for subjects receiving saline 
than for those receiving naloxone.
Bandura et al (1988) concluded that a lowering of self-efficacy is associated with opioid 
activation, this being blocked for the subjects receiving naloxone. However, since ratings of 
stress, time pressure and perceived impairment of task performance were observed to be 
greater in the low self-efficacy than in the high self-efficacy group, it is equally plausible that 
the increased opioid activation was attributable to stress (e.g., Akil et al., 1976).
Bandura et al (1988) also observed that, for subjects in the high self-efficacy condition, 
those receiving saline demonstrated a significant positive correlation between increases in 
mathematical self-efficacy and increases in pain tolerance. No significant correlation between 
the variables was observed for subjects receiving naloxone. For subjects in the low self- 
efficacy condition, receiving saline, reductions in mathematical self-efficacy were associated 
significantly with increases in pain tolerance whilst, for those receiving naloxone, reductions 
in self-efficacy were associated significantly with reductions in pain tolerance.
The results reported by Bandura et al (1988) suggest that exposing subjects to high 
levels of cognitive stress (low mathematical self-efficacy condition) may produce opioid 
activation (as suggested by the reduction in pain tolerance for the subjects receiving naloxone), 
whilst for those exposed to lower levels of stress (high self-efficacy condition), no opioid 
activation may occur (as suggested by the absence of any differential effect of saline and 
naloxone on pain tolerance). When subjects are not exposed to high levels of cognitive stress 
(high self-efficacy condition) increases in self-efficacy may be related to increases in pain 
tolerance, provided that the endogenous pain control system is unimpaired (no such correlation 
was observed when subjects were given naloxone). For subjects exposed to high levels of 
cognitive stress (low self-efficacy condition), reductions in self-efficacy may be associated 
with increases in pain tolerance when they receive saline, but when the opioid system is 
impaired by naloxone, reductions in self-efficacy may be associated with reductions in pain 
tolerance.
The results obtained by Bandura et al (1988) have implications for an understanding of 
the relationship between stress and headache. Headache sufferers have been postulated to have
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impaired endogenous opioid systems (e.g., Genazzani et al., 1984; Sicuteri, 1982). The results 
of the present study suggest that headache sufferers may be more pain sensitive and their 
nervous systems more reactive to somatosensory input than headache-free persons. 
Furthermore, the results presented in Chapter 7 suggested that self-control-efficacy may 
moderate the strength of the relationship between stressful events and headache frequency: 
lower levels of self-control-efficacy being associated with a stronger relationship between the 
frequency of stressful events and the frequency of headache. If the endogenous opioid system 
is impaired in headache sufferers, the findings obtained by Bandura et al (1988) suggest that 
stressful events and lower levels of self-efficacy could lead to a heightening of pain sensitivity 
and an increased probability of headache occurring, this process being mediated by the 
endogenous opioid system. Thus, the moderating effect of self-control-efficacy on the 
relationship between the frequency of headache and the frequency of stressful events, reported 
in Chapter 7, could have been mediated by endogenous opioid functions. This hypothesis 
could be explored by replicating the study conducted by Bandura et al (1988) on headache 
sufferers and headache-ffee subjects. Headache subjects would be expected to show lower 
levels of opioid activation under cognitive stress and to demonstrate greater reductions in pain 
tolerance following such stress than controls. Furthermore, reductions in self-efficacy, 
occurring under stress, would be expected to be associated with reductions in pain tolerance 
for headache subjects (due to a lack of opioid activation under stress) but with increases in 
pain tolerance for control subjects.
Additional studies could investigate the hypothesis that cognitive processes, such as 
self-control-efficacy, may be related to headache through the mechanism of sensory 
modulation, by examining interactions of these variables with measures of pain sensitivity or 
AEP amplitude in the prediction of headache severity. Such lines of inquiry may contribute 
more to an understanding of the mechanisms through which psychological variables contribute 
to headache than has been gained, heretofore, from a focus upon relationships between these 
variables and the processes of muscle contraction and vasodilatation.
8.6. SUMMARY.
In Study III an investigation of the central theory of headache was conducted by 
comparing headache sufferers and control subjects on pain sensitivity and SSEP amplitudes, 
occurring between 60 and 300 msec after electrical stimulation of the index finger.
Headache sufferers were found to have lower pain threshold and tolerance levels for 
electrical stimulation of the index finger than headache-free control subjects. Headache 
subjects were also observed to have lower pain tolerance levels when ice was applied to the
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temporal region, but no significant difference between groups was observed on temporal ice 
pain threshold. When headache subjects were assessed on pain threshold and tolerance for 
electrical finger pain, during and between headache attacks, no significant difference between 
conditions was observed. When temporal ice pain threshold and tolerance levels were assessed 
in a group of headache sufferers reporting headaches affecting only one side of the head, 
including the temporal region, no significant differences between the habitually affected side 
and the unaffected side were observed.
It was concluded that headache sufferers may be more sensitive to pain than headache- 
free persons; that this increased sensitivity may be a consistent feature of headache sufferers, 
unaffected by the presence or absence of headache; and that the heightened pain sensitivity of 
headache subjects may not be specific to the head or the region affected habitually by 
headache.
The question of whether there exists any neurophysiological basis to the increased pain 
sensitivity of headache subjects was addressed by assessing the behaviour of the P j-N j and 
N j -P2 components of the SSEP over increasing levels of stimulus intensity. The P j -Nj 
amplitude of the SSEP was found to be greater and to increase more rapidly with stimulus 
intensity for headache sufferers than for control subjects. The N j-P2 amplitude was also found 
to be larger for headache than for control subjects, but no difference between groups on the 
rate at which this amplitude increased with stimulus intensity was observed. When the P\-N^ 
and N|-P2 amplitudes were assessed in headache subjects during and between attacks, no 
significant differences between conditions were observed. No significant differences between 
pain sensitive and pain insensitive subjects were found on P j-N j or N^-P2 amplitudes for 
headache subjects. For control subjects, the N1-P2 amplitude increased more rapidly with 
stimulus intensity for pain sensitive than for pain insensitive subjects, but no other significant 
differences were observed.
It was concluded that the nervous systems of headache sufferers may be more 
responsive to sensory input than those of headache-free control subjects. Some deficiency in 
the mechanism of sensory modulation may represent one avenue through which cognitive 
processes contribute to headache.
211
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.
The studies reported in this thesis aimed to identify the cognitive appraisal processes 
related to recurrent headache and to develop and examine a conceptual model detailing the 
inter-relationships between appraisal processes, stressful events, coping and headache. 
Furthermore, the thesis was concerned with evaluating the prospects for articulating cognitive 
processes to headache through the mechanism of sensory modulation as outlined in the gate 
control theory of pain (Melzack and Wall, 1965; 1982; see Appendix A) and in the central 
theory of headache (Sicuteri, 1982; Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978). In an endeavour 
to achieve these aims, three empirical studies were conducted. The conclusions following from 
each of these studies are detailed in the following sections.
9.1. Study I: Rationality and Headache.
In Study I (see Chapter 6) an attempt was made to identify the cognitive appraisal 
processes involved in headache by means of a comparative treatment study. The relationship 
between stressful events and headache was conceptualised in terms of the rational-emotive 
theory of emotional distress (Ellis, 1962, 1977a, b). According to this theory human beings 
experience intense aversive emotions, in response to stressful events, to the extent that their 
belief systems are irrational. Thus, the distinction between rational and irrational beliefs was a 
crucial theoretical issue which had to be addressed before applying the theory to an analysis of 
the relationship between stress and headache.
It was argued that an irrational belief is one which demands that particular outcomes 
follow from one's actions or that reality be altered. However, it was noted that the rational 
desire for reality to be different, and the irrational demand that it should or must be different 
(Ellis, 1962, 1977a, b) are easily confused when this dimension is assessed by questionnaire. 
In order to overcome the problem of distinguishing between desires and demands it was 
decided to focus upon rationality, defined by Ellis (1962) as an acceptance of oneself, others 
and the environment. Irrationality was regarded as any departure from this position. The 
Rationality Scale was developed along these lines and was administered to headache sufferers 
before and after rational-emotive therapy or progressive relaxation training.
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The results did not support the rational-emotive model of the relationship between stress 
and headache. Reductions in headache frequency, intensity, duration and medication intake 
were not reliably greater for the rational-emotive than for the relaxation treatment at the post- 
treatment or 12-week follow-up assessments. Furthermore, when post-treatment Rationality 
Scale scores were correlated with each post-treatment headache outcome measure by means of 
partial correlation analyses (controlling for the pre-treatment values of each pair of variables), 
no significant partial correlation coefficients were observed for either treatment. Thus, it was 
concluded that the significant reductions in headache frequency observed for the relaxation 
treatment, and the significant reductions in headache frequency and intensity observed for the 
rational-emotive treatment, were not mediated by increases in rationality, as assessed by the 
Rationality Scale.
It was suggested that self-efficacy expectations (Bandura, 1977, 1982, 1986) may have 
been strengthened in each treatment by providing subjects with a rationale for understanding 
the origin of their headaches, as well as with strategies by which they might master their 
disorder. It was suggested further that the development and examination of a model, linking 
self-efficacy to headache, may cast more light on the mediational processes involved in the 
relationship between stress and headache than has been gained through a focus upon 
rationality.
9.2. Study II: Cognitive Aspects of the Stress Process and Headache.
In the theoretical model proposed in the introduction to Study II (see Chapter 7), it was 
postulated that self-efficacy, regarding control over behavioural, cognitive and affective 
responses (self-control-efficacy) moderates the strength of the relationship between stressful 
events and headache onset. It was postulated further that self-control-efficacy would be related 
to headache through the mechanisms of appraisal, coping and emotional upset. It was proposed 
that self-control-efficacy determines the level of affective regulation in the face of stressful 
events and that, this coping strategy, reduces the strength of the emotional response to stressful 
events, thereby mitigating against headache onset. Furthermore, it was proposed that a high 
level of self-control-efficacy would lead individuals to appraise stressful events as amenable to 
change; to engage in direct coping to alter the stressor, reduce the intensity of the emotional 
response; and reduce the probability of headache occurring in the face of stressful events. 
Finally, a low level of self-control-efficacy was expected to be associated with a tendency to 
appraise stressful events as not amenable to change which would, in turn, be associated with 
avoidance coping, an increased emotional response to the stressor and a greater probability of 
headache occurring.
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The frequency of stressful events was observed to account for a significant proportion of 
the variance in diary recordings of headache frequency. Furthermore, and as expected, the 
strength of this relationship was found to be moderated by the level of self-control-efficacy 
such that, the positive correlation between stressful events and headache was greater for 
subjects low in self-control-efficacy than for those high in self-control-efficacy.
Stressful events occurring within headache episodes were found to be associated with 
increases in headache intensity following those events. When subjects' continuous records 
were divided into headache and headache-free cycles (a headache cycle being defined as a 
headache-ffee day followed by a headache day; a headache-free cycle as two consecutive 
headache-free days), stressful events were found to precede headache onset more often than 
periods of headache freedom. These results suggest that stressful events may be causally 
related both to headache onset and to increments in headache intensity.
Consistent with the proposed theoretical model, appraisals of stressful events as 
amenable to change and reliance upon affective regulation and direct coping efforts were more 
evident in periods leading up to headache freedom (headache-free cycles) than in periods 
preceding headache (headache cycles). Furthermore, when stressful events occurred during 
headache attacks, increments in headache intensity following those events were associated 
with higher levels of avoidance coping and with lower levels of direct coping. However, 
contrary to the model, events were rated as more important in headache-free cycles and levels 
of avoidance coping and emotional upset were observed to be greater in headache-free than in 
headache cycles.
Since scores on all event coping scales were greater in the headache-free than in the 
headache cycles, it was suggested that it may be the number of coping strategies employed in 
response to a stressful event, rather than the nature of those strategies, that is the important 
determinant of whether or not a headache will develop. It was suggested further that when 
stressful events occur and are not recognised as important or upsetting (as indicated by the 
lower scores on the Event Mattered and Upset Rating Scales), such conditions may be 
conducive to headache onset. The results suggest that the events related most strongly to the 
occurrence of headache may be those which the headache sufferer perceives as having little 
relevance to his or her well-being.
Contrary to those aspects of the theoretical model linking self-control-efficacy to 
headache through the processes of appraisal and coping, self-control-efficacy was not observed 
to be correlated significantly with the extent to which events were appraised as amenable to 
change, the level of importance attached to those events or with the levels of affective 
regulation or direct coping. Consistent with the model a significant negative correlation
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between self-control-efficacy and avoidance coping was noted. However, the finding that 
lower, rather than higher, levels of avoidance coping were associated with headache onset, 
suggests that this type of coping does not mediate the buffering effect of self-control-efficacy 
on the relationship between stressful events and headache.
Higher levels of self-control-efficacy were associated with lower levels of emotional 
upset in the face of stressful events. Once again, however, the fact that upset ratings were 
found to be greater in headache-free than in headache cycles, suggests that the level of 
emotional upset is unlikely to represent a mechanism by which self-control-efficacy exerts its 
buffering effect Therefore, it appears that the buffering effect of self-control-efficacy was not 
mediated by the appraisal, coping or emotional responses under investigation.
The theoretical model linking stressful events to headache through self-control-efficacy, 
appraisal, coping and emotional response variables was partially supported by the data 
obtained. Stressful events were observed to contribute to the onset and intensity of headache 
attacks and the strength of the relationship between these events and headache frequency was 
moderated by self-control-efficacy. Furthermore, appraising events as amenable to change and 
engaging in efforts to cope with those events were found to mitigate against headache onset. 
The main areas in which the model was not supported concern the linkages postulated to 
mediate the buffering effect of self-control-efficacy; the absence of any differential effect of 
coping on headache; and the presence of a heightened aversive emotional response and higher 
event-mattered ratings in periods leading to headache freedom (headache-free cycles) than in 
periods preceding headache onset (headache cycles). The model proposed may need to be 
modified so as to take account of the suggestion that headache sufferers may be most 
vulnerable to headache onset when they do not recognise the personal significance of stressful 
events. This interpretation of the data is consistent with the view that sensitising headache 
sufferers to the events, thoughts and feelings which precede headache attacks, may be an 
important ingredient in psychological treatment programmes (Bakal et al., 1981).
Although the theoretical model proposed in Chapter 7 was recognised as far from 
complete, it was considered that a more pressing concern than the specification of linkages 
between self-control-efficacy and headache, or the clarification of the relationship between 
emotional distress and headache, was the need to explore the prospects for linking cognitive 
constructs, such as self-control-efficacy, to the pathophysiological mechanisms that might be 
involved in headache attacks.
In view of the finding suggesting that self-efficacy to tolerate pain may be related to 
endogenous pain inhibitory processes (Bandura et al., 1987), and bearing in mind the lack of 
success that psychophysiologists have had in relating psychological processes to the peripheral
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mechanisms implicated in the pathophysiology of headache (see Chapter 2), it was decided to 
conduct an evaluation of the central theory of headache, with a view to facilitating the 
development of theoretical models linking cognitive constructs, such as self-control-efficacy, 
to the mechanisms of sensory modulation thought to be involved in the pathophysiology of 
headache (Sicuteri, 1982; Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978). This inquiry was 
undertaken in Study III.
9.3. Study III: Pain Sensitivity and Sensory Modulation in Headache.
In Study III (see Chapter 9) the central theory of headache (Sicuteri, 1982; Sicuteri, 
Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978) was examined by studying differences between headache and 
headache-free control subjects on pain sensitivity and SSEP amplitudes. According to the 
central theory, headache is at least in part, the result of a depletion of pain inhibitory 
substances in the CNS.
It has been suggested that the pain control systems of headache sufferers are fragile 
(Sicuteri, 1982); that this is evident as a heightened sensitivity to pain (Sicuteri, Anselmi and 
Del Bianco, 1978); and that this system is prone to break-down during periods of stress 
(Sicuteri, 1982). Thus, an investigation of pain sensitivity in headache and control subjects was 
carried out. It was decided to include a study of SSEP amplitudes in order to determine 
whether or not there exists a neurophysiological basis for any heightened pain sensitivity 
observed for headache sufferers. The existence of such a neurophysiological mechanism is 
implied by the postulation of a depletion of pain inhibitory substances in the CNS as 
contributing substantially to headache (Sicuteri, 1982).
Headache sufferers assessed between attacks were observed to have lower pain 
threshold and tolerance levels for electrical finger pain than controls. When ice blocks were 
applied to the temple (temporal ice pain test), headache subjects demonstrated lower pain 
tolerance levels, but there was no significant difference between groups on pain threshold. It 
was concluded that, during periods of headache freedom, headache sufferers may be more pain 
sensitive than headache-free persons and that this heightened sensitivity may be a generalised 
condition which is not specific to the head.
Subjects reporting unilateral headaches affecting the temporal region were no more pain 
sensitive over the site of headache than on the contralateral side when tested between headache 
attacks. However, this result cannot be regarded as conclusive given that, amongst a larger 
sample of subjects, pain sensitivity has been reported to be higher in regions of the scalp 
affected habitually by headache than in unaffected regions (Drummond, 1987).
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No differences in sensitivity to electrical finger pain were observed for headache 
subjects tested during and between headache attacks. This finding is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that headache attacks are accompanied by a generalised increase in pain sensitivity 
(Sicuteri, 1982).
An investigation into the extent of any involvement of neurophysiological mechanisms 
in the heightened pain sensitivity of headache sufferers was carried out by a study of SSEP 
amplitudes. A review of the literature on augmenting-reducing in AEP amplitudes, occurring 
between 60 and 300 msec after stimulation, indicated that larger amplitudes and greater rates 
of increase in the size of the amplitudes, with increasing stimulus intensity, may be associated 
with both a heightened sensitivity to pain (e.g., Buchsbaum et al., 1977, 1981b; von Knorring, 
1978), and with pharmacologically induced depletions of pain inhibitory substances (e.g., 
Davis et al., 1978; von Knorring and Johansson, 1980). Thus, it was hypothesised that SSEP 
amplitudes would be larger and would increase more rapidly with stimulus intensity for 
headache than for control subjects.
Since Connolly et al (1982) observed the P j-N | amplitude of the VEP recorded from 
vertex to be larger for migraine than for control subjects, it was hypothesised that differences 
between groups on the SSEP would be most evident on this component. It was also anticipated 
that SSEP amplitudes would be related to measures of pain sensitivity.
As hypothesised, the Pj-N j amplitude was observed to be larger, and to increase with 
stimulus intensity at a greater rate for the headache subjects than for the controls. The 
mean amplitude was larger for headache subjects, but there was no difference between groups 
on the rate at which this component increased with stimulus intensity. When subjects within 
each group were divided into pain sensitive and pain insensitive groups, on the basis of their 
scores on the pain tests, no consistent relationships between pain sensitivity and SSEP 
amplitudes were observed. It was concluded that, although the nervous systems of headache 
sufferers may be more responsive to sensory input, this increased reactivity may not account 
for their heightened pain sensitivity.
The P j -Nj and SSEP amplitudes and their relationships with stimulus intensity
were found to be unaffected by the presence or absence of headache. It was concluded that the 
reactivity of the nervous systems of headache sufferers to somatosensory input may not be 
affected by the presence of headache.
The results obtained on the pain measures and SSEP amplitudes were interpreted as 
being consistent with the theory that some deficiency in the capacity to modulate sensory input 
may be an important factor in the pathophysiology of headache. It was suggested that such a
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deficiency could represent one mechanism by which stress may contribute to headache. 
Specifically, it was conjectured that the buffering effect of self-control-efficacy, observed in 
Chapter 7, might exert its influence on the stress-headache relationship by acting upon the 
mechanism of sensory modulation.
9.4. General Conclusions.
The results of the empirical work reported in this thesis suggest the following general 
conclusions:
1. The effects of rational-emotive therapy or progressive relaxation training on 
recurrent headache do not appear to be mediated by increases in rationality (defined 
as the tendency to accept oneself, others and the environment, and assessed by the 
Rationality Scale). In addition, rational-emotive therapy may be no more effective 
than relaxation training in the treatment of headache. These findings suggest that 
rationality may not play a significant role in the relationship between stressful 
events and headache activity.
2. Frequent stressful events may be causally related to headache onset and to 
increases in headache intensity during attacks. The strength of the relationship 
between stressful events and headache frequency appears to be buffered by the 
level of self-efficacy regarding control over behavioural, cognitive and affective 
responses (self-control-efficacy). Appraisals of stressful events as amenable to 
change and the process of engaging in efforts to cope with those events, may 
mitigate against subsequent headache onset. However, any linkages between self- 
efficacy, appraisal, coping, emotional response and headache remain unclear, as 
does the issue of the type of coping most likely to be related to headache onset.
3. Avoidance coping, in response to stressful events occurring during headache 
attacks, may be associated with higher levels of headache intensity following the 
event, whilst direct coping may be associated with lower post-event headache 
intensity ratings. However, it is not clear whether these coping strategies could be 
causes, consequences or simply correlates of post-event fluctuations in headache 
intensity. Stressful events that are not recognised as significant for one's well-being 
or that are not associated with a strong aversive emotional response may be most 
likely to be followed by a headache.
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4. Headache sufferers reporting at least one headache per week may be more sensitive 
to experimental pain than headache-free control subjects. This heightened 
sensitivity does not appear to be influenced by the presence or absence of headache 
and is not specific to the head. The results reported in Chapter 8 support the 
contention that there may exist a generalised weakness of the pain control system 
in headache sufferers (Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978), but do not support 
the hypothesis that such a deficiency is specific to the head (Sicuteri, 1982). The 
larger P j-Nj and SSEP amplitudes observed for headache subjects and the
fact that the N j-Pj amplitude increased more rapidly with increasing stimulus 
intensity for the headache subjects, suggests that a neurophysiological basis may 
exist for a deficiency in sensory modulation in headache sufferers. The SSEP 
amplitudes under investigation were unaffected by the presence or absence of 
headache. Although it appears unlikely that the SSEP abnormalities observed in 
headache sufferers underlie their heightened pain sensitivity, the SSEP results 
indicate, nevertheless, that headache sufferers may be lacking in their capacity to 
modulate sensory input. This could represent a mechanism by which psychological 
processes contribute to headache attacks.
The results of the studies reported in this thesis suggest that cognitive appraisal 
processes may make a significant contribution to the severity of headache and, thus, strengthen 
the rationale for the application of cognitive therapy to this problem. In particular, it was 
shown that frequent stressful events precede periods of headache more often than periods of 
headache freedom, and that the strength of the relationship between these events and headache 
frequency is buffered by the level of self-control-efficacy. Thus, self-control-efficacy may 
operate as a psychological resource serving to reduce the frequency of headache in the face of 
stressful events. These results suggest that self-efficacy regarding control over behavioural, 
cognitive and affective responses to stressors could represent an important process variable in 
the successful psychological treatment of recurrent headache and may, thus, facilitate the 
formulation of theories of the therapeutic process which have been lacking in the literature 
concerning psychological treatments for headache (see Chapter 4).
The results reported in Chapter 8 are consistent with the central theory of headache and, 
thus, raise the possibility that the relationships between stressful events, self-control-efficacy, 
appraisal, coping and headache, observed in Chapter 7, may be mediated by the mechanism of 
sensory modulation.
Subjects with naloxone induced impairment of the endogenous opioid system, placed 
under conditions of cognitive stress (solving arithmetic problems under time pressure), have 
been shown not to generate the opioid activation demonstrated by subjects receiving injections
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of inactive saline solution (Bandura et al., 1988). Furthermore, under conditions of cognitive 
stress, reductions in self-efficacy to manage stress have been associated with reductions in pain 
tolerance, for subjects administered naloxone; the direction of this relationship being reversed 
when subjects receive saline instead of the opioid antagonist (Bandura et al., 1988). These 
results suggest that if there is some impairment of the endogenous opioid system in headache 
sufferers (e.g., Genazzani et al., 1984; Sicuteri, 1982), the buffering effect of self-control- 
efficacy on the relationship between stressful events and headache may be mediated by this 
system. The existence of some impairment in the capacity to modulate somatosensory input in 
headache sufferers was suggested by the results obtained in Study III (see Chapter 8).
The formulation of theories linking psychological processes to headache through the 
mechanism of sensory modulation, may prove to be a more profitable line of inquiry than that 
offered by the emphasis of previous research upon the peripheral processes of muscle 
contraction and vasodilatation. However, this is not to say that peripheral processes are 
irrelevant to headache. The results obtained in Study III indicated that any weakness in the 
endogenous pain regulatory system is likely to be non-specific in its focus and, therefore, 
unable to give an account of the location of head pain. As suggested by Lance (1982), it seems 
that a complete account of the pathophysiology of headache is most likely to follow from a 
consideration of the interaction of peripheral processes with central pain control functions.
9.5. Directions For Further Research.
The studies reported in this thesis suggest a number of directions for further research. 
These are elaborated in the following paragraphs.
Much of the research into the rational-emotive theory of emotional distress has been 
plagued by the problem of defining the construct of rationality-irrationality in such a way that 
it can be regarded as conceptually distinct from the emotional distress it seeks to explain 
(Smith, 1982). In Chapter 6 it was argued that such a distinction may be achieved by following 
Ellis' (1962) definition of rationality as an acceptance of oneself, others and the environment, 
and by recognising irrationality as departures from this position. On the basis of this 
conceptualisation the Rationality Scale was constructed. The scale was found to have a high 
test-retest reliability and a high internal consistency. It was validated against the remainder of 
the items on the Irrational Beliefs Test and, as predicted by rational-emotive theory, was found 
to correlate moderately, and in the expected direction, with scores on the Beck Depression and 
Trait Anxiety Inventories. However, the claim that the instrument assesses a construct separate 
from that of emotional distress should be investigated further by means of a factor analytic
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study, investigating whether or not the scale items load together on a factor separate from 
those upon which high loadings are observed for items tapping anxiety or depression.
In Study I (see Chapter 6) changes in Rationality Scale scores, over the course of 
rational-emotive therapy were observed to correlate significantly with reductions in anxiety 
and depression. No such relationships were observed for subjects receiving relaxation training. 
Such a pattern of results suggests that the significant correlations observed in the former 
treatment are unlikely to be explicable in terms of a confounding between rationality and 
emotional distress. Thus, the Rationality Scale may be a useful measure by which to examine 
hypotheses derived from rational-emotive theory. In particular, it is suggested that future 
research into the theory might profit from the use of this scale in treatment studies designed to 
examine the question of whether or not increases in rationality underlie the effects of rational- 
emotive therapy upon psychological disorders.
In Study II (see Chapter 7) the buffering effect of self-control-efficacy upon headache 
frequency was demonstrated. However, the mechanisms by which this buffering takes place 
remain unclear. The Self-Control-Efficacy Scale assessed efficacy regarding cognitive, 
behavioural and emotional control. An expansion of this scale, the development of a factored 
measure of each of the three components, and a replication of the buffering effect, may yield 
further information on the nature of this process. Particular aspects of self-control-efficacy 
might then be observed to be related to appraisal and coping responses. The relationship 
between self-control-efficacy and headache could also be explored further by tracking self- 
control-efficacy scores over the course of psychological treatments. In the light of the results 
reported in Chapter 7, significant correlations would be expected between reductions in 
headache frequency and increases in self-control-efficacy. It could also be hypothesised that 
since the relationship between stressful events and headache is not significant for headache 
sufferers high in self-control-efficacy, these subjects might not be good candidates for 
psychological treatments aimed at modifying the individual's reaction to such stressful events.
Direct and avoidance coping, in response to stressful events occurring during headache 
attacks, were found to be related to subsequent headache intensity. Tracking the relationship 
between these variables over the course of psychological treatments, would provide a method 
for assessing the direction of the relationship of each of these coping strategies to headache 
intensity following stressful events.
The question of whether particular patterns of coping are related to headache onset, 
subsequent to a stressful event, is also worthy of further investigation. In Study II (see Chapter 
7) it was the number, rather than the type, of coping responses that was related to headache 
onset. The event-coping scales employed in the study were found to be moderately inter-
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correlated. The development of more independent scales might facilitate the identification of 
particular coping methods conducive to headache onset or headache prevention.
The finding that headache attacks were less likely to follow stressful events appraised as 
important and generating higher levels of emotional upset, than events associated with lower 
scores on these variables, requires clarification. It would be important to compare headache 
sufferers' scores on these variables with those obtained by headache-free control subjects in 
order to determine whether such reactions to common stressful events are a characteristic of 
headache sufferers.
Future studies should employ more multifaceted measures of emotional distress in an 
effort to identify those types of emotional responses that may be understated by headache 
sufferers in periods preceding attacks. In Study II the emotional reaction to events was 
assessed by means of a single visual analogue scale. Future studies could assess a range of 
affective responses including anger, anxiety and depression. A focus upon anger would appear 
warranted given that migraine sufferers have been reported to express less anger than 
headache-free persons in competitive situations requiring subjects to solve anagrams rapidly 
(Grothgar and Scholz, 1987). A replication of Study II, addressing a broader range of 
emotional responses, might indicate that a failure to express anger, in stressful situations, 
increases the likelihood of headache occurring.
The headache sufferers participating in Study II were experiencing at least one headache 
per week. Such a level of headache frequency restricted the diary recording data to short cycles 
of only two days in length. Thus, it was not possible to study relationships between headache 
onset and psychological processes which may have occurred several days earlier. This could 
be accomplished by selecting headache sufferers with less frequent attacks and expanding the 
length of the cycles. In this manner any lagged effects of stressful events, appraisal, coping or 
emotional responses on the occurrence of headache attacks, could be examined.
Although the results obtained in Study III (see Chapter 8) indicated that a heightened 
sensitivity to pain may be a feature of headache sufferers, other studies have not reported such 
consistent findings (Drummond, 1987). It was suggested that the discrepancy between the 
results obtained in Study III and those reported by Drummond (1987) may have been due to an 
increased frequency of headache amongst the subjects studied in this thesis. Future studies of 
pain sensitivity in headache could address this hypothesis by assessing pain sensitivity across 
subjects with varying levels of headache frequency.
Any contribution of psychological variables to the heightened pain sensitivity observed 
for headache sufferers should also be explored. A methodology for assessing cognitive and
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affective responses during experimental pain induction has been described by Spanos and his 
colleagues (Spanos et al., 1979, 1981). These researchers have shown that strategies which 
increase pain tolerance times are effective to the extent that they reduce catastrophising 
ideation (i.e., shift attention away from the aversive aspects of pain; see Appendix A). Since 
the central theory of headache assumes that the pain inhibitory system is deficient in headache 
sufferers (e.g., Sicuteri, 1982; Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978), it may be 
hypothesised that headache subjects would be less able than controls to increase their pain 
tolerance times, even if they were successful in reducing their level of catastrophising.
On the SSEP headache subjects were observed to have larger P j-N j and N j-P2 
amplitudes than controls and the P j-Nj amplitude was found to increase more rapidly with 
stimulus intensity for headache subjects. These results are consistent with the theory that some 
neurophysiological deficit in the capacity for sensory modulation may be a characteristic of 
headache sufferers (Sicuteri, 1982; Sicuteri, Anselmi and Del Bianco, 1978). However, the 
absence of consistent relationships between the SSEP components studied and measures of 
pain sensitivity, suggests that these two variables could represent independent processes, each 
of which could contribute in some way to the occurrence of headache attacks.
Persons demonstrating large increases in the size of the VEP with stimulus intensity 
have, been observed to report greater frequencies of life events and higher levels of emotional 
distress in association with those events (von Knorring et al., 1980). Thus, the differences on 
the SSEP between the headache and control groups, observed in Study III, raise the possibility 
that the former group may be more reactive to stressful events and that this might contribute to 
headache. Such an hypothesis could be explored by observing whether or not the correlation 
between stressful events and headache is greater for headache sufferers with larger SSEP 
amplitudes than for those demonstrating smaller amplitudes. It would also be important to 
compare headache subjects with subjects from other chronic pain groups on the SSEP so as to 
determine whether the enlarged amplitudes observed for headache sufferers in Study III could 
be a result of repeated exposure to pain, rather than a phenomenon specific to the nervous 
systems of headache sufferers.
Exposing headache and headache-free control subjects to cognitive stress (such as 
mental arithmetic under time pressure), assessing pain tolerance pre- and post-stress and 
testing for opioid activation by administering naloxone or saline prior to the post-stress pain 
test (c.f. Bandura et al., 1988) would provide a test of the hypothesis that stress contributes to 
headache through deficient opioid mechanisms (Genazzani et al., 1984; Sicuteri, 1982). On 
the post-stress pain test, headache subjects would be expected to show smaller reductions in 
pain tolerance, following naloxone, than headache-free controls also receiving this drug, but to 
demonstrate greater reductions in pain tolerance than controls under conditions of inactive
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saline administration. These results would be expected if there were some deficiency in the 
endogenous opioid system rendering headache sufferers susceptible to increases in pain 
sensitivity under stress (Sicuteri, 1982).
The release of catecholamines has been associated with the exposure of subjects to 
laboratory stress (Cox et al., 1983; Forsman and Lindblad, 1983) and with the onset of 
migraine headache (Anthony, 1981). Anthony (1981) observed increased blood levels of 
catecholamines to be associated with the release of free fatty acids which have been found, in 
turn, to release serotonin from platelets (Anthony, 1978), thereby reducing blood levels of the 
amine. Anthony (1981) suggested that the lower blood levels of serotonin could lead to 
headache by reducing the vascular tone of the cranial vessels. However, it is also possible that 
these processes act to reduce serotonin levels in the CNS and contribute to headache by 
opening the pain gate (see Chapter 2).
The contingent negative variation (CNV) is a negative potential recorded from the scalp, 
prior to the motor response in a reaction time task, and has been thought to be related to central 
catecholaminergic activity (Lance, 1987; Maertens de Noordhout, Timsit-Berthier and 
Shoenen, 1985). The CNV amplitude has been found to be greater for migraineurs than for 
tension headache or headache-free control subjects (Maertens de Noordhout et al., 1985). The 
enlarged SSEP components observed for headache sufferers in the present study could also be 
related to heightened activity within the sympathetic nervous system. This hypothesis could be 
explored by correlating indices of sympathetic activity, such as blood levels of noradrenaline, 
adrenaline or dopamine-beta-hydroxylase (Anthony, 1981) with the amplitude of the P j-Nj 
and N j -P2 components of the SSEP.
9.6. The Contribution of the Current Work.
The main contribution of the current work has been to show that cognitive processes 
may be significant determinants of the frequency of headache attacks. In particular, evidence 
was obtained to suggest that stressful events may be causally related to headache onset and 
that self-control-efficacy may function to buffer this relationship. Appraising stressful events 
as amenable to change was also observed to mitigate against the onset of headache attacks. 
These observations lend some support to the widely held view that stressful events play an 
important part in the aetiology and / or maintenance of headache attacks (Friedman, 1979; 
Friedman et al., 1954; Levor et al., 1986) and also support the rationale for the application to 
headache of psychological treatments in general, and cognitive therapy in particular.
The current work was also concerned with exploring the prospects for linking 
psychological processes to the mechanism of sensory modulation outlined in the central theory
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(Sicuteri, 1982). An evaluation of this theory was observed to support the hypothesis that 
headache sufferers may be deficient in their capacity to modulate sensory input Although such 
a deficiency cannot, in itself, offer a full account of headache, there being a need to postulate 
the involvement of peripheral processes in order to explain the location of head pain (Lance, 
1982), it was argued that it may be through an action on the mechanism of sensory modulation, 
rather than through an action on the mechanisms of muscle contraction or vasodilatation, that 
psychological processes contribute to recurrent headache. The development of theoretical 
formulations, postulating a mediational role for sensory modulation in the relationship between 
psychological processes, and headache may make for more profitable lines of inquiry than 
have followed from an emphasis upon peripheral mechanisms.
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APPENDIX A
THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN PAIN 
OTHER THAN HEADACHE.
A.l. Defining Pain.
Although it is customary to open discussions of pain with definitions of the 
phenomenon (e.g., Beecher, 1959; Stembach, 1968), these efforts rarely serve any useful 
purpose. As Lewis (1942, p. v.) noted:
"Reflection tells me that I am so far from being able to satisfactorily define
pain...that the attempt would serve no useful purpose."
The International Association for the study of Pain (1979, p. 250) defined pain as:
"...an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or
potential tissue damage or described in terms of such tissue damage."
This definition has been criticised for being vague about the dimensions that comprise 
the term "unpleasant" (Melzack and Wall, 1982). Furthermore, it would seem plausible for a 
person to experience pain which is not associated with any potential or actual tissue damage or 
described in terms of such damage. For example, the pain of tension headache is often 
described as "dull" (Hunter and Philips, 1981).
Psychology and physiology have not come to terms with the definition of pain, but then 
neither have physics nor chemistry come to grips with concepts such as "matter" or "energy" 
or "light", yet our understanding of the behaviour of these phenomena does not appear to have 
been hampered to any great extent by the absence of clear definitions. Pain cannot be defined 
satisfactorily at the present moment, but some appreciation of its vicissitudes follows from a 
consideration of theories of pain.
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A.2. The Specificity Theory of Pain.
Specificity theory postulates the existence of a direct connection between specialised, 
pain transmitting receptors in the skin and a particular pain centre in the brain (e.g., von Frey, 
1895). As Melzack (1973) has argued, such an hypothesis implies that the level of pain would 
always be directly proportional to the level of receptor stimulation. Often the degree of pain is 
not related to the degree of tissue damage (e.g., Beecher, 1959; Pavlov, 1927, 1928; see also 
Melzack, 1973) and this seriously undermines the specificity theory.
A.3. Pattern Theories of Pain.
The pattern theorists (e.g., Hebb, 1949; Livingston, 1943) proposed that sensory 
impulses enter a patterning mechanism before being relayed to the cortex. The patterning 
concept was introduced in order to account for individual differences in the relationship 
between injury and pain. It was suggested that, in pathological pain states where the level of 
pain exceeds the extent of any tissue damage, there is some abnormality in the patterning 
mechanism such that reverberatory activity within this structure summates (Livingston, 1943), 
or becomes synchronised (Hebb, 1949) with normally non-noxious impulses, to produce pain. 
Psychological factors, such as emotional disturbance, were thought to contribute to the pain 
syndrome by further activating abnormal neuronal activity within the patterning system, 
thought to exist in the spinal cord (Livingston, 1943) or in the thalamus (Hebb, 1949).
Pattem theories are challenged by the fact that spinal cord lesions often do not relieve 
pain (e.g., White and Sweet, 1969). Although it has been proposed that, despite surgery, there 
may be some "leak" in the pain transmission system (Noordenbos, 1959), it is difficult to 
appreciate how such small inputs could occasion severe pain (Melzack, 1973).
Pattem theories in general have been criticised for being vague about the processes 
involved in concepts such as summation and patterning (Uttal, 1973). The gate-control theory 
draws heavily from the pattern theories, but is much more specific about the processes 
involved in pain perception.
A.4. The Gate Control Theory of Pain.
The gate-control theory of pain (Melzack, 1973; Melzack and Wall, 1965,1982) was the 
first to recognise psychological processes as exerting an influence on afferent nerve impulses 
before they reach those areas of the brain subserving the experience of pain. The theory
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developed out of the incapacity of the existing specificity (von Frey, 1895) and pattern (e.g., 
Hebb, 1949; Livingston, 1943) theories to account for such phenomena as the absence of pain 
despite considerable tissue damage, pain in the absence of tissue damage, and the fact that 
surgical lesions of the spinal cord often do not relieve pain (see Beecher, 1959; Melzack, 
1973).
In order to account for the lack of concordance between injury and pain, Melzack and 
Wall (1965, 1982) conjectured that some neural mechanism must exist and function to 
modulate sensory input before it is experienced as pain. They considered the most likely site of 
this pain gate to be the substantia gelatinosa which runs the length of the spinal cord. 
According to the theory, injury activates the small-diameter (A-delta and C) fibres which enter 
the gating mechanism through the dorsal horns of the spinal cord and activate the second order 
neurons which pass those signals on to an action system. This action system was thought to 
consist of two subsystems;
1. The sensory-discriminative system, responsible for the localisation and sensory 
qualities of the pain.
2. The motivational-affective system, subserving the aversive, distressing aspects of 
pain experience.
The strength of the sensory impulses passing through the gate and activating the second 
order neurons is considered to be determined by the relative levels of activity in the large (A- 
beta) and small fibres such that, excitation of large fibres attenuates transmission (i.e., closes 
the gate), whilst small fibre activity facilitates transmission (i.e., opens the gate). Once the 
activity in the second order neurons exceeds a critical level, those impulses are interpreted by 
the brain as pain.
In addition to modulation of pain by the interaction of large and small fibres at the pain 
gate, Melzack and Wall (1965) postulated the existence of a central control system that could 
also act to open or close the pain gate and, thereby, modulate afferent input before it is 
processed by the brain. This process was thought to be mediated by projections from the 
reticular formation, limbic system and cerebral cortex to the substantia gelatinosa. Such 
modulation was invoked to account for the absence of pain despite injury.
In a later version of the theory (Melzack and Casey, 1968), it was proposed that central 
control processes also modulate pain by acting directly upon the sensory-discriminative and 
motivational-affective systems within the brain itself. This process was described as the 
cognitive-evaluative dimension of pain, involving the evaluation of the sensory and affective
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experiences in terms of past experience and the meaning of the situation. All three dimensions 
were thought to interact in determining the experience of pain.
In more recent times, the existence of a pain inhibitory mechanism (Melzack and Wall, 
1965) has been supported by the discovery of endogenous opioid substances in the brainstem 
and their analgesic effects (see Basbaum and Fields, 1978, 1984 for reviews). Although this 
research has led to some minor modifications to the gate control theory, the main tenets of the 
theory appear to have been well supported.
It has been suggested that psychological processes may exert an inhibitory effect on the 
pain gate, through the action of the endogenous opioids. For example, when naloxone (an 
opiate antagonist) or inactive substances are administered as placebos for clinical pain, only 
the inactive substance results in any improvement in pain; naloxone actually worsens the 
condition (e.g., Levine et al„ 1978).
It was by postulating the existence of a pain modulating mechanism, and by stressing 
the extent of cortical involvement in the operation of that mechanism, that Melzack and Wall 
(1965) established the field of pain as a legitimate area for psychological investigation.
A.5. The Assessment of Pain.
Methods of assessing pain fall into one of two categories: those associated with 
laboratory-induced pain (often referred to as experimental pain), and those associated with 
clinical pain syndromes. In the former case, the experimenter is able to evaluate the subject's 
level of pain report against the intensity of a noxious stimulus; in the latter instance, only 
reports of subjective pain experience are available to the observer. These contrasting 
approaches to the measurement of pain are considered in the following sections.
A.5.1. Laboratory Methods for Producing Pain.
Researchers have employed a variety of noxious stimuli to produce pain, including the 
cold pressor test (Lovallo, 1975; Spanos et al., 1979), electrical stimulation (Bromm and 
Treede, 1980; Tursky, 1976), radiant heat (Hardy et al., 1952; Mor and Cannon, 1975), 
tourniquet ischemia (Moore, Duncan, Scott, Gregg and Ghia, 1979; Smith and Beecher, 1969), 
the sphygmomanometer cuff (Poser, 1962) and the pressure algometer (Keele, 1954).
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Pain is induced through the sphygmomanometer cuff by placing a metal grater 
(Hollander, 1939), or sewing pointed projections (Poser, 1962), inside the cuff and inflating it 
around the subject's upper arm. However, this technique is not really very satisfactory as it 
leaves marks on the skin lasting for a number of days (Wolff, 1978). A similar method of pain 
induction is offered through tourniquet ischemia. In this method a tourniquet is tied around the 
subject's upper arm and the subject is required to engage in various exercises with his or her 
hand (Smith and Beecher, 1969). Although the technique has been claimed to be sensitive to 
the analgesic effects of morphine and aspirin (Smith and Beecher, 1969), other researchers 
have been unable to replicate these effects (Moore, Weissman, Thomas and Whitman, 1971). 
Furthermore, this method has been reported to demonstrate rather low reliability (Stembach, 
Deems, Timmermans and Huey, 1977), with the severity of pain depending very heavily upon 
how vigorously the subject performs the ischemic exercises (Moore et al., 1979).
The pressure algometer consists of a spring-loaded pressure gauge with a flat tipped 
plunger. The plunger is applied to the skin and pressure exerted until pain responses are 
obtained (Keele, 1954). However, this technique has been found to have lower reliability than 
other pain induction methods (Wolff, 1977), possibly because the rate of compression is 
uncontrolled (Procacci, Zoppi and Maresca, 1979).
The cold pressor test has been applied widely to the study of experimental pain (e.g., 
Friedman, Thompson and Rosen, 1985; McCaul and Haugtvedt, 1982). The procedure 
involves the subject in placing his /  her hand in water maintained at a temperature of 
approximately 0°C. The dependent variables are time to the point where the subject indicates 
the sensation to be painful (pain threshold) and time to the point where the subject wishes to 
withdraw from the stimulus (pain tolerance). The technique has been shown to have good 
validity, being sensitive both to placebos and analgesics (e.g., Wolff et al., 1966, 1976). 
However, its reliability is limited by the fact that, in general, only one or two trials can be 
conducted as a period of several minutes is required before normal temperature and circulation 
is restored (Wolff, 1978).
In the radiant heat method, a high intensity beam of light is focused on a blackened area 
of the subject's skin (Hardy et al., 1952; Mor and Cannon, 1979). Although the procedure 
affords the experimenter a high degree of control over the level of stimulation, there is some 
question over its validity with equivocal results being reported in human analgesic assays 
(Kutscher and Kutscher, 1957; Wolff et al., 1976).
Electrical stimulation has been applied to the forearm (Tursky and O'Connell, 1972), the 
fingers (Bromm and Treede, 1980) and to the tooth pulp (Chapman, Chen and Bonica, 1977). 
The stimulus lends itself to a high degree of experimental control and several measures of pain
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parameters can be obtained easily, making for excellent reliability (Tursky and O'Connell, 
1972). Although electrical stimulation produces a novel sensation, very different from the 
sensory aspects of clinical pain (Wolff, 1978), this method has been found to be sensitive to 
the effects of analgesics (Wolff et al., 1966, 1976).
Electrical stimulation and the cold pressor test are the most commonly employed pain 
induction methods in laboratory pain studies involving human subjects. Both methods have 
been validated against analgesics but the ease with which electrical stimulation can be repeated 
makes for a higher level of reliability (Wolff, 1978).
The various parameters of pain, derived from the application of noxious stimuli, are 
considered in the following sections.
A.5.2. Pain Threshold.
The pain threshold is the point where the subject first perceives pain, on trials of 
ascending stimulus intensity or, in the case of descending intensity, the point where pain 
ceases. This measure has been criticised for being far removed from the anxiety and suffering 
associated with clinical pain (Beecher, 1959). However, pain thresholds have been found to be 
responsive to analgesics (Wolff et al, 1976) and to psychological manipulations such as 
relaxation training (Elton and Stanley, 1976) or cognitive strategies (Horan, Hackett, 
Buchanan, Stone and Demchik-Stone, 1977). Threshold reliabilities, for a variety of pain 
induction methods, have been found to vary from 0.65 for the pressure algometer to above 
0.95 for electrical stimulation (Wolff, 1978).
A.5.3. Pain Tolerance.
Pain tolerance is the maximum stimulus intensity the subject is prepared to endure, or 
the length of time he /  she will tolerate the stimulus. For this reason, it can only be assessed 
through an ascending series of trials. This measure has been thought to be more strongly 
related to clinical pain than the pain threshold (Beecher, 1966; Wolff, 1984). Measures of pain 
tolerance have been found to be responsive to analgesics such as aspirin, codeine and 
morphine (Wolff et al., 1966, 1976). The reliability of pain tolerance measures has been 
reported to vary from 0.81 for the pressure algometer to above 0.90 for electrical stimulation 
and radiant heat (Wolff, 1978).
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A.5.4. Pain Sensitivity Ranpe.
The pain sensitivity range is simply the arithmetical difference between the tolerance 
and threshold measures, but has not been employed as widely as the parameters from which it 
is derived. The pain sensitivity range has been found to be responsive to codeine and aspirin 
for cold pressor pain, but not for electrical pain (Wolff et al., 1976). It is yet to be determined 
whether or not the pain sensitivity range contributes any information on the response to 
experimental pain, over and above that already contained in the threshold and tolerance 
measures.
A.5.5. Ratings of Pain Intensity.
A number of researchers have assessed experimental pain by requiring subjects to give 
verbal ratings of their pain level at various intervals on 5 or 10 point scales. This method has 
been most commonly applied in studies utilising the cold pressor test (e.g„ Farthing, Venturino 
and Brown, 1984; Girodo and Wood, 1979; Spanos, et al., 1979) possibly because, in this pain 
induction method, a sizeable proportion of subjects are able to tolerate the stimulus beyond the 
point where there is any further increase in pain (Davidson and McDougall, 1969).
A.5.6. Signal Detection Theory.
Signal detection theory started as a technique for identifying a weak signal against 
background noise (Green and Swets, 1966). It was first applied to the study of human pain by 
Clark (1969). The appeal of the technique, as far pain researchers are concerned, is that it 
promises to separate the subject's sensitivity to the stimulus from his / her criterion for 
reporting it as painful. Each of these variables is recognised to contribute to measures of pain 
threshold and tolerance (Gelfand, 1964; Wolff, 1984).
In signal detection theory experiments, the signal plus noise and noise distributions are 
assumed to be of equal variance. The signal is selected so that it is not easily distinguished 
from the noise, thus, leading to a considerable overlap of the two distributions. It is assumed 
that, in a state of uncertainty, the observer adopts some decision rule. For example, he / she 
may attempt to minimise the number of false positives. This decision rule can be expressed as 
the ratio of the likelihood of sensation having arisen from the signal plus noise distribution to 
the likelihood of its having arisen from the noise distribution. In its application to the 
assessment of experimental pain, this measure is thought to indicate the subject’s bias for 
reporting pain, whilst the distance between the means of the distributions is thought to indicate
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how reliably he / she can discriminate between different categories of pain intensity 
(Chapman, Gehrig and Wilson, 1975; Clark, 1969; Clark and Goodman, 1974). The former 
measure is referred to as the criterion and the latter as the subject's sensitivity or as d’.
With the development of the signal detection methodology, it was hypothesised that 
only the criterion measure would be sensitive to psychological manipulations, whilst the d 
measure would respond only to pharmacological manipulations (Clark, 1969). However, d' has 
been found to be responsive to such psychological factors as anxiety (Schumacher and Veldon, 
1984) and modelling (Craig and Cohen, 1975). The tranquillizer, diazepam, has been found 
increase pain tolerance, but to have no effect on the criterion or d’ measures (Chapman and 
Feather, 1973). This latter finding raises the question of whether the parameters derived from 
signal detection theory are any more useful or valid than those obtained from the much simpler 
tolerance measure.
The aim of signal detection theory is to separate sensory and judgemental components 
of pain response (Clark, 1969). Certainly, when attempts are being made to detect a weak 
stimulus against background noise, these components can be separated. However, the 
assumption that this methodology can be extended to studies of pain, where the stimulus is 
often well above threshold levels, has been questioned (Rollman, 1977; Wolff, 1978).
A.6. The Assessment of Clinical Pain.
The most common methods employed in the assessment of clinical pain are the verbal 
rating scale (Beecher, 1959), the visual analogue scale (Huskisson, 1974) and the McGill Pain 
Questionnaire (Melzack, 1975).
A.6.1. The Verbal Rating Scale.
The application of the verbal rating scale (VRS) to pain measurement was popularised 
by Beecher (1959) in his studies of the effects of various drugs on human pain. The scale 
typically consists of 5 to 7 categories carrying semantic labels reflecting increasing levels of 
pain experience. The subject indicates his / her current level of pain by selecting one of these 
categories.
A number of researchers have claimed this technique's sensitivity to analgesics as 
evidence for its validity (e.g., Lasagna, 1960; Loan, Morrison and Dundee, 1968). Subjects'
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category judgements have also been reported to correlate with observer ratings of pain 
behaviour (Kast and Collins, 1966).
The VRS is used widely in studies of both acute (Wolff, 1978) and chronic (Dolce, 
Crocker and Doleys, 1986; Philips, 1987b) pain, including headache (Budzynski et al., 1973; 
Holroyd et al., 1984).
The VRS has been criticised for forcing subjects to translate a continuous sensation into 
discrete categories, the intervals between each of which cannot be demonstrated to be 
equivalent (Ohnhaus and Adler, 1975). The visual analogue scale which does not require 
category judgements has, therefore, been claimed as a superior measure (Huskisson, 1974).
A.6.2. The Visual Analogue Scale.
The visual analogue scale (VAS) consists of a straight line, the extremities of which are 
defined as the upper and lower limits of pain. For example, "no pain" and "pain as bad as it 
could be" (Scott and Huskisson, 1976, p. 176). Comparisons of the VRS and VAS have found 
scores on both scales to be highly correlated (e.g., Ohnhaus and Adler, 1975; Scott and 
Huskisson, 1976). However, there is some suggestion that scores on the latter may be more 
sensitive to reductions in the intensity of chronic pain following the administration of 
analgesics (Scott and Huskisson, 1976).
A.6.3. The McGill Pain Questionnaire.
Although the VAS and the VRS provide convenient measures of pain intensity, they 
each have the disadvantage of collapsing the multidimensional experience of pain into a 
unidimensional measure (Carlsson, 1983). Given the wide variation in the quality of pain that 
people experience, Melzack (1973, 1975) has argued’that the unidimensional approach is 
seriously deficient:
"To describe pain solely in terms of intensity is like specifying the visual world 
only in terms of light flux without regard to pattern, colour, texture and the many 
other dimensions of visual experience." (Melzack, 1975, p. 278).
In order to assess the multidimensional experience of pain, Melzack (1975) developed 
the McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ). This consists of 78 verbal pain descriptors, organised 
into 20 categories designed to assess the discriminative, motivational-affective and evaluative 
qualities of pain. On the basis of the severity ratings assigned to each word by physicians,
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patients and students, the words within each category were ordered in terms of intensity and 
assigned numerical values (Melzack, 1975). These numerical values provide measures of each 
of the three dimensions of pain postulated in the gate control theory (Melzack and Wall, 1965, 
1982).
Factor analytic studies of the MPQ have consistently confirmed the existence of the 
discriminative (or sensory) and motivational-affective (or affective) dimensions (e.g., Crocket, 
Pricachin and Craig, 1977; Reading, 1979). Although these researchers were unable to 
substantiate the evaluative dimension, this component of the questionnaire has been identified 
in subsequent studies (Prieto et al., 1980; McCreary, Turner and Dawson, 1981).
The construct validity of the sensory and affective dimensions has been supported by 
studies showing that the sensory descriptors distinguish between pain syndromes (Dubuisson 
and Melzack, 1976; Leavitt and Garron, 1979), and by studies showing that the affective, but 
not the sensory descriptors, correlate with measures of emotional distress (McCreary et al., 
1981; Parker, Doerfler, Tatten and Hewett, 1983).
The MPQ has been employed as an outcome measure in psychological treatments for 
chronic pain, and each of the three dimensions has been found to be sensitive to improvements 
in pain (e.g., Philips, 1987b; Rybstein-Blinchik, 1979). However, the extent to which each of 
the dimensions is reactive to particular interventions awaits further research.
A.7. Relationships Between Cognitive Processes and Pain.
Research on the role of cognitive processes in human pain may be divided into clinical 
and experimental studies.
In experimental pain studies the laboratory setting affords the experimenter control over 
the painful stimulus and makes for the manipulation of cognitive activity through the nature of 
the instructions offered to subjects (e.g., Farthing, Venvrino and Brown, 1984; Subotnik and 
Shapiro, 1984). However, the extent to which laboratory findings can be generalised to clinical 
pain has been questioned (e.g., Beecher, 1959). Experimental pain is usually of brief duration 
and does not generate the affective states of depression, demoralization or anxiety which often 
accompany chronic pain problems (Stembach, 1974).
In clinical studies, ethical concerns make it difficult to assign subjects to no-treatment 
control groups and a number of strategies are often employed to try and help the suffering
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patient, making it difficult to be specific about what exactly is being manipulated in the 
treatment (Weisenberg, 1984).
A.7.1. Cognitive Processes and Experimental Pain.
In studies involving experimental pain, cognitive activity has been manipulated by 
instructions (e.g., Friedman, Thompson and Rosen, 1985), suggestion (e.g., Feather, Chapman 
and Fisher, 1972), varying the level of perceived control over the stimulus (e.g., Glass et al., 
1973) or teaching subjects cognitive coping strategies (e.g., McCaul and Haugtvedt, 1982). 
These studies have not typically assessed cognitive activity, but have assumed that the 
manipulations carried out have effected the desired cognitive change. Exceptions include 
studies by Spanos and his colleagues (Spanos, et al., 1979, 1981) v/ho interviewed subjects 
about their ongoing cognitive activity during cold pressor pain, and studies suggesting that 
self-efficacy judgements for pain tolerance may be predictive of pain tolerance times (e.g., 
Dolce, Doleys et al., 1986; Litt, 1988; Vallis and Bucher, 1986).
The effects of the various cognitive manipulations on experimental pain are considered 
in the following sections.
A.7.1.1. Instructions.
Reports of pain have shown to be responsive to the instructions administered by the 
experimenter. For example, Wolff and his colleagues (Wolff and Horland, 1967; Wolff, 
Krasnegor and Farr, 1965) observed that, asking subjects to imagine that they would receive 
$1000 if they delayed terminating electrical stimulation for as long as possible, led to increases 
in pain tolerance relative to a control group. Similarly, asking subjects to be certain that the 
stimulus is painful, rather than strongly discomforting, has been found to result in an elevation 
of the pain threshold (Blitz and Dinnerstein, 1968). Indeed, it has been reported that the mere 
appearance of the word "pain", in a set of experimental instructions, can lower the pain 
threshold, pain tolerance and ratings of pain severity (Hall and Stride, 1954; Friedman et al., 
1985).
A.7.1.2. Suggestion.
The administration of placebo medication with the suggestion that this will reduce pain, 
has been found to elevate the pain threshold (Clark, 1969; Feather et al., 1972). Suggestions
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for pain relief have been found to potentiate the effects of analgesic substances (e.g., Dworkin, 
Chen, Schubert and Clark, 1984) and suggestions for analgesia, made under hypnosis, have 
been observed to increase pain tolerances (Hilgard, 1975; McGlashen, Evans and Ome, 1969), 
pain thresholds (Hardy et al., 1952), and to reduce ratings of pain intensity (Girodo and Wood, 
1979).
A.7.1.3. Perceived Control.
It has been reported that, when subjects believe that they have control over a noxious 
stimulus, this tends to increase pain tolerance levels (e.g., Bowers, 1968; Geer and Maisel, 
1972; Staub, Tursky and Schwartz, 1971). However, many researchers have not found these 
manipulations to be effective in reducing ratings of pain intensity (e.g., Geer, Davison and 
Gatchel, 1970; Glass et al., 1973; Mills and Krantz, 1979). Weisenberg, Wolf, Mittwoch, 
Mikulincer and Aviram (1985) found that when subjects judged themselves as capable of 
regulating their own experience of pain, allowing them control over the noxious stimulus led to 
higher ratings of pain intensity than when control was in the hands of the experimenter. 
Conversely, when subjects judged themselves incapable of controlling their experience of 
pain, allowing them control over the stimulus was effective in lowering pain intensity ratings. 
These results highlight the need to consider individual differences in self-efficacy to manage 
pain when considering the effects of perceived control on pain perception.
A.7.1.4. Cognitive Strategies.
Although such diverse cognitive strategies as hypnotic analgesia (Miller and Bowers, 
1986), attention-focusing (Blitz and Dinnerstein, 1971), imagery (Westcott and Horan, 1977), 
distraction (McCaul and Haugtvedt, 1982), and self-statements (Girodo and Wood, 1979) have 
been reported to be effective in reducing experimental pain, reviews of the effectiveness of 
these techniques suggest that they may be no more effective than placebo or no-treatment 
control conditions (see Turk, 1978; Tan, 1982).
Spanos et al (1979) studied the effects of hypnosis and suggestion on cold pressor pain 
ratings and then interviewed subjects regarding their use of cognitive strategies. Hypnosis did 
not add to the effects of suggestion on pain report or strategy use. Strategy use was effective in 
lowering pain ratings only for those subjects whose cognitive activity did not focus on and 
exaggerate the aversiveness of the situation. In a subsequent study (Spanos et al., 1981), 
suggestions for analgesia was associated with reductions in cold pressor pain ratings, only for 
those subjects who were initially exaggerates but whose cognitive activity during the post-test
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shifted such that, instead of focusing on aversive elements, they made positive self-statements 
or imagined events inconsistent with pain. Thus, individual differences in the tendency to 
catastrophise may be an important determinant of strategy effectiveness.
The existing literature on the role of cognitive appraisal processes in the perception of 
experimental pain suggests that although certain factors (such as suggestion, perceived control 
over pain and reliance upon cognitive strategies) may reduce pain for some subjects, more 
research is required into the role of individual differences in the determination of these effects.
A.7.2. Cognitive Processes and Clinical Pain.
The research on the role of cognitive appraisal processes in headache was discussed in 
Chapter 4. Accordingly, the following sections are confined to a consideration of pain 
syndromes other than headache.
A role for cognitive appraisal processes in clinical pain is suggested by the strength of 
the placebo effect in this area (Beecher, 1959, 1960; Evans, 1974a, b). For example, Beecher 
(1960) reviewed ten studies involving 831 patients complaining of headache, angina, cancer or 
post-operative pain and found that about 35% of patients reported pain relief following placebo 
medication.
Studies of cognitive factors in clinical pain may be subdivided into observational 
studies, where relationships between cognitive variables and pain are examined without 
intervention on the part of the experimenter (these studies have dealt almost exclusively with 
chronic pain) and treatment trials involving the manipulation of cognitive factors in a variety 
of chronic and acute pain syndromes.
A.7.2.1. Observational Studies on Chronic Pain.
Chronic pain has been described as pain which persists for six months or more (e.g., 
Hall, 1982; Webb, 1983). Most often, it is not accompanied by any detectable tissue damage 
(Stembach, 1968, 1974). Very few observational studies on cognitive appraisal and chronic 
pain have been carried out, thus, only the most tentative conclusions can be drawn.
It has been suggested that persons complaining of pain in the absence of any 
demonstrable organic pathology may be focusing their attention upon normal bodily sensations 
and, thus, amplifying their intensity (Barsky and Klerman, 1983). Employing the Body
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Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller, Murphy and Buss, 1981), Ahles, Pecora and Riley 
(1987) observed that, within a sample of chronic pain patients, scores on private body 
consciousness were correlated positively with the level of pain report. Employing the Self- 
Consciousness Scale (Fertigstem, Scheir and Buss, 1975), Pennebaker and Skelton (1978) 
reported college students' scores on this scale to be correlated with summary scores on a 
measure of 12 physical symptoms including headache, chest pain and sore muscles. Similar 
results were reported by Ahles, Cassens and Stalling (1987). However, these correlational data 
make it impossible to draw any inferences regarding causality. It would be premature to regard 
the data as supportive of Barsky and Klerman's (1983) position, as it would seem equally 
likely that the presence of physical symptoms could lead persons to become more preoccupied 
with bodily sensations and, hence, to score higher on measures such as private self- 
consciousness.
Jensen, Karoly and Huger, (1987) developed the Survey of Pain Attitudes. This 
instrument assesses attitudes towards physicians and medical treatment, as well as levels of 
perceived social support, disability and the degree of control patients believe they have over 
their pain. These researchers obtained some evidence to suggest that attitudes may be 
predictive of pain coping behaviour amongst chronic pain patients. For example, the Pain 
Control Subscale was found to correlate positively with the use of active coping strategies, 
such as relaxation and exercise, amongst a group of hospitalized chronic pain patients. 
Relationships between attitudes to pain and pain experience were not explored.
The Coping Strategy Questionnaire (CSQ; Rosenstiel and Keefe, 1983) was developed 
to assess one behavioural strategy (increasing activity level) and six cognitive strategies 
(attention diversion, reinterpreting pain sensations, coping self-statements, praying or hoping 
and catastrophising) amongst chronic back pain patients.
Turner and Clancy (1986) administered the CSQ, together with the Sickness Impact 
Profile (Bergner, Bobbitt, Carter and Gilson, 1981), a measure of physical and psychosocial 
disability, and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961), to chronic low back pain 
subjects. Subjects kept records of their pain for one week. Scores on the CSQ were found to 
account for significant proportions of the variance in depression and disability, but were 
unrelated to pain intensity ratings.
Keefe et al (1987) factor analysed the CSQ and identified two factors which they termed 
Coping Attempts, and Pain Control and Rational Thinking. Osteoarthritis patients scoring high 
on the latter factor were found to report lower pain levels, better health status and lower levels 
of psychological distress.
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In a study involving arthritis patients, Shoor and Holman (1984) found that ratings of 
self-efficacy to control pain were correlated negatively with ratings of pain and disability 
obtained four weeks later.
The evidence obtained from observational studies does not make for any confident 
conclusion regarding the relationship between chronic pain and cognitive appraisal. There are 
suggestions that perceived control over pain (Keefe et al., 1987) and self-efficacy with respect 
to pain management (Shoor and Holman, 1984) might be associated with lower levels of pain, 
while a tendency to focus attention on bodily sensations might accompany increased pain 
ratings (e.g., Ahles, Cassens and Stalling, 1987; Pennebaker and Skelton, 1978). Much more 
research is required to substantiate these very tentative conclusions, and to address the issue of 
whether there exists any causal relation between the variables.
A.7.2.2. Cognitive Processes In The Treatment of Clinical Pain.
Attempts to relieve clinical pain through therapeutic procedures seeking to occasion 
some alteration in cognitive processes have dealt primarily with chronic, surgical and 
childbirth pain. The effects of these procedures on pain and cognitive processes are considered 
below.
Chronic Pain
Very few well controlled treatment studies involving cognitive interventions for chronic 
pain have been reported in the literature, making it difficult to offer any judgement on the 
efficacy of these cognitive techniques. Although a number of uncontrolled studies examining 
the effects on chronic pain of multi-faceted interventions, including some cognitive 
components, have been conducted (e.g., Gottlieb et al, 1977; Khatami and Rush, 1978; Sachs, 
Feurstein and Vitale, 1977; Stenn, Mothersill and Brooke, 1979), the absence of control and 
placebo-control groups, and the plethora of procedures employed in any one treatment 
approach, make it impossible to attribute the observed improvements in pain to any specific 
cognitive manipulation.
Turner and Clancy (1986) treated chronic pain patients with multi-faceted cognitive- 
behavioural therapy, or operant behavioural therapy or assigned them to a waiting list control 
condition. Changes in cognitive activity were assessed with the CSQ. Within the cognitive- 
behavioural group, there were significant increases in the use of coping self-statements and 
attention diversion strategies. Both experimental groups evidenced significant reductions in
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catastrophising. A between-groups analysis of covariance demonstrated a greater increase in 
attention diversion for the cognitive-behavioural group than for the control group. The two 
experimental groups did not differ in their use of cognitive strategies over the course of 
treatment. Unfortunately, no between-groups analysis of pain intensity ratings was conducted. 
When the two treatment groups were combined, an increased use of praying and hoping 
strategies was positively correlated with reductions in pain intensity. A lesser reliance on 
catastrophising strategies was also associated with lower pain ratings and with decreased 
disability ratings.
Rybstein-Blinchik (1979) studied the effects on chronic pain of specific cognitive 
strategies, taught in groups, by assigning a mixed sample of chronic pain patients to one of the 
following conditions:
1. Control: Subjects shared their personal experiences of pain with other members of 
the group.
2. Somatisation: Subjects were instructed to relabel their pain as "a certain feeling", 
and to explore the sensations associated with that feeling.
3. Irrelevant Thoughts: Subjects were trained to replace any thoughts about pain with 
thoughts concerning other "important events" in their lives.
4. Relevant Thoughts: Subjects learned to reinterpret their experience of pain by 
relabelling the sensation as ticklish or numb.
At the post-treatment assessment, subjects in the Relevant Thoughts condition reported 
fewer pain behaviours and lower scores on the Sensory, Affective and Evaluative Scales of the 
MPQ than subjects in the remaining conditions. Subjects in the Relevant Thoughts condition 
also rated their pain as less intense than those in the Somatisation or Control groups, and 
ratings of pain intensity were lower in the Irrelevant Thoughts than in the Control condition. 
Although no follow-up assessment of patients was carried out, the findings do suggest that the 
cognitive relabelling of chronic pain, which is often employed in cognitive-behavioural 
treatments (e.g., Turk and Meichenbaum, 1984), may be of benefit, at least in the short term.
The effectiveness of distraction strategies, as employed in Rybstein-Blinchik's (1979) 
Irrelevant Thoughts condition, has been questioned by studies suggesting that these strategies 
may be associated with poorer treatment outcomes (Keefe and Delon, 1986; Turner and 
Clancy, 1986).
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Behavioural programmes for chronic pain, where subjects are required to increase their 
exercise levels gradually over the course of treatment, have been associated with increases in 
self-efficacy (Dolce, Crocker, and Doleys, 1986). These researchers offered chronic pain 
patients behavioural treatment and assessed their self-efficacy levels for exercise, work, and 
for coping with pain without medication at post-treatment. Follow-up data was collected six to 
twelve months after treatment. Post-treatment self-efficacy ratings were found to correlate 
significantly with follow-up measures of work status, exercise levels and medication 
consumption. Similar results have been obtained by other researchers (Kores et al., 1985), 
suggesting that self-efficacy expectations may be predictive of outcome from behavioural 
treatments for chronic pain.
Philips (1987b) examined relationships between perceived control over pain and 
outcome over the course of a cognitive-behavioural treatment for a mixed group of chronic 
pain patients. The subjects were assigned either to cognitive-behavioural treatment or to a 
waiting list control group. Although subjects receiving treatment demonstrated significant 
improvements on the MPQ and on diary recordings of pain intensity at post-treatment, eight 
week and one year follow-up assessments, no statistical analysis of differences between groups 
was reported. Perceived control over pain increased over the course of treatment, but this 
variable was not assessed in the control group.
Philips (1987b) studied relationships between concurrent measures of perceived control 
over pain and pain intensity. This raises the question of the extent to which her measure of 
perceived control over pain and ratings of pain severity were independent. If subjects undergo 
successful psychological treatment for pain, emphasising self-control techniques, it seems very 
likely that they might attribute reductions in pain to increases in control gained through 
treatment. Indeed, an interpretation of Philips' (1987b) results in terms of such confounding is 
suggested by the fact that her measures of perceived control and pain severity were 
unconrelated at the pre-treatment assessment, but correlated 0.81 at the one year follow-up 
assessment.
Assessing cognitive constructs, such as perceived control or self-efficacy at post­
treatment, and relating these measures to follow-up measures of pain (Dolce, Crocker and 
Doleys, 1986; Kores et al., 1985) provides a far more stringent test of hypotheses specifying 
relationships between these two sets of variables.
In conclusion, it would appear that self-efficacy to control pain may be predictive of 
outcome from behavioural treatments (Dolce, Crocker and Doleys, 1986; Kores et al., 1985). 
More well controlled studies, such as that of Rybstein-Blinchik (1979), are required before the 
effectiveness of particular cognitive interventions will be demonstrated.
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Surgical Pain.
Research on the effects of cognitive factors on surgical pain has typically involved 
giving subjects preparatory information and / or teaching them cognitive coping skills (e.g., 
Johnson, Rice, Fuller and Endress, 1978; Wells, Howard, Nowlin and Vargas, 1986). Many of 
the studies conducted have not assessed subjective pain experience (e.g., Johnson, Morrisey 
and Leventhal, 1973; Johnson, Kirchoff and Endress, 1975). Those studies which have 
considered this dimension have not reported consistent effects for the procedures (e.g., Tan, 
Melzack and Poser, 1980; Wells et al., 1986).
Johnson and his colleagues (Johnson et al., 1973, 1975) compared information on likely 
sensations with procedural information given to subjects prior to undergoing painful medical 
procedures. Subjects receiving sensory information were rated as less distressed by observers, 
demonstrated lower heart rates and were less restless during the procedure than subjects 
receiving procedural information. Subjective ratings of pain were not obtained. When 
subjective pain has been studied procedural and sensory information have been found no more 
effective in reducing surgical or post-operative pain than placebo or no treatment control 
conditions (e.g., Johnson et al., 1978; Kendall et al., 1979).'
Kendall et al (1979) compared cognitive-behavioural coping skills training with 
preparatory information for patients undergoing cardiac catheterisation. Attention-placebo and 
usual hospital routine control groups were also employed. Subjects in the two treatment groups 
reported lower levels of anxiety and were considered to have made a better adjustment to the 
procedure on the basis of "blind" observer ratings, than those in either of the control groups. 
However, no differences between groups emerged on patients’ subjective pain ratings.
Stress Inoculation Training for pain control, which involves information and training in 
relaxation and a range of cognitive coping skills (Meichenbaum, 1975; Meichenbaum and 
Turk, 1976), has been applied to the management of surgical pain (e.g., Tan and Poser, 1982; 
Wells et al, 1986). Wells et al (1986) studied patients undergoing a variety of surgical 
procedures. Those receiving stress inoculation training reported lower levels of pain and 
anxiety after surgery than control subjects who simply went through the usual hospital routine. 
However, other studies have found Stress Inoculation Training to be no more effective in 
reducing ratings of surgical pain than control or placebo conditions (e.g., Tan, Melzack and 
Poser, 1980; Tan and Poser, 1982).
In general, studies of patients undergoing painful medical procedures have as yet 
provided no consistent evidence to indicate that specific cognitive manipulations have a 
reliable effect upon pain experience.
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Childbirth Pain.
Preparatory childbirth training programmes have typically involved information, 
training in deep breathing, relaxation and / or attention focusing (e.g., Doering and Entwisle, 
1975; Huttel, Mitchell, Fischer and Meyer, 1972; Scott and Rose, 1976). These authors have 
reported on the efficacy of such procedures, relative to control conditions, on outcome 
measures such as maternal satisfaction with the delivery. Other studies have reported that 
preparatory techniques reduce the amount of medication consumed during labour and delivery 
relative to controls (e.g., Chertok, 1969; Enkin, Smith, Dernier and Emmett, 1972). Manning 
and Wright (1983) found that self-efficacy to manage childbirth, following training, was 
predictive of medication consumption during labour and of medication latency during delivery. 
However, none of these studies assessed maternal pain experience. Thus the relationship 
between cognitive processes and childbirth pain has yet to be thoroughly explored (see Tan, 
1982 for a review).
In concluding the literature on intervention studies in chronic and acute clinical pain 
(excluding the literature on the treatment of headache dealt with in Chapter 4), it is apparent 
that there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that training in cognitive strategies is 
any more effective in modifying pain than placebo conditions. Unfortunately, this conclusion 
is not based on the existence of well controlled studies; rather, it follows from the absence of 
adequate controls in studies of chronic pain and from the failure of many researches to include 
subjective pain ratings as outcome measures in studies of acute pain.
Within the context of cognitive and behavioural treatments for clinical pain, there is 
some evidence suggesting that self-efficacy to manage pain may be predictive of outcome 
from behavioural treatment programmes (Dolce, Crocker and Doleys, 1986; Kores et al., 
1985). However, the role of self-efficacy has yet to be examined in studies investigating 
whether or not treatments, aimed at increasing self-efficacy, are any more effective in relieving 
clinical pain than placebo conditions with no specific focus on this construct.
A.8. General Comments.
Some evidence in support of the premise that cognitive factors contribute to pain 
perception comes from studies of experimental pain. Suggestions for pain relief have been 
found to reduce pain report (e.g., Dworkin et al., 1984; Feather et al., 1972) and self-efficacy 
judgements regarding pain management skills may be predictive of pain tolerance levels (e.g., 
Dolce, Doleys et al., 1986; Litt, 1988; Vallis and Bucher, 1986). A pre-occupation with the
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aversive elements of experimental pain (catastrophising) may be associated with a reduced 
capacity to tolerate pain (Spanos et al., 1979, 1981).
The literature on clinical pain is characterised by a shortage of adequately controlled 
studies. Often, researchers have not assessed subjective pain experience and have relied 
instead upon less direct measures such as medication consumption (e.g., Johnson et al., 1973, 
1975; Manning and Wright, 1983). No conclusion can be offered about the relative efficacy of 
particular cognitive strategies. Most of the evidence for the role of cognitive factors in clinical 
pain derives from studies of the placebo effect (e.g., Beecher, 1959, 1960; Evans, 1974a, b), 
which have not attempted to identify the particular cognitive processes involved. Some recent 
work suggests that increases in self-efficacy to manage pain may be associated with better 
treatment outcomes for chronic pain sufferers (e.g., Dolce, Crocker and Doleys, 1986; Kores et 
al., 1985).
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APPENDIX B
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RATIONALITY SCALE
Instructions:
This is an inventory of the way you think about various things. There are a number of 
statements with which you will tend to agree or disagree. You will be given an answer sheet 
and asked to circle one of five possible answers to each item. For each statement, you should 
mark your answer sheet as follows, according to your own reaction to the item:
Circle D if you STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Circle d if you MODERATELY DISAGREE 
Circle n if you NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
Circle a if you MODERATELY AGREE 
Circle A if you STRONGLY AGREE
It is not necessary to think over any item very long. Mark your answer quickly and go on to 
the next statement.
Try to avoid the neutral or "n" response as much as possible. Select this answer only if you 
really cannot decide whether you tend to agree or disagree with a statement.
Before you start, be sure to print your name, sex, and age at the top of the answer sheet where 
indicated. In the space for "grade", place the number of the highest school grade completed. 
If you have had college or university, one year would be 13, four years would be 16, etc.
Irrational Beliefs Test Items (Tones. 19681:
1. It is important to me that others approve of me. (I).
2. I hate to fail at anything. (E).
3. People who do wrong deserve what they get. (I).
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4. I usually accept what happens philosophically. (R) .
ajc
5. If a person wants to, he can be happy under almost any circumstances. (R) .
6. I have a fear of some things that often bothers me. (E).
7. I usually put off important decisions. (I).
8. Everyone needs someone he can depend on for help and advice. (I).
9. "A zebra cannot change his stripes". (I).
10. There is a right way to do everything. (I).
11. I like the respect of others, but I don't have to have it. (R)*.
12. I avoid things I cannot do well. (I).
13. Too many evil persons escape the punishment they deserve. (I).
14. Frustrations don't upset me. (E).
15. People are disturbed not by situations but by the view they take of them. (R).
16. I feel little anxiety over unexpected dangers or future events. (E).
17. I try to go ahead and get irksome tasks behind me when they come up. (R).
18. I try to consult an authority on important decisions. (I).
19. It is almost impossible to overcome the influences of the past. (I).
20. There is no perfect solution to anything. (R).
21. I want everyone to like me. (I).
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22. I don't mind competing in activities where others are better 
than I. (R)*.
23. Those who do wrong deserve to be blamed. (I).
24. Things should be different from the way they are. (I).
25. I cause my own moods. (R).
26. I often can't get my mind off some concern. (E).
27. I avoid facing my problems. (I).
28. People need a source of strength outside themselves. (I).
29. Just because something once strongly affects your life doesn't mean it need do so in 
the future. (R).
30. There is seldom an easy way out of life’s difficulties. (R).
31. I can like myself even when many others don’t. (R)*.
3|C
32. I like to succeed at something but I don't feel I have to. (R) .
33. Immorality should be strongly punished. (I).
34. I often get disturbed over situations I don't like. (E).
35. People who are miserable have usually made themselves that way. (R).
36. If I can't keep something from happening, I don't worry about it. (E).
37. I usually make decisions as promptly as I can. (R).
38. There are certain people that I depend on greatly. (I).
39. People over-value the influence of the past. (I).
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40. Some problems will always be with us. (R).
41. If others dislike me, that’s their problem, not mine. (R).
42. It is highly important to me to be successful in everything I do. (I).
43. I seldom blame people for their wrongdoings. (R).
*
44. I usually accept things the way the are, even if I don't like them. (R) .
45. A person won't stay angry or blue long unless he keeps himself that way. (R).
46. I can't stand to take chances. (E).
47. Life is too short to spend it doing unpleasant tasks. (I).
48. I like to stand on my own two feet. (R).
49. If I had had different experiences I could be more like I want to be. (I).
50. Every problem has a correct solution. (I).
51. I find it hard to go against what others think. (I).
%
52. I enjoy activities for their own sake, no matter how good I am at them. (R) .
53. The fear of punishment helps people be good. (I).
54. If things annoy me, I just ignore them. (E).
55. The more problems a person has, the less happy he will be. (I).
56. I am seldom anxious over the future. (E).
57. I seldom put things off. (R).
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58. I am the only one who can really understand and face my problems. (R).
59. I seldom think of past experiences as affecting me now. (R).
60. We live in a world of chance and probability. (R).
61. Although I like approval, it's not a real need for me. (R) .
62. It bothers me when others are better than I am at something. (E).
9|C
63. Everyone is basically good. (R) .
64. I do what I can to get what I want and then don’t worry about it. (E).
65. Nothing is upsetting in itself - only in the way you interpret it. (E).
66. I worry a lot about certain things in the future. (E).
67. It is difficult for me to do unpleasant chores. (I).
68. I dislike for others to make my decisions for me. (R).
69. We are slaves to our personal histories. (I).
70. There is seldom an ideal solution to anything. (R).
71. I often worry about how much people approve of and accept me. (E).
72. It upsets me to make mistakes. (E).
73. It’s unfair that "the rain falls on both the just and the unjust". (I).
*
74. I am fairly easy going about life. (R) .
75. More people should face up to the unpleasantness of life. (I).
76. Sometimes I can’t get a fear off my mind. (E).
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77. A life of ease is seldom very rewarding. (R).
78. I find it easy to seek advice. (I).
79. Once something strongly affects your life, it always will. (I).
80. It is better to look for a practical solution than a perfect one. (R).
81. I have considerable concern with what people are feeling about me. (E).
82. I often become quite annoyed over little things. (E).
83. I usually give someone who has wronged me a second chance. (R).
84. I dislike responsibility. (I).
85. There is never any reason to remain sorrowful for very long. (E).
86. I hardly ever think of such things as death or atomic war. (I).
87. People are happiest when they have challenges and problems to overcome. (R).
88. I dislike having to depend on others. (R).
89. People never change basically. (I).
90. I feel I must handle things in the right way. (I).
91. It is annoying but not upsetting to be criticised. (E).
92. I’m not afraid to do things which I cannot do well. (E).
a|c
93. No one is evil, even though his deeds may be. (R) .
94. I seldom become upset over the mistakes of others. (E).
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95. Man makes his own hell within himself. (R).
96. I often find myself planning what I would do in different dangerous situations. (I).
97. If something is necessary, I do it even if it is unpleasant. (R).
98. I've learned not to expect someone else to be very concerned about my welfare. (I).
99. I don't look upon the past with any regrets. (E).
100. There is no such thing as an ideal set of circumstances. (R).
Indicates one of the 12 items on the Rationality Scale.
(E) Indicates items involving the self-disclosure of emotional states.
(I) Indicates remaining items scored in the direction of irrationality.
(R) Indicates remaining items scored in the direction of rationality.
Note: The above codes were not included in the questionnaire presented to subjects.
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IRRATIONAL BELIEFS TEST 
ANSWER SHEET
NAME: ______________________________________  AGE:
SEX: ______________________________  GRADE: _
DATE: ____________
Question
Strongly
Disagree
(D)
Moderately
Disagree
(d)
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
(n)
Moderately
Agree
(a)
Strongly
Agree
(A)
1 D d n a A
2 D d n a A
3 D d n a A
4 D d n a A
5 D d n a A
6 D d n a A
7 D d n a A
8 D d n a A
9 D d n a A
10 D d n a A
11 D d n a A
12 D d n a A
13 D d n a A
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Strongly Moderately Neither Agree Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Nor Disagree Agree Agree
Question (D) (d) (n) (a) (A)
26
27
30 D a A
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Strongly M oderately N either Agree M oderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree N or Disagree Agree Agree
Question (D) (d) (n) (a) (A)
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
45
46
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Strongly M oderately N either Agree M oderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree N or Disagree Agree Agree
Q uestion (D) (d) (n) (a) (A)
48 D d n a A
48 D d n a A
49 D d n a A
50 D d n a A
51 D d n a A
52 D d n a A
53 D d n a A
54 D d n a A
55 D d n a A
56 D d n a A
57 D d n a A
58 D d n a A
59 D d n a A
60 D d n a A
61 D d n a A
62 D d n a A
63 D d n a A
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Strongly M oderately N either Agree M oderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree N or Disagree Agree Agree
Question (D) (d) (n ) (a) (A)
64 D d n a A
65 D d n a A
66 D d n a A
67 D d n a A
68 D d n a A
68 D d n a A
69 D d n a A
70 D d n a A
71 D d n a A
72 D d n a A
73 D d n a A
74 D d n a A
75 D d n a A
76 D d n a A
77 D d n a A
78 D d n a A
79 D d n a A
295
Question
Strongly
Disagree
(D)
M oderately
Disagree
(d)
N either Agree 
N or D isagree 
(n)
M oderately
Agree
(a)
Strongly
Agree
(A)
80 D d n a A
81 D d n a A
82 D d n a A
83 D d n a A
84 D d n a A
85 D d n a A
86 D d n a A
87 D d n a A
88 D d n a A
89 D d n a A
90 D d n a A
91 D d n a A
92 D d n a A
93 D d n a A
94 D d n a A
95 D d n a A
96 D d n a A
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Strongly Moderately Neither Agree Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Nor Disagree Agree Agree
Question (D) (d) (n) (a) (A)
97 D d n a A
98 D d n a A
99 D d n a A
100 D d n a A
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Internal Consistency of The Rationality Scale.
The internal consistency of the Rationality Scale was assessed by means of the item-total 
correlation analysis presented below (N = 36). The item numbers are those assigned to the 
items on the Irrational Beliefs Test.
Item
Number Mean S.D.
Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation
4 2.61 1.32 0.50
5 2.58 1.27 0.28
11 2.39 1.20 0.53
22 2.31 1.19 0.38
31 2.56 1.16 0.43
32 2.86 1.33 0.60
44 2.86 1.20 0.49
52 2.56 1.30 0.61
61 2.94 1.19 0.49
63 2.75 1.11 0.29
74 3.17 1.25 0.48
93 2.97 1.13 0.53
The above analysis yielded a reliability coefficient alpha of 0.81.
APPENDIX C
HEADACHE RECORDING DIARY (CHAPTER 6) 
Each diary consisted of 7 sheets of which the following is an example:
HEADACHE RECORDING SHEET
Name: Date:
Headache as 
bad as it 
could be
am 6_____________________________________________________
7 ____________________________________________________
8 ________________________________________________________
9_____________________________________________________
10_____________________________________________________
11_____________________________________________________
12_____________________________________________________
pm 1_____________________________________________________
2_____________________________________________________
3 ____________________________________________________
4 ____________________________________________________
5 ___________________________________________________
6 ___________________________________________________
7 ____________________________________________________
8 _________________________________________________________
9_____________________________________________________
10_____________________________________________________
11_____________________________________________________
12_____________________________________________________
am 1_____________________________________________________
2_____________________________________________________
3 ____________________________________________________
4 ____________________________________________________
5 ___________________________________________________
No
Headache
Medication (type and amount) 
Situation..................................
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Each Headache Recording Diary was prefaced by the following instructions sheet:
HEADACHE RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS
Name: Date:
Record the intensity of your headaches for each hour of the day on the forms provided. 
A mark on the line towards the left represents a headache of lesser intensity and a 
mark towards the right represents a headache of greater intensity.
If you experience a completely headache-free day, write HEADACHE FREE on the 
form for that day.
If you have any problems, please phone Nicholas Francis-Jones at the Australian 
National University on 49-4003.
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APPENDIX D
TREATMENT CREDIBILITY RATING SCALES
On the rating scales below, please indicate the following:
1) The likelihood of your recommending the treatment to a friend suffering from headaches.
I definitely would 
not recommend the 
treatment
I definitely would 
recommend the 
treatment
2) How important do you think it is that the treatment be made available to other headache 
sufferers?
Unimportant
Very
Important
301
APPENDIX E
COMPARISON OF PRE-TREATMENT VARIABLE VALUES 
FOR RATIONAL-EMOTIVE (n = 14) AND RELAXATION (n = 15) GROUPS
Variable
Rational-Emotive
Mean
Relaxation
Mean
t-value 
(df=27)
Age 39.14 42.20 0.79
(10.11) (10.71)
Years of 14.14 14.13 0.01
Education (3.74) (3.16)
Headache 5.21 4.50 1.17
Frequency (1.57) (1.72)
Headache 7.59 7.57 0.02
Duration (4.06) (3.18)
Headache 20.20 17.76 0.52
Intensity (12.37) (12.65)
Medication4- 1.91 1.64 0.55
(1.41) (1.22)
Rationality 32.71 31.00 0.54
(8.37) (8.56)
Beck 1.88 1.88 0.00
Depression4- (0.96) (0.77)
Trait 43.58 41.33 0.57
Anxiety (10.40) (9.85)
Note: The standard deviations are given in brackets.
Indicates degrees of freedom = 25 (two values 
were missing for the rational-emotive group).
+ Indicates that these variables were observed to be 
skewed and thus subjected to the transformation 
In (variable + 1) prior to the analysis.
None of the obtained t-values reached the 0.05 level of significance (2-tailed test).
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APPENDIX F
SUMMARY TABLES FOR RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE 
BETWEEN RATIONAL-EMOTIVE THERAPY AND RELAXATION 
TRAINING GROUPS ON POST-TREATMENT AND FOLLOW-UP 
HEADACHE ACTIVITY MEASURES WITH PRE-TREATMENT 
VALUES AS COVARIATES
Analysis of Post-Treatment Scores CN = 29)
Headache Frequency:
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Co variate 1 53.63 16.92 0.000
Group 1 0.66 0.21 0.652
Error 26 3.17
Headache Intensity:
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Covariate 1 2100.76 28.12 0.000
Group 1 324.20 4,34 0.047
Error 26 74.71
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Headache Duration:
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Covariate 1 197.51 20.51 0.000
Group 1 18.66 1.94 0.176
Error 26 9.63
Medication Intake:
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Covariate 1 0.22 1.33 0.72
Group 1 0.13 0.08 0.78
Error 26 1.67
Analvsis of Follow-Uo Scores (N =  2 3 )
Headache Frequency:
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Covariate 1 21.54 8.96 0.007
Group 1 0.49 0.20 0.656
Error 20 2.40
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Headache Intensity:
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Covariate 1 2157.73 26.22 0.000
Group 1 82.19 1.00 0.330
Error 20 82.30
Headache Duration:
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Co variate 1 132.03 14.77 0.001
Group 1 22.10 2.47 0.131
Error 20 8.94
Medication Intake:
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Covariate 1 1.94 1.48 0.238
Group 1 0.22 0.17 0.684
Error 20 1.31
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APPENDIX G
SUMMARY TABLES FOR RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF COVARIANCE BETWEEN 
RATIONAL-EMOTIVE THERAPY AND RELAXATION TRAINING GROUPS ON 
POST-TREATMENT RATIONALITY, BECK DEPRESSION AND TRAIT ANXIETY 
SCORES WITH PRE-TREATMENT SCORES AS COVARIATES
Rationality Scale (N = 29)
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Covariate 1 354.60 21.16 0.000
Group 1 0.30 0.02 0.895
Error 26 16.76
Beck Depression Scale (N = 29)
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Covariate 1 9.61 18.43 0.000
Group 1 1.33 2.54 0.123
Error 26 0.52
Trait Anxiety Scale (N = 27)
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Co variate 1 506.08 12.62 0.002
Group 1 24.21 0.60 0.445
Error 24 40.11
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APPENDIX H
SELF-CONTROL-EFFICACY SCALE
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree that each of the following items are 
descriptive of yourself by circling the appropriate letter:
A = Strongly Agree, 
a = Somewhat Agree, 
d = Somewhat Disagree.
D = Strongly Disagree.
1. If I sense that I'm about to act too 
rashly or impulsively, I am usually 
able to stop myself.
2. Quite often I cannot overcome 
unpleasant thoughts that bother me.
3. Once I know what has to be done, I am 
usually confident about my ability to 
carry it through.
4. I cannot avoid thinking about mistakes 
I have made in the past.
5. When I get angry about something, I can 
usually get over those feelings quickly 
once the situation has passed.
6. Although it makes me feel bad, I cannot 
avoid thinking about all kinds of 
possible catastrophes in the future.
7. I often fmd it difficult to overcome my 
feelings of nervousness and tension 
without outside help.
A a d D
A a d D
A a d D
A a d D
A a d D
A a d D
A a d D
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8. W h e n  I fe e l d e p re sse d , I c a n  u su a lly  do  
so m e th in g  to  m a k e  m y s e lf  fe e l b e tte r . A  a  d  D
9. I n e e d  o u ts id e  h e lp  to  g e t rid  o f  so m e 
o f  m y  b a d  h a b its . A  a d  D
N o te : I te m s  1. 2 . 4 . 6 . 7  and  9 a re  re v e rse  sco re  item s .
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Internal Consistency of the Self-Control-Efficacy Scale:
The internal consistency of the scale was assessed by means of the item-total correlation 
analysis presented below (N = 120).
Item
Number Mean S.D.
Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation
1 3.09 0.88 0.15
2 2.27 1.06 0.58
3 3.48 0.78 0.31
4 2.37 1.04 0.44
5 2.78 1.06 0.41
6 2.88 1.06 0.48
7 2.99 1.07 0.54
8 3.16 0.93 0.56
9 2.93 1.08 0.46
The above analysis yielded a reliability coefficient alpha of 0.76.
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APPENDIX I
SELF-MONITORING DIARY
The Self-Monitoring Diary consisted of the instructions sheet given below plus seven sheets 
with each of the two subsequent pages of this Appendix (see over) printed on each side.
Date:.......
Name:.............................
Please record the intensity of your headaches for each hour of 
the day on the form. Indicate the level of headache pain for 
each hour by placing a cross (x) under the number which best 
describes the intensity of your headache at that time.
The scale is as follows:
0 = No Headache.
1 = Barely Noticeable Headache.
2 = Mild Headache.
3 = Moderate Headache.
4 = Severe Headache.
5 = Extremely Intense Headache.
If you experience a completely headache free day, write - 
HEADACHE FREE on the form for that day.
It is important that headaches be recorded AS THEY OCCUR, 
rather from memory. Thus, please try to keep the diary with 
you at all times.
At the end of each day, please complete the EVENT RECORDING 
section of the form, if an irritating or upsetting event did 
occur during the day, please be sure to answer ALL of the 
items on BOTH SIDES of the form. If more than one such event 
occurred, choose the one event that was most upsetting.
If you have any problems, please phone Nicholas Francis-Jones 
at Prince Henry Hospital on 694-5611 or leave a message 
on 694-5680. Thankyou.
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Marne: Date:
HEADACHE RECORDING
IntensityTime
Today's medication
EVENT RECORDING
(1) Was there anything today that you found
at all irritating or upsetting? This can be an 
event that actually occurred today, or one that 
you recalled from the past or some future event 
that you thought about.
Please circle your answer: YES NO
If NO, please stop at this point, If YES, please 
be sure to complete ALL of the following items:
(2) Briefly describe the event..................
(3) Roughly, at what time did this event start?
....... am/pm (time to nearest hour and cross out
that which does not apply).
(4) Please indicate how much this event MATTERED 
to you AT THE TIME by circling the appropriate 
number:
NOT MUCH......................  1
SOMEWHAT......................  2
QUITE A 3IT...................  3
A LOT.......................... 4
(5) Please indicate how much you thought you 
could CHANGE this event AT THE TIME it occurred:
NOT AT ALL ...................  0
A LITTLE ...................... 1
SOMEWHAT.....................  2
A LOT ......................... 3
IMPORTANT : THERE IS MORE ON THE OTHER SIDE!
PLEASE TURN OVER THE PAGE AND BE 
SURE TO ANSWER ALL OF THE ITEMS
Type
Quantity
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EVENT COPING SCALE:
(6) Listed below are some ways in which people react to events. Please 
read each item and indicate, by circling YES or NO, whether or not you 
reacted this way to the event you described. Please answer every item:
1 Doubled mv efforts and tried harder to make things work out._____ YES NO
2 Postponed dealing with the problem.______________________________ YES NO
Avoided discussion of the issue. YES NO
4 Wished that I could change what had happened. YES NO
Tried to relax myself. YES NO
g Avoided things that reminded me of the problem. YES NO
j Wished the situation would go away or somehow be over with.______ YES
g Fantas ized about how things might turn out.______________________ YES
NO
NO
Talked to someone who could do something about the problem. YES NO
Tried to find out more about the situation. YES NO
H  Went over in my mind what I would sav or do. YES
12 Changed something to trv and make things work out. YES NO
1 3  Reassured myself that things would work out all right. YES
Tried to view the situation as a challenge. YES NO
Wished I was a stronger person - more optimistic and forceful. YES
lg Reminded mvself how much worse things could be. YES
NO
1 7  Tried to think of a number of wavs to sort out the problem,
18 Concentrated on something good that could
come out of the whole thing._______________________________
YES
YES
NO
NO
ig Even though the problem had not been sorted out, 
I tried to forget about the whole thing.________ YES
(7) On the scale below, please indicate how upset you felt during the 
event you described. Do this by placing a small vertical line across the 
scale at the point that represents how upset you felt during the event:
Not at all 
upset
As upset as I 
have ever been
(8) Did you have a headache today? YES NO (circle answer)
If YES, did the EVENT you described start:
BEFORE the DURING the AFTER the
headache headache headache had gone
(Please CIRCLE your answer)
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Internal Consistency of Event Coping Subscales:
The internal consistency of the Event Coping Subscales was assessed by means of the item- 
total correlation analyses presented below (N = 935):
Direct Coping Scale
Item
Number Mean S.D.
Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation
1 0.47 0.50 0.38
9 0.38 0.49 0.43
10 0.42 0.49 0.52
11 0.54 0.50 0.38
12 0.37 0.48 0.49
17 0.61 0.49 0.51
The above analysis yielded a KR-20 reliability coefficient of 0.72.
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Avoidance Coping Scale
Item
Number Mean S.D.
Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation
2 0.21 0.40 0.37
3 0.24 0.43 0.34
4 0.68 0.47 0.30
6 0.27 0.44 0.41
7 0.78 0.42 0.35
8 0.37 0.48 0.23
15 0.34 0.47 0.33
19 0.38 0.49 0.36
The above analysis yielded a KR-20 reliability coefficient of 0.64.
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Affective Regulation Scale
Item
Number Mean S.D.
Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation
5 0.70 0.46 0.28
13 0.66 0.47 0.43
14 0.31 0.46 0.36
16 0.40 0.49 0.34
18 0.41 0.49 0.43
The above analysis yielded a KR-20 reliability coefficient of 0.61.
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Event Coping Scale:
Rotated Factor Matrix After Principal Components Analysis 
With Varimax Rotation Extracting 3 factors (N = 935)
Item
Number
Factor 1 
(Direct)
Factor 2 
(Avoidance)
Factor 3 
(Affect. Reg.)
1 0.41873* -0.19783 0.42288*
2 -0.04931 0.63124* -0.06973
3 -0.18808 0.57242* -0.02927
4 0.21527 0.47964* -0.07211
5 -0.04500 0.24202 0.46401*
6 -0.05498 0.60434* 0.18202
7 0.16993 0.52509* 0.02282
8 0.41402* 0.33071 0.11045
9 0.69125* 0.05135 -0.09391
10 0.72798* -0.05828 0.03039
11 0.55935* 0.27092 0.15543
12 0.58618* -0.16943 0.21475
13 0.08891 0.08056 0.67343*
14 0.20940 -0.09931 0.61526*
15 0.12911 0.44117* 0.20841
16 -0.00785 0.22433 0.52466*
17 0.63985* 0.13248 0.21094
18 0.21265 -0.01878 0.63361*
19 -0.15601 0.53271* 0.27114
Variance 17.9% 12.9% 7.8%
Indicates a factor loading of 0.3 or greater which was accepted as 
significant (Comrey, 1973; Gorsuch, 1983).
Inter-correlations of Event Coping Scales (N = 114)
Direct Avoidance Affect. Res.
Direct 1.00 0.34 0.43
Avoidance 1.00 0.48
Affect. Reg. 1.00
All correlations were significant on a 2-tailed test (p < 0.001).
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APPENDIX T
RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE BETWEEN TENSION, TENSION- 
VASCULAR AND MIGRAINE SUBJECTS ON VARIABLES 
STUDIED IN CHAPTER 7
MEAN GROUP VALUES
Tension-
Variable Tension Vascular Migraine N F-value
Self-Control 26.91 25.18 26.97 120 1.48
-Efficacy (3.84) (5.60) (5.28)
Social 9.82 10.17 11.09 120 0.81
Desirability (4.89) (3.95 (3.61)
Headache 4.22 3.92 3.67 115 0.63
Frequency (1.98) (1.78) (1.71)
Headache 2.12 2.00 2.19 115 1.46
Intensity (0.59) (0.46) (0.58)
Events 9.43 7.72 9.06 114 1.17
(5.92) (4.60) (5.91)
Mattered 2.87 2.85 3.06 114 1.75
Ratings (0.39) (0.55) (0.54)
Change 0.72 0.77 0.96 114 1.41
Ratings (0.42) (0.65) (0.56)
Avoidance 2.90 3.09 3.31 114 0.49
Coping (1.40) (1.58) (1.43)
Direct 2.59 2.55 2.82 114 0.48
Coping (1.33) (1.28) (1.27)
Affective 2.12 2.43 2.64 114 1.39
Regulation (1.21) (0.96) (1.28)
Upset 38.24 42.48 44.83 114 1.17
Ratings (14.41) (15.82) (15.13)
The standard deviations are entered in brackets. None of the obtained F-values reached the 
0.05 level of significance.
313
APPENDIX K
SUMMARY TABLES FOR RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF Pr Nj 
AND Nr P2 SOMATOSENSORY AVERAGE EVOKED POTENTIAL AMPLITUDES
K-l
Matched Pairs of Headache (n = 36) and Control (n = 36) Subjects on Pj-N^ Amplitude Over
Four Levels of Stimulus Intensity.
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subiects:
Group 1 147.72 7.82 0.008
Pairs 35 24.44 1.29 0.224
Error 35 18.88
Within Subiects:
Linear Trend:
Intensity 1 249.42 96.74 0.000
Group x Int. 1 22.16 8.59 0.006
Error 35 2.58
Quad. Trend:
Intensity 1 9.81 4.25 0.047
Group x Int. 1 7.36 3.19 0.083
Error 35 2.31
Cubic Trend:
Intensity 1 2.23 0.90 0.361
Group x Int. 1 1.93 0.78 0.384
Error 35 2.48
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K-2
Headache Subjects in Headache and Headache-Free States (Status) on P^-Nj Amplitude Over
Four Levels of Stimulus Intensity (N = 16)
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subiects:
Status 1 1.19 0.18 0.676
Pairs 15 55.58 8.48 0.000
Error 15 6.55
Within Subiects:
Linear Trend: -
Intensity 1 352.72 244.54 0.000
Status x Int. 1 0.06 0.04 0.846
Error 15 1.44
Quad. Trend:
Intensity 1 6.34 3.84 0.069
Group x Intensity 1 0.33 0.20 0.662
Error 15 1.65
Cubic Trend:
Intensity 1 5.34 3.77 0.071
Group x Intensity 1 0.12 0.08 0.779
Error 15 1.42
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K-3
Pain Sensitive and Pain Insensitive Headache Subjects on Pj-N j Amplitude Over Four Levels
of Stimulus Intensity (N = 23)
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subjects: 
PS 1 1.36 0.04 0.835
Error 21 30.81
Within Subiects:
Linear Trend:
Intensity 1 169.52 24.32 0.000
PS x Int 1 1.03 0.15 0.704
Error 21 6.97
Quad. Trend: 
Intensity 1 2.59 1.00 0.330
PS x Int 1 1.20 0.46 0.504
Error 21 2.60
Cubic Trend:
Intensity 1 0.61 0.42 0.523
PS x Int 1 0.31 0.21 0.650
Error 21 1.45
PS = Pain Sensitivity
Pain Sensitive and Pain Insensitive Control Subjects on PpNj  Amplitude Over Four Levels of
Stimulus Intensity (N = 28)
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subjects:
PS 1 0.06 0.01 0.923
Error 26 6.34
Within Subiects:
Linear Trend:
Intensity 1 50.47 14.35 0.001
PS x Int. 1 0.58 0.16 0.688
Error 26 3.52
Quad. Trend:
Intensity 1 0.09 0.06 0.814
PS x Int. 1 5.06 3.35 0.079
Error 26 1.51
Cubic Trend:
Intensity 1 1.48 0.72 0.403
PS x Int. 1 0.21 0.10 0.751
Error 26 2.05
PS = Pain Sensitivity
322
K-4
Tension Headache (n = 15), Migraine (n = 13) and Control (n = 36) 
Subjects on Pj-Nj Amplitude Over Four Levels of Stimulus Intensity
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subiects: 
Group 2 115.79 5.71 0.005
Error 61 20.29
Within Subiects:
Linear Trend:
Intensity 2 243.18 64.13 0.000
Group x Int. 2 13.32 3.51 0.036
Error 61 3.79
Quad. Trend: 
Intensity 2 16.51 7.03 0.010
Group x Int. 2 12.46 5.30 0.008
Error 61 2.35
Cubic Trend:
Intensity 2 0.23 0.12 0.727
Group x Int. 2 0.29 0.15 0.860
Error 61 1.90
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Pairwise Comparisons Between Groups on Linear and 
Quadratic Trend for Pj-N j Amplitudes
Migraine (n = 13) and Tension (n = 15) Headache Subjects
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Within Subiects: 
Linear Trend: 
Intensity 1 184.63 38.50 0.000
Group x Int. 1 0.83 0.17 0.680
Error 26 4.80
Quad. Trend:
Intensity 1 18.57 6.82 0.015
Group x Int. 1 16.94 6.22 0.019
Error 26 2.72
Tension Headache (n = 15) and Control (n = 36) Subjects
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Within Subiects: 
Linear Trend: 
Intensity 1 174.00 50.53 0.000
Group x Int. 1 21.98 6.38 0.015
Error 49 3.44
Quad. Trend:
Intensity 1 0.08 0.033 0.857
Group x Int. 1 0.002 0.001 0.979
Error 49 2.38
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Migraine (n = 13) and Control (n = 36) Subjects
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Within Subiects: 
Linear Trend: 
Intensity 1 131.32 36.49 0.000
Group x Int. 1 11.45 3.18 0.081
Error 47 3.60
Quad. Trend:
Intensity 1 25.86 12.29 0.001
Group x Int. 1 22.86 10.86 0.002
Error 47 2.11
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K-5
Tension Headache (n = 15), Migraine (n = 13) and Control (n = 36) 
Subjects on Amplitude Over Four Levels of Stimulus Intensity
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subiects:
Group 1 144.52 3.17 0.049
Error 61 45.61
Within Subiects:
•
Linear Trend:
Intensity 1 625.90 48.21 0.000
Group x Int. 1 10.01 0.77 0.467
Error 61 12.98
Quad. Trend:
Intensity 1 3.31 0.86 0.358
Group x Int. 1 9.11 2.36 0.103
Error 61 3.85
Cubic Trend:
Intensity 1 0.18 0.09 0.767
Group x Int. 1 0.56 0.28 0.761
Error 61 2.02
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K-6
Matched Pairs of Headache (n = 36) and Control (n = 36) 
Subjects on Nj-P2 Amplitude Over Four Levels of Stimulus Intensity
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subiects: 
Group 1 178.83 4.24 0.047
Pairs 35 47.20 1.12 0.370
Error 35 42.16
Within Subiects:
Linear Trend:
Intensity 1 817.79 65.81 0.000
Group x Int. 1 31.55 2.54 0.120
Error 35 12.42
Quad. Trend: 
Intensity 1 23.04 5.76 0.022
Group x Int. 1 9.88 2.47 0.125
Error 35 4.00
Cubic Trend:
Intensity 1 0.02 0.01 0.919
Group x Int. 1 2.63 1.83 0.185
Error 35 1.44
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K-7
Headache Subjects in Headache and Headache-Free States (Status) 
on Nj-P2 Amplitude Over Four Levels of Stimulus Intensity (N = 16)
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subiects:
Status 1 10.94 0.57 0.460
Pairs 15 91.67 4.81 0.002
Error 15 19.06
Within Subiects:
Linear Trend:
Intensity 1 698.77 164.00 0.000
Status x Int. 1 6.22 1.46 0.246
Error 15 4.26
Quad. Trend:
Intensity 1 6.33 2.33 0.148
Group x Int. 1 1.31 0.48 0.498
Error 15 2.72
Cubic Trend:
Intensity 1 0.01 0.003 0.956
Group x Int. 1 4.71 3.02 0.102
Error 15 1.56
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K-8
Pain Sensitive and Pain Insensitive Headache 
Subjects on N jTS Amplitude Over Four Levels 
of Stimulus Intensity (N = 23)
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subiects: 
PS 1 22.85 0.30 0.590
Error 21 76.34
Within Subiects: 
Linear Trend: 
Intensity 1 328.28 17.91 0.000
PS x Int. 1 0.72 0.04 0.845
Error 21 18.32
Quad. Trend: 
Intensity 1 0.18 0.04 0.844
PS x Int. 1 0.03 0.01 0.933
Error 21 4.62
Cubic Trend:
Intensity 1 2.43 1.38 0.253
PS x Int. 1 1.58 0.90 0.354
Error 21 1.76
PS = Pain Sensitivity
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Pain Sensitive and Pain Insensitive Control 
Subjects on N j -P2 Amplitude Over Four Levels 
of Stimulus Intensity (N = 28)
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subiects: 
PS 1 99.14 3.62 0.068
Error 26 27.37
Within Subiects: 
Linear Trend: 
Intensity 1 221.80 20.29 0.000
PS x Int. 1 47.75 4.37 0.047
Error 26 10.93
Quad. Trend: 
Intensity 1 25.63 16.30 0.000
PS x Int. 1 0.27 0.17 0.685
Error 26 1.57
Cubic Trend:
Intensity 1 0.09 0.04 0.843
PS x Int. 1 0.04 0.02 0.896
Error 26 2.14
PS = Pain Sensitivity
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APPENDIX L
SUMMARY TABLES FOR RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TENSION (n = 15), MIGRAINE (n = 13) AND 
CONTROL (n = 36) SUBJECTS (GROUP) ON PAIN MEASURES
Electrical Pain Threshold
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-valuc
Between Subjects: 
Group 2 188.12 4.11 0.021
Error 61 45.75
Electrical Pain Tolerance
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-value
Between Subjects: 
Group 2 1123.83 6.51 0.003
Error 61 172.73
Temporal Ice Pain Threshold
SOURCE DF MS F-value p-valuc
Between Subjects: 
Group 2 1457.94 1.43 0.247
Error 61 1018.85
